In their essay, Nancy Bouchier and Ken Cruikshank, professors of history at Hamilton’s McMaster University, argue the merits of historical recall in shaping issue awareness and inspiration for resolving problems. They use their case study of Hamilton’s polluted bay-waterfront to frame the struggle by concerned individuals and groups to address a problem well over a century old. Noting that some half-million Hamiltonians relate to the bay-waterfront as a site for living, working, and/or playing, they examine past efforts to engage, sustain, manage, and reshape its social and natural environment. Their “public history” translated into aroused public dialogue and action on the environment and on the community’s health and recreational spaces, bringing together social activists, political leaders, local conservation authorities, and fish and wildlife officials. Historic plaques residing amid warning signs about health and safety hazards, a new nature park created from a toxic dump site, the rejuvenation of plant, bird, and fish populations, and “people presence” are examples of this particular history’s “struggle” to inform and activate. As Bouchier and Cruikshank make evident, much has been done, and much more needs doing.

Collectively, the six essays above resemble an engagement with Marxist theory, a dimension of which Playing for Change underscores by reflection and research into unequal access to sport as a participatory form in contemporary societies. More than Just Games, in contrast, seems like Gramscian theory, in that people often play sport in contested terrain, seeking control and power. Those differences aside, both books offer a tenet worthy of reflection as well as a recipe for action: “[T]o resist is to challenge, to challenge is to change.”

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In May 1789, the six hundred non-clerical and non-noble members of the Estates-General, after having been forced to wait for two hours, were coldly received by King Louis XVI of France at Versailles. Within a few months, the outbreak of revolution had created an existential threat to the Bourbon monarchy and, in January 1793, Louis himself ascended the scaffold in Paris. Historians have often interpreted these dramatic events as the beginning of Europe’s “Age of Revolution.” In the following decades, the continent’s remaining hereditary rulers were forced onto the defensive, fighting an increasingly desperate rearguard action against the forces of constitutionalism, parliamentarianism, republicanism, and socialism. The collapse of the three great empires of Central and Eastern Europe in the final months of the First World War served as the coda to these largely hopeless efforts to safeguard monarchical privilege in an increasingly democratic age. This narrative
of inevitable decline, according to Frank Lorenz Müller, is misleading: when war broke out in 1914, monarchy had not been pushed irreversibly onto the back foot, but was still widely popular. Exploring the paths to the throne taken by the heirs to three of Germany’s smaller kingdoms—Ludwig of Bavaria, Friedrich August of Saxony, and Wilhelm of Württemberg—and shifting his analytical focus to the “monarchical future” of these men, Müller seeks to uncover the reasons for the enduring relevance and surprising resilience of monarchy into the first decades of the twentieth century. After all, “notwithstanding the fact that they would end up as the last of their kind, the three princes predestined to ascend the thrones in Munich, Stuttgart and Dresden one day had every reason to expect that they and their families had a rich future ahead of them” (pp. 6-7).

This confidence in the future did not mean that Ludwig, Friedrich August, and Wilhelm could approach their royal duties with complacency. Europe during the “long nineteenth century,” a period stretching from the French Revolution to the outbreak of the First World War, witnessed far-reaching economic and social changes that fundamentally altered the relationship between rulers and subjects. The revolutionary concept of popular sovereignty and the gradual appearance of a highly educated and politically ambitious middle class increased the pressure on monarchs across the continent to share their decision-making authority with ministers and parliaments. The political mobilization of the working class as a result of industrialization and urbanization created still another threat to the principle of hereditary rule. No longer confident in the unconditional loyalty of their subjects, Europe’s ruling houses therefore embarked on wide-ranging public relations campaigns that exploited new forms of mass communication in order to redefine the function of monarchs in a constantly changing society. Even before they ascended their thrones, the future Ludwig III of Bavaria, Friedrich August III of Saxony, and Wilhelm II of Württemberg played important roles in these transformative efforts. Not only were they expected to demonstrate their competence in the political sphere as members of parliamentary upper houses and uphold the image of the “heroic monarchy” as high-ranking officers in their armies, the three heirs had to portray themselves as guarantors of future political stability, impartial mediators of confessional conflict, and embodiments of prevailing domestic virtues. Failing to live up to public expectations could have serious consequences. It took several years and tireless effort for Friedrich August to rebuild his image as a loving and devoted father after his wife fled to Switzerland to join her Belgian lover in December 1902.

As Friedrich August’s dedication to overcoming his marital disaster reveals, the heirs to the thrones of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg clearly understood that “princes in glass houses should not throw tantrums” (p. 64). They also had to coexist with one another. While Müller convincingly depicts the three German ruling houses as “learning institutions” and, in doing so, contributes to an expanding body of literature on the malleability of monarchy in the decades before the First World War, his study also sheds much-needed light on monarchical relationships within the German empire. Somewhat ironically, the “blood and iron” approach to Germany’s unification pursued by Prussian Minister-President Otto von Bismarck...
in the late 1860s involved substantial concessions to Germany’s smaller dynasties. After 1871, the German emperor, or Kaiser, who simultaneously wore the crown of the empire’s largest state, Prussia, coexisted with almost two dozen other sovereigns. Many of these were politically unimportant: in 1895, Prince Georg of Schaumburg-Lippe’s domain amounted to barely more than three hundred square kilometers and contained only forty-one thousand inhabitants. That being said, even as heirs to three of the empire’s far larger and more influential states, Ludwig, Friedrich August, and Wilhelm were compelled to perform a delicate balancing act between the nation and region after unification. Because the centripetal pull of an imperial monarchy might one day render their ruling houses superfluous, all three men “had to fit into and continue the telling of dynastic stories of regional rootedness that had helped turn their kingdoms into clearly defined narrower German fatherlands within a wider German nation” (p. 126). At the same time, each heir also had to participate in the “nationalisation of monarchy.” Otherwise, they risked exposing themselves to accusations of particularism and disloyalty to the empire. The abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in November 1918 put an end to this balancing act, but also removed the threat that had, in large part, justified the continued existence of the lesser German dynasties. Having read the writing on the wall, Ludwig, Friedrich August, and Wilhelm left their capitals and retired to their country estates without even putting up a fight.

Because the First World War marked the end for the ruling houses of the smaller German kingdoms, it is disappointing that Müller did not include a chapter on the efforts of Ludwig, Friedrich August, and Wilhelm to come to grips with the challenges of wartime. It would have been interesting to learn how these three men, now sitting on their thrones, sought to retain popular support for their dynasties in the context of growing casualty lists, increasing food shortages, and intensifying labour disputes. Briefly addressing the roles played by the next generation of heirs—Ludwig’s son Rupprecht and Wilhelm’s distant cousin Albrecht served as senior commanders on the Western Front and thereby upheld the martial traditions of their ruling houses—would have further justified Müller’s focus on the monarchical future. The absence of such a chapter does not take away from what is otherwise an impressive piece of scholarship and one that is written in an engaging style. This book is the product of exhaustive research in archives across Germany, as well as careful analysis of contemporary mass media, which, like the depiction of Ludwig’s thoroughly unmilitary appearance in the satirical magazine *Simplicissimus*, highlight the many public relations pitfalls that the three heirs encountered on their paths to the throne. Perhaps the most important contribution of this study is its call for further research into Europe’s monarchies and, in particular, the lesser German dynasties around the turn of the twentieth century. Müller’s study, as well as other the contributions emerging from the “Heirs to the Throne” project at the University of St Andrews, will go a long way towards filling this gap in the historiography.

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