What is most surprising about The Best Poor Man's Country is that in a book so distinguished by technical competence there is a weakness in the way the author handles his main thesis. Dr. Lemon has imparted unity and direction to what in less skilled hands might have been a disastrously diffuse study by emphasizing the commonly shared liberal — i.e. individualistic and acquisitive — values that Pennsylvania residents held and the way in which these values determined the character of colonial society. In doing so, Dr. Lemon demonstrates the fallaciousness of theories ascribing the various social practices and conditions that emerged in Pennsylvania to differences between national groups and rejects the argument that the environment evoked certain kinds of critical social responses. Dr. Lemon argues that "...ideology... determined [Pennsylvanians'] actions..." and that ideology was the "...middle-class orientation of many of the settlers who elected to leave their European communities" (p. xv). It is not the thrust of the argument that I find disappointing, although personally I would stress the natural as well as the evolving social environment somewhat more, but the way in which it is presented. Despite the fact that the initial strength of the settlers' commitment to liberal values is untestable — for there is no way of controlling for the influence of environment — Dr. Lemon makes repeated generalizations about the unanimity and intensity with which newcomers embraced these imperatives. In a book so carefully constructed, documented, and controlled, such statements appear so sweeping, so dogmatically pronounced that they serve to irritate rather than illuminate. But this fault and the author's prose style, which is rough if not tortuous at times, are the only noteworthy flaws in a first-rate book.

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As the title suggests, this book is not so much a biography of a man, as a study of his money. The author has made exhaustive and intelligent use of a wide variety of sources on both sides of the Atlantic in order to lay bare the means by which Admiral Peter Warren (and his heirs) acquired and managed his fortune. Professor Gwyn's claim that such a study provides a method of re-examining certain assumptions concerning what may be termed life, land and loot in the 18th century British Empire would seem to be amply borne out by the evidence of his research, whilst the painstaking historical reconstruction involved leaves the reviewer filled with admiration. The fact that so complicated a study is presented in a lively and readable fashion is even more admirable. The book is to be highly commended.

In the light of this I hope the author will forgive me if I ignore most of his themes to concentrate upon that implied in the main title The Enterprising Admiral, and trust that other reviewers will treat the rest with the justice it deserves. Just how enterprising an Admiral was Peter Warren?

The history of eighteenth century England abounds with examples of crusty old admirals who, after a lifetime of hard fighting and triumph, retired amidst the plaudits of their fellow countrymen. Along the way many of them collected considerable fortunes from their share of the prize money earned from captured enemy shipping.
Vice Admiral Sir Peter Warren certainly earned both praise and fortune but his fighting career was brief and not particularly distinguished, and as soon as he became rich he apparently had little inclination to continue in the King's Service. He struck his flag in 1748 at the early age of 44, became a Member of Parliament and country squire, and then, fortune deserting him, died four years later.

As a fighting officer he hardly deserves examination, partly it must be said through no fault of his own. He joined the navy in 1716 and thus until 1739 there was little opportunity for combat. However, when war broke out he commanded a squadron in North America and the West Indies which saw little or no action until the entry of France into the conflict in 1744. The results for Warren were not bloody battle, but easy prize money from the capture of homeward bound (and richly laden) French West India men. He served as rear admiral under Anson in the battle off Cape Ortegal in 1747 but the credit for that victory presumably belongs principally to the latter. This did not prevent Warren from sharing in the glory (he was knighted) or the prize money he received, about £30,000.

Apart from the fact that prize money made him very rich, Warren's only claim to fame is that he commanded the blockading squadron off Louisburg when the Massachusetts militia (against his advice) attacked and captured that fortress in 1745. Even here his role was secondary and resulted for him, not in ardent naval combat, but in further accessions of easy prize money.

The author sees in Warren an example of how young men of obscure ancestry and less fortune could use a naval career to amass wealth and social status. However, beyond the fact that his success might inspire youngsters to go to sea this is debatable, for there can be no doubt that Warren was exceedingly lucky, and even then, did not acquire more than a modest estate until the last four years of his naval career. One has the impression that his sudden elevation was as unexpected to him as it was to others. His ambition for most of his life was perhaps to live as a decent if modest country gentleman. In his case the race was not to the swift but to the unexpectedly lucky.

Let us see just how lucky Warren was. True he was born of impoverished Catholic parents, but they possessed very prominent Protestant relatives and he was prudently raised as a Protestant. His naval career was not hindered by the fact that one of his mother's relatives was Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Matthew Aylmer. His first promotion occurred when a superior officer in his ship was killed by natives off the Coast of Africa, and his first command, (in 1726, of no less than a 50 gun ship), came as a result of his captain's equally convenient death at sea. Given the seniority lists of a preacetime navy, this good fortune was hardly short of astounding. He was equally fortunate in his naval postings for after 1727 he seems to have spent most of his time on the American and West Indies stations where a naval captain, (no matter how impoverished), was quite a catch for some merchant's daughter. His marriage in 1731 to the daughter of Stephen Delancey of New York provided Warren with his first solid wealth. More importantly, it put him into contact with relatives who were to prove essential in increasing that wealth, for despite Professor Gwyn, one is left with the feeling that at least in the case of his successful investments in America, his in-laws provided the direction. Where, (in the Mohawk settlement for example) Warren made his own decisions, the outcome was much less fortunate. His gradual acquisition of land in Ireland was, (at least in the beginning), no more than a familial desire to recover the family estates, although after 1748 his investments there were much more extensive.
Professor Gwyn, with a wealth of exact scholarship, traces the history of Warren's investments first in America and Ireland and later in Britain where he purchased an estate and bought heavily into Government stock. He sees Warren as a “war entrepreneur,” who, unlike many other officers, was interested in trade and happy to associate with merchants. Warren's acquisition of wealth, and his mode of investing it is contrasted with, it is argued, the conservative and cautious policy of his widow and her descendants. One wonders whether too much can be made of the methods used by Warren in his investments. Could it not be argued that his first ventures arose in America because his marriage settlement concerned American properties, and not only he, but even more, his relatives were at hand to manage them? With the rapid accession of prize money from 1744 onwards — and given the fact that this was one of the few times when the Admiral had to devote considerable attention to his naval duties in America — where else could he have put his prize money except into government funds, no matter whether they were depressed by fears of Jacobites or not. Even here one assumes he acted at least initially on the advice of his brokers. Certainly Warren's actions after 1748 — purchasing his estate in Hampshire and entering Parliament — were exactly what one might expect of a successful parvenu. We cannot say what Warren might have gone on to do if his life had been longer, but this reviewer cannot condemn his widow's investment policies quite as much as does the author. True, neither she nor her sons-in-law were speculators, but why should they have been? Was not the aim of 18th century man to become a gentleman and live in the style and dignity requisite to that station? Warren's fortune was large enough for this purpose and the end of the eighteenth century saw it still intact. Few in those times would have hoped for anything more.

These comments notwithstanding, Professor Gwyn has written an admirable book which in its use of difficult and even now under-utilised sources, should encourage everyone in the field of socio-economic history to persevere in pursuit of the grimy facts. Too much may be made of Warren as an example of the 18th century naval career, but the history of his fortune fully justifies the work.

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Aspects of Early New York Society and Politics is a scrapbook of papers and pictures from a conference held in Tarrytown in October, 1971. This miscellany would certainly never have been assembled and published except that, in the words of the editors, “as part of its educational service to the academic community and general public, Sleepy Hollow Restorations sponsors occasional conferences on various aspects of American history” and prints the results. “The results” in this case consist of three research papers by Patricia Bonomi, Thomas Archdeacon, and Edwin Burrows on such disparate subjects as local government and politics, Leisler’s Rebellion, and military service and the origins of Federalism and Anti-Federalism; a “gloria” to New York as the “prototypical” American colony by Milton Klein; two brief critical commentaries on the above by Lawrence Leder and Jackson Turner Main; and an after-dinner talk by Richard Morris about John Jay and the Revolution.

In addition to this conference material, and in an effort to bring some order to the proceedings, the editors have included a few pages of introduction that