

camps où il a été interné et son dossier de militaire ne sont pas non plus utilisés. Pas plus que le recueil de correspondance du chef fasciste publié par certains de ses anciens collaborateurs (*Arcand ou... la vérité retrouvée*, 2002) ou le fonds Alexandre Duhaime, un militant du PUNC, acquis par Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec en 2010. Il aurait enfin été intéressant d'analyser *Le Bavard*, périodique publié durant la guerre par Joseph Ménard, grand collaborateur d'Arcand.

Malgré quelques lacunes, la biographie écrite par Hugues Théorêt demeure un bon ouvrage qui permet de connaître les principaux pans de la vie d'Adrien Arcand. Elle saura sans doute plaire aux amateurs d'histoire et de biographies. Elle pourrait également être utile aux chercheurs chevronnés, mais ils devraient tenir compte de ses limites.

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WHITAKER, Reg, Gregory S. KEALEY, and Andrew PARNABY — *Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. Pp. 687.

The authors of this impressively-researched and detailed work wrestle with fundamental questions at the heart of liberal democracies: to what degree should police or security agencies monitor their citizens and organizations? When does surveillance of political dissent violate the fundamental principles of democracy? To what degree should political policing be accountable to elected authority or civilian oversight? *Secret Service* examines more than 150 years of how federal police agencies and, starting in the 1980s, the civilian Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), spied on Canadians. The authors have years of experience in researching and writing on political policing and state responses to labour and the left; one of them has been the subject of his own RCMP dossier. As they document, most of this surveillance was hidden from the public and not reported to or debated in parliament. Although the RCMP shared information with the United States, Canada's political policing was largely self-contained until the 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks on New York. With "9/11," the situation changed, and Canada's spy agencies became more integrated with those of the United States and operated for the first time beyond Canadian soil. This new reality was revealed by the O'Connor inquiry and a Military Police Complaints Commission which investigated the rendition of Maher Arar to Syria and the role of CSIS and military intelligence in the transfer of Afghan prisoners captured by the Canadian army to the custody Afghanistan's notorious security service.

Historically, security and intelligence was not a burning issue politically and focused almost entirely on Canadian citizens in Canada. Yet, external links were often the catalyst for action; the first secret police effort responded to Fenian threats within Canada and from the United States in the 1860s. Gilbert McMicken's secret police, with agents and informants in border cities, by 1870 had all but neutralized the Irish nationalist security threat to Canada. The Dominion Police, formed in 1868 following the assassination of Thomas D'Arcy McGee, was the nucleus of Canada's political policing effort. By the 1910s, its focus had shifted to the South Asian community in British Columbia where "agitators" were challenging British rule in Indian and Canada's immigration policies.

By the early twentieth century, the Royal Northwest Mounted Police (RNWMP) became involved in monitoring dissent, notably from the radical left and organized labour.

During World War I, political policing included registering, monitoring and in some cases internment of enemy aliens and combating subversion. Political policing, which the authors argue is inherently conservative and defends the economic and political status quo, was preoccupied with the left. In the wake of the 1919 Winnipeg general strike, the RNWMP and the Dominion Police were merged to form the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), a national constabulary charged with enforcing federal laws. During the 1920s, it struggled for resources and new roles; one of the latter was conducting immigration clearance investigations. During the Great Depression, RCMP political policing was directed against the Community Party and other leftist movements, with mixed success. During World War II, the national security bureaucracy expanded as the RCMP screened defence industry workers.

Although Canada was not a major power and enjoyed a relatively peaceful and democratic political life, it was not insulated from the Cold War (c. 1946-1990). Again the focus was on internal threats, most of them with real or imagined left-wing associations. During the 1950s and 1960s, homosexuals, who were thought to be vulnerable to Soviet blackmail, were a special category of security vetting. Canada's inability to gather foreign intelligence on its own during this era made it "vulnerable to manipulation and disinformation" (p. 205) and to American demands for intelligence on Canadian citizens, which could lead to Canadians being denied entry into the United States. The most dramatic example of the pitfalls of this relationship was the 1957 suicide of Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman after the Federal Bureau of Investigation passed on classified information, including a RCMP report, to a Congressional committee.

*Secret Service* details how the 1960s and 1970s were a challenging time for the security service. A more critical media and a better educated and more liberal public questioned undemocratic attitudes and practices, even as the RCMP attempted to spy on more Canadians and their organizations (such as universities) and social movements. During the 1960s, Quebec separatism, first of the armed, militant variety, became the new focus of political policing. Scandals surrounding the RCMP security service led to the Mackenzie Commission, which despite its Cold War ethos recommended that the service be "civilianized." Following the 1970 October Crisis, the federal government (somewhat unfairly according to the authors) blamed the RCMP for the intelligence failure. In fact, the RCMP had provided quality intelligence prior to the crisis and its senior officials, according to the authors, would have opposed the invocation in 1970 of the *War Measures Act*. With terrorist cells broken following 1970, Quebec separatism continued via peaceful democratic means. RCMP activities in Quebec however took a darker turn, with a campaign of dirty tricks directed against the Parti Québécois, which won provincial office in 1976. These excesses against threats to national unity resulted in a provincial inquiry and in the McDonald Commission, whose recommendations helped create CSIS in 1984. Contrary to popular perception, the RCMP did not leave the national-security field; it remained responsible for the prosecution of security-related offences.

*Secret Service*, which has a thoughtful conclusion, carries the story of political policing up to the present. Many of its conclusions are troubling in terms of Canada's ability to maintain an independent national-security policy, protest the rule of law and ensure public accountability. With no public debate, for example, CSIS became active in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. The work contains many fascinating and nuanced insights into the political and bureaucratic environments that have shaped Canada's national security apparatus. It is difficult to find fault with this book, which will stand for many years as the classic study of the topic. There are brief discussions of the RCMP's usually positive public image or "mystique" (p. 543), much of which was derived from popular culture. It would have been

useful to provide more “police history” context on the expanding operational policing role of the RCMP in the twentieth century, which added to its prestige, institutional power and its institutional hubris that it was insulated from political oversight or public complaints. In other works, the expanding RCMP was a “package deal” that derived its power and prestige from a combination of roles.

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WICKEN, William C. — *The Colonization of Mi'kmaw Memory and History, 1794-1928. The King v. Gabriel Sylliboy*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2012, 328 p.

Cet ouvrage a pour point de départ les témoignages en cour de six Mi'kmaw de la Nouvelle-Écosse dans le cadre d'un appel de la condamnation du chef Gabriel Sylliboy, jugé coupable l'année précédente d'avoir chassé illégalement le rat musqué. À travers les propos exprimés par les différents témoins, l'auteur souhaite montrer comment à cette époque le souvenir de la signature d'un traité avec les Britanniques en 1752, traité mis en preuve à la cour, s'est transformé dans la mémoire des Mi'kmaw au fil des générations et dans le sillon de l'expérience coloniale. Grâce à une connaissance approfondie des sources documentaires relatives aux Mi'kmaw et à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-Écosse, l'auteur parvient ici, au prix de patientes et minutieuses mises en contexte, à tirer un maximum d'information d'un corpus initial relativement maigre et à proposer un argumentaire cohérent et convaincant. Certes, certaines affirmations faites au fil de l'ouvrage relèvent avant tout d'extrapolations ne pouvant être appuyées sur des preuves documentaires, mais au terme de l'exercice, le scénario proposé s'avère tout à fait réaliste.

L'ouvrage se divise en trois parties, la première étant consacrée à décrire le contexte qui a mené à la poursuite des autorités provinciales contre le chef Sylliboy, ainsi que les raisons qui ont amené ce dernier à interjeter l'appel de sa condamnation. Selon l'auteur, la coutume mi'kmaw de chasser hors saison sur des propriétés privées, la méfiance du monde rural envers les Autochtones, et surtout la volonté du gouvernement provincial de limiter l'accès aux terres de la Couronne au profit du développement économique expliquent pourquoi le chef s'est retrouvé devant les tribunaux. Pour sa part, en choisissant de financer l'appel de Sylliboy, le gouvernement fédéral voyait une occasion de laisser au tribunal l'interprétation de la portée du traité de 1752 en termes de droits de chasse et de pêche pour les Mi'kmaw; en d'autres termes, il laissait la province et les Indiens régler leurs différends entre eux.

Dans la seconde partie, l'auteur cherche à comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles les Mi'kmaw étaient convaincus, en 1928, que le traité de 1752 leur octroyait des droits particuliers. À cette fin, il devenait nécessaire de situer les propos du chef Sylliboy et des cinq autres témoins dans leur contexte historique. L'histoire de la Nouvelle-Écosse entre 1850 et le tournant des années 1920 sert ici de toile de fond pour démontrer comment s'est construite la mémoire du traité signé un siècle auparavant, particulièrement à travers l'analyse de pétitions déposées par les Mi'kmaw entre 1794 et 1853 et des témoignages livrés à la cour. L'exercice est ici périlleux puisque l'auteur associe la perception du traité telle qu'en témoigne le contenu des différentes pétitions à celle qu'auraient entretenue aux mêmes époques les arrière-grands-parents, les grands-parents et les parents des six Mi'kmaw qui en auraient hérité. Or, rien ne permet de croire que ces parents et ancêtres directs aient eu quoi que ce soit à voir avec la rédaction des pétitions. Néanmoins, en