## 308 Histoire sociale / Social History

versities during the 1890s, university officials decided to enrol women on the basis of the *Abitur*, or German matriculation exam. By doing so, they took decisive steps to limit the number of female students, disqualifying foreign — largely Jewish — women from attendance. The result was that, as a group, female students at German universities were even more socially elite and ethnically distinct than their male peers. As Mazón's intriguing study of novels, plays, and satirical poems reveals, the image of the *Studentin* sparked a wide range of anxieties about German society in its transition to modernity.

By 1910 all German universities were open to women. Yet Mazón argues that, even in this apparent triumph, the negative results of the reformers' compromise became increasingly clear. The first generations of women to enter university found a male world for which, Mazón writes, "the women's movement could not have prepared them and that it did not understand" (p. 84). Co-education was not established on the basis of equality, but rather on the reformers' promise that female students would maintain their femininity and not pursue studies or careers that would place them in competition with men. As a consequence, female students were simply excluded from central activities of student life, which continued to be dominated by the masculine ethos inherent to the concept of academic citizenship. Through the lens of several autobiographical studies, Mazón reveals that the Studentinnen existed as poorer academic cousins to their male counterparts, neither fully accepted as academic citizens nor able to create sustaining parallel female communities. While some influential reformers in Britain and the United States promoted separate institutions as nurturing academic communities for female students, reformers in Imperial Germany early on abandoned the idea of separate colleges for women on the understandable grounds that a female institution would be a second-class one. Although Mazón does not explore this issue in depth, it would seem that by 1904 German education officials also had rejected the separate college model on the grounds of economy.

Adding to the growing number of studies on the history of women in higher education, Patricia Mazón's study will be of interest to scholars of women's history and of education and youth. The book is a successful hybrid of social and intellectual history, using a wide range of voices to explore the cultural terrain on which the question of women's higher education was constructed and contested.

> Sara Z. Burke Laurentian University

METZGER, Chantal — L'Empire colonial français dans la stratégie du Troisième Reich : 1936–1945, Bruxelles, Presses interuniversitaires européennes et Peter Lang, 2002, tomes 1 et 2, 1111 p.

According to Chantal Metzger's conclusions, Adolf Hitler, like Bismarck in his early days, judged colonialism to be stupid, at least as far as Germany was concerned.

Histoire sociale - Social History, vol. XXXVII, nº 74 (novembre-November 2004)

Metzger further informs her readers that nothing could be found in the sources she consulted that can be said to demonstrate that Hitler ever really had a significant plan to develop an overseas German empire (vol. 1, p. 739). With this in mind, it is not unreasonable to ask why Metzger decided to prove this point in almost 750 pages. The short answer is that, while Hitler himself may not have thought much of the idea, many officials of the Third Reich did, and they were not idle between 1936 and 1945, the years under consideration.

Metzger's work is in two volumes. The first comprises her written narrative, while the second contains 200 pages of appendices, the bibliographical information, indices of names and places, and a table of the annexes. The documentary collection and information presented in the second volume could be of use either to specialists in the field or to students of all university levels, and on this grounds alone deserves to be purchased by academic libraries. This review focuses on the information and narrative covered in the first volume.

The narrative is broadly chronological and is presented in three major parts. The first covers the persistence of the German colonial project (the pre-war years); the second considers Hitler's war ("a war without colonial objectives"); and the third is devoted to the end of the colonial discourse, as the tide turned against Germany in North Africa and Eastern Europe, placing colonial ambitions of many officials further and further away from reality.

The first part provides a good summary of how Germans viewed the colonial question as another mirror of the injustices of Versailles and how the Wilhelmine dreams never quite died out. Certainly by 1936, the point at which the narrative begins in earnest, Germans with visions of grandeur had much reason to feel optimistic. Germany was in the ascendance, and no nationalist question seemed beyond reopening at some point in the possibly near future. Metzger provides detailed analysis of the attempted pressures by colonial lobbies, reminiscent of what Bismarck may have faced a few generations earlier, and how they viewed the French empire with jealous eyes. The first steps taken in fulfilment of the overseas ambitions were tentative indeed, and consisted primarily of attempts at Franco-German "collaboration" (pp. 93 ff.) and German academic and religious "missions" (pp. 137 ff.). Metzger makes clear that, throughout these years, it was not simply an errant section of the German Foreign Office that was involved in the question: the OKW, the Abwehr, the propaganda ministry, the universities, and numerous private economic organizations and companies all were actively probing the limits of this potential frontier. Significant effort went into developing an effective administrative apparatus, as well as technical knowledge and support that would be necessary once Germany again took its rightful place in the sun.

The second part of the narrative gets even more interesting, and more than one reader may be reminded of the interplay between German and French officials in the classic film *Casablanca*. Germany's successes in Europe and the subsequent armistice with France seemed to open the door wide to colonial dreamers. Metzger meticulously takes the reader through the steps of negotiations between the German and French sides, paying close attention to the need to placate Italy (pp. 245–267).

## 310 Histoire sociale / Social History

Germany's need to be sensitive to maintaining a positive relationship with Vichy France to gain full access to colonial resources is an important one, and comes to dominate much of the discourse during the early war years. However, as the author demonstrates convincingly, negotiations between the two parties soon turned into negotiations between "victor and vanquished", with the result being the beginnings of German exploitation of French colonial resources (chapter 5).

As the war slowly soured in Europe, and the Allies came to defend Egypt and then landed in North Africa, the dreams of German colonialists slowly began to fade. As Metzger points out, it was not long before General von Epp was left with a Ministry of Colonial Affairs but no colonies over which to rule (p. 535). The third part of the narrative takes the reader through the steps by which the detailed plans of the pre-war era, and the hopes raised by the sudden conquest of France, appeared increasingly unimportant and eventually ridiculous, given the realities imposed upon Germany by its main war effort in Russia. Attention was still commanded by "colonial" questions, especially the potential use of Arabs as allies, but these issues receded further and further from the foreground. From May 1943 onward, the main German interest overseas was primarily related to espionage, and the colonial dream was at an end.

L'Empire colonial français dans la stratégie du Troisième Reich is an impressive work of scholarship. It was a *thèse d'État* at the Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne, where it received the 1999 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle prize given by the Institut d'histoire des relations internationales contemporaines. Its foundation is built upon virtually every conceivable archive and special collection related to the field in Germany and France. One complaint that cannot be levelled against this work is that it lacks either intellectual or historiographical rigour. Aside from the usual preferences peculiar to any given reader, it is difficult to find fault with Metzger's work. Simply put, she fills a gap that has existed in the historiography by answering the question of what role, if any, the French empire played in the German consciousness from the heyday of the Third Reich's strength to its fall. That Hitler, as she demonstrates throughout, never thought all that much of the issue did not mean that he discouraged others from investigating the possibilities.

Each of the three main parts of the narrative has its own short introduction, is structured precisely and logically, and carries a natural coherence. The work is broken down into so many sub-sections that, while on one hand the flow of reading is somewhat hindered, on the other specified subjects are easily identified and dealt with. Metzger demonstrates that there was, ultimately, no firm hand directing the German colonial effort, and many of the fiefdoms of the Third Reich seemed to be working for their own ends. This work thus has value not only for the specialist involved in Franco-German relations or colonial affairs, but also as a case study on how "weak" or chaotic Hitler's dictatorship may have been. It merits attention, therefore, as a general complement to Third Reich literature.

Vasilis Vourkoutiotis University of Ottawa

Histoire sociale - Social History, vol. XXXVII, nº 74 (novembre-November 2004)