why not take the power for oneself? To paraphrase the aphorism as it once ran, "If the bishops cannot teach, the king cannot rule."

From this argument, this elaboration of the primacy of legitimacy and sovereignty, Clark then proceeds to demonstrate that *popular* radicalism as it actually appeared from the 1760s on could not have done so until men were made to believe that serious flaws existed in the rule of the sovereign and his relationship with Church and Parliament. The perceptions of "flaws" which motivated men in the colonies, Clark shows, had much more to do with religious individualism than with purely legal or materialist individualism. In fact, he demonstrates that to the contemporary mind the latter two forms of individualism made no sense except in light of the former. Radicals in the eighteenth-century Anglophone world, and in America in particular, pointed first to real and imagined infringements of religious conscience, the threat of "popery", and the supposed presumption of the Anglican episcopacy. In America, the Dissenting Protestant sects had kept active this particular list of fears since the time of the Civil War. The fears were in fact constitutive of the sects. Thus the Radical appeal motivated masses of men to rebellion by appealing to liberties based in popular heresy.

This is Clark's basic argument, and it is one no serious student will easily dismiss. Despite accusations to the contrary, Clark makes no attempt to exclude the impact of other factors on eighteenth-century Anglophone political theory and practice. He is entirely open to the study of property rights, scientific-secular thought, sociological dynamics of class, and other issues important to American political life. Clark claims, and his research of the last ten years more than substantiates the assertion, that the serious student of Anglophone political development in the eighteenth century cannot understand his subject without understanding Christian political theory in its Trinitarian Anglican variant.

Anyone who doubts that Jonathan Clark has been misunderstood might benefit from a close survey of the critical literature surrounding his work. It is rare to find any reference to Trinitarian theology (and even rarer to find thoughtful ones) among Clark's critics, despite the fact that the man they hope to refute has placed the concept at the heart of his work. Next, look for an essay on English Dissent and radicalism by A. M. C. Waterman, in Haakonssen, ed., *Enlightenment and Religion*, forthcoming from Cambridge. Professor Waterman can assist us all ably in at least getting the categories of argument right. Perhaps some of the heat of the criticism against Clark would dissipate if the ignorance of his categories of analysis were less.

Kenneth E. Hendrickson, III
Sam Houston State University

Robert H. MacDonald — *Sons of the Empire: The Frontier and the Boy Scout Movement, 1890–1918*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. Pp. viii, 258.

In response to and emerging from that nexus of Edwardian anxieties — impover-

ished slums, urban decay, moral declension, race suicide, national inefficiency, imperial decline, and the crisis of masculinity — the Boy Scouts movement, founded by Robert Baden-Powell in 1908, at once renounced the enervating effects of a feminized civilization and promised the physical and psychic rejuvenation of boys and, ultimately, of the Empire itself. An enormously popular phenomenon of international proportions, Scouting has been well studied by historians. John Springhall (*Youth, Empire and Society: British Youth Movements, 1883–1942*, Helm, 1977) argues that the Boy Scouts shared intimate links with British imperialism and militarism; in *The Character Factory: Baden-Powell and the Origins of the Boy Scout Movement* (Pantheon, 1986), Michael Rosenthal maintains that the Boy Scouts constituted an important site of social indoctrination, a place to prepare British youth for the next war; finally, Tim Jeal's 670-page biography, *Baden-Powell* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), provides a detailed examination of the movement's founder, complete with references to a troubled sex life and a repressed homosexuality. For his part, Robert MacDonald (an English professor "interested in the ways social myths worked") seeks to fill a gap in the historiography: namely, the critical importance of the frontier myth in general, and of the frontiersman in particular, to "the most successful youth organization ever", the Boy Scouts (pp. vii, 114). The result both captivates and frustrates.

Part I, "Scouting for Men", studies the invention, evolution, and meaning of the frontiersman in turn-of-the-century British popular culture, from the Canadian North-West Mounted Police to the South African Constabulary. It was the American frontier, however, according to MacDonald, that provided the most potent type: "In his various personae the American frontiersman had become a powerful symbol of energy, innocence, independence, and strength, of a code of honour, and of an assertive nostalgia for a simpler way of doing things" (p. 44). Inspired by the cult of Buffalo Bill, Baden-Powell imagined himself cut from the same (flannel) cloth. Indeed, in chapter 3 MacDonald is at his best. Concerned "not so much with the facts of history as with the making of myth, and with the response of the media and the public to Mafeking", MacDonald reveals Baden-Powell's uncanny ability to invent himself, to play the part of military hero before an adoring media and a longing public (p. 90). This chapter has much to offer scholars interested in the invention of national heroes.

Part II, "Scouting For Boys", explores the ways in which Baden-Powell successfully grafted the frontier ideal onto the Scouting movement. Like James Barrie's Peter Pan, Baden-Powell never did grow up. Intuitively, he understood that boys crave adventure; his genius, therefore, was to combine the excitement of the frontier with the necessary lessons of good citizenship and military discipline. The Boy Scouts, in the end, reconciled the tension between the rugged individualism of the frontier and the imperatives of duty and deference to authority. But Scouting, as MacDonald argues, was about much more. Concerned that British boys had become soft and feminine, Baden-Powell sought to remove boys from the female "world of home and childhood" and to instil in them an idealized masculinity. "Manliness", wrote Baden-Powell in *Scouting for Boys*, "can only be taught by men, and not those who are half men, half old women" (pp. 17, 123–124).

Yet, for all its insights into the frontier myth and the Boy Scouts movement, *Sons of the Empire* is at times frustrating to read. MacDonald never defines the frontier: to argue his thesis he freely draws on evidence from the imperial frontier (in all its diversity) and the American frontier (with its multiplicity of meanings and multitude of contradictions). The reader is thus advised to "Be Prepared" for an often confusing journey through several frontier myths. MacDonald himself appears confused when he ignores his own insistence on the importance of the American frontier and oddly concludes "that the myth of the *imperial frontier* [emphasis added] provided both the context and the material for the construction of Scouting" (p. 204).

In part a study of masculinist ideology, *Sons of the Empire* contributes to the expanding literature on the history of masculinities. Beyond citing Michael Kimmel's "crisis of masculinity" and the introduction to Elaine Showalter's *Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the fin de siècle* (Viking, 1990), however, MacDonald fails to provide an account of how he intends to use gender as a category of analysis. Given all that has been written on the history and theory of gender in the past two decades, this remains a glaring omission. Moreover, Kimmel points out that at least three masculinities emerged in response to America's turn-of-the-century New Woman who resisted existing definitions of femininity and challenged established structures of power. The pro-feminist man (albeit a minority) embraced the possibility of a future free from a dangerous, compulsive masculinity. The anti-feminist man sought refuge in an aggressive misogyny and ideas about the natural inferiority and subordination of women. The pro-male man, meanwhile, placed a renewed emphasis on traditional masculinity, one that rejected sentimentality for virility and the martial spirit. Was Baden-Powell's notion of masculinity one of these? Or was it a different masculinity altogether?

These shortcomings notwithstanding, *Sons of the Empire* will be of interest to historians interested in the study of myths, masculinities, and youth movements.

Donald A. Wright
University of Ottawa

Eviatar Zerubavel — *Terra Cognita*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv, 164.

Peggy Brock — *Outback Ghettos: A History of Aboriginal Institutionalisation and Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. v, 180.

The 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's first voyage to the Americas sparked a heated debate about his place in history. Eviatar Zerubavel's *Terra Cognita* is one of the countless books to address this controversy. Unlike most other scholars, however, Zerubavel is not interested in using the commemoration as an opportunity to reassess the impact of European expansion on aboriginal peoples. Rather, he took the occasion to rethink what is meant by the concept of "discovery". Zerubavel's purpose is to challenge the popular notion that Columbus was