Social Demography of the Chinese and Japanese in the United States of America

by Stanford M. LYMAN *

This paper focuses on differences in the first phases of Chinese and Japanese contact with the United States. Specifically, it discusses the factors affecting the location and settlement patterns of these two immigrant racial groups. These patterns were affected by 1) the occupational opportunities available for the groups at the time of their arrival in America; 2) the scope and effectiveness of general community controls and the social and economic effects of indebtedness; 3) the social and economic effects of the sex ratio and the availability of husbands and wives. Changes in the patterns first established have occurred because of changes in occupational opportunities, changes necessitated by child-rearing and other familial issues, and sudden politically-inspired enforced movements made involuntarily.

I. — THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES.

A. NUMBER.

Although only a few Chinese had ever come to the United States between 1790 and 1850, a great number began to arrive after news of California's gold strike had reached China. By 1860 the census recorded more than 34,000 Chinese in the United States and in that same year San Francisco's custom house counted over 46,000 passing through its gates. [1] The number continued to grow until 1882, when the United States Congress, influenced by the general anti-Chinese sentiment in California [2] and pressured by the notoriously racist labor unions in the eastern and midwestern cities, [3] passed restrictive legislation prohibiting the coming of Chinese laborers for ten years. This prohibition was renewed every

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[1] See Mary COOLIDGE, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1909), pp. 498-499.

[2] See Elmer C. SANDMEYER, *The Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Urbana, Ill., 1939), pp. 25-95.

[3] See Herbert HILL, "The Racial Practices of Organized Labor — The Age of Gompers and After", in Arthur M. Ross and Herbert HILL (Eds.), *Employment, Race, and Poverty : A Critical Study of the Disadvantaged Status of Negro Workers from 1865 to 1965* (New York, 1967), pp. 365-402.

Table I

CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN UNITED STATES, 1790-1950.

	Chinese		Japanese	Increase			
	Census	Other [1]	Census	Chinese		Japanese	
1790	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1800	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1810	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1820	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1830	—	3 [2]	—	—	—	—	—
1840	—	8 [2]	—	—	—	—	—
1850	—	450 [2]	—	—	—	—	—
1860	34,933	46,897	—	—	—	—	—
1870	63,199	71,083	55	+28,266	80.9	—	—
1880	105,465	104,881	148	+42,266	66.9	+93	—
1890	107,488 [3]	—	2,039	+2,010 [3]	1.9	+1,891	1,277.7
1900	89,863	—	24,326	—17,625	—16.4	+22,287	1,093.0
1910	71,531	—	72,157	—18,332	—20.4	+47,831	196.6
1920	61,639	—	111,010	—9,892	—13.8	+38,853	53.8
1930	74,954	—	138,834	+13,316	21.6	+27,824	25.1
1940	77,504	—	126,947	+2,550	3.4	—11,887	—8.6
1950	117,629	—	141,768	+40,125	51.8	+14,821	11.7

Source : U.S. Census Data.

[1] Figures in Mary COOLIDGE, *Chinese Immigration* (New York : Henry Holt, 1909), appendix, p. 498.
[2] Chinese arrivals at San Francisco Custom House, *loc. cit.*
[3] Exclusive of population enumerated in 1890 on Indian reservations : Chinese, 13.

ten years thereafter until total exclusion was achieved in the unlimited extension of the prohibition by the Act of 1904. Thirty-nine years later absolute prohibition was lifted and a very limited quota system was established. After 1943 Chinese entrance to the United States was facilitated by several kinds of special legislation and by private bills. [4] During the Johnson Administration quotas by national origin were lifted and many more Chinese have been eligible to enter the United States.

As Table I shows, the absolute number of Chinese declined in the three decades after 1890. Unable to enter the United States after 1882, and also unable, under a special provision of the law, to bring over their wives to join them, [5] the Chinese steadily aged and died off or returned to China with no new Chinese to take their place. "The Chinese population is slowly declining in the United States", wrote Robert E. Park in 1926, "but San Francisco, at any rate, will miss its Chinese quarter when it goes." [6] Park's prophecy proved wrong, however. Chinatown did not disappear. Between 1920 and 1930 the decline in numbers of Chinese was arrested. Some entered the country as members of the categories exempted from prohibition by the law; [7] others were smuggled across the Canadian and Mexican borders, [8] or procured false papers linking them with Chinese families in America; [9] some have been born in the United States from among the few whole families established here. The heavier growth which shows up after 1940 is explained by the lifting of exclusion, the hundreds who entered under the annual quota and special legislation, the "new immigration" which occurred with the end of quotas

[4] See S. W. KUNG, *Chinese in American Life : Some Aspects of Their History, Status, Problems, and Contributions* (Seattle, 1962), pp. 132-147.

[5] "The wife of a Chinese labourer or a Chinese woman not previously a labourer, who married a Chinese labourer, was held to have or acquire the status of the husband, and was not permitted to enter the United States." Huang TSEN-MING, *The Legal Status of the Chinese Abroad* (Taipei, 1954), p. 84. See *The Case of the Chinese Wife*, 21 Fed. 785 (1884).

[6] Robert E. PARK, "Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific", *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), p. 151.

[7] "The 1882 Act which also barred Chinese from naturalization did not prohibit, however, the entry of Chinese teachers, students, merchants, or those 'proceeding to the United States... from curiosity'." Frank L. AUERBACH, *Immigration Laws of the United States* (Indianapolis, 1961), p. 7.

[8] See James G. MCCURDY, *By Juan de Fuca's Strait : Pioneering Along the Northwestern Edge of the Continent* (Portland, 1937), pp. 209, 282. For an interesting aspect of the Mexican border problem, see F. B. WORLEY, "Five Hundred Chinese Refugees", *Overland Monthly*, April 1918, pp. 290-294.

[9] Timothy J. MOLLOY, "A Century of Chinese Immigration : A Brief Review", *Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review*, December 1947, pp. 69-75. For a critique of America's Chinese immigration policy, see Burton H. WOLFE, "The Chinese Immigration Puzzle", *Chicago Jewish Forum*, Fall, 1959, pp. 33-39.

by national origin after 1966, and by a natural increase following the establishment of more Chinese families on the American mainland.

The Japanese did not start coming to the United States in any great numbers until after 1880. The Exclusion Act of 1882 did not apply to Japanese and they remained unrestricted in their immigration until 1907, when the Immigration Act of that year authorized the President to refuse admission to certain persons if he became satisfied that their coming would be detrimental to labor interests. Although the Japanese Government had begun to discourage immigration to the continental United States, Japanese had obtained visas to Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico, whence they entered the United States. On 14 March, 1907, the President issued a proclamation excluding from the continental United States all "Japanese and Korean laborers, skilled or unskilled, who had received passports to go to Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii and come therefrom". [10] This executive order was implemented the following year by the so-called Gentleman's Agreement concluded between the United States and Japan, whereby Japan agreed to issue passports for travel to the United States only to those of its laborers who were former residents thereof, to parents, wives, or children of residents of the United States, and to agriculturists. [11] The Act of 1917 further restricted Oriental immigration by establishing a "barred zone", including parts of China, all of India, Burma, Siam, the Malay States, Asiatic Russia, the Polynesian and East Indian Islands, and parts of Arabia and Afghanistan, from which no natives were admissible. [12] In the Omnibus Act of 1924 Japanese were excluded from further immigration to the United States by the provision which refused admission to aliens ineligible for citizenship. That category included all those who were not "free white persons", as well as "aliens of African nativity" and "persons of African descent" according to the Naturalization Act of 1906. [13] In 1940 Chinese and a few others were dropped from ineligibility to naturalization, and in 1952 the ineligibility based on race and national origins was dropped altogether. The Act of 1952 established an annual quota for Japan of 185, [14] which lasted until, fourteen years later, a "needed skills" requirement was substituted for the quota system.

[10] Executive Order No. 589, 14 March 1907.

[11] See Thomas A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (Gloucester, Mass., 1964), pp. 150-165, 233-234, 270-280, 305-321.

[12] Auerbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 93 n.

[13] Huang Tsen-ming, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-175.

[14] Auerbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-97.

B. Distribution and Concentration.

Tables II A and B show the Chinese and Japanese population by regions. Although the total number of Chinese in the United States dropped continuously from 1890 through 1920, the seven regions east of the Mountain Region show increases in Chinese population for all but a few decades. On the other hand, the Mountain Region shows a regular decline after 1880 until 1950, when a sharp increase still left the Chinese population below the level of 1920. The Pacific Region shows a decline in Chinese population from 1880 to 1920, when a recovery began. Except for 1950 the Chinese population on the Pacific Coast has, since 1910, been less than 50,000.

Until 1940 only three regions east of the Rocky Mountain area had over 1,000 Japanese — Middle Atlantic, West North Central and East North Central. Of these, only the Middle Atlantic Region sustained a Japanese population of over 1,000 steadily through 1950. By 1950, the relocation necessitated by the wartime exclusion from the Pacific Coast resulted in a Japanese population of over 1,000 in five regions east of the Mountain Region. The Moutain Region, which witnessed a depopulation of Chinese steadily after 1880, showed an irregular increase in Japanese for every decade except 1930-1940. The Pacific Region, similarly, showed a rapid and large increase irregularly after 1880, except for the 1930's and the war years after 1940. Since 1910, when Japanese first outnumbered Chinese in the United States, their population on the Pacific Coast has always exceeded 50,000.

Tables III A and B show the comparative concentration of Chinese and Japanese in the Pacific, Mountain, and Pacific and Mountain Regions, and the rest of the United States. Over 75% of the Japanese in the United States have lived on the Pacific Coast since 1890 : 80% or more since 1910. Only in 1950 did the proportion of Japanese on the Pacific Coast drop to 69.5% of the total Japanese population. Since 1900 the Japanese population in the combined Pacific-Mountain Regions has hovered around 95%, except for the drop to 79.5% in 1950.

On the other hand, there has been a greater eastward dispersion of Chinese. From a point of 83.4% in 1880, the proportion of the Chinese population on the Pacific Coast has fallen to slightly more than one-half since 1920. In the Mountain Region, it decreased from 13.5% in 1880 to

Table IIA

CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES BY REGIONS, 1880-1950.

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950
United States Total	105,465	107,488	89,863	71,531	61,639	74,954	77,504	117,629
New England	401	1,488	4,203	3,499	3,602	3,794	3,238	4,684
Middle Atlantic	1,227	4,689	10,490	8,189	8,812	14,005	16,408	24,247
East North Central	390	1,254	2,533	3,415	5,043	6,340	4,799	8,454
West North Central	423	1,097	1,135	1,195	1,678	1,738	1,293	2,192
South Atlantic	74	669	1,791	1,582	1,824	1,869	2,047	4,755
East South Central	90	274	427	414	542	743	944	1,763
West South Central	758	1,173	1,555	1,303	1,534	1,582	1,935	3,950
Mountain	14,274	11,572	7,950	5,614	4,339	3,252	2,853	3,750
Pacific	87,828	85,272	59,779	46,320	34,265	41,631	43,987	63,834

Source : U.S. Census Data.

Table IIB

JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES BY REGIONS, 1880-1950.

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950
United States Total	148	2,038	24,326	72,157	111,010	138,534	126,947	141,768
New England	14	45	89	272	347	352	340	732
Middle Atlantic	27	202	446	1,643	3,266	3,662	3,060	6,706
East North Central	7	101	126	482	927	1,022	816	15,996
West North Central	1	16	223	1,000	1,215	1,003	755	2,738
South Atlantic	5	55	29	156	360	393	442	1,393
East South Central	—	19	7	26	35	46	43	328
West South Central	—	42	30	428	578	687	564	1,334
Mountain	5	27	5,107	10,447	10,792	11,418	8,574	14,231
Pacific	89	1,532	18,269	57,703	93,490	120,251	112,353	98,310

Source : U.S. Census Data.

Table IIIA

CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES SHOWING NUMBER, AND PERCENT OF TOTAL IN THE UNITED STATES, PACIFIC REGION, MOUNTAIN REGION, PACIFIC AND MOUNTAIN REGION, AND REST OF UNITED STATES, 1880-1950.

Chinese

	United States		Pacific Region		Mountain Region		Pacific-Mountain Region		U.S. less Pacific and Mountain	
Year	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1880	105,645	100.0	87,828	83.4	14,274	13.5	102,102	96.9	3,543	3.1
1890	107,488	100.0	85,272	79.3	11,572	10.8	96,844	90.1	10,644	9.9
1900	89,863	100.0	59,779	66.5	7,950	8.8	67,729	75.3	22,134	24.7
1910	71,531	100.0	46,320	64.7	5,614	7.8	51,934	72.5	19,597	27.5
1920	61,639	100.0	34,265	55.6	4,339	7.0	38,604	62.6	23,035	37.4
1930	74,954	100.0	41,631	55.4	3,252	4.26	44,883	59.6	30,071	40.4
1940	77,504	100.0	43,987	56.6	2,853	3.69	46,840	60.3	30,664	39.7
1950	117,629	100.0	63,834	54.2	3,750	3.26	67,584	57.5	50,045	42.5

Source : U.S. Census Data.

Table IIIB

JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SHOWING NUMBER, AND PERCENT OF TOTAL IN THE UNITED STATES, PACIFIC REGION, MOUNTAIN REGION, PACIFIC AND MOUNTAIN REGION, AND REST OF UNITED STATES, 1880-1950.

Japanese

	United States		Pacific Region		Mountain Region		Pacific-Mountain Region		U.S. less Pacific and Mountain	
Year	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1880	148	100.0	89	60.0	5	3.4	94	63.4	54	36.6
1890	2,039	100.0	1,532	75.0	27	1.3	1,559	76.3	480	23.7
1900	24,326	100.0	18,269	75.0	5,107	20.9	23,376	95.9	950	4.1
1910	72,157	100.0	57,703	80.0	10,447	14.4	68,150	94.4	4,007	5.6
1920	111,010	100.0	93,490	85.0	10,792	9.25	104,282	94.25	6,728	5.75
1930	138,834	100.0	120,251	86.5	11,418	8.3	131,669	94.8	7,165	5.2
1940	126,947	100.0	112,353	88.1	8,574	6.7	120,927	94.8	6,020	5.2
1950	141,768	100.0	98,310	69.5	14,231	10.0	112,541	79.5	29,227	20.5

Source : U.S. Census Data.

Table IVA

CITIES WITH OVER 100 CHINESE, OF CITIES WHICH IN 1930 HAD 100,000 POPULATION: 1890-1940.

	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940
Boston, Mass.	444	1,186	1,192	1,075	1,595	1,386
Cambridge, Mass.	35	112	83	81	133	133
Fall River, Mass.	24	81	76	45	108	104
Lynn, Mass.	14	62	113	124	69	--
Springfield, Mass.	16	49	55	148	75	41
Worcester, Mass.	27	109	65	80	79	50
Providence, R.I.	43	245	192	135	132	167
Hartford, Conn.	45	122	82	135	75	32
New Haven, Conn.	50	90	86	103	69	71
New York, N.Y.	2,498	6,321	4,614	5,042	8,414	12,753
Jersey City, N.J.	132	218	149	85	152	112
Newark, N.J.	127	261	231	281	667	259
Paterson, N.J.	62	130	86	64	68	60
Philadelphia, Pa.	738	1,165	997	869	1,672	922
Pittsburgh, Pa.	115	182	236	306	296	141
Akron, Ohio	1	2	6	119	107	34
Cincinnati, Ohio	24	14	17	41	135	108
Cleveland, Ohio	36	103	228	275	570	308
Columbus, Ohio	6	8	45	92	126	95
Chicago, Ill.	567	1,209	1,778	2,353	2,757	2,013
Detroit, Mich.	10	2	28	438	710	583
Milwaukee, Wis.	14	21	51	65	176	153
Minneapolis, Minn.	17	24	101	196	221	304
St. Paul, Minn.	36	28	45	96	122	76
Kansas City, Mo.	186	89	62	45	108	56
St. Louis, Mo.	170	312	423	328	484	236
Omaha, Nebr.	89	96	53	126	147	69
Baltimore, Md.	178	477	314	328	438	379
Washington, D.C.	91	415	369	461	398	656
Norfolk, Va.	8	76	59	117	151	80
New Orleans, La.	142	437	344	246	267	230
Oklahoma City, Okla.	8	9	101	124	112	34
El Paso, Texas	210	299	228	117	175	—
San Antonio, Texas	46	54	62	193	316	471
Denver, Colorado	971	306	227	212	154	110
Salt Lake City, Utah	222	214	193	188	155	102
Seattle, Wash.	359	438	924	1,351	1,347	1,781
Spokane, Wash.	341	318	239	139	74	99
Tacoma, Wash.	9	252	23	59	89	48
Portland, Ore.	4,539	7,841	5,699	1,846	1,416	1,569
Los Angeles, Calif.	1,871	2,111	1,954	2,062	3,009	4,736
Oakland, Calif.	1,128	950	3,609	3,821	3,048	3,201
San Diego, Calif.	676	292	348	254	509	451
San Francisco, Calif.	25,833	13,954	10,582	7,744	16,303	17,782

Source : U.S. Census Data.

3.26% in 1950. During the same period, the proportion of Chinese in the regions east of the Rockies grew from 3.1% in 1880 to 42.5% in 1950. The Chinese have shown, then, a greater emigration from the Pacific and Mountain regions than the Japanese.

Table IVB

CITIES WITH POPULATION OF 100,000 OR MORE IN 1930 WITH 100 OR MORE IN JAPANESE: 1890-1940.

	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940
New York	123	286	1,037	2,312	2,356	2,087
Chicago	—	68	233	417	486	390
Philadelphia	7	12	93	130	138	89
Detroit	2	2	30	100	103	63
Washington, D.C.	9	7	47	103	78	68
Seattle	125	2,990	6,127	7,874	8,448	6,975
Spokane	23	51	352	168	393	276
Tacoma	56	606	1,018	1,306	1,193	877
Portland	20	1,189	1,461	1,715	1,864	1,680
Long Beach	—	—	—	375	596	696
Los Angeles	26	150	4,238	11,618	21,081	23,321
Oakland	85	194	1,520	2,709	2,137	1,790
San Diego	9	14	159	772	911	828
San Francisco	590	1,781	4,518	5,358	6,250	5,280

Source: U.S. Census Data.

Table IV lists cities, with a population of 100,000 or over in 1930, which have ever had a population of 100 or more Chinese or Japanese from 1880 to 1940. Forty-three such cities have had, at some time, over 100 Chinese. But only 14 cities have had over 100 Japanese. Thirty-four of the cities with over 100 Chinese are east of the Mountain Region; five with over 100 Japanese are east of the Mountain Region. Five of the 14 cities with over 100 Japanese are in California; three in Washington; one in Oregon.

C. Rural-Urban Concentration.

Table V shows the distribution of Chinese and Japanese in urban and rural areas (with rural-farm and rural non-farm for 1930, 1950) from 1910 to 1950. The Chinese show a great preponderance in urban areas. The proportion of Chinese in urban areas grew steadily from 75.9% urban in 1910 to 93.0% urban in 1950. In 1910 barely a quarter of the Chinese

Table V

CHINESE AND JAPANESE, RURAL, URBAN WITH RURAL-FARM, RURAL — NON-FARM FOR 1930 AND 1950 : 1910-1950.

	Chinese							Japanese						
	Urban		Rural					Urban		Rural				
	No.	% Total	No.	% Total	R-F	R N-F	Total R. U.	No.	% Total	No.	% Total	R-F	R N-F	Total R. U.
1910	54,331	75.9	17,200	24.1	—	—	71,531	35,181	48.8	36,976	51.2	—	—	72,157
1920	50,008	81.1	11,631	18.9	—	—	61,639	53,830	48.5	57,180	51.5	—	—	111,010
1930	65,778	87.6	9,176	12.4	3,211	5,965	74,954	74,675	53.8	64,159	46.2	46,186	17,973	138,834
1940	70,226	90.6	7,278	9.4	—	—	77,504	69,673	54.8	57,274	45.2	—	—	126,947
1950	109,434	93.0	8,195	7.0	2,351	5,844	117,629	100,735	71.1	41,033	28.9	26,773	14,260	141,768

Source : U.S. Census Data.

population in the United States was rural; in 1950 only 7% remained rural. In 1930 approximately two-thirds of the rural Chinese were non-farm; in 1950 over 70% were rural non-farm.

The number of Japanese in urban and rural areas rose steadily from 1910 to 1930 with the proportion urban rising from just below to just above 50%. In 1940, when the decrease in Japanese population was 11,887, the urban population declined 5,002 and the rural 5,885, revealing the rough static relationship between urban and rural. The sudden increase in urban Japanese in 1950 reflects the effects of the exclusion and relocation when many Japanese lost their land holdings.

Table VI shows the number and percentage of Chinese and Japanese in urban and rural areas by regions from 1910 to 1930. The Chinese show a high degree of urbanization in all regions except two, the East South Central and Mountain. In the latter the degree of urbanization rose from 54.1% in 1910 to 67.3% in 1930. The absolute number of Chinese in this region declined in both rural and urban areas, but more rapidly in rural areas. The East South Central Region shows a regular rise in rural Chinese and an irregular increase in urban Chinese. In general urbanization of Chinese is higher in the Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central and South Atlantic regions than in other regions.

The Japanese show a lower degree of urbanization than the Chinese. It should be noted that in those regions where the urban percentage is high, few Japanese are located. Of the 1,444 urban Japanese in the Middle Atlantic Region in 1910, 1,037 were in New York City; of the 2,979 there in 1920, 2,312 were in New York City; of the 3,233 in 1930, 2,356 were in New York City. There is only a small increase in urbanization on a national scale in the three-decade period. The Pacific Region, in which most Japanese are concentrated, reflects the national proportions; the Mountain Region shows a degree of rural settlement higher than the national average.

D. Summary of Data.

The Chinese are a highly urbanized population : over 70% of the total Chinese population is found in cities. Until the forced removal of the Japanese from the Pacific Coast in 1942, subsequent to which 112,000 Japanese were incarcerated in prison camps in the American interior

Tableau VIA

CHINESE, RURAL AND URBAN, BY REGIONS, AND FOR CALIFORNIA, 1910-1930.

Chinese

	1910				1920				1930			
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total United States	54,331	76.5	17,200	23.5	50,008	81.1	11,631	18.9	65,778	87.3	9,176	12.7
New England	3,441	97.4	58	2.6	3,527	97.9	75	2.1	3,707	97.7	87	2.3
Middle Atlantic	7,917	96.6	272	3.4	8,590	97.5	222	2.5	13,738	98.1	267	1.9
East North Central	3,306	96.8	109	3.2	4,952	98.2	91	1.8	6,252	98.6	88	1.4
West North Central	1,040	87.0	155	13.0	1,521	90.6	157	9.4	1,643	94.5	95	5.5
South Atlantic	1,412	89.3	170	10.7	1,675	91.8	149	8.2	1,755	93.9	114	6.1
East South Central	236	57.0	178	43.0	244	45.0	298	55.0	327	44.0	416	56.0
West South Central	1,111	84.5	192	15.5	1,198	78.1	336	21.9	1,304	82.4	278	17.6
Mountain	3,039	54.1	2,575	45.9	2,603	60.0	1,736	40.0	2,180	67.3	1,072	32.7
Pacific	32,829	70.9	13,491	29.1	25,698	75.0	8,567	25.0	34,872	83.8	6,759	16.2
California	24,262	66.9	11,986	33.1	21,094	72.5	7,718	27.5	31,218	80.9	6,143	19.1

Source : U.S. Census Data.

Tableau VIB

JAPANESE, RURAL AND URBAN, BY REGIONS, AND FOR CALIFORNIA, 1910-1930.

Japanese

	1910				1920				1930			
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total United States	35,181	46.7	36,976	51.3	53,830	48.5	57,180	51.5	74,675	53.8	64,159	46.2
New England	246	90.4	26	9.6	299	86.2	48	13.8	261	74.1	91	25.9
Middle Atlantic	1,444	87.9	199	12.1	2,979	91.2	287	9.8	3,233	88.3	429	11.7
East North Central	445	92.3	37	7.7	854	92.1	73	7.9	916	89.6	108	10.4
West North Central	622	62.2	378	37.8	701	57.7	514	42.3	467	46.6	536	53.4
South Atlantic	88	56.4	68	43.6	236	65.6	124	34.4	286	72.8	107	27.2
East South Central	17	—	9	—	16	—	19	—	25	—	21	—
West South Central	135	31.5	293	68.5	266	46.0	312	54.0	346	50.4	341	49.6
Mountain	3,438	32.9	7,009	67.1	2,941	27.3	7,851	72.7	2,692	23.5	8,726	76.5
Pacific	28,746	49.8	28,957	50.2	45,538	48.7	47,952	51.3	66,449	55.5	53,802	44.5
California	18,612	45.0	22,744	55.0	33,209	45.6	38,743	54.4	53,397	54.6	44,059	45.4

Source : U.S. Census Data.

Table VII

Chinese population for United States for cities of 100,000 population and over and for cities 25,000-100,000 : 1880-1940.

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940
Total United States	105,465	107,488	88,869	71,531	61,639	74,954	77,504
Total in cities with 100,000 population or over	22,925	32,664	29,630	29,002	34,670	48,608	55,030
Percent in cities with 100,000 population or over	21.6	30.3	33.0	40.5	56.2	64.1	71.0
Total in cities with 25,000-100,000 population	490	13,685	18,062	12,220	7,115	26,886	22,474
Percent in cities with 25,000-100,000 population	.4	12.7	20.1	17.1	11.3	35.8	28.9
Total in cities under 25,000 and rural areas	82,050	61,639	41,971	30,309	19,854	—	—
Percent in cities under 25,000 and rural areas	77.8	56.8	46.8	42.3	32.2	—	—
Total Percent	99.8	99.8	99.9	99.8	99.7	99.8	99.9

Source : Rose Hum Lee, "The Decline of Chinatowns in the United States", *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1949, p. 427.

until 1945,[15] the Japanese population had been divided approximately equally between rural and urban aggregates. The degree of urbanization, which until 1940 showed a slight increase, was accelerated by the exclusion from the Pacific coast. The return to the coast which has characterized Japanese internal migration since 1950 has not been accompanied by a resumption of farm activities.

In general the Chinese may be characterized as a small, highly urbanized population, which, although heavily concentrated on the Pacific coast, shows a steady dispersion to areas of concentration in urban eastern and midwestern metropolitan centers. The Japanese are a slightly larger population, which until recently has been far more rural than the Chinese, and which continues to be concentrated in the Pacific Coast and Mountain Regions, although some eastern dispersion is evident since 1945. The significant differences between the Chinese and Japanese are the higher degrees of ruralization and concentration in the west of the latter; the much greater and longer urbanization of the former and their increasing dispersal.

II. — SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS.

The California of 1848-1882 was a different California from that of 1882-1924. Thus, the periods of Chinese and Japanese immigration must be viewed almost as if the two groups were coming to different countries. During the "Chinese period" (1848-1882), California was the scene of two major kinds of economic activity : gold mining and railroad building. The former occupation required long, difficult hand labour and many miners. Labour-saving machinery for mining was almost unknown. When gold mining ceased to be a profitable enterprise and attention was turned to California's other mineral wealth, chiefly quartz, machinery had been invented which replaced much of the labour needed in the early period. This technological revolution coincided, approximately, with the exclusion of the Chinese and the respite before the influx of Japanese. Similarly railroad construction reached its peak in the years prior to the completion of the Transcontinental Railway (1869). When railway construction ended many Chinese were thrown out of work and into the cities on the Pacific Coast, along the lines of the railway, and — because

[15] See Jacobus TEN BROEK, Edward N. BARNHART, and Floyd MATSON, *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution* (Berkeley, 1954).

of the desire for cheap labour — into the cities of the East. When the Japanese began arriving in the United States, after 1890, the two occupations which had served as incentives for Chinese immigration were closed to them. Like the Chinese before them, they had to adjust their lives to the available economic opportunities.

A. Factors Affecting the Location Pattern of the Chinese.

Chinese immigration was stimulated not only by the apparent opportunities on the American frontier, but also by the Tai Ping Rebellion, which dislocated the economy in South China, causing large numbers of Chinese agricultural labourers in Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces to gather in Canton, Hong Kong and Macao. Unemployment was high, and many Chinese shipped from the latter two ports to the Isthmus of Panama, Cuba and South America as contract labor. Others sailed, especially from the port of Hong Kong, to Britain and America as "free" emigrants. Those who emigrated as contract labor were largely single men, contracted by "Hongs", or corporations, which employed them for long periods of time. Of those who sailed for California, at least 50% were married, leaving their wives behind in accord with the prohibitory Chinese laws and customs concerning women. [16] Payment of passage for free migrants was often obtained by a loan from a Chinese brokerage firm, which accepted the emigrant's wife and family as security. [17]

The Chinese who came to California were largely former agricultural and urban labourers. Agriculture in Kwangtung was carried on from village centres, and village organization and large kinship units have been the standard vehicles of social control. In California the village and province structure was not left behind. Instead district associations, corresponding to the districts from which the immigrants had come, were organized. At first these were separate associations, but in the mid-1850's, as a result of growing anti-Chinese sentiment in California, the lack of an effective organization to represent Chinese interests, and the absence

[16] The Chinese kinship system was patrilineal, patronymic, and patripotestal. A wife was required to live in the home of her husband's parents and to remain there even if the husband should go abroad temporarily. See Wen Yen Tsso, "The Chinese Family from Customary Law to Positive Law", *Hastings Law Journal*, May 1966, pp. 727-765. See also Maurice Freedman, "The Family in China, Past and Present", *Pacific Affairs*, Winter, 1961-1962, pp. 323-336. For the marital status of the early overseas Chinese, see Coolidge, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-20.

[17] Russell H. Conwell, *Why and How* (Boston, 1871), pp. 176-196.

of any regularized diplomatic representation from the Manchu Government, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, better known as the "Chinese Six Companies" was established.[18] The organization claimed to speak for the entire Chinese population in America and served as a representative, and creditor agency, for every Chinese under its jurisdiction. In the words of the Association's authorized historian,

> When, therefore, the seven district groups — which sociologically speaking, constitute the basic social control groups among California Chinese — unite together to form a coordinating organization such as the Chinese Six Companies, the social power that such an agency would wield is practically without limit. By united agreement the Six Companies was empowered to speak and act for all the California Chinese in problems and affairs which affect the majority of the population.[19]

Table VIII

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CHINESE SIX COMPANIES.

in six companies		*in United States* (various estimates)	
1876[1]		Census : 1870	63,199
Total	151,300	Coolidge :[3] 1870	71,083
		Coolidge : 1876	111,971
Ning Yueng	75,000	S. F. Bulletin	
Hop Wo	34,000	April 20, 1876	60,000
Kong Chow	15,000		
Yeong Wo	12,000	Census : 1880	105,465
Sam Yup	11,000	Coolidge :[3] 1880	104,991
Yan Wo	4,300		
1942[2]		Census : 1940	77,504
Total	27,500	California	58,324
		San Francisco	5,230
Ning Yueng	13,500		
Show Hing	4,000		
Hop Wo	3,000		
Kong Chow	2,500		
Yeong Wo	2,500		
Sam Yup	1,500		
Yan Wo	500		

[1] Cited in Otis GIBSON, *The Chinese in America* (1887), and in William HOY, *The Chinese Six Companies* (San Francisco : Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, 1942), p. 16. Hoy believes the figures for 1876 were "jacked up" by the Six Companies.

[2] From HOY, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[3] Mary COOLIDGE, *Chinese Immigration* (New York : Henry Holt, 1909), p. 498 ff.

[18] See William HOY, *The Chinese Six Companies* (San Francisco, Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Ass'n., 1942); COOLIDGE, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-410; Everett WONG, "The Exclusion Movement and the Chinese Community in San Francisco" (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of California, 1954), pp. 69 ff.; Anne D. COULTER, "The Economic Aspect of the Chinese Labor Problem" (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of California, 1952), p. 15.

[19] HOY, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19. See also Nora STERRY, "Social Attitudes of Chinese Immigrants", *Journal of Applied Sociology*, July-August 1923, pp. 328-329.

One function of the Association is particularly important since it served, inadvertently, to insure the continuation of an urban Chinese labor force. The Companies assured themselves of membership by meeting each arriving ship and collecting the name and district of departure of each Chinese. These lists were utilized not only for the Companies' census of Chinese, but also to insure payment of debts. No Chinese could return in China without appearing at the offices of the Six Companies, paying all his debts and presenting a "departure fee" to the companies — a reimbursement for the Companies' services and a donation toward the welfare of those Chinese who remained in California. [20]

The Companies were able to exercise effective control over remigration to China through their arrangements with the steamship companies. Until 1880, i.e., until two years prior to the exclusion of Chinese immigrants, the steamship companies agreed not to allow a Chinese to purchase a ticket for China unless he had a certificate from the Six Companies showing he had paid his debts. [21] Thus, although the Chinese labourer may have left wife and family behind, he was compelled to meet his financial obligations before he could rejoin his family. Wage labour, rather than long-term, unpredictable investment in agriculture, was the more sure way of obtaining the financial means to return home.

The Chinese communities outside the Pacific Coast area may well have originated with the reciprocal demand of incipient industrialism for cheap labour and the need by Chinese for money in order to return home. Although the evidence is scanty it is not improbable that the forces which created the early migration of Chinese outside the Pacific region were generated by the decline of mining and railroading after 1880. In 1870 Chinese labourers were shipped from California to North Adams, Massachusetts, to break a strike among shoemakers. [22] Anti-Coolie meetings were held in Boston to protest against reducing American labour to the standards of "rice and rats". [23] In 1877 Chinese were sent to break a strike in a cutlery plant in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania. The Cincinnati *Enquirer* protested against the use of Chinese labour in the cigar-making

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25; Coolidge, *op. cit.*, pp. 409-410.
[21] Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 410.
[22] Boston *Transcript*, 13 June 1870, quoted in Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America* (Cleveland, 1939), p. 460.
[23] Boston *Transcript*, 30 June 1870, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 460.

industry. Many Chinese were imported into the South to develop rice culture and to replace Negroes on railway projects.[24]

Chinese who were brought to the East often discovered economic opportunities for themselves and informed their brethren in the West. The Chinese hand laundry with its methodical care for high quality linen found a place in the metropolis where higher status Caucasians appreciated this service. Perhaps the first Chinese in any great numbers in the East were brought out by a certain Mr. Thomas to work in a laundry in Belleville, New Jersey.

> They quickly discovered, upon their arrival, the field presented by the neighbouring cities for their work, and the news spread rapidly to California and even to China itself. Thousands of Chinese came to the East, until at present there is scarcely a town throughout the whole extent of country where one or more may not be found, while in the large cities colonies have been formed, in which much of their primitive life has been re-established...[25]

The fact that the Chinese who first came to America were either single or had left their wives behind served as an added factor in determining their urban location. The laundry business, which has come down as a stereotype of the Chinese, originated because of the absence of women on the frontier. Caucasian males soon discovered through observation of the Chinese that the latter did not possess the scruples about doing "women's work" which inhibited white males from this occupation. Chinese laundries became profitable institutions until Caucasian entrepreneurs sought, with the aid of steam machinery, to invade this ethnically-monopolized occupation.

Secondly, it may be inferred that insofar as a Chinese had left his wife behind he had no desire for any lengthy tenure in the United States. Moreover, many Chinese, even though single, had been sent to America to make their fortune and return to China to support their parents and other relatives. Given this kind of economic incentive, the need was for regularized income without much heavy investment in unmovable capital within the United States. Farms, then, even if available, did not provide the form of occupation suitable for Chinese immigrants. Laundries re-

[24] Cincinnati *Enquirer*, 11 April, 8 January, 24 June 1870; Cleveland *Leader*, 6 June 1870, 19 January, 17, 20, 23 June, 27 July 1867; *Ohio State Journal*, 3 November 1873, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 461.

[25] Stewart Culin, "China in America : A Study in the Social Life of the Chinese in the Eastern Cities of the United States", Paper read before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, at the Thirty-Sixth Meeting, New York, 1887 (Philadelphia, 1887), pp. 8-9.

quired little investment and used little or no machinery. The other occupations which early immigrants entered, besides mining and railroad construction, consisted of intra-ethnic services, i.e., sales of Chinese foods — which have also enticed American diners since 1850 — and other products, and migratory agricultural labour. With respect to the latter occupation, a well-known economist has argued that Chinese exclusion was in part inspired by the desire of some Californians for small independent farms, rather than large, quasi-feudal estates. [26] If this is true, then the Japanese, with their ability to cultivate a small acreage singly and intensively, provided an ideal agriculture force for California.

B. Factors Affecting the Location of Chinese in the Post-immigration Period.

Professor Rose Hum Lee outlived three phases of Chinese location in the United States : [27] 1) Concentration in the Pacific States and Rocky Moutain areas, 1850-1880; 2) Dispersion to midwestern and eastern parts of the United States, 1880-1910; 3) Reconcentration in larger urban centers in the East and West, 1910-1940. The concentration of the first period and the dispersion following it, as has been stated, were caused by the economic opportunities and their disappearance. The reconcentration, which manifests itself most completely in the decline of Chinatown in the Rocky Mountain area, is due to the undermining of the economic base upon which such centers exist, and the effect of beliefs about marriage upon a relatively small Chinese population. Actually the period characterized by Professor Lee as dispersion reflects a phase of a steady movement of concentration of Chinese in larger urban centers.

The size of a city and its ability to maintain a Chinese community within it are reciprocally related. If there are diversified industries, offering varied occupations for both Chinese and Caucasians, and a large enough Caucasian population to support a Chinese community's special services, e.g., hand laundries and exotic restaurants, the Chinese community will thrive. If there are but a few basic industries or sources for occupation, the existence of the Chinese community will reflect the success

[26] Paul S. Taylor, "Foundations of California Rural-Society", *California Historical Society Quarterly*, September 1945, pp. 193-228.
[27] On this point see Rose Hum Lee, "The Decline of Chinatowns in the United States", *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1949, pp. 422-432.

and size of that industry. The Rocky Mountain Chinatowns have declined as their single industrial base has declined, depopulating the area in general and thus subverting the economic base for a Chinatown. [28]

Moreover the social structure of the Chinatown has been its own undoing. Organized on the basis of four-clan associations or family associations, the organization restricts the choice of mate for marriage. Members of the same clan are considered related by common descent and are prohibited from marriage to one another. Since exogamy must prevail, the Chinese youth in a small Chinatown, inhabited by only one or two clans, must either remain single in his city of birth, or let his parents arrange a marriage through friends in another city, or migrate to another Chinatown to find a mate. As the second and third generation Chinese-Americans reached marriageable age, the first two choices seemed less attractive than the third. Choice of mate and occupational opportunity are greatest in larger urban centres; thus the migration to these centres occurred. [29]

C. Factors Affecting the Location Pattern of the Japanese.

The heavy migration of Japanese to the United States beginning in the 1890's was a partial result of the demographic change in Japan caused by industrialization. Overpopulation on the land caused a migration to urban centers and heavy emigration. The United States was but one outlet for this population movement. From 1899 until 1924 emigration companies arranged for the transportation of contract labourers to Peru, [30] Brazil, Mexico, and Hawaii. Although the migrants to other nations and Hawaii were chiefly contract labourers, United States law forbade such importation, so that the Japanese who came to the United States were not formally under contract.

Miyamoto [31] has divided the adjustment of Japanese in America into three intervals. 1) During the Frontier Period, before the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907, the Japanese immigrant (*Issei*) regarded himself as a "sojourner", planning to return to Japan. 2) The Settling Period, from

[28] Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 422-427.

[29] Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 429-430.

[30] Toraji Irie, "History of the Japanese Migration to Peru", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, August-October 1951, pp. 436-452, 648-664 (translated by William Himel).

[31] S. F. Miyamoto, "Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle", *University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences*, 11 (December 1939), p. 84. Cited in Leonard Bloom and John Kitsuse, *The Managed Casualty* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956), p. 1.

1907 to the Exclusion Act of 1924, saw semi-permanent and permanent American residence undertaken on farms and in Japanese ghettos. Economic improvement was begun and families were founded. 3) The Second Generation Period began in 1924 and continues with the increase of *Nisei*, the children of immigrants, and *Sansei*, the grandchildren of immigrants.

These periods correspond to periods of occupational change and, consequently, of locational change or concentration. Three periods may be designated correspondingly. 1) During the Sojourner Period, ending roughly at the time of the Gentlemen's Agreement, Japanese were employed as replacements for Chinese in railroading, mining, and as agricultural labourers on a migratory basis. In urban enterprise Japanese worked as houseboys and in other domestic service as gardeners, laundrymen, cooks, etc. In this period the decline in railroading and mining effectively decreased job opportunities, while migrant farm labourers competed with Mexicans and immigrants from South Eastern Europe.[32] 2) In the Settlement Period (1907-1930) *Issei* and some *Nisei* began to purchase, lease, or manage farm property and take up residence in the United States. Families were founded as Japanese males arranged for brides from Japan through the "picture system" (*shashin kekkon*). 3) The Urbanization Period is noticeable with the increase of *Nisei* and *Sansei* of mature years after 1930. Marginal to their Japanese and American cultures, they move out from the essentially *Issei*-dominated agricultural occupations and attempt to move into the areas in which competition with Caucasians occurs. Although the success here is quite small, certain ethnic enclaves develop in urban centres for Japanese. In Los Angeles — a city of heavy Japanese concentration — these enclaves include the fields of ethnic restaurants and shops (cafes, laundries, and barber shops); fishing and fish canning; wholesale and retail produce business; contract gardening; domestic service.[33] The depression of the thirties resulted in many *Nisei* returning to family enterprises, on farms or in retail fruit businesses.[34]

The factors which affected Chinese occupation and location had a different effect upon the Japanese. Again if one examines the economic

[32] D. THOMAS, *The Salvage* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), p. 20.
[33] Leonard BLOOM and Ruth RIEMER, *Removal and Return* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), pp. 7-31. W. T. KATAOKA, "Occupations of Japanese in Los Angeles", *Sociology and Social Research*, May-June 1937, pp. 464-466.
[34] NODERA, *op. cit.*, p. 465.

conditions in the country at the time of arrival, and the existing institutions within the immigrant community for social control, the reasons for the largely rural and agricultural status of the Japanese become clear.

For the first Japanese immigrants to California, only a short period of railroad building remained. Mining had become a diminishing source of employment, as quartz mining replaced gold-mining and machinery displaced men. Urban areas, already "abused" by the influx of Chinese labour did not provide a safe haven for any very remunerative employment. However, California was undergoing an agricultural change toward intensive agriculture, a form of agriculture to which the Japanese peasant was accustomed. During the "sojourner period" the Japanese, like their Chinese predecessors, were nevertheless unwilling to invest in land. There grew up then in the early period, and lasting through the present day, the system of migratory Japanese agricultural labour gangs, under a Japanese boss. These gangs later formed into clubs with secretaries and relatively formalized procedures. They underbid their ethnic competitors and were fairly successful during the period around the turn of the century. [35]

These gangs were replaced by an increase in tenants and sharecroppers after 1900. In 1900, less than 4,000 acres in California were leased to Japanese tenants; by 1905, this had increased to 60,000; by 1910, to 177,000. [36] Tenancy was increased, moreover, as Japanese bosses showed preferential treatment to landowners who permitted Japanese to lease land from them.

The Japanese occupied small holding and generally cultivated, on an intensive level, berries, vegetables, fruits and other truck crops, and even developed some new crops. Tenancy continued until 1913 when the first of California's Alien Land laws was passed. It was followed by more restrictive measures in 1920 and 1923, including a law which presumed fraud when an ineligible alien bought or leased land in the name of his citizen offspring. If these laws had been strictly enforced Japanese would have been forced out of agriculture and into urban areas or remigration, but evasion was not difficult and only rarely were the laws actively enforced or legitimized in the public eye. [37] It was not, then,

[35] THOMAS, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[37] THOMAS, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24; BLOOM and RIEMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-71.

until the wholesale removal of Japanese from the Pacific Coast in 1942 by government order, that the gradual rural to urban migration was upset.

The concentration of Japanese in and around Los Angeles is due to the general shift in intensive agriculture to the southern vegetable growing areas in which the Japanese participated. With this movement south the Japanese, utilizing their special agricultural techniques, obtained a virtual monopoly on vegetable growing in the region. [38]

D. The Japanese Associations.

The Japanese family, more than the Association, has acted as an institution of social control for the Japanese. Whereas the Chinese early came under the social influence and economic domination of the Chinese Six Companies, the Japanese Association of America exercised little if any economic domination and had small membership. [39] The Japanese Association of California arose out of discussions on how to combat anti-Japanese activities in California which intensified because of labour agitation and an outbreak of bubonic plague in 1900. Another was organized in New York in 1914 in response to more anti-Japanese agitation. Even-

Table IX

Membership in Japanese Associations of America. [1]
1924

	Members in Association	*Number in Area*	*%*
Total (U.S. and Hawaii)	36,792	260,592	12
Japanese Association of America at San Francisco (includes 38 locals)	16,000	63,893	
Central Japanese Association of Southern California (20 locals) in Los Angeles	8,000	38,110	
Northwest American-Japanese Association (Washington and Montana : 14 locals)	6,860	15,768	
Japanese Association of Oregon (Portland; Idaho)	1,250	7,728	
New York	1,200	—	
Denver, Colo., Arizona, Utah, Texas, Illinois (9 locals)	2,127	—	

[1] From Michinari Fujita, "Japanese Associations in America", *Sociology and Social Research*, January-February 1929, pp. 211-228. The figures are derived from a census taken by the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles.

[38] Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Bloom and Riemer suggest that livestock and dairy farming did not arise among Japanese since they depend on fish for protein, and since Buddhism discourages animal killing. *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

[39] The following analysis is from Michinari Fujita, "Japanese Associations in America", *Sociology and Social Research*, January-February 1929, pp. 211-228.

tually there were seven such associations in the United States and Hawaii with various numbers of locals.

The chief function of these associations can best be described, sociologically, as institutions of accommodation. They engaged in various forms of Americanization programs, taught English and attempted to create an understanding among the Japanese of American society and culture. They gave legal aid to the Japanese, and served as a microcosmic imitation of the United State Department of Agriculture Field Service, providing lectures and reports on improved methods of agriculture. They conducted censuses of the Japanese population in the United States by occupation and business conditions and made these reports available to the Japanese consulates. They aided Japanese who had left the country to obtain re-entry permits, and they acted as agencies, in the absence of Japanese consular officials, for the endorsement of certain certificates. (In this capacity they charged a fee of one to four dollars.) They attempted to educate American-born Japanese about Japan, and to educate non-Japanese about the culture of Japan and Japanese-Americans.

They did not function, however, as creditor agencies, nor did their membership permit them to exercise dominance in the way that the Chinese Six Companies did. In effect, then the Japanese community was not burdened by a requirement to pay debts on a regularized basis, and thus was not in such great need for regularized wage labour.

The absence of a definite need for regular wages is made more significant by the functions which the Japanese family served. Not only in Japan but in the United States the Japanese family has provided welfare and employment for those members in need. [40] The number of Japanese classified as "unpaid family farm labourer", or "unpaid family workers" reveals the extent of this institutional practice. [41] Urban unemployment could be countered then by a position in the family enterprise or a migration to the farm. The practice of sending children to work as fruit

[40] On Japan, see Irene TAEUBER, "Family, Migration and Industrialization in Japan", *American Sociological Review*, April 1951, pp. 149-157.

[41] BLOOM and RIEMER, *op. cit.*, p. 13, 19, note that 1,746 Japanese (of a total of 17,005 employed) were unpaid family farm laborers; of these 605 were native born males, 432 native born females. In a 20% sample of employed Japanese in Los Angeles (1941) 576 unpaid family workers were listed : 161 in clerical and sales, 36 operatives and kindred, 79 service workers, 297 farm and nursery labourers, 3 labourers, except farm. The sample was 3,500; the percent unpaid family workers 16.5.

pickers in the summer months is not uncommon among urban Japanese families, and is looked upon, in many instances, as a customary vacation for the children.

It may be inferred then, that in the absence of culturally influential and economically dominant associations and with the family able and expected to provide a haven for those unemployed, the ability to engage in rural activities was enhanced. At the same time the urban Japanese remained relatively concentrated in areas of the west, close to family farm where they could return if necessary, or if needed. Similarly Japanese agriculture was concentrated in areas of accessible markets, and where communication between urban and rural Japanese was facilitated.

E. Marital Status of the Japanese.

While there is evidence that at least half of the Chinese who came to America were married, Japanese immigrants appear to have been single. In 1910, 65.1% of the male Japanese 25 to 44 years old reported themselves single, or 15,500 out of an age group of 23,820. Of 3,095 female Japanese in California, aged 25-44, only 275 or 8.9% reported themselves single. Chinese show a higher percentage married and lower percentage single for the same year.

After 1910 the Japanese began the importation of brides from Japan, cutting the sex ratio and providing the possibility of offspring. Before this, the single status of immigrant Japanese was significant. Whereas the Chinese may have been inhibited from land investment because of the desire to return to wife and family in China, the Japanese were not so inhibited. While both Chinese and Japanese paid lip service to their status as "sojourners" in America, the willingness to invest in what might involve long-term settlement — a farm — was greater for the Japanese. Moreover, the importation of Japanese brides from 1910 to 1923 reveals — when coupled with the increase of farm tenancy and management in spite of legal obstacles — the intention to abandon "sojourner" status and take up semi-permanent or permanent residence in the United States. The move into agriculture was made easier by the absence of wives at home, and the ability to stay in agriculture enhanced by the importation of wives.

Table X

MARITAL STATUS CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA, 1910. PERSONS 15 YEARS OR OLDER.

	Males 15 years of age and older							*Females 15 years of age and older*						
	Total	Single		Married		Wid.	Div.	Total	Single		Married		Wid.	Div.
		No.	%	No.	%				No.	%	No.	%		
Chinese [1]	31,337	14,751	47.1	13,997	44.7	628	8	2,110	450	21.3	1,455	69.0	188	3
15-24	4,309	3,855	89.5	421	9.8	—	—	602	318	52.8	276	45.8	6	—
25-44	9,670	4,004	41.4	5,262	54.4	99	3	1,061	106	10.0	881	83.0	67	2
45-	16,087	6,826	42.4	8,295	51.6	529	5	438	21	4.8	298	68.0	114	1
Rural	11,231	6,561	58.4	4,242	37.8	265	2	301	52	17.3	216	71.8	28	1
Urban	20,106	8,190	40.7	9,755	48.8	363	6	1,809	398	22.0	1,239	68.5	160	2
Japanese [1]	33,312	23,154	69.5	9,320	28.0	324	45	4,510	522	11.6	3,916	86.8	63	6
15-24	7,094	6,794	95.8	251	3.5	3	1	1,280	235	18.4	1,040	81.3	3	2
25-44	23,820	15,500	65.1	7,900	33.2	232	35	3,095	275	8.9	2,778	89.8	37	4
45-	1,922	667	34.7	1,143	59.5	88	9	117	7	6.0	87	74.4	23	—
Rural	18,993	13,208	69.5	5,404	28.5	226	15	1,968	123	6.3	1,824	92.7	19	1
Urban	14,319	9,946	69.5	3,916	27.3	98	30	2,542	399	15.7	2,092	82.3	44	5

[1] Totals include persons of unknown age.

Source : U.S. Census Data.

Table XI
CHINESE AND JAPANESE MALES AND FEMALES, NATIVE AND FOREIGN BORN : 1850-1950.

Chinese

	Males			*Females*			Total	M per
Year	Native	Foreign	Total	Native	Foreign	Total	M - F	100 F
1850	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1860	—	—	33,149	—	—	1,784	34,933	1,858.1
1870	—	—	58,633	—	—	4,566	63,199	1,284.1
1880	—	—	100,686	—	—	4,779	105,465	2,106.8
1890	—	—	103,620	—	—	3,868	107,488	2,678.9
1900	6,657	78,684	85,341	2,353	2,169	4,522	89,863	1,887.2
1910	11,921	54,935	66,856	3,014	1,661	4,675	71,531	1,430.1
1920	13,318	40,573	53,891	5,214	2,534	7,748	61,639	695.5
1930	20,693	39,109	59,802	10,175	4,977	15,152	74,954	394.7
1940	25,702	31,687	57,389	14,560	5,555	20,116	77,504	285.3
1950	—	—	77,008	—	—	40,621	117,629	189.6

Japanese

	Males			*Females*			Total	M per
Year	Native	Foreign	Total	Native	Foreign	Total	M - F	100 F
1850	—	—	—					
1860	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1870	—	—	47	—	—	8	55	—
1880	—	—	134	—	—	14	148	—
1890	—	—	1,780	—	—	259	2,039	687.3
1900	156	23,185	23,341	113	872	985	24,326	2,369.6
1910	2,340	60,730	63,070	2,162	6,925	9,087	72,157	694.1
1920	15,494	57,213	72,707	14,178	24,125	38,303	111,010	189.8
1930	35,874	45,897	81,771	32,483	24,580	57,063	138,834	143.3
1940	42,316	29,651	71,967	37,326	17,654	54,980	126,947	130.9
1950	—	76,649	—	—	—	65,119	141,768	117.7

Source : U.S. Census Data.

CONCLUSION.

The Chinese and Japanese occupy different locations and present different degrees of urban and rural concentration because of conditions at the time of the immigration period.

1) The Chinese came to an area of mining, railroading and incipient urbanization. Their occupations were determined by available economic opportunities. The Japanese arrived when mining and railroading began their decline and intensive agriculture — at which the Japanese were adept — began.

2) Chinese institutions of social control made it necessary to pay debts regularly and to pay all debts and fees before leaving for China. Occupying a "sojourner" status the Chinese were in need of ready capital which could be obtained by wage labour rather than agriculture. The Japanese Associations did not function so as to require debt payment, and did not command the authority which Chinese Associations did. Hence, in the absence of opportunities for wage labour, and in the presence of opportunities in agriculture, the Japanese were able to enter agriculture more readily than the Chinese.

3) The Chinese and Japanese both regarded themselves first as "sojourners" in America. But this status for Chinese was more real since they had left wives and family behind, sometimes as security for payment of passage to America. The desire to return to wives and family in China inhibited Chinese from investments in land which involved long-term settlement with unpredictable income, and enhanced their desire to obtain ready capital. The Japanese sojourner status was more readily lost in the presence of agricultural opportunity and the absence of wives awaiting at home.

4) The Chinese need for capital, coupled with the incipient industrialism in the United States, made them more readily exploitable by entrepreneurs. Not tied to the land like the Japanese, they were available and willing to migrate to areas of industrial employment. Their early scattering in the United States, and the continued concentration of Japanese on the Pacific Coast, was due to their availability for spatial mobility. The Japanese, on the other hand, without need of capital, were able to concentrate and intensively build up their agricultural investments.