Grant’s method is to focus on the Putilov works in St. Petersburg, one of Russia’s largest heavy industrial companies before the Revolution and a centre of workers’ discontent. The book is strictly business, and the reader will not find discussions like those in several recent studies on Moscow industrial figures regarding the lifestyle or political, social, and cultural interests of men of business.

Among the principal issues discussed are business strategy, the policies and personnel of the Putilov board of directors, company financing, product lines, profits and losses, and relations with various agencies of the Imperial government. Grant’s basic source of information is archival material, especially company reports. There is an admitted paucity of memoirs by directors and others connected with the company on the grounds, as Grant says, that these men of business were too heavily engaged in their work to write about their activities.

On several issues, Grant finds that a detailed study of the Putilov works challenges widespread assumptions about business in pre-Revolution Russia. The Leninist view that banks took over private business and established increasingly monopolistic control over sectors of the economy does not stand up to scrutiny. The Russo-Asiatic Bank increasingly bought stock in Putilov, provided financing, and placed a representative on the board of directors without ever exerting control over the company. As for whether the tsarist government exercised pre-1916 control, this common assumption is refuted by the continuing independent policy-making role of the board of directors.

Putilov lost its independence and was sequestered only in 1916, when, in the midst of waging World War I, the Russian government concluded that the production of munitions, especially artillery shells, and armaments could be speeded up by state control. Aside from the consequences of war, Putilov conducted itself almost identically to other large heavy industrial concerns in the West, and Grant convincingly parallels its practices with those of Krupp in Germany, Creusot in France, Vickers in England, and Carnegie in the United States. Strategic planning, financing, and other practices were so similar in all of these companies that Putilov entered into the technology transfer that went on among them, supporting Grant’s conclusion that these particular large manufacturing concerns behaved similarly.

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The Michelin Company is today an international corporation manufacturing tires; it has an established reputation for good quality, innovative products (the company
introduced pneumatic tires for bicycles and cars at the end of the nineteenth century and steel-belted radials after the Second World War), good relations with its workers, and the promotion of tourism (the red and green guides). Stephen Harp traces its development as a unique French company from the Belle Époque of the late nineteenth century to 1940. The book is not a company history (the company archives remain closed to historians), but rather is “a case study of Michelin’s role in reflecting and helping to create French national culture in the twentieth century” (p. 3). Harp studies Michelin’s use of advertising, notably its creation of the iconic Bibendum (1898), at once to promote its products and to create a notion of modern France, the two goals often overlapping. Throughout the book, Harp assumes that “the history of business offers interesting sources for cultural history and that cultural history reveals an additional perspective for business history” (p. 13).

Harp shows how Michelin successfully promoted automobile tourism as a means of selling tires. In the process the company advocated mass production and industrial efficiency (Taylorism and Fordism) to modernize the French economy along American lines, while avoiding the mass society and egalitarianism of the United States. The Michelin company also promoted housing, medical care, and retirement pensions for its workers and paid them a better than average salary. It subsidized employees with large families. On the national level it pushed aviation from the turn of the century, published guides to the battlefields of the First World War and other patriotic literature, and played an active role during the interwar years in promoting a higher birthrate. What is striking is that, in every field it undertook, the company had remarkable success in using advertising and public relations to promote at once its tires, the automobile, aviation, mass production, nationalism, and pro-natalism.

Harp does a good job of catching the nuances and of analysing the cultural assumptions behind the company’s actions. The Michelin Company is not always easy to understand or to categorize. He notes that the Michelin family, notably André and Édouard Michelin, who ran the company from the Belle Époque to 1940, were socially conservative, Catholic, solidarist, and pro-family (though the company avoided too close a connection to Vichy), and yet in many ways were progressive (if somewhat paternalistic), paying their employees well, providing subsidized housing, schools, recreation programmes, and pensions. Harp also notes that the company cleverly geared its advertising to the social realities of the times. Bibendum, the well-known company icon, first appeared in 1898 when only the well-to-do could afford automobiles; it is not surprising that he was portrayed as a white, upper-class Frenchman, often a man about town, “who could advise or dominate fellow men, ‘conquer’ women, and control racial inferiors” (p. 16).

In the process of promoting the automobile, and therefore the sale of its tires, among well-to-do French males, the Michelin company encouraged automobile tours in the provinces, actively campaigning for the building of new roads and the upgrading of existing ones, better road signs and markings, the numbering of highways, and the preservation of natural and historic sites. By 1914 Michelin had implemented a veritable tourist system in France. It supplied guidebooks, prepared individual itineraries, and designed maps to be used in concert. It employed patriotic and solidarist themes to associate the Michelin name not only with tourism but with
France itself. “The company thus reinforced both French national identity as well as the collective urban bourgeois, and male identities of individual prewar tourism, playing an important role in defining and disseminating a form of national consciousness among the French bourgeoisie” (pp. 87–88).

During the interwar years the Michelin company was strongly pro-natalist in its advertising and in its support for various pro-natalist groups. Bibendum evolved from a man about town to a father figure surrounded by children. The campaign of Michelin and other groups increasingly paid off as the government took the first steps toward introducing family allowances during the interwar years and, after World War II, implemented the most extensive system of family allowances in the world. The company also continued to push aviation as part of its effort to modernize manufacturing along the lines of American mass production. These projects achieved relatively few results prior to 1940, but since the war France has moved rapidly ahead in aviation, gaining international prestige with the introduction of the Concorde and Airbus. Although advocating modernization, the company avoided associating itself with the American way of life, arguing that France could develop as a distinctly modern country without becoming Americanized.

In the minds of most North Americans, Michelin is associated with the promotion of French tourism, especially the red and green guides. The red guide, ranking hotels and restaurants, first appeared in 1900 (the star system ranking restaurants in the 1920s), the Michelin road maps in 1910, the green guides, promoting tourism in the provinces, in the interwar period. The guides established the idea of France as a country of picturesque regions, each having its own culture and cuisine, distinct, yet forming part of a larger French national entity, itself the world leader in cuisine, culture, and tourist appeal. The red guide “assumes a hierarchy of foods with French cuisine at the summit, and with yet another clear hierarchy of the restaurants serving that food; only in 1999 did the first Chinese restaurant in Paris manage to get a star” (p. 274). Good cuisine is, by definition, French cuisine.

Harp catches the flavour of the company and how it reacted to and influenced each generation over the past century. He concludes that Michelin had an influence, however unquantifiable, in creating the widespread cultural assumptions that France is the place to eat, drink, and tour, and a place of modern innovation. France leads the world in the number of tourist visits (the United States is a distant second). “The notion that France can be both ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, that it can have the world’s best and fastest civilian aviation and high-speed trains but also remain the most beautiful, nostalgia-laden countryside for touring, is in part a legacy bequeathed by the various advocates of early-twentieth century tourism, notably by the Touring Club of France and Michelin” (p. 281). Michelin further shared in defining solidarity in the form of family allowances and in offering a selectively ambiguous image of the United States. “In the end, the company tapped into earlier images about what constituted France, but in so doing participated fully in rearticulating them, helping to give them a cultural life of their own. While by no means acting along, there seems little question that Michelin helped to formulate a certain idea of France.... It is easy to forget that all this began as an effort to sell more tires” (p. 281).

Harp thus argues that Michelin is a prime example of how businesses can reshape
Cultural attitudes and assumptions, particularly through advertising. He analyses the cultural assumptions of France, including representations of gender, race, and class, in a way that is lively, interesting, and informative. His combination of business and cultural history is fascinating and should be read by all those interested in the subject.

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This is an important work, but it is slow going because of the references to the exhaustive archival research on which it is based. About 160 national constitutions have been created since World War II. However flawed or useless or senseless, they have all been created by their own countries, though often with outside help. It is well known that the 1947 Constitution of Japan was forced onto the country by the American Occupation in the wake of World War II. In my view, a new Japanese constitution was justified, but the process has always raised questions. The preamble says that it was created by “We the Japanese People”, but almost nobody has believed this. Hence this work on its origins is worthwhile.

It remains the most radically democratic constitution in the world, in which rights and liberties are unqualified. Thus it is unlike the previous Constitution of Great Imperial Japan of 1889, and indeed unlike the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982, which contains a huge and ambiguous qualification. The 1947 Constitution of Japan has been accepted by everyone in the Japanese legal and judicial world, but its application in a society based on inequality remains a problem. Until 1945 the social system was based on the ancient five Confucian relationships, all unequal, and in the first half of the twentieth century the primary relationships of loyalty to the ruler and filial piety towards one’s parents were emphasized above all else. Planting a radically democratic constitution based on individualism into such a country was problematical, but that is not a concern of this work.

Instead, it is concerned exclusively with American policy formation. Volume 1, *Washington*, deals with American debates over the projected American invasion of Japan in November 1945, the terms for Japanese surrender, the necessity of the atomic bombs, and the ultimate position of the Emperor of Japan and the imperial institution. The debates went on for years during the war, and Dale Hellegers shows through archival research the many groups and forces and conflicting views that went into decision-making, to the point that one wonders how any decisions were made at all. It is interesting that volume 1 relies exclusively on American English-language sources to show how Americans made up their minds about these matters. Use of Japanese sources, of which the author is capable, would have made the objective situation more clear (for example with regard to Japanese positions on the fate of the Emperor upon surrender), but the author has chosen to show the Ameri-