politique), variations de publics et variations d'acteurs sociaux, cette confusion dans ce qui souvent ne sont que des simulacres de force, dans ce qui jamais n'est symétrie entre l'écriture, l'action qu'elle suppose et l'opinion qu'elle appelle, ne réussit pas à convaincre d'une opinion publique dont on voit mal ce qu'elle doit désigner. Le projet, en ce sens, ne dépasse pas l'objet.

Si on peut regretter ce flou épistémologique, qu'aurait peut-être pu combler une attention particulière sur les lieux et les circuits d'opinion qu'ont étudiés Fogel, Jouhaud et Descimon, le lecteur se réjouira, à l'évidence, de cette anatomie érudite des batailles polémiques et des bouleversements politiques rythmant le règne de Louis XIII. *Faire voir, faire croire* présente et démontre le processus grâce auquel l'absolutisme s'est progressivement mis en place, à travers la mainmise continue du pouvoir royal sur les différents circuits de l'information politique, littéraire et religieuse que réaliseront plus avant, sous d'autres formes, la censure et la propagande de Louis XIV.

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ENGLISH, Allan D. — *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004. Pp. xvi, 198.

The word "culture", Allan English tells us, has some 150 meanings; if that interests you, you will find most of those meanings explicated early in this book, no doubt satisfying its sponsors, the Canadian Defence Academy and one of its elements, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. Despite many tribulations, the Canadian Forces have decided to add serious education to their culture: degrees have become a requirement for an officer's commission, and post-graduate degrees will henceforth be an asset rather than a question mark for those squeezing their way up the greasy pole to a general officer's status.

For more general readers, the particular interest of *Understanding Military Culture* will derive from English's core question: is Canadian military culture becoming Americanized? It would be no surprise to find that this was the case. Canada's security has long depended on a dominant power — France until 1759, Great Britain until 1940, and the United States ever since. In 1908 Canada and other Dominions formalized a state of affairs that had existed *de facto* for many years: henceforth Canada's military organization, training, and tactical doctrine would be British. In two world wars, Canada's armed forces struggled to be interoperable with those of Britain. Uniforms, customs, mess etiquette, and even the accents of ambitious officers faithfully followed British examples.

In 1948 a similar agreement to imitate the United States was approved by the government of W. L. Mackenzie King. Less perfectly and with many a backward glance, Canada's defenders accepted the Americans as their models and mentors. The change was embraced more eagerly by the Canadian navy and air force than by the older, more culturally self-confident army. For one thing, as equipment-based forces, the air

force and navy had suffered inappropriate and sometimes inferior British aircraft, ships, and weapons during the Second World War and envied their American allies. The army remembered the mass-produced but fire-prone Sherman tank. Some suspected that U.S. generals had been more profligate of their men's lives than their British counterparts.

Today, 56 years and many joint operations since the 1948 decision, plus the integration in North American air defence and countless postings to American naval and military professional schools, formations, and units, would it be surprising that the Canadian Forces have become the most American of our institutions? If Canadian admirals and generals were once almost indistinguishable from their British counterparts, Canadian uniforms were deliberately redesigned in 1968 to be green versions of the United States Air Force service uniform, with rank badges from the United States Navy and little gold maple leafs where U.S. generals wore silver stars.

After a quarter-century in the Canadian Forces, English would properly insist that these are purely superficial symbols. His experience, and an increasingly rich tradition of military sociology on both sides of the border, drives him deeper into the adjoining cultures and enriches his readers accordingly. Ironically, many of the qualities and most of the defects in U.S. military culture reported by English have sociological dimensions. A common feature in any military organization is promotion. How can officers best be selected for advancement? How will the ambitious manipulate the measurements? Are the best officers those who take initiatives or those who always "get it right"? Does a "zero defects" policy inhibit risk-taking? Officers who insist that they and their units are "ready, aye, ready" for any challenge may sacrifice others to win approval from superiors. Studies show that lower ranks in the U.S. forces have lost confidence in the integrity of superiors. "Risk aversion" also discourages juniors from communicating defects to their superiors.

These were common charges in the era of the Vietnam war, and they are back again. In post-Cold-War cutbacks, based on arbitrary assessment, the lowest third of U.S. officers were terminated. The rest absorbed a harsh lesson in the importance of pleasing superiors. Officers who were less than positive about the long-term prospects in Iraq or who suggested that it would take longer and more troops than Secretary Rumsfeld or President Bush wanted to believe have been sidelined or retired. Not surprisingly, risk-aversion and a potentially demoralizing careerism have also been alleged in the contemporary Canadian Forces. Of course, unless they revert to measuring seniority as sole criterion for advancement, peacetime armed forces always have difficulty predicting who will succeed on active service.

Unlike the American forces, with four powerful and distinct service cultures, Canada's three armed services were officially unified in 1968. If old rivalries survived and were even confirmed by distinct uniforms during the Mulroney era, English argues, unification makes it easier for Canada to anticipate the "jointness" which has been one of the watchwords of the Rumsfeld era. The American services, in contrast, fight for their own interests. Anyone who visits one of the service academies soon discovers that rival academies are the enemy. Of course, an observer of the rivalries between Canada's services, branches, and even regiments might question English's optimism about jointness.

Still, there are real differences between the Canadian and American service cultures. Despite conscription crises, Canada has depended on volunteers to fight wars and fill present-day forces; American wars until the 1990s were fought by masses of draftees. In consequence, suggests English, Canada tolerates no loss of rights on the part of service members; the United States allows considerable constraints. In Canada, service is increasingly a job; in the U.S. it is linked to an anachronistic and even politicized patriotism.

Americans, English suggests, might even have something to learn from Canadian experience. After focussing exclusively on full-scale combat, U.S. doctrine must now adjust to peace support missions and "Operations other than war" that Canadians have practised for 40 years. Like Canadians, American military personnel grow older, are more likely to be married, and tent to place priority on family responsibilities. Like NDHQ, the Pentagon now deals with civilian leaders without military experience. Smaller, unified, and ahead of the curve in experience, "the armed forces of Canada", English concludes, "may be in a better position than the American services to weather the storms of the future and at the same time, provide a model for its larger allies to emulate" (p. 151).

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FORTH, Christopher E. — *The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of French Manhood.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. Pp. xii, 241.

By the 1890s, Christopher Forth tells us, France was suffering from a crisis of manhood. Increasingly working in sedentary occupations, challenged by newly assertive females and increasingly visible homosexuals, French men feared that they — and society at large — were losing their virility. This is consistent with what a number of scholars have recently claimed (most notably, Venita Datta, *Birth of a National Icon*, 2002, and Robert Nye, *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France*, 1993). By and large they have seen the crisis in terms of a general reaction — mostly by the political right — to the forces of modernity. It comes as no surprise that anti-Dreyfusards should ridicule effete intellectuals and Jews, contrasting their physical feebleness with the robust virility of the army. But Forth argues that the preoccupation with manhood was equally intense among the partisans of progress — the Dreyfusards. They couched their defence of Dreyfus in classically masculine terms, stressing their courage and their virile search for the truth, and pointed to the essentially female characteristics of the gullible anti-Dreyfusard mobs and a typically feminine resistance to the truth on the part of Dreyfus's antagonists. Forth makes his case through a detailed and subtle examination of the discourse of both sides in the affair with particular attention to the graphic representations in the popular press.

What does all of this tell us about the Dreyfus Affair? Forth is never entirely clear about the exact connection between the crisis of masculinity and the Affair itself. He acknowledges that the crisis of masculinity can hardly explain the Affair since,