flew in the RCAF, who fought with the Vandoos, the Chaudières, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, the Maisies, and 50 more regiments and corps, and who withstood the anglocentrism of the Royal Canadian Navy to go to sea presumably understood what was at stake in the conflict. There were ships sunk by U-boats in the St. Lawrence, after all, and there was a real possibility that Canada might have come under direct attack or even invasion if Britain had not hung on after Dunkirk and if the United States Navy had not won the Battle of Midway in 1942. There is also no doubt that this was a just war in the eyes of virtually every citizen of the Western democracies as well as by every canonical definition. If it had been lost, Quebeckers would have been enslaved along with all their English-speaking compatriots. Somehow, however, Quebec all but alone among the democracies failed to draw the proper conclusions. Pierre Trudeau and André Laurendeau were not alone in opting out.

That the Canadian armed forces did not always welcome francophones as they should have is unquestionably true. That the King government’s promises against conscription for overseas service were violated in 1942 and 1944 can similarly be argued (but no longer by me!). But there is also no doubt that the federal government had learned from the mistakes of the Great War and that it made enormous efforts to persuade French Canadians to participate in a war that was Canada’s in a way that the 1914–1918 war was not. For innumerable reasons, which have been delineated better and much more fully by English-speaking than francophone historians, Quebec did not respond as it should have. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the participation rate in Quebec was very much higher than in World War I.

The Quebeckers who volunteered for service in World War II, then, more than merit the approbation of their compatriots, francophone and anglophone. They overcame the antiwar sentiments that were widespread in French Canada and served with great distinction. Serge Bernier notwithstanding, however, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Quebec as a whole merits no such salute. It would be good for historians in Quebec, including the very sensible Bernier, to recognize this and to stop the myth-making that this collection of papers all too obviously represents before it takes hold. It is also long past time for those historians in English Canada — and I especially include myself — who have spent years trying to justify and explain away Quebec’s appallingly weak war effort to start to call a spade a spade.

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In Tobacco in History, Jordan Goodman looks “to explain how humankind became involved with the tobacco plant, and how the relationships between it and ourselves have changed over time” (p. 13). The book is timely considering the recent
tobacco-spiking scandal in the United States and Canada’s own problems in finding the balance between “healthy” taxation and contraband. Because the book is mainly a synthesis of the research done on tobacco, it not only provides a convenient resource to understanding how what is now called the “tobacco problem” has been conceptualized, but also where holes exist in its logic. Goodman’s answer to these questions, as the title suggests, rotates around “dependence”.

The first two sections of the book primarily focus on the cultural meanings of consuming tobacco. Here, the “hard sciences” are left to make the dependency argument. Goodman begins by explaining the chemical process by which tobacco addicts. He maintains as refutable “that people consume tobacco in whatever form in order to administer nicotine to themselves” (p. 5). His subsequent discussions of the social and cultural history of tobacco are linked to this intention. Beginning in pre-contact Amerindian societies, Goodman ties tobacco’s effects to its symbolism. For example, tobacco provided the necessary hallucinogenic effects to facilitate a supernatural, out-of-body experience that was important in Native spiritual tradition. Along the same lines, early acceptance of tobacco into the impoverished classes of European society may have been due to the more ready acceptance of hallucinogenic plants which cut the feeling of hunger.

Among European state officials and upper classes, Goodman argues, the process of indigenization occurred when Europeans divorced Amerindian meaning from tobacco and gave it their own legitimized meaning. For the early botanists and medical doctors who brought tobacco back to Europe, these were dominantly medical. Medical meanings were quickly linked to recreational meanings and tobacco gained important cultural and even ritualistic significance in Europe. Tobacco boxes, pipes, and snuff boxes were prized as fashion accessories by the upper classes, and different forms of consumption gained social significance. Chewing tobacco was frowned upon, and snuff, supported by medical discourse, became the dominant and respectable form of consuming tobacco. Regional variations to these consumption trends are mentioned but mainly in context of tobacco’s spread throughout the world.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are discussed in context of the cigarette’s circumvention of the world. For Goodman, culturally this was mainly a history of advertising and medicine. Cigarette companies picked up on changes in society and capitalized on them. They took advantage of gender stereotypes — whether the masculine “Marlboro Man” or the feminine “Virginia Slim”. The medical community, on the other hand, was slow in producing convincing evidence to show the health hazards of smoking. Goodman brings these two themes together in the 1950s when a slew of reports were finally released on the dangers of smoking. The tobacco companies responded by shifting their advertising to new brands of tobacco with low nicotine or with filters — a move that solidified their hold on the market.

Goodman’s second dependency argument revolves around the commercial history of tobacco and where it fit within global markets. He argues that tobacco was nothing short of the “sine qua non of settlement” for many of the early English and French colonies. For the Portuguese and the Spanish it was also important, though their colonies were not as dependent on it. Within the mercantile structure
of exchange, the Chesapeake Bay colony and Brazil rose to predominance while other colonies moved to sugar during the seventeenth century. The “culture of tobacco” which developed affected the organization of labour, land structure, and population profile. Goodman identifies a number of general trends — indentured labour shifted to slavery; small planter moved to large plantation; and white labourers were replaced by black slaves. Using the example of the Chesapeake, Goodman demonstrates how French consumption habits affected Glaswegian merchants who in turn helped shape the Chesapeake society. This dependency was not broken — the Chesapeake failed to diversify and imperial governments were less interested in promoting a diversified economy; after all, they received important revenues from the tobacco trade.

The book’s final argument on tobacco and dependency centres on government regulation and the roots of tobacco’s industrial structure. Goodman shows how governments have attempted to control the tobacco industry on several different levels such as customs duties, excise, and monopolies in order to extract revenues. Running parallel to government systems were contraband networks which denied governments these revenues. Among the most interesting were the networks of convents and monasteries that produced snuff for export. What made the tobacco industry so hard to control was its industrial structure. Until the end of the nineteenth century, tobacco manufacturing was dominated by small-scale, lowly capitalized, labour-intensive businesses. Such a widespread industry was difficult to tax effectively.

This particular problem with industrial structure and tax income did not last. By the end of the nineteenth century, James Duke had fused mechanized production processes with mass consumption, popularizing the cigarette. Duke’s American Tobacco Company dominated the cigarette industry by 1890, then formed a global cartel in 1902, the British American Tobacco company. The companies that were born of BAT’s dissolution, along with a number of state monopolies, make up the international tobacco industry that we know today.

Despite the book’s breadth, it has a number of problems. In his conclusion Goodman argues that, for the use of tobacco to end, the cigarette must be understood as an artefact with complex cultural significance. This is undoubtedly true, but how does Goodman measure up to his own statement? Goodman’s use of the word “culture” is blurry. At times he takes a broad anthropologic approach and includes production and marketing as well as consumption in his definition. At other times, however, he is confusing. In chapter 2 he writes that, to Natives, smoking was “culture itself”, whereas modern readers find it “counter-cultural”. Defining modern smoking as “counter-cultural” conflicts with his more general use of the term culture.

The issue of smoking having current cultural significance is skirted. “Modern” smokers are only discussed in terms of addictions and buying into cigarette company advertisements. Linguist Richard Klein, in his Cigarettes are Sublime, has argued that smoking is a language, and cultural meanings of smoking go far beyond the need “to administer nicotine”. Klein’s argument complicates the modern Canadian regulators’ “Pavlov’s Dog” theory of smoking — make the packages black and white and people will not smoke. Unfortunately, there is no attempt in Tobacco in History to see most modern consumers as more than tobacco company dupes.
Other holes are more endemic of the state of the literature in general (specifically, pipe and cigar smoking, the most popular forms of smoking in the nineteenth century). The book is strongest in the earlier sections on Native and early European consumption of tobacco where Goodman draws from a broad range of literature and creatively gives important context (for example, the comparison of tobacco to coca in the indigenization process). The well-developed research on the agricultural and commercial history of tobacco is also nicely synthesized. It is only in the more modern period that the suspicious thematic format of the book becomes a narrative device that obscures lack of research. It would have been more useful to point out the problem of gaps in the research by emphasizing the different periods of tobacco use. At any rate, *Tobacco in History* is a useful guide to the vast amount of research on tobacco and will be helpful to future researchers on the subject.

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In our conspiracy-minded age, historians increasingly feel compelled to evaluate presidential assassination theories. We live in a time, after all, when Oliver Stone’s *JFK* packs movie theatres and when supposedly rational scientists exhume the body of innocuous Zachary Taylor to investigate rumours of foul play. In this atmosphere, it was perhaps inevitable that we would revisit one of the oldest of these ‘‘plots’’: the alleged conspiracy to kill Abraham Lincoln.

Speculation about a cabal going beyond John Wilkes Booth and his cohorts surfaced soon after Lincoln’s assassination in 1865. In the years since, various accusers have fixed culpability on U.S. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, Vice-President Andrew Johnson, and Radical Republicans in Congress. In his second book on the assassination, William Tidwell offers yet another perspective. He argues that the plan which ultimately resulted in Lincoln’s murder originated in the highest levels of the Confederate government.

Drawing on his previous work in *Come Retribution: The Confederate Secret Service and the Assassination of Lincoln* (1988), Tidwell explores the entire range of Confederate covert operations. He exposes an intricate network of military men, diplomats, and private individuals who tried to win through stealth what the Confederacy had lost on the battlefield. In the process, Tidwell analyzes the role of covert warfare in the nineteenth century, the escalating brutality of the Civil War, and the creation of a Southern usable past.

Tidwell holds that Jefferson Davis and his Secretary of State, Judah Benjamin, decided in late 1864 to kidnap Lincoln and recapture the initiative in the Civil War. To plan this effort the Confederacy relied on a large intelligence organization, which included John Wilkes Booth. As matters grew more desperate for the Confederacy in early 1865, the kidnapping plan evolved into a plot to blow up the