The book hints at some of these contrasts, but more because Pennethorne's contemporaries were conscious of them than because the author considers them analytically challenging questions. Nevertheless, there insistently emerges from this study a realization of the way the national state, urban government, the patronage system, a recurrent anxiety to control public spending, and, it must be conceded, party conflict in a system of representative government all combined to frustrate planning for London. Pennethorne's own position lacked precision of purpose, and his appointment under the patronage system and his dependence on the favours of politicians meant that he was never secure in spite of his high income. More importantly, the contrasts between London and Paris help explain the lack of a vision for London's development, the lack of boldness of imagination in both planning and architecture which has lasted to the present day, and a reluctance, also enduring, to envisage for state buildings architectural statements which went beyond the appropriate and the conservative and sought instead to excite. Those who have criticized the Venturi extension of 1991 to the National Gallery — for its timidity on the one hand or for its failure to match a much-loved monument on the other — would do well to read the depressing tale of the original building in chapter 6: the constraints of the site; the struggle of the architect, William Wilkins, to overcome them; and above all the criticisms heaped on his building for its internal inadequacies and its external incoherence and muddle. The much-loved face was not always so.

This is an attractive book, beautifully produced and illustrated. The text is informative and well organized, though the author is more concerned to tell the story than to reflect on why London's architectural and planning development in this period was so stuttering and limited, for it is the story which dominates. The story is of a hard-working public servant committed to improvements in urban design and amenities, to sound buildings within a flexible classical tradition that did not preclude an occasional excursion into the Gothic when required, and to the reorganization of the capital's centre in a fashion that was in advance of what was expected of him — but not extravagantly so. Pennethorne was an appropriate official architect for mid-Victorian London.

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B. D. Graham — *Choice and Democratic Order: The French Socialist Party, 1937–1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xvi, 430.

Choice and Democratic Order is an excellent, extremely detailed guide through the convoluted internal politics of the French Socialist Party (the SFIO) during a crucial period in the party's history, from 1937 to 1950. During this time the party had two active dissident groups within its ranks, the *Gauche Révolutionnaire* and the *Bataille Socialiste*, each of which disagreed with the party leadership on issues of ideology and strategy. By the mid-1930s the Socialists had joined the Popular Front, a move

which, to some, was a serious compromise of the party's basic principles. To the leadership, although joining the Popular Front alliance meant that the party would move from opposition to participation in the government, the compromise was worth it. From within, it would be possible both to battle fascism and to bring about and then protect economic and social reforms desired by the working class. Others, especially the *Gauche Révolutionnaire* and the *Bataille Socialiste*, were not persuaded.

The tensions came to a head twice at party congresses in 1938 and 1946. In 1938 the party leadership, under Léon Blum and Paul Faure, was able to stave off the challenge to its control. In 1946, under Daniel Mayer, with Léon Blum playing a rather secondary role and distancing himself from the fray, it was not. B. D. Graham asserts that the outcomes of the crises were different because of differences in leadership, in the party's political structure, which encouraged the practice of different types of politics, and in modes of activity. Graham uses two models of conflict, sectarianism and factionalism, to help explain why the party leadership was able to deal with the challenge facing it much more successfully in 1938 than in 1946.

Two issues dominated the debates: whether the party should pursue its objectives through a revolutionary or reformist strategy; and, linked to that debate, whether the party should participate in the government of a bourgeois state, to use its terminology, or should remain in permanent opposition to avoid compromising its principles. Graham walks the reader through a meticulous account of the many twists and turns of these political and ideological debates leading to and shaping the two crises, while regularly pulling back from the detail to reorient the reader.

The book serves several useful purposes. First, it is a salutary reminder that political parties are not monolithic, but can be deeply riven internally. Second, he demonstrates effectively how those rifts shaped and constrained the party's actions and responses in the external political arena. In interwar France, where governments were inevitably coalitions of various parties, the SFIO's continuous debate about whether to participate in a government or not, informed by concern from some quarters that the party was abandoning its revolutionary roots, was a decidedly destabilizing force. Third, it is an effective illustration of the debates which plagued the European socialist movement in general during these years, revolving around its role in politics and government and whether it should pursue a revolutionary or reformist strategy.

The book is weakest in its application of the models of conflict. They figure primarily in the introduction and conclusion of the work, receiving only brief passing references throughout the text. This has the advantage of not obscuring the narrative behind confusing jargon, but it undermines the persuasive power of the models. Graham's purpose in using the models is to facilitate a comparison of the two crises and to explain the nature of the politics being practised and the differences in the nature of the opposition between 1938 and 1946. In 1938 internal party politics took the form of *luttes de tendances* or *jeus de tendances*, conflicts of ideas between dissident groups within the party and the party leadership. The *tendances* which mobilized were homogeneous groups (or sects, to use the model) from within

the party bound together by a common set of beliefs about the party's purpose, principles, and basic strategy to be pursued. The *luttes* or battles followed a well-established protocol, a set of normative rules intended to define the limits of acceptable behaviour by *tendances* or dissident groups. Exceeding those limits quickly resulted in strict disciplinary action by the leadership. Thus, disagreement was permitted, but also well contained within the structure of internal party politics. In 1938 the protest came from the *tendances*, and the leadership knew how to deal with this form of opposition. In 1946 the protest movement was much more heterogeneous, factional in nature, drawing together a diverse group which rallied behind an individual, in this case Guy Mollet, whose promise and strategy was to overthrow the established party leadership and seize power for himself and his faction. From that position of power, the various grievances could be resolved. The established leadership was unused to this type of politics and unable to combat it, for the dissidents refused to follow the traditional protocol of protest. In the end, Mollet succeeded in ousting the established leadership.

It is unclear what purpose the models serve. The story could be told and the points made as effectively without reference to them. In fact, there is not much integration, so that the narrative largely stands alone. Only in the conclusion are the models discussed in any detail, and even here they are not used to explain the narrative so much as the narrative is used as data to demonstrate the models. This may very well be less disturbing for a political scientist than for a historian. In the end, however, this problem does not undermine the work, for Graham has done a masterful job of leading the reader through the labyrinth that was SFIO politics between 1937 and 1950, explaining the changes in the nature of the party's structure and leadership and their consequences.

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Gordon Darroch and Lee Soltow — *Property and Inequality in Victorian Ontario: Structural Patterns and Cultural Communities in the 1871 Census.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. Pp. v, 280.

This study has not topped the non-fiction bestseller lists, nor will it. In *That Noble Dream* (Cambridge, 1988), Peter Novick notes of *Time on the Cross* that those looking for the foundations for Fogel's and Engermann's ''conclusion that slaves were only moderately exploited'' were referred to a long and relatively incomprehensible equation (p. 588). Gordon Darroch's and Lee Soltow's book is based on equations equally daunting. Theirs is a work that requires considerable expertise in cliometrics. When the two invite the reader to ''consider'' a calculation, they do so with the easy and disarming confidence that that reader, fully armed with an intimate knowledge of the intricacies of multiple regression analysis and the like, can do so readily and pleasurably. Shall I confess that in my case their confidence is misplaced? Or relay my suspicion and hope that some other readers will share