
In 1995 Charles Esdaile’s *The Wars of Napoleon* appeared. In contrast with Esdaile’s emphasis on the emperor, David Gates seeks to deal with a wider context: if the wars his book deals with were in the Napoleonic era, Napoleon himself was not always the sole cause. With conspicuous clarity and narrative flow, Gates’s book is a fine general introduction to the whole period of Napoleon’s European mastery.

He begins by discussing historiographical concerns and the nature of evidence, especially that of participants in battle — too many smoking guns! — and proceeds to the revisionism of D. Hamilton Williams, who has recently sought to reappraise the battle of Waterloo. In discussing the belligerents of the Napoleonic wars, Gates crosses swords with Esdaile, who ascribes blame for the wars to Napoleon alone, and with Owen Connolly and Correlli Barnett, who undervalue Napoleon’s martial prowess.

Napoleon’s successes stemmed from the lessons of his predecessors as military thinkers, as well as from his own organizational changes and personal qualities. Gates indicates features of French armies that Napoleon’s adversaries came to imitate. In discussing the armed forces that opposed Napoleon, Gates deals with such issues as European demography, industrialism, crops, the nature of society, religion, and many other factors that explain the strengths and weaknesses of the various combatants, and also how the populations of European states were affected by the wars as they were fought and afterwards.

One chapter deals with the Austerlitz campaign, the next with naval concerns over the whole period, explaining why the British navy was more successful than its French and Spanish rivals despite the building superiority of the latter. The losses of the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians in the wars before Tilsit induced them to initiate military reforms. These are discussed in a chapter that relates them to concomitant administrative and social reforms as well as to changed political aspirations, such as Stein’s hopes for a new Germany. The chapter dealing with the fortunes of the Fifth Coalition explains the increase in nationalist feeling in the Tyrol, the establishment of secret societies, and the appearance of a nationalistic element in German literature, such as in the writings of Arndt and Gorres. The author has made good use of some of Otto Johnson’s forays into the interconnection of political activity and literature in Germany.
A rewarding chapter deals with “trade patterns and resource constraints”. Not only does this deal with the economic bases for the wars, but it also discusses the economic rivalry between Britain and France and elucidates the war between Britain and the United States. The chapter on the Peninsular war clearly demonstrates Gates’s especial expertise on this topic.

Although this clear and reliable book seems destined to have a fine career as an undergraduate text, it is more than that. It is critical of the interpretations of previous writers. The final section, which points to the evolution of the modern state and notes compelling comparisons with the First World War, is especially memorable. Advanced readers already familiar with most of the topics discussed will appreciate the wide range of new and older materials used in the book’s compilation, listed in the chapter endnotes and in the very valuable, 20-page bibliographical essay, which includes a list of primary and manuscript sources. Especially remarkable are the references to German manuscripts in particular, but the author’s fluency has led him to display in the main text a panoply of untranslated German technical terms.

So great is the rate and volume of Napoleonic publication now that the Bicentenary is in full flood that it is difficult to keep up. Doubtless this explains why only one of Michael Broers’s books is listed and why there is only a sampling of the many recent books about the American war of 1812. It is strange not to find any reference to the publications of Alain Pigeard, a noted authority on the Napoleonic army. Zlotnikov’s book in Russian on the blockade is cited, but there are no Russian language books on military topics. Why is there no reference to J. H. L. Keep’s fine Soldiers of the Tsar? Admiral Saumarez has been omitted from the index. Flayhart’s book on the British expedition to Naples in 1805 might have advantage been listed in the chapter notes, rather than in the general bibliography. Was Schulmeister, Napoleon’s “chief spy”, not worth mentioning, or is there a hint in the account of Ulm’s capture? The major battles are easy to follow because plans are supplied, but not all campaigns are made clearer by maps. It is to be hoped that the book’s success will permit many more editions, thus negating these little quibbles.

It is a pleasure to report that in February 1999 this book was awarded the Literary Prize of the International Napoleonic Society, a choice that speaks volumes.

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In recent years, historians of early America have begun to recognize that African-American society did not emerge tabula rasa on the slave plantation, but instead grew from African roots that shaped its culture and influenced not only Africa’s children, but also the culture and history of the larger Union. Exchanging Our