Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s *Crime and Punishment in the Russian Revolution* opens with a brief history of St. Petersburg (renamed Petrograd in 1914), a city with real and powerful social divisions and one plagued, as a result of recent decades of industrialization and urbanization, by increased criminality. With the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, law and order in the imperial capital eroded rather quickly; things deteriorated even further when, following the abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917, the Provisional Government decided to dismantle the tsarist criminal justice system and its much-hated police force. Furthermore, all incarcerated prisoners were freed, and a large number of weapons fell into the hands of hooligans and criminals. Drug abuse, theft and robbery, gambling, prostitution and venereal disease, alcoholism, kidnapping and rape, and murder became rampant. Lastly, the acute shortage of consumer goods, above all food, a housing crisis, skyrocketing inflation, the decline in real wages, as well as the roaming and brawling of drunken sailors and soldiers—both psychologically brutalized on an unprecedented scale by the carnage of the First World War—also accounted for a significant increase in the crime rate and fostered social disintegration.

The Provisional Government, whose authority was eroded by incessant political crises, failed to establish a new, centralized, and coherent legal order that would be accepted and respected in Petrograd. The same fate befell a municipal government (the city duma) that soon found itself confronted with escalating problems. Since the latter was broke, it could not provide essential social services to its citizens; for example, the city militia that replaced the tsarist police force was poorly trained and provisioned, badly coordinated across districts, too often lacking self-control, and occasionally infiltrated by former criminals; unsurprisingly, it proved to be ineffective. The fact that workers chose to patrol their own neighbourhoods through their own militias (a class-based, politicized police that revealed the powerful force of decentralization spawned by the Revolution itself) did not help either.

Unable to rely on higher authorities to protect their property and their lives, frustrated city dwellers, as they came to appreciate their own vulnerability, reacted with anger and violence. Insecure, deprived, and desperate, they turned to vigilantism; they took the law into their own hands. Mob justice (*samosud*), a symbol of their fleeting empowerment, thus became “the ultimate symbol of February’s hopes dashed” (p. 167). This violence, frequent and extraordinarily brutal, was directed against merchants, political opponents, medical personnel, even simple thieves and robbers. Predictably, not only did it fail to stem the crime rate, but it also contributed to escalating lawlessness and violence. Lawyers and journalists, who argued that mob justice represented a serious danger to the creation of a genuine civil society, could not contain the fury of the crowd. Thus a vicious cycle of fear, rage, and violence was created—one that alienated the people from politics, contributed to the disintegration of society, and set the stage for
Lenin’s October coup d’état, a takeover that was largely ignored by Petrograders consumed by their daily struggle for survival. Criminality, Hasegawa concludes, had fostered conditions for state failure.

Once in power, though, the Bolsheviks were immediately challenged by the very breakdown of social order that they had helped unleash before October. Actually, social disintegration accelerated as robberies and murders increased in quantity and intensity to the point, for example, where even a funeral procession turned into a shootout. The destructiveness of the so-called alcohol pogroms (from November 1917 to January 1918) as well as a significant escalation of mob justice—a mayhem that resulted in hundreds of lives lost, property stolen, and cultural treasures ruined—affected the Bolsheviks’ attitude toward crime, police, and governance in general. They convinced them that the infestation of crime in the capital had to be dealt with coercively. Lenin’s government ultimately restored order by establishing the Cheka, a centralized and state-driven police force that, by using unprecedented coercion, suppressed crime and paved the way for the establishment of the first totalitarian state. The centrifugal aims of the revolution were thus categorically rejected. The Bolsheviks had found an answer: crime was now configured and declared a counterrevolutionary political act. Indeed, since it threatened not just public order, but also socialism and the Soviet state, crime had to be eradicated by any means, even by “a machine of terror unencumbered by law or institutional oversight” (p. 259). Arrests, trials, imprisonments, deportations to forced labour camps, and executions followed.

First and foremost an examination of the year 1917 in Petrograd through the lens of crime and its lethal impact on ordinary people, this well-researched and well-written monograph adds an important new perspective to our understanding of that brief but tumultuous period of history. Its originality is double: first, it focuses on people—the unorganized and alienated urban poor, the men and women who occupied the lower rungs of society—that even social historians have too often ignored; second, it draws on Emile Durkheim’s sociological theory of anomie—the condition of normlessness that explains the inability of a society to maintain cohesion—and, borrowing here from Max Weber, on the theory of the failed state, with the growth of criminal violence as a key indicator of the very failure of authorities to supply security, especially human security.

Crime and Punishment in the Russian Revolution relies on archival materials, memoirs, newspapers, cartoons, as well as secondary writings. Hasegawa draws on contemporary accounts that recreate very vividly the prevailing atmosphere in the troubled city; he also does it with a touch of black humour: at the founding conference of the Knights of Knives and Screwdrivers (the colourful name thieves gave to their union), a seasoned thief complained that he had been pickpocketed! This is social history from the bottom up at its very best.

No book is perfect, though. Readers will discover fairly quickly that the author does not hide his antipathy towards Lenin, the “infamous Bolshevik leader” (p. 83), who possessed “no specific solutions to any of the crises besetting Russia in 1917” (p. 196) and who, once in power, “had no idea how to act on their creed” (p. 229). Not everyone will agree with such a throwback to Cold War historiography.
Furthermore, significant as crime was in Petrograd for the political fortunes of the Bolsheviks, one could argue that there were more important reasons that explained their coming to power in the Fall of 1917, such as Lenin’s ideological justifications that convinced members of his party that the time was ripe for the revolution to transition from the bourgeois-democratic phase of development to the proletarian-socialist one, as well as the Bolsheviks’ answers to the popular demands for 1) an end to Russia’s participation in the Great War, 2) workers’ control in the factories, 3) a large measure of autonomy on the peripheries of the now deceased Russian Empire, where many non-Russian nationalities were located, and 4) the legalization of the seizure by the peasants of nobles’ estates in the countryside. Should not all historians try to avoid mistaking a tree, even a big one, for a forest? Nevertheless, as a street-level analysis of the disturbances and chaos that engulfed Petrograd in 1917, this monograph—a project that was in the making, the author confesses in a brief epilogue, for thirty years—is very much worth reading.

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Young-Sun Hong’s book is a welcome contribution to global Cold War history, the sprawling field that explores the military, diplomatic, and development activities not only of the US and USSR, but of other states as well. Deeply researched and densely argued, the book examines Cold War Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, or West and East Germany) and its engagement with what was, at the time, known as the “Third World.” In addition to central Europe, the action unfolds in Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Guinea, India, the Koreas, the Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam—parts of what David Engerman in *Kritika* (2011) so evocatively called the “second world’s third world.”

Like much other work published since Odd Arne Westad’s *Global Cold War* (2005), this book holds the conviction that the conflict cannot be understood as epiphenomenal to the Moscow-Washington rivalry. Rather, undertakings of the type Hong examines had an independent logic and momentum of their own, albeit one connected to the greater drama. She explores a wide range of German international activity that falls under the rubric of what she calls the “global humanitarian regime,” encompassing medical aid, housing and infrastructure construction, public health, and medical education. These included East German efforts to help North Korea rebuild after the 1953 armistice, West German construction and operation of a South Korean hospital in postwar Pusan, and both Germany’s medical missions to Algeria and Congo (among other destinations) in