

their thoughtful examination of rules and regulations concerning immigration. From turn-of-the-century Privy Council decisions to the *Immigration Act* of 1976, every single important policy on immigration is summarized, put into context, and critiqued.

In presenting the Privy Council decisions *Union Colliery v Bryden* (1899) and *Cunningham v Tomey Homma* (1903), for example, Kelley and Trebilcock argue convincingly that “B.C. Statutes which restricted the right of employers to hire Asians ... were declared invalid as being beyond provincial jurisdiction, while provincial laws regulating the right of Asians to vote or to hire white employees were found to be lawful exercises of provincial power” (p. 141). These decisions, they conclude, strongly suggest that judges were “as sensitive to business concerns as were the politicians” (p. 142). In their subsequent account, the authors continue to analyse both actual regulations and their hidden subtext, thus broadening our understanding of immigration policies. We learn, for instance, that in 1911 the Laurier government decided against proclaiming an order-in-council that prohibited the landing in Canada of “any immigrant belonging to the Negro race, which race is deemed unsuitable to the climate and requirements of Canada” (p. 155). Instead, the government adopted an informal exclusionary programme which was strikingly “effective”. Standard medical and character examinations at the border resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of black immigrants to Canada that fell from 136 in the years 1907–1908 to seven in 1909–1910. These figures demonstrate the “success” of immigration policies that were neither debated extensively nor explicitly articulated in legislation.

This is an ambitious work that is tremendously reader-friendly. Introductory and concluding remarks for each chapter allow quick navigation; the text is well written and the division of periods convincing. At times, the authors attempt to cover too much ground by delving deeply into labour politics and settlement patterns of immigrants, thus distracting from their major key questions. In addition, the second chapter relies so heavily on Canadian history survey texts — and is, consequently, so general in character — that it could easily have been omitted. In a study, finally, that professes to be “primarily historical” (p. 4), it is rather startling that not more than minimal attention is given to the historiography of the subject, particularly since the bibliography is both comprehensive and up-to-date. Yet these are quibbles with an otherwise fine work.

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Stephen S. Large — *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography*.
New York: Routledge, 1992; 1998. Pp. xii, 249.

This is one of the first books in the English language to examine in some detail both the postwar as well as pre-war career of Hirohito (1901–1989). It thus addresses an important contemporary issue, the persistent use of the Imperial Family in

official efforts to influence public opinion, and tackles the contentious subject of Hirohito's role in the Asian-Pacific War (1931–1945). At the risk of oversimplification, one can divide interpretations of Hirohito's moral and legal responsibility for war into two camps. On the one hand are those who believe that the Emperor played an active role in decision making and is as responsible as his ministers, who were later punished for conspiring to wage war. It is the arguments of this group that I find more convincing. On the other hand are those who believe that the Emperor deserves little censure because he often personally opposed, but was constitutionally obliged to accept, his ministers' unanimous decisions.

Stephen Large, who describes his subject as “the unwilling symbol, not the maker, of chaos and catastrophe”, clearly supports this latter view and outlines the various “external” and “internal” constraints on the Emperor (pp. 216, 7–14, 80–83, 206–210). With regard to external constraints, Large states that the most important was the contradictory nature of the Meiji Constitution. The Constitution made the Emperor commander-in-chief of the armed forces and granted him the authority to declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties. At the same time, it gave the expectation that the Emperor would exercise his powers on the recommendations of his ministers and not on his own initiative. The Constitution also committed officials to respect the views of the Emperor, but, as Large points out, it did not provide safeguards to prevent them from ignoring imperial advice or even commands. The “internal constraints” on Hirohito, which kept him from exercising his potential influence on decision making, include his upbringing in a court environment that stressed conformity to rules, his essentially passive personality, and his commitment to being a constitutional monarch.

According to Large, Hirohito viewed himself as a constitutional monarch having the limited right to consult, encourage, and warn officials on matters of national policy. In the pre-war period, this self-image restricted his field of independent action. It not only led him to accept two *faits accomplis* and turning points in Japan's territorial aggression in China: the murder of Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuo-lin by members of Japan's Guangdong Army in 1928 and the Guangdong Army's takeover of Manchuria in 1931. It resulted in his refusal to exceed what he believed were the proper limits of his authority by opposing his ministers' decision to wage war against the United States in 1941.

In the postwar period, however, Hirohito's belief in a ruler's advisory rights meant that he sometimes compromised his political neutrality under the new Constitution of 1947. Large discusses four instances during the American Occupation (1945–1952) in which the Emperor sought to encourage U.S. authorities in protecting Japan from the threat of communism (pp. 156–158). Neither Hirohito nor postwar Japanese governments were prepared to treat the throne as wholly divorced from politics. In the last chapters of the book, Large focuses on how Japanese officials since the late 1940s have tried to reinstate the Emperor as some “neo-nationalist symbol” or rallying point for protecting national interests overseas while promoting him abroad as a symbol of Japanese goodwill and international cooperation (p. 182).

Large's contention is that the actions of the Emperor throughout his reign were

circumscribed or dictated by his view of himself as a constitutional monarch. Still, other scholars would caution against exaggerating Hirohito's constitutional scruples and the constraints on his actions. In "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility", Herbert Bix observes that the Emperor and his ministers had actually rendered the decision to declare war against the United States through an imperial conference, which Bix describes as "a supra-constitutional forum for the emperor to deliver his 'imperial decisions' (*seidan*)" (*Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992, p. 345). In "Emperor Shōwa's Accountability for War", Awaya Kentaro disputes Hirohito's postwar argument that he had little opportunity to express his opinions during such conferences (*Japan Quarterly*, October-December 1991, p. 394). His will could be conveyed through a proxy, the president of the privy council, and prior to each imperial conference Hirohito received a final draft of the proceedings. Awaya states that at that stage the Emperor could freely express his views and even refuse to sanction the draft if he did not like it.

Declaring that "[t]he portrayal of Emperor Shōwa as a constitutional monarch and a pacifist ... is the greatest political myth of postwar history", Awaya also notes that works depicting him in this fashion tend to concentrate on Japan's war with the United States and fail to examine more closely Hirohito's attitude toward conflict with China ("Emperor Shōwa's Accountability for War", pp. 396, 387). Utilizing the "Shōwa Emperor's Monologue", a recently discovered document dating from 1946, which Large himself uses extensively in his book (pp. 4, 132–133), Awaya draws attention to many passages revealing Hirohito condoning and abetting the actions of the military. The Monologue, an account in Hirohito's own words of developments from 1928 to 1945, was designed to vindicate the Emperor of personal responsibility for war, but Awaya notes that, because Hirohito focused on issues related to the outbreak of hostilities with the United States, he let his guard down when discussing matters concerning China ("Emperor Shōwa's Accountability for War", pp. 391–392).

During the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the Emperor explained that he sanctioned the arbitrary action of the Guangdong Army because it did not jeopardize relations with the Anglo-American countries. Hirohito, in fact, later issued in 1932 a widely publicized rescript praising the Guangdong Army, an action he was not obliged to perform (Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue'", p. 344). As for the outbreak of war with China in 1937, Hirohito recalled that he had urged senior military officials to send additional troops to Shanghai and to mount a strong offensive against the enemy (Awaya, "Emperor Shōwa's Accountability for War", p. 392). Like Awaya and Bix, Bob Wakabayashi, in "Emperor Hirohito on Localized Aggression in China", also suggests that a close reading of the Monologue would reveal that the Emperor was no political bystander or strong opponent of the military when it came to conflict with China (*Sino-Japanese Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1991).

While its emphasis on Hirohito's commitment to an ideal of constitutional monarchy may be disputed, Large's book does help readers develop a better sense of the Emperor as an individual and as a "supreme survivor" and defender of the imperial institution. It does so through its exploration of Hirohito's attitudes toward

his subjects, domestic political movements, and Occupation reforms. Large states that the overriding priority of the Emperor and the Japanese government during the Occupation was the preservation of the monarchy and notes that, although unsuccessful, Hirohito opposed the complete abolition of the peerage and constitutional changes permitting the Diet to amend the imperial house law (pp. 192, 151). Large's examination of the postwar career of Hirohito is a welcome contribution. His book examines an individual whose actions and attitudes are and may always be open to interpretation and debate, and I would recommend it to students along with the other works mentioned here.

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Linda Niemann and Lina Bertucci — *Railroad Voices*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Pp. ix, 158.

This fascinating coffee-table book intertwines the photographs and "narratives" of two of the few women who worked in the railway running trades in the United States. Lina Bertucci, who teaches photography in New York, worked as a brakewoman on the Milwaukee Central in the 1970s. She presents 58 photographs documenting railway workers and yards. Accompanying the photographs are 23 vignettes of railway life, written by Linda Niemann. She was the last brakewoman or brakeman hired by the Southern Pacific Railroad, in 1979. Niemann already has written an interesting memoir of her experiences, well worth the attention of social and labour historians, entitled *Boomer*.

For anyone familiar with most historical railway photographs, Bertucci's images are striking. Workers, not locomotives, machines, or buildings, provide the central focus. The black-and-white portraits are mainly of workers at rest, men and a few women enjoying a break or waiting in aging shelters. The poses, which frequently appear self-conscious, as well as the faces, clothes, and settings provide revealing glimpses into the masculine culture of railway work. In addition, there are unromantic photographs of busy and clearly dangerous engine yards. The bleak realism and professional composition of these photographs capture the harsh conditions of this work, mostly as it is etched on the faces or expressed in the body language of workers. A few, such as "Carman with cigar", reminded me of the portrait photographs of Yousuf Karsh in their treatment of light and subject.

Are these pictures worth a thousand words? For social and labour historians, they document the conditions of railway work and attitudes of railway workers. Future historians may well be frustrated, however, by the often vague captions and the absence of any further documentation. The reader has to guess that the photographs were taken around 1974, while Bertucci was working. In the end, I was left wanting to know more about the men and women in these photographs. Portraits of the rich and powerful would undoubtedly be accompanied by names and brief biographies of their careers and accomplishments; why do we refuse to do the same for workers?