

He also shows in fascinating detail the degree to which political radicalism was rooted in the religious experiences of the 1630s. Men who had sharpened their teeth in the struggle against the oppression of bishops and in the quest for the liberty to create their own separatist churches were ready to take on popery in the form of “superstitious” images, books, altars, and vestments at the beginning of the 1640s. Their absorption of radical protestant ideas had given them a practical belief in liberty and human equality. This belief, combined with the organizational experience that they now had under their belts, prepared them to wage war against royal tyranny and on behalf of radical democracy.

Thus Lindley shows that the Leveller movement grew from the Independent and separatist congregations of London — above all the Baptists. Future Leveller activists such as John Lilburne, William Walwyn, Edmund Chillenden, William Larner, Giles Calvert, Clement Wrighter, Thomas Prince, and Nicholas Tew threw themselves with boundless enthusiasm into the war against the king in 1642 and 1643. The Salters Hall subcommittee to raise volunteers for the war effort was a special focus of their activities. The early commitment of men such as William Walwyn to organizing and fighting the war should serve as a corrective to any lingering idea that the Levellers comprised a movement that somehow eschewed violence.

If there is a criticism to be made of this richly detailed study, it is that too much space is allocated to investigating the social basis of parliamentary radicalism and not enough to the political struggles that shook the capital during the epochal decade of the 1640s. To give but one example: William Walwyn and other future Levellers were heavily involved, with republican MP Henry Marten, in the effort to organize a “general rising” in the summer of 1643. The aim was to put together a volunteer force of 10,000 men in London and place it at the disposal of Sir William Waller, who was the great hope of all who were disillusioned by the lacklustre military leadership of the Earl of Essex. In the event the movement for a general rising was a dismal flop: according to Sir Simonds D’Ewes, the committee was not able to raise 400 men. Lindley briefly describes this episode in revolutionary politics but refrains from commenting on its larger significance.

We may hope that Lindley has the stamina to give us a sequel to this substantial volume, for the London of the later 1640s and 1650s still awaits its historian. This gap in our understanding of the revolutionary years badly needs filling.

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Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos, eds. — *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp. ix, 286.

*Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe* is a thought-provoking collection of essays addressing the vexatious problem of nationalism in Europe. The first part of the book provides the theoretical framework for the subsequent essays, which are

state- or region-specific studies of nationalism, giving the collection a useful coherence. The result is an insightful study of the various forms nationalism has taken in Europe, both in the past and into the present day, and why.

The study's starting point is not whether "nation" exists or not, but how the category operates in practice — "how nationalist logics and frames of references are formulated and deployed" (p. 11). Jenkins and Sofos argue that

nationalisms are the product of complex social negotiations, premised on the activation of social and cultural relationships and emotional investments among the — potential — members of the national community, as well as on strategies for the pursuit of interests, and attainment of power by individuals and collectivities. Their emergence, sustenance and demise are the outcome of conflict and negotiation at several levels of the "social". But it is the articulation of the "national" to political discourses and practices, the elevation of the nation to the status of a political subject that characterises nationalism. (pp. 11–12)

Two conflicting models of nationalism emerged in Europe, an inclusive citizenship model based on an open, voluntarist definition of nationality based on residency, and an exclusive ethnicity model based on ethnic, cultural, and ideological alliances. The story of nationalism in Europe is the ongoing conflict between these different models, which coexist in tension with one another, each waxing and waning in particular countries depending upon the national circumstances of the moment.

The national and regional essays, which deal with Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal, Italy, Poland, Russia, and the former Yugoslavia, explore the process of social negotiation and its success or failure in establishing a strong sense of nationalism in each respective country, as well as the reasons why one model succeeded rather than another in particular corners and at particular times. In certain instances, circumstances (social, political, economic) facilitated the creation of a sense of national community and identity, either inclusive or exclusive, and in others circumstances got in the way. The stories are complex, yet the essayists discuss the evolution with insight and clarity.

What makes this collection especially intriguing is that each has taken the story into the post-Cold-War era and explored the implications of what Jenkins and Copsey, in their essay on France, call "post-modernity". While Jenkins and Copsey are the only authors to use the term, the other essays also recognize the two crises these authors see facing post-Cold-War society. The first results from the fragmentation of social life and of any sense of community, leaving individuals without a communal identity. The second is a crisis at the level of the nation-state. In recent decades in Western Europe, the state increasingly has been losing its sovereign authority either to supranational organizations (such as the European Union) or to regional or municipal authorities through decentralization. This has the effect of undermining the state's capacity to protect its society, thus weakening its authority and any sense of nationalism defined by membership in that state (the citizenship model) and promoting the growth of an exclusive definition of membership in the nation. In Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and of Yugoslavia

has created an opportunity for the emergence of nationalism of the exclusive kind, and Millard, Flenley, and Sofos do an admirable job, in limited space, of explaining why.

The various authors also link the re-emergence of racism and of the extreme Right in recent years in Europe with the reassertion of an exclusive form of nationalism at the expense of the more inclusive citizenship model. They explore the various reasons for this change and make the point that the extreme Right does not succeed in countries such as Spain and Portugal, with a weak sense of national identity (to which the extreme Right cannot appeal), or in those countries with governments that already exercise strict controls over foreign immigration (thus stealing a key platform of the extreme Right).

Thus the study helps us to understand the malleability and ambiguous nature of nationalism, the curious tension between the two models which makes nationalism easily mobilized by all parts of the political spectrum. *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe* is a useful and thoughtful collection of essays, one well worth reading.

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Lawrence Robert Aronsen — *American National Security and Economic Relations with Canada, 1945–1954*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997. Pp. xxii, 212.

Lawrence Robert Aronsen provides a very useful study of American-Canadian economic relations in the era immediately following World War II. Writing for an audience of American foreign policy analysts and Canadian nationalists, Aronsen rebuts traditional interpretations that have depicted the relationship as one of American dominance and Canadian surrender. He contends that these North American allies shared a “special relationship” which, while asymmetrical, was built on mutual national self-interests. Beyond their individual agendas, he observes, Canada and the United States shared a “partnership in the pursuit of creating international peace and prosperity” (p. 19), most particularly in the development and sustenance of a liberal world trading system.

Aronsen’s study comprises four detailed chapters that address Canadian-American trade relations, joint industrial mobilization (aircraft, automobiles), investment in Canadian strategic minerals, and transportation links (such as the St. Lawrence Seaway). He employs newly declassified records from the American State and Defense Departments, the United States National Security Resources Board (NSRB), and the United States Munitions Board (USMB), as well as extensive Canadian primary sources. His theoretical framework is derived from recent American foreign policy scholarship — the post-revisionist school, which posits that the choices involved in developing American foreign economic policy during the Cold War were dictated by national security concerns. As such, U.S. foreign economic policy nearly always served the larger strategic and political goals of containment. The