

# *Industrialist Paternalism and Lower-Class Agitation: The Case of Mulhouse, 1848-1851\**

by Arthur BORGHESE\*\*

During the period 1848-1851, lower-class agitation in Mulhouse was remarkable for its character and intensity. Yet contemporary historians have not adequately considered this phenomenon of collective behaviour. Roger Price, for example, emphasizes the lack of class consciousness among factory workers and their total subordination to the local patronat.<sup>1</sup> Though he accepts the sociological argument that employees will adopt hostile attitudes vis-à-vis their employers because of the impersonal environment of the factory, he makes an exception of the Alsatian case:

This theory of relative hostility which was essentially true in practice and will help an understanding of worker reactions after February 1848, was however nuanced in certain areas by the paternalism of the employers. This was especially true of Alsace where employers were active in charity and in the establishment of mutual aid societies, so reducing the extremes of misery and winning a real feeling of gratitude from [the] working class...<sup>2</sup>

Again, he points out that, "in Alsace and particularly the more industrialized arrondissements of Altkirch (where Mulhouse is located) and Colmar, the influence of a new type of notable, the industrialist, was clearly evident... in the paternalistic management of enterprises, clearly evincing the subordination of the labour forces."<sup>3</sup> Such an interpretation supposes that the worker, grateful and dominated at the same time, had internalized all the aspirations and all the values of his master. According to Price, then, popular agitation among factory personnel did not take place due to industrialist paternalism. But if Mulhouse was notable for the philanthropic programmes of its manufacturers, nevertheless the city experienced impressive demonstrations of lower-class unrest during the revolutionary period.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the phenomenon of lower-class agitation in Mulhouse, from the outbreak of the 1848 Revolution to the fall of the Sec-

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\*\* Department of History, University of Toronto.

<sup>1</sup> Roger PRICE, *The French Second Republic: A Social History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

ond Republic in 1851. Two interrelated aspects will be delineated. On the one hand, in the sphere of industrial relations, I will consider the conflict between workers and manufacturers as disclosed in the course of strikes. On the other hand, in the sphere of politics, I will examine the alliance between workers and petty bourgeois against the commercial-industrial class as manifested in municipal and national elections.<sup>4</sup> During the period, lower-class agitation underwent three distinct phases: (1) an initial stage of quasi-structured protest, from March to August 1848; (2) an interval of political mobilization against the conservative reaction, from September 1848 to August 1849; (3) the dissolution of the protest movement, from September 1849 to December 1851.

The argument presented does not discount the importance of industrialist paternalism; on the contrary, it is seen as having fundamentally characterized lower-class agitation in Mulhouse.<sup>5</sup> Factory owners had realized that their mode of pro-

<sup>4</sup> In this article, I have adopted a tripartite class division: workers, petty bourgeois and commercial-industrialists. This division, which comprehends the majority of Mulhousian inhabitants and takes into account regional history, incorporates two principles of classification involving the participation of socio-economic groups in (1) the production and (2) the market exchange of goods (including food) and services. In the case of *workers*, the criterion of classification is that they were directly engaged in production in a physical manner. The category is largely comprised of factory personnel or employees (who did not own the means of production), and includes some artisans or handicraftsmen (e.g., bricklayers and carpenters) who were often employed in factories and foundries. In the case of *petty bourgeois*, their activity in the retail phase of market exchanges is the main criterion. The application of this principle implies the grouping of small-scale employer-entrepreneurs who had close contact with their clients. Included, then, in this category are the less physically involved artisanal tradesmen (e.g., shoe-makers and tailors), shopkeepers (e.g., bakers and grocers), small merchants (e.g., hardware and clothes dealers), and purveyors of lodging and accommodation (e.g., tavern and beer-hall keepers). Their employees such as clerks, apprentices, journeymen, waiters and others of dependent status are not considered directly in this article: though they could be viewed as forming a sub-group of the working class at Mulhouse, little information has been found concerning their role in agitation in reference to conflict with their employers or in the political arena generally. In the case of *commercial-industrialists*, the distinguishing characteristic and basis for classification is their extensive participation in wholesale exchange in the market (e.g., grain and lumber dealers) and in large-scale control over the means of production (e.g., manufacturers). As alternative terms to designate the commercial-industrialists, I use "upper class" and "notables"; for the petty bourgeois, I employ "lower middle class"; and when referring to both the petty bourgeois and workers, I adopt the expression "lower classes".

<sup>5</sup> Paternalism can be defined in several ways. Critical judgements are common. For example, see Rémy CAZALS, *Avec les ouvriers de Mazamet dans la grève et l'action quotidienne, 1909-1914* (Paris: François Maspero, 1978), p. 22. E. P. THOMPSON offers a more reasoned assessment in his works such as *The Making of the English Working Class* (Aylesbury, Bucks: Watson and Viney, 1978); and "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in Eighteenth Century England", *Past and Present*, 50 (1971): 76-136. Paternalism is essentially a conservative attitude: a view of society as an organic whole arranged in hierarchical fashion in which persons are placed in set positions implying mutual rights and duties. Thus the paternalists conceive social relations not in terms of antagonistic classes or autonomous individuals, but rather in accord with a model of the family wherein due protection from "superiors" is to be acknowledged with deferential obedience from "inferiors". They perceive economic relations not in the context of a sphere of self-regulating mechanisms (for the unbridled satisfaction of personal interests) independent of human volition, but as a domain of controlled activities (for the *common good*) subject to intervention when situations arise (like a crop failure followed by speculation) that lead to an "unjust" distribution in the necessities of life. In short, paternalism is a form of authoritarianism tempered with solicitude in social matters, and interventionism qualified by indirect action or non-violence in economic affairs. This definition of paternalism, though it may not comprehend all aspects of the phenomenon, has the heuristic value in a study on lower-class agitation of relating philanthropy (the expression of authoritarian solicitude by industrialists towards their workers) to the conventional market sector (where interventionism in favour of the *common good* can appear to disadvantage the petty bourgeoisie).

duction was brutalizing the labour population, posing a threat to "civilization" as they conceived it.<sup>6</sup> Besides altruistic motives, they sought to maintain public order by ameliorating the moral and material conditions of the working class. Since the Revolution of 1830, they had adopted a number of measures to attain this objective. In the public sector, they subsidized day nurseries, homes for the elderly, committees to help destitute families, public baths, and low-cost worker tenements. In the factory sector, they instituted mutual aid societies, food stores, libraries and elementary schools, and they advocated legislation limiting the employment of children.<sup>7</sup> But with the Revolution of 1848, this programme proved ineffective as the prolonged crisis forced them to reduce wages. The failure induced a revolt all the more vehement because — at a time when liberal ideas were spreading freely — the workers had already assumed the moral sentiments of the ethic of social responsibility that the patronat espoused in limited fashion. Not efficacious enough to convince the working class that their well-being was assured, industrialist paternalism revealed itself as too efficient an intervention in the market exchange of goods and services, thereby constituting an ostensible threat to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. The result was a complex configuration of conflicts and alliances which jeopardized the hegemony of local notables. In short, I will argue that industrialist paternalism was indeed operative at Mulhouse, but that it did not have the effectiveness or consequences ascribed to it by the conventional thesis. Before analysing the phenomenon of lower-class agitation and relating it to the question of industrialist paternalism, a brief survey will be made of the socio-economic development of Mulhouse prior to the upheaval of 1848.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Mulhouse underwent important demographic and economic changes. From 1798, when the ancient Protestant Republic joined France, to 1846, population more than tripled from about 10,000 to 30,000. The high rate of growth was not due to natural increase. In the forty-eight years, births amounted to 25,316 while deaths totalled 21,905, resulting in an increment of only 3,411 individuals. The decisive factor was immigration.<sup>8</sup> By 1836, foreigners, and persons born outside of Mulhouse but in the country, constituted almost two-thirds of the population, numbering 5,636 and 5,950 respectively. By 1841, there were fewer foreigners (4,844), but their decrease was more than compensated by the 9,759 nationals who were not native to the city. By 1846, foreigners probably represented one-fifth (5,846 inhabitants), while the 12,849 non-Mulhousian nationals formed close to one-half of the population. The crisis of the mid-nineteenth century favoured the relative proportion of the native citizens, causing

<sup>6</sup> See the debate on employment of children in manufacturing, Archives départementales du Haut-Rhin (hereafter cited as ADHR), series IM 123/b1.

<sup>7</sup> On these philanthropic works see Marie Joseph BOPP, "L'Oeuvre sociale de la haute bourgeoisie haut-rhinoise au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle", in *La Bourgeoisie alsacienne* (Strasbourg: Istra, 1967), pp. 387-402; Simone LAZARUS, *Les Origines des oeuvres sociales dans la région mulhousienne* (Paris: Librairie Technique et Economique, 1938); Xavier MOSSMANN, *Les Grands Industriels de Mulhouse* (Paris: P. Ducrocq, 1879); and Jules SIMON, *L'Ouvrière* (Paris: Hachette, 1861).

<sup>8</sup> Data on births and deaths are based on registers at ADHR, 5E 337. On the political history of Mulhouse, see the excellent bibliography by Clémence SEITHER, *Essai de bibliographie de la Ville de Mulhouse*, special supplement to *Bulletin du Musée historique de Mulhouse* (1957). The Republic of Mühlhausen was forced to join France in 1798 because of economic pressures. The city changed its name to Mulhouse in 1848.

a sharp decline in the number of foreigners (4,650) by 1851; however, the presence of newly arrived nationals slightly increased to 12,950, constituting the single largest group (46 percent) of inhabitants. The majority of these newcomers were Alsations who had emigrated from near-by villages to find employment in the textile and metallurgical industries, as well as in the construction trade.<sup>9</sup>

Mulhouse, like the rest of the province, was renowned for its production of fine textiles, such as *brillantés*, *jaconas*, *mousselines* and *piqués*, but it enjoyed an exceptional reputation in the manufacture of printed cotton fabrics, called calicoes.<sup>10</sup> In 1746, citizens Jean Jacques Schmalzer, Samuel Koechlin and Jean Henri Dollfus, founded the first printing enterprise.<sup>11</sup> As Georges Hatt notes, the complex industry of cloth printing subsequently attracted subsidiary branches:

Contrairement à toute logique, qui aurait voulu que ce mouvement ait lieu en allant du simple au plus compliqué, c'est précisément le produit le plus parfait, nécessitant le plus de manipulations et de traitements savants qui a été fabriqué en premier lieu et ce n'est que par la suite et successivement, que les articles des stades intermédiaires et ceux qui peuvent être considérés comme des matières premières pour l'impression, ont été produits sur place.<sup>12</sup>

Weaving and spinning became firmly established at Mulhouse by the enterprises of Dollfus-Mieg et Cie (1811-1812) and Charles Naegely et Fils (1825). The process of diversification was extended in 1824, when an immense foundry was built by citizens André Koechlin, Henri Bock and Mathias Thierry, with the financial aid of Swiss bankers and the collaboration of Sharp, Roberts and Co. of Manchester.<sup>13</sup> The metallurgical industry furnished the textile sector with mechanical looms and supplied the railway interests with locomotives. In fact, construction of the railway lines Thann-Mulhouse and Strasbourg-Basel (completed in 1834 and 1841 respectively) was the project of another Mulhousian, partisan of free-trade, Nicolas Koechlin.

With this diversified economic base, Mulhouse became one of the most advanced centres of industry in the realm — the Manchester of France. By 1841, the city was the site of at least fifty textile and metallurgical enterprises, employing about 12,400 workers.<sup>14</sup> In the textile sector, printing paid the highest wages (near-

<sup>9</sup> The data are based on the series "Police des étrangers" at the Archives municipales de Mulhouse (hereafter cited as AMM).

<sup>10</sup> For a review of Mulhouse's economic development, see Paul LÉVY, *Histoire de l'industrie cotonnière en Alsace: Etude de sociologie descriptive* (Paris: Alcan, 1912); and the two-volume work by Henry LAUFENBURGER and Pierre PFLIMLIN, *Cours d'économie alsacienne* (Paris: Sirey, 1930-31).

<sup>11</sup> See André BRANDT, "Les Origines de l'industrie de Mulhouse", *Bulletin de la Société Industrielle de Mulhouse* (1946), pp. 9-23.

<sup>12</sup> Georges HATT, "Evolution économique de l'impression en Alsace", *Bulletin de la Société Industrielle de Mulhouse* (1946), pp. 24-37.

<sup>13</sup> See André BRANDT, "Apports anglais à l'industrialisation en Alsace au début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle", *Bulletin de la Société Industrielle de Mulhouse* (1967), pp. 1-15; and especially company documents deposited at AMM, series 18T. "Archives de la Société Alsacienne de Constructions Mécaniques".

<sup>14</sup> See ADHR, 1M 123/B1. "Projet de classement des manufactures... arrondissement d'Altkirch (1842)". The information was collected by the departmental government in order to facilitate application of the law of 22 March 1841, concerning employment of children in manufacturing. According to Articles 1 & 2 of this law, the information relates exclusively to "manufactures, usines et ateliers à moteur mécanique ou de feu continu, et dans leurs dépendances... [et] toute fabrique occupant plus de vingt ouvriers en atelier". Children are designated as being eight to sixteen years of age, in the context of this law.

ly Fr. 3.00 per day) and concentrated fourteen establishments, that is more than half the number operating in the department of the Haut-Rhin. This branch occupied 5,550 persons, mainly adult males (46 percent) and children (32 percent). Large-scale interests dominated the trade, notably Dollfus-Mieg (1,100 employees), Blech-Fries (710), Daniel Schlumberger (650), Josué Hofer (560), Heilman-Mantz (535), Schlumberger-Koechlin (470) and Isaac Schlumberger (460). In comparison, the weaving branch comprised twelve establishments and paid workers much lower wages (probably Fr. 1.50 per day). It employed some 2,025 individuals, particularly men (43 percent) and women (36 percent). Dollfus-Mieg engaged several workers (275) in weaving, along with the widow of Laurent Weber (900), and smaller enterprises like Schmalzer-Weiss (115). Mechanization had seriously undermined weaving by hand throughout the countryside and accentuated the presence of females and children in the workforce: from 1841 to 1849, their proportion rose from 57 to 62 percent.<sup>15</sup> The process of substitution was even more thorough in the spinning branch where, since 1830, the mule jenny had eliminated the hand-loom. Here the proportion of women increased from 33 to 52 percent, as that of men fell from 29 to 26 percent. Spinning likely paid the lowest wages of the textile sector. The twelve establishments employed 3,212 workers in 1841, with Charles Naegely et Fils occupying a majority (1,315), followed by Dollfus-Mieg (360), Koechlin-Dollfus Frères (250) and Daniel Linck (120).

During the last decade of Louis-Philippe's reign, textile production enjoyed prosperity; however, the crisis of the mid-nineteenth century brought recession for the printing industry. In 1849, its workforce was twenty percent less than in 1841. In the interval, spinning increased its personnel by more than half, forming the largest source of employment in the city. Weaving also grew by about thirty-five percent, though it remained the least significant branch. Textiles thus continued to expand, generally giving work to about eleven percent more personnel than in 1841, despite the malaise of printing; spinning had the distinction of dynamic growth, mediocre wages, fairly high concentration of enterprises, and intense exploitation of female and child labour. It was precisely the branch that underwent the greatest industrial strife during the Second Republic.

The metallurgical sector, which experienced rapid growth due to developments in textiles and public works, comprised six establishments in 1841. The workforce numbered 1,630 and was predominantly adult male; and wages of *métallos* exceeded those of printers. André Koechlin's foundry set the pace of production with 1,085 employees, followed by Jean Jacques Meyer (350), Huguenin-Ducommun (125) and other workshops. By 1849, however, employment in metallurgy fell fifteen percent below the 1841 level, on account of the bankruptcy of Meyer's establishment, called "L'Expansion".<sup>16</sup> Metallurgy, like the printing trade in textiles,

<sup>15</sup> Data relating to industries in 1849 taken from ADHR, 1M 127/7 & 8. "Commune de Mulhouse. Résultats comparés de l'industrie en 1849 et 1850", 19 September 1850. Concerning the transformation of the weaving industry, see the two-volume work by Marie Madelaine KAHAN-RABECQ, *L'Alsace sous le règne de Louis-Philippe* (Paris: Éditions des Presses Modernes, 1939). The author, in my opinion, exaggerates the extent of substitution during the July Monarchy. It was during the Second Empire that introduction of power-loom became general.

<sup>16</sup> See ADHR, 1M 127/7 & 8. "Commune de Mulhouse".

occupied highly skilled personnel who suffered from the economic depression.<sup>17</sup> As will be seen, metal workers and printers played active roles in the political arena during the Second Republic.

The three major classes of Mulhousian society — workers, petty bourgeois and commercial-industrialists — were differentiated in several ways. With regard to geographical recruitment, a study of ten percent of marriages contracted at Mulhouse during the period 1821-1846 confirms the impression derived from other sources that the majority of the population came from Alsace, and to a lesser extent from outlying countries.<sup>18</sup> In the case of workers generally, eighty percent of male spouses were born in the province. Skilled factory workers, like printers and metal workers, were somewhat exceptional in that about one-quarter of them were native to Mulhouse; spinners and weavers were less than ten percent indigenous. Unskilled labourers were seldom native inhabitants; they were mainly Alsatian (86 percent). Handicraftsmen, like carpenters, stone hewers and bricklayers, were even less indigenous than labourers, but a significant proportion (53 percent) came from Germany and Switzerland. During the construction season, they numbered as many as 3,000.<sup>19</sup>

In the case of the petty bourgeoisie, marriage records illustrate a high degree of heterogeneity. In fact, this class of about 1,000 households constituted an intermediary group between workers generally and commercial-industrialists. At least twenty-one percent of male partners belonging to the lower middle class were born in the city. Although a large number (35 percent) emigrated from the province, many (34 percent) came from Germany and Switzerland, revealing a pattern of geographical recruitment similar to that of handicraftsmen of the building trades. When the ancient Republic joined France, they lost their corporate identity, forcing their ranks open to newcomers of different backgrounds. As certain representatives of the bakers noted in 1818, “nous nous voyons encore dans la dure nécessité de résister de tous nos efforts à l’augmentation du nombre des boulangers établis en cette ville où il est déjà reconnu que ceux actuellement existants sont beaucoup plus que suffisants pour assurer non seulement la subsistance de la population mais encore pour établir la concurrence qui peut tourner à l’avantage du public... nous nous opposons à l’admission des étrangers.”<sup>20</sup> Wherever they found access to representative bodies, like the *Chambre de Commerce* or the *Conseil des Prud’hommes*, their membership was limited and ineffectual in the presence of bankers, wholesale merchants

<sup>17</sup> At André Loechlin et Cie, for example, the total of all salaries paid fell from about Fr. 700,000 to Fr. 250,000 from 1847 to 1850. See AMM, 18T 30/33. Graph, “A. K. C. Salaires des ouvriers de 1828 à 1872”.

<sup>18</sup> The sample numbered 407 and was based on every tenth marriage contract from 1821-1846, ADHR, 5E 337.

<sup>19</sup> See Achille PENOT, “Recherches statistiques sur Mulhouse”, *Bulletin de la Société Industrielle de Mulhouse* (1842), p. 279.

<sup>20</sup> ADHR, 1M 104/1. Letter, “Les syndics et adjoints des boulangers de la ville de Mülhausen”, 29 September 1818.

and factory owners.<sup>21</sup> The commercial-industrial class was the most highly indigenous group at Mulhouse: thirty-four percent were born in Mulhouse, according to marriage registers. Other sources indicate that the one hundred or so manufacturers of the mid-nineteenth century were almost all descendants of ancient families established here prior to 1798.<sup>22</sup> While petty bourgeois lived from day to day, with scarce financial resources to buffer them in a time of crisis, the industrialists counted millionaires within their ranks. In 1849, a difficult year, the value of textile and metallurgical production at Mulhouse was estimated at Fr. 46,560,000.<sup>23</sup> Their wealth found expression through political preponderance, rather than in conspicuous consumption or the *goût du luxe*.<sup>24</sup>

Culture and religion also differentiated classes. Most workers, who recently came from the surrounding villages, could only speak the Alsatian dialect, a variant of High German; their culture was based on oral traditions reinforced by a high rate of illiteracy common among the less skilled factory personnel and generally among women.<sup>25</sup> A study of handwriting used by spouses and witnesses to sign their names in marriage registers, linked to a number of household heads inhabiting the city in 1846, illustrates that generally workers employed the German fashion of writing to a high extent (64 percent).<sup>26</sup> Among skilled factory personnel, metal workers and printers used German 50 percent and 56 percent respectively, while spinners and particularly weavers were prone to write in this manner at 71 percent and 84 percent. Handicraftsmen and labourers each resorted to German at rates of

<sup>21</sup> On the *Chambre de Commerce*, see ADHR 1M 114/2, and on the *Conseil des Prud'hommes*, see ADHR 1U 28, 5U 1/2 and 5U 1/7. Following the Revolution of 1848, membership in both of these bodies was slightly increased by changes in statutes. Given the highly concentrated industrial situation of Mulhouse, the *Conseil des Prud'hommes* was perhaps the least democratic: it was modelled on that of Lyon (introduced at Mulhouse by Napoleon I). As the *Chambre consultative des arts et manufactures* noted: "Vu l'absence des chefs d'ateliers ou d'ouvriers patentés qui n'existent pas ici comme à Lyon... le Résultat fut l'Entrée au Conseil (de Prud'hommes) de Contre maîtres employés des Fabriques sous les Ordres de leurs Chefs, et qui en conséquence ne jouissent pas de l'indépendance, que la Loi doit nécessairement avoir eue en vue pour leur attribuer la qualité de Juges" (ADHR 1U 28. Lettre, 8 May 1820).

<sup>22</sup> See the numerous references to family genealogies in Clémence SEITHER, *Bibliographie de la Ville de Mulhouse*, as well as Philippe MIEG, "Etude statistique sur la population de Mulhouse à travers les âges", *Bulletin de la Société Industrielle de Mulhouse* (1950), pp. 14-20; and Raymond OBERLÉ, *L'Enseignement à Mulhouse de 1798 à 1870* (Paris: Diffusion Ophrys, 1961).

<sup>23</sup> See ADHR, 1M 127/7 & 8. "Commune de Mulhouse".

<sup>24</sup> See André-Jean TUDESQ, *Les Grands Notables en France (1840-1849): Etude historique d'une psychologie sociale* (Paris: P. U. F., 1964); Claude FOHLEN, *L'Industrie textile au temps du Second Empire* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956); and in particular, Archives Nationales (hereafter abbreviated as AN), BB 30/376. Procureur général au Garde des Sceaux, 20 January 1866.

<sup>25</sup> On the Alsatian dialect, see Ernst KELLER, *German Dialects: Phonology and Morphology with Selected Texts* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961); and on illiteracy, see Raymond OBERLÉ, "Etude sur l'analphabétisme à Mulhouse au siècle de l'industrialisation", *Bulletin du Musée historique de Mulhouse* (1959), pp. 99-110.

<sup>26</sup> The study of signatures in marriage registers is based on a two-stage research project: (1) about seven percent of household heads were chosen at random from the 1846 population census (ADHR, 1M 138/43a), constituting a sample of 353 household heads; (2) these individuals were then identified in marriage registers for the period 1798-1846 (ADHR, 5E 337), resulting in about thirty-five percent of the census sample being positively identified. The persons indicated as inhabiting Mulhouse in 1846, as well as their witnesses, totalled 625. The results of this study did not differ significantly from those found in the direct study of ten percent of marriage contracts, referred to in footnote n° 12 above.

about 69 percent and 67 percent, but the incidence of the use of the sign "X" among the latter was eight percent. Moreover, the population census of 1846 indicates that more than three-quarters of workers generally followed the Catholic religion. Among skilled factory workers, *métallos* and particularly printers were notably affiliated with the Protestant churches, at about 25 percent and 50 percent respectively, while more than 85 percent of spinners and weavers adhered to catholicism. Handicraftsmen and especially labourers were Catholics at rates of 70 percent and 87 percent. In short, the less skilled jobs at Mulhouse tended to fall in the hands of the German speaking Catholic population, while the more sophisticated and remunerative positions were occupied by a significant minority of literate Protestants who tended to be native to the city.

As for the petty bourgeoisie, linguistic and religious orientation further defined its intermediary position between the working class and the commercial-industrialists. Marriage registers disclose that though the majority (58 percent) signed their names in French style, a significant proportion (40 percent) employed German handwriting, and that illiteracy was rare. In matters of religion, 43 percent followed protestantism; Jews and Catholics made up 10 percent and 47 percent, exemplifying the extent to which cohesiveness had broken down within the ranks of these formerly exclusive occupations.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, the lower middle class still retained a sense of corporate identity. As officer A. Troude remarked in 1846: "Les métiers n'ont pas encore perdu tout-à-fait l'esprit de corporation; on en peut juger par leurs actes. Ils paraissent même tenir à ceux de leurs anciens privilèges qui ne leur ont pas encore échappé."<sup>28</sup> Humiliated by the political domination of the commercial-industrial class, the petty bourgeoisie would become a notable protagonist during the Second Republic.

From the linguistic point of view, commercial-industrialists displayed a higher degree of formal education, if not national integration. Marriage registers indicate that illiteracy among them was quite uncommon and that about 95 percent employed the French style of handwriting. Generally, 41 percent of this class were Protestants. In fact, the Calvinists held a virtual monopoly in the field of manufacturing. Related by family ties based on patriarchal discipline, they were steadfastly devoted to their work — and they demanded the same behaviour of their workers. The authoritarian yet solicitous patronat has often attracted the attention of historians who argue that industrialist paternalism was a chief factor for the lack of public disorder.<sup>29</sup> Contemporaries of the nineteenth century, however, believed the city was highly susceptible to disturbances of the peace.<sup>30</sup> As will be seen, events at

<sup>27</sup> With regard to the demographic reversal of religious affiliations, see OBERLÉ, *L'Enseignement à Mulhouse*, p. 13.

<sup>28</sup> Archives du ministère des Affaires militaires (hereafter abbreviated as CV), MR 1187. "Reconnaissances, plans et projets sur la ville de Mulhouse".

<sup>29</sup> As Paul LEUILLIOT notes: "Le calme social d'une région très industrialisée est traditionnellement expliqué par l'important effort social de ce patronat." See his "Essai sur l'industrialisation à Mulhouse et dans le Haut-Rhin sous le Second Empire et ses conséquences", *Bulletin du Musée historique de Mulhouse* (1973), p. 149; cf., Georges DUVEAU and Paul LEUILLIOT, "Patrons et ouvriers au temps de l'industrialisation", *Christianisme social* (1949), p. 482.

<sup>30</sup> See ADHR, 1M 10/a et 3. Sous-préfet d'Altkirch au Préfet du Haut-Rhin, 27 September 1836. As late as 1853, one government official remarked about Mulhouse that "c'est là qu'est réellement le foyer de la démagogie alsacienne et peut-être de tout l'Est de la France. Mulhouse en matière de désordre est la clef de cette contrée" (AN BB 30/376).

Mulhouse during the period 1848-1851 call in question the theory of total subordination of factory workers and illustrate that industrialist paternalism substantially influenced collective protest among the lower classes.

The first phase of lower-class agitation was preceded by a period of economic instability. Since 1845, the blight and poor weather conditions ravaged potato and wheat harvests; during the summer of 1847, a commercial-industrial depression combined with a crisis in the agricultural sector.<sup>31</sup> As food prices rose to unprecedented levels and unemployment spread, industrial relations became tense. A riot broke out in the city — the so-called “Fête des Boulangers” — on 26 June 1847. Almost five thousand hostile workers milled about the streets, attacking shopkeepers and bakers, until troops, national guardsmen and police dispersed them.<sup>32</sup> With the fall of the July Monarchy in February 1848, political uncertainty caused a crisis of confidence among merchants and factory owners of Mulhouse (as it did throughout the country); and the same phenomenon of strikes took place. From the beginning of March, workers engaged in several demonstrations against layoffs.<sup>33</sup> On the 9th, Mayor Emile Dollfus hastily requested the return of troops previously sent to Colmar, the departmental capital. He informed the authorities that the manufacturers were planning to lay off more personnel and to reduce the workday: “Dans peu de jours, nous aurons bien des bras inoccupés... Mieux vaut prévenir que réprimer.”<sup>34</sup> Thus, during the early days of the Second Republic, the patronat adopted a policy of austerity which would constitute an immediate cause of popular discontent in Mulhouse.

It is indeed a paradox that at the very moment when a slump in commercial activities was occurring, the provisional government had decided (on 2 March) to decree a reduction of the workday in the province from twelve to eleven hours, without specifying the manner in which workers were to receive compensation for the loss in wages. As for the industrialists of the textile sector, the mayor remarked that, “ils se trouvaient dans la nécessité... de chercher à ralentir la production pour ne pas voir la marchandise s’accumuler outre mesure et les prix baisser de plus en

<sup>31</sup> From 1844 to 1845, the annual average price of one kilogramme of ordinary bread increased from 24 centimes to 28 centimes; in 1846 it reached 37 centimes and in 1847, it attained 40 centimes. The average price of one hectolitre of potatoes followed the same trend, with a one-year time lag. For weekly prices, see *L’Industriel Alsacien*. Since food prices never attained the 1847 price level during the Second Republic, Theodore HAMEROW’s generalization seems applicable to the situation at Mulhouse, when he states that, “the food shortage which helped produce the international wave of insurrection had already passed its crisis when the victorious revolutionaries prepared to consolidate their initial successes...”, in his article, “1848”, in *The Responsibility of Power*, eds: L. KRIEGER and F. STERN (Garden City, 1969), p. 160; however, Hamerow does not take into account the sharp fall in wages which occurred during the political-economic crisis of 1848.

<sup>32</sup> Concerning the causes of the 26 June 1847 riot, see my doctoral dissertation, “From Riot to Strike”, Part II, Chapter I, where I emphasize the economic crisis among middle and small-scale enterprises as being the major factor leading to the uprising. For other considerations, see Félix PONTEIL, “Agitation ouvrière dans le Haut-Rhin en juin-juillet 1847”, *La Révolution de 1848* (1931-1932), pp. 155-67; M. M. KAHAN-RABECQ, *La Crise des subsistances dans le Haut-Rhin à la veille de la Révolution de 1848 et la ‘Fête des Boulangers’ à Mulhouse (26 juin 1847)* (Paris: Rieder, 1937); and Joseph BRUXER, “Der Mülhauser Brotkrawal”, *Elsassland-Lothringer* (1934), pp. 45-52.

<sup>33</sup> See ADHR, 1M 232. Commissaire d’Altkirch au Commissaire du Gouvernement, 11 March 1848.

<sup>34</sup> ADHR, 1M 232. Le Maire Emile Dollfus au Commissaire d’Altkirch, 9 March 1848.

plus."<sup>35</sup> They resolved to apply the government reform as follows: though the level of remuneration would be maintained in the case of workers paid by the hour, it would be reduced proportionately in relation to the diminished workday output in the case of piece workers — a reduction of at least eight percent. Since piece workers were skilled adult employees, like spinners and weavers who operated mechanical looms, household heads suffered the wage-cut directly. Factory workers continued to protest against the stringent industrial policy and on the eve of the constituent assembly election, they would express their dissatisfaction in concert with the lower middle class at the voting polls.

Paul Muller, republican from Colmar, noted that Alsace was calm on the eve of the April 23rd election.<sup>36</sup> According to the common interpretation of the period, it was a time of class fraternity or "illusion lyrique".<sup>37</sup> The Mulhousian press offers an apparent verification of this thesis. For example, in a German-language supplement, *L'Industriel Alsacien* published a speech addressed to the mayor by a delegation supposedly representing all factory workers in the city. The workers' delegates thanked the mayor for his steadfastness in dangerous times, and they expressed their admiration of the heroic people of Paris, proclaiming themselves proud to be citizens now that, "die heiligen Ideen von Freiheit, Gleichheit, Bruderverliebe, endlich zur Wirklichkeit werden, im Leben treten und aufgehört haben leere Worte zu seyn!"<sup>38</sup> Conscientious of their rights and duties, they would patiently await social improvements, all the while respecting person and property. Finally, they promised to vote in such a manner as to ensure their families the fruit of their labour and a good education for their children.

The journal, it should be noted, was closely tied to the interests of commercial-industrialists in Mulhouse. It published the supplements to instruct the electorate, swelled by petty bourgeois and working class voters, on the "véritables intérêts de la Nation". In fact, each edition illustrates the upper class preoccupation with maintaining public order. As developments in Paris became more and more radical in character, *L'Industriel Alsacien* found less and less edifying material to edit. The supplements first appeared on 2 March; the last one was published on 2 April — three weeks before the election.<sup>39</sup> The outcome of 23 April 1848 indicates that the lower classes were influenced considerably by the propaganda of partisans for a democratic socialist Republic. Though the results of the department as a whole demonstrate a victory for moderate republicans that was more to the left of the national vote, in the canton of Mulhouse the campaign clearly reveals a more radical-socialist trend. On the one hand, the cantonal and departmental votes coin-

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Paul MULLER, *La Révolution de 1848 en Alsace* (Mulhouse: Bader, 1912), p. 125.

<sup>37</sup> See Georges DUVEAU, *1848* (Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1968), pp. 61-68; and Philippe VIGIER, *La Seconde République* (Paris: P. U. F., 1970), pp. 7-26.

<sup>38</sup> Cited from *L'Industriel Alsacien* (supplement), 12 March 1848. Translation of text: "The sacred ideas of Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood have become real as life, ceasing to be merely words void of sense."

<sup>39</sup> An example of a disconcertingly radical development in Paris (from the commercial-industrialists' point of view) was the democratization of the Paris National Guard — see *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 21 March 1848. A history of the National Guard in Mulhouse is written by Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, *Organisation militaire de Mulhouse et son système de défense contre les incendies*, 2 vols. (Rixheim: F. Sutter, 1879).

cided in the election of Struch (former deputy of the July Monarchy), Stoecklé (parish priest from Rouffach), Rudler (ex-soldier and mayor of Husseren), Kestner (radical industrialist from Thann), Yves (defence counsel of the 1847 riotors) and Emile Dollfus (former mayor of Mulhouse and deputy). On the other hand, cantonal electors did not acclaim the rest of the candidates chosen in the Haut-Rhin: instead of Heuchel (doctor from Cernay), Prud'homme (proprietor and notary), Koenig (lawyer and alderman at Colmar), Bardy (judge from Belfort), and Baron de Heeckeren (large landholder), they preferred Nicolas Koechlin (financier of railways in Alsace), Georges Joseph Schmitt (elementary school teacher at Mulhouse), Caillet and Grisez (mechanics), as well as Kittler (of no stated occupation, but probably a spinner or metal worker by trade).<sup>40</sup> The campaign was well contested, since there were more than 350 candidates, and among the twenty most popular persons, there were at least five workers. The fact that relatively unknown personalities like Schmitt, Caillet, Grisez and Kittler, had entered the competition aptly shows the commencement of popular participation in politics. In the meantime, industrial relations became more and more tense.

While uprisings were taking place in Paris, Mulhouse underwent some disquieting incidents. On 22 June, cloth printers and spinners of three establishments walked off the job to protest reduced wages.<sup>41</sup> Following the arrival of news from Paris, Dollfus-Mieg et Cie offered to revise their pay rate from Fr. 26.00 to 27.00 per fortnight, but the strikers refused. Should the workers' response be seen as a "retentissement du mouvement de Paris", as the prefect believed?<sup>42</sup> Indeed, *L'Industriel Alsacien* suspected that "émissaires" from the capital had been active in Mulhouse. According to the mayor's assistant, Pierre Thierry, there was no Paris connection; rather he stressed the growing suspicion among workers concerning the "good intentions" of their bosses. This suspicion, he argued, was being nurtured by socialist propaganda:

Généralement, les ouvriers ne sont pas assez pénétrés de la sollicitude et des sacrifices dont ils sont l'objet depuis bientôt deux ans: les publications erronées, les théories débitées soi-disant dans leurs intérêts leur ont fait un tort dont ils supporteront longtemps encore peut-être les déplorables conséquences; le mal le plus grand qu'ils conservent contre leurs chefs, [c'est] qu'ils ne [les] croient occupés qu'à chercher d'augmenter leurs profits.<sup>43</sup>

The same reference to socialist propaganda is made by wall-paper manufacturer Frédéric Zuber, in his recollections of this period:

Hélas une nouvelle tempête s'est élevée, non pas envoyée par Dieu, mais fomentée par les passions humaines. Elle a anéanti les fleurs de nos espoirs et a ébranlé les bases profondes de la vie sociale et bourgeoise... Depuis la fondation de la République ces idées

<sup>40</sup> Departmental results are given in MULLER, *La Révolution de 1848*, pp. 125-28; the cantonal votes, in *L'Industriel Alsacien*. Frédéric Caillet was an employee of the railway company at Mulhouse. See ADHR, 5E 337. Marriage register no. 107, 24 May 1845. With regard to candidate Kittler, the journal does not give his first name. During the strikes of August, a Boucart Kittler was among the audacious spinners who walked off the job at Koechlin-Dollfus Frères. His brother, Laurent Kittler, was an iron turner by trade and may have been actively involved in the municipal election. See ADHR, 5E 337. Marriage register no. 326, 1 September 1859.

<sup>41</sup> See *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 25 June 1848.

<sup>42</sup> ADHR, 1M 232. Letter, Sous-Préfet, 28 June 1848.

<sup>43</sup> ADHR, 1M 126/1. Letter, Pierre Thierry, 3 July 1848.

[socialistes] furent annoncées avec violences, tant par des discours, que par des écrits. En particulier fut diffusée une notion erronée de la Liberté et de l'Égalité ou toute différence d'état et de forme était négligée: tous les travailleurs devaient recevoir le même salaire, les biens devaient être partagés en parts égales entre tous. Ces doctrines étaient répandues partout à pleines mains... On avait semé le vent et on recueillait la tempête...

Chez les ouvriers d'ici, de méchantes suggestions ont créé un esprit général de révolte. On leur a laissé espérer la réalisation de promesses insensées qu'il sera impossible de tenir. On leur a présenté une idée exagérée de leurs droits. On les a orientés vers la paresse et on leur a fait miroiter un bonheur auquel ils pourraient prétendre sans beaucoup de peine ou de travail. Sont nombreux ceux qui maintenant ont des exigences d'appropriation et sont insatisfaits. Or, il est impossible aux propriétaires de fabriques de répondre à leur demande. Ces aveugles ne comprennent pas que devant la persistance des circonstances difficiles leurs dirigeants sont contraints à faire d'importants sacrifices et ne peuvent continuer à travailler qu'avec le renversement de la fortune acquise antérieurement, et ne le font que pour éviter à leurs ouvriers d'être sans pain. Au lieu de reconnaître cette bonne volonté avec reconnaissance, ils se refusent d'en tenir le moindre compte et exigent des salaires plus élevés. Ils préfèrent ne pas travailler du tout et de se priver et leur famille de tout gain.<sup>44</sup>

The situation remained tense: on 26 June, a factory worker was seriously wounded by bayonet when the National Guard dispersed a crowd.<sup>45</sup> By 9 July, the personnel of Dollfus-Mieg et Cie finally returned to work, but those of the communal workshop (set up to rectify the Doller River banks, etc.) went on strike to demand higher wages. This "petite révolution", as *L'Industriel Alsacien* called it, was unsuccessful.<sup>46</sup> While unemployment spread, on the eve of the municipal elections, the protest movement in the industrial sector gained momentum when spinners halted production at Koechlin-Dollfus Frères, and Daniel Linck et Cie.<sup>47</sup>

In 1848, the city's electorate grouped 4,230 voters, the majority being members of the petty bourgeoisie and the working class.<sup>48</sup> It must have been difficult for factory personnel to visit the polls, since 30-31 July were workdays. But the results indicate a significant victory for the "comité des ouvriers". The campaign began on 26 July, when *L'Industriel Alsacien* published a slate of thirty-seven candidates, listing the names of the most powerful commercial-industrialists of the city, such as the Dollfuses, the Koechlin, the Schlumbergers and the Trapps. After the elections, the journal admitted that it had received complaints that its list was "trop exclusive, trop aristocratique". It observed that, after all, most voters had been guided by special ballots, "marqués d'un signe particulier pour ceux qui ne savaient pas lire".<sup>49</sup> Hence, despite the veneer of official uniformity emitted by *L'Industriel Alsacien*, the election campaign had been sharply contested.

<sup>44</sup> Cited from the typed manuscript of Paul René ZUBER, ed., "Frédéric Zuber (1803-1891)", *Cahiers de la Famille Zuber*, N° XIII (Colmar, 1954), pp. 52-53. The manuscript is deposited at the *Bibliothèque municipale de Mulhouse*.

<sup>45</sup> See *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 2 July 1848; and ADHR, 1M 232. Sous-Préfet au Préfet du Haut-Rhin, 28 June 1848.

<sup>46</sup> *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 16 July 1848.

<sup>47</sup> The actual number of spinners who walked off the job at the two companies was fifty-five; less than ten percent of these workers were native to Mulhouse, but they were almost all "pères de familles nombreuses", according to the subprefect. Their strike involved the laying off of about 150 other employees. ADHR, 1M 126/1, esp. letter by D. Linck.

<sup>48</sup> *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 6 August 1848.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

The results of the first ballot suggest a landslide for the workers' committee. Twenty aldermen were elected during the round, and among the winners there were only four from the list of notables: Martin Hartmann (iron merchant), Jean de Frédéric de Shoen, Jr. (cloth merchant), Mathias Doll (former subprefect and Director of Assurances Mutuelles), and David Dettwiller (cloth manufacturer who employed about thirty workers in 1841). These four candidates were not the most highly recommended persons listed in the journal. But the victory of the left deserves qualification. On the one hand, some merchants and industrialists successfully appealed to the general electorate, namely F. Zeissolff (wine merchant), Georges Mansbendel (cloth merchant), F. Muller (manufacturer), and Jean and Josué Hofer (textile industrialists). The Hofer brothers were ardent radicals who owned a cloth printing factory (430 workers in 1841) at near-by Niedermorschwiller, and Josué directed a similar enterprise (560 workers) at Mulhouse. Their election illustrates that within the ranks of the upper class, there was a minority sympathetic to the socialist cause. On the other hand, certain candidates not present on the list of *L'Industriel Alsacien* were not clearly affiliated with the radicals: this is particularly the case of artisanal tradesmen like M. Guth (cordwainer) and D. Fels (shoemaker), and small-scale proprietor J. Sengelin.<sup>50</sup> But the more educated or commercially involved members of the lower middle class were prominent partisans of the left. Georges Joseph Schmitt, the elementary school teacher who almost obtained a seat in the National Assembly, won in this election. He soon became chief editor of *Die Volksrepublik*, a German-language socialist journal. Pierre Danner, beerhall keeper, was also elected and he became an outspoken partisan. The group of radical aldermen was augmented by factory workers like F. S. Schell (cylinder engraver), C. Rébert and L. de Maupeau (mechanics).<sup>51</sup> On the second ballot, held 31 July, six more aldermen were chosen. In this round, the victory of the left was lessened by the election of two candidates from the "notable" list, along with former Mayor Emile Dollfus. But with the large contingent of socialists voted into municipal administration, the hegemony of the commercial-industrial class suffered a veritable débâcle — a result all the more startling, taking into account the lack of structured organization of the left at Mulhouse.

It is in the wake of the municipal elections that the climax of quasi-structured popular discontent can be discerned. Relations in the industrial sector became worse due to the patronat's extended application of wage reductions. This period is also distinguished by an unprecedented audacity on the part of factory workers, especially spinners. The strike, already in progress for two weeks at Koechlin-Dollfus Frères and Daniel Linck et Cie, spread to other establishments, such as Guthern, Jourdan, Blech-Steinbach, Marck, and Charles Naegely et Fils — the largest spinning enterprise of the city.<sup>52</sup> Koechlin-Dollfus argued that the wage adjustment had to be imposed in order to withdraw all compensation allowed at the time of the March 2nd decree: in the case of cotton spinners, it was announced that daily wages would be cut from Fr. 1.85 to Fr. 1.55, that is a reduction of 16.2 percent. The companies blamed poor thread sales and engaged in a public campaign against their employees

<sup>50</sup> That Guth and Fels had close personal ties with skilled factory workers is evident in marriage registers. See ADHR, 5E 337, No. 123, 26 September 1833 and no. 151, 28 November 1839.

<sup>51</sup> Schell in particular went on to play a prominent role in strike and political activity during the Second Empire.

<sup>52</sup> See ADHR, 1M 126/1. Report by Pierre Thierry, 14 August 1848.

through the local press.<sup>53</sup> The spinners responded by addressing the prefect with a petition remarkable for its *mélange* of deference and disdain:

Les ouvriers que l'on noircit à vos yeux ne sont pas ce que l'on vous en a dit, ils sont patients comme des agneaux et ils ne se plaignent que quand la misère et l'injustice des chefs industriels les y poussent; pour l'amour de Dieu, ne nous jugez pas avant de nous avoir entendus; nous pourrions par nos livres de paye vous prouver que dans l'*Industriel Alsacien* on a exagéré de beaucoup notre salaire, pour nous accabler davantage; la moyenne indiquée est aussi fautive que Dieu est Grand, mais Citoyen Préfet, nous souffrons avec patience et résignation, espérant de jour en jour, mieux, nous voulons l'ordre et si il devait être trouble cela ne proviendrait pas de nous, notre devise est ORDRE, LIBERTÉ, ÉGALITÉ ET FRATERNITÉ... Ayez pitié des malheureux ouvriers, ils ont pleine confiance en vous et suivront vos conseils paternels.<sup>54</sup>

Negotiations broke down when the workers agreed to return to their jobs only on condition that they be paid for time spent on strike, a demand that was immediately rejected by the industrialists. The prefect readily granted the request of acting Mayor Pierre Thierry to have troops deployed in the city. More than fifty workers were arrested and several were sent to prison in Colmar. The affair almost ended when the *Chambre du Tribunal* of Altkirch (the arrondissement's capital) decided not to prosecute the strikers, issuing instead a *non lieu* verdict. When the twenty-two liberated workers returned to Mulhouse and demanded that they receive pay for time spent in jail, Pierre Thierry ordered them to leave town. It was only after the intervention of Subprefect Weiperdt (proud of being an artisan's son who quit the workshop to devote himself to the Republic), that the patronat decided to show indulgence towards their recalcitrant employees.<sup>55</sup>

The strikes of August represented a significant counterpoint to the municipal elections of July. Indeed, the electoral contest gave the confrontation in the industrial sector an added dimension. As Police Chief Comte observed: "Les ouvriers deviennent de plus en plus agressifs dans leur langage, ils paraissent fiers du résultat des dernières élections (municipales), qui permettent à ceux-ci de compter leurs forces."<sup>56</sup> Though the spinners' petition addressed to the prefect indicates the persistence of deferential attitudes towards authority, proper to a pre-industrial era, the disdain and above all the audacity of workers vis-à-vis their employers bespeaks of a basic sense of dignity which was reinforced by revolutionary ideals.

If, during the first phase of popular agitation at Mulhouse, the expression of lower-class discontent was only partially structured yet massive enough to weaken the hegemony of the upper class, during the interval from September 1848 to August 1849, it became increasingly organized by the left yet incapable of stemming the conservative tide. The reaction began to impose itself in early September, due to the intervention of the government. The objective was the reconstruction of the municipal council, divided by the presence of the socialist contingent elected in July. On 2 September 1849, the *Conseil de Préfecture* at Colmar rendered a decree "accepting" the resignations of aldermen Zeissolff, Pétry, Guth and Fels. At the

<sup>53</sup> See ADHR, 1M 126/1. Koechlin-Dollfus au Maire de Mulhouse, 4 August 1848.

<sup>54</sup> ADHR, 1M 126/1. Petition addressed to "Monsieur le Préfet", signed, "Des Malheureux ouvriers", undated, posted 7 August 1848 (grammatical errors have been corrected).

<sup>55</sup> See ADHR, 1M 126/1. Sous-Préfet au Préfet, 2 September 1848.

<sup>56</sup> AHDR, 1M 126/1. Commissariat Central de Police de Mulhouse (Comte) au Préfet, 3 August 1848.

same time, the government order nullified the candidature of Georges Joseph Schmitt, because the teacher had been a salaried employee of the commune during the elections.<sup>57</sup> By mid-September, the prefect officially designated Pierre Thierry as temporary mayor, the same administrator who had troops deployed during the August strikes and who lost the first ballot of the municipal election held the previous month. As assistants to the mayor, the prefect chose iron merchant Martin Hartmann and *rentier* Joseph Koechlin, both proposed by the "notable" list of *L'Industriel Alsacien*.

Despite this government interference, the hegemony of the notables remained limited. There were still several socialists in the municipal council. The presidential election of 10-11 December 1848 would constitute another check for the dominant class, who sponsored the candidature of General Cavaignac. At Mulhouse, the General of the June Days was supported by a special electoral committee headed by Jean Dollfus, chief associate of Dollfus-Mieg et Cie, who also appeared on the "notable" list. Louis Napoleon won 61.2 percent of the cantonal votes, while Cavaignac received but 32.5 percent and Ledru-Rollin gathered 6.2 percent.<sup>58</sup> The campaign took place in calm, though a few strikes broke out, such as the spindlers' walkout at Charles Naegely et Fils.<sup>59</sup> The economic situation, moreover, was favourable with commercial-industrial activity improving and food prices falling to moderate levels. Yet Cavaignac lost in Mulhouse, probably because of the persistence of the Napoleonic Legend among the lower classes (a legend kept alive by oral tradition and by the pro-Emperor attitudes of the industrialists during Louis-Philippe's reign), and as a demonstration by petty bourgeois and workers against the local patronat.<sup>60</sup> The vote for Ledru-Rollin was small but indicative of the presence in Mulhouse of a nation-wide organization of the left.

The socialist republican association, known as *La Solidarité*, was founded on 4 November 1848, by Ledru-Rollin, in view of the presidential and legislative elections; however, it was not solidly implanted at Mulhouse until the beginning of 1849.<sup>61</sup> Here it was formed thanks to the cooperation of individuals like dyer

<sup>57</sup> According to *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 17 September 1848, "le Conseil de Préfecture, par arrêté... a annulé la nomination du citoyen Schmid (sic), instituteur, pour cause d'incompatibilité de ses fonctions d'instituteur communal et employé salarié de la commune, dont il ne s'était pas démis jusque-là."

<sup>58</sup> For departmental results on the presidential election, see MULLER, *La Révolution de 1848*, p. 131.

<sup>59</sup> See *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 4 February 1849.

<sup>60</sup> That the Napoleonic Legend was nurtured by industrialists at Mulhouse, is made evident by the fact that one of the first trains constructed at André Koechlin & Co. was christened *Napoléon*. During the First Empire, several manufacturers were devoted to the Emperor (whose continental policy was in their favour); and after the Restoration, they remained in opposition. See André BRANDT, "Le Général Rapp et les libéraux de Mulhouse sous la Restauration", *La Revue d'Alsace* (1955), pp. 145-57. But this did not imply that they were followers of the "Emperor's nephew". Indeed, on the eve of the presidential election, *L'Industriel Alsacien* portrayed Louis Napoleon as a *Don Quixote*. At the popular level, the Napoleonic Legend thrived in folklore and was reinforced by the pictorial representations of the Mulhousian lithographer, Engelmann; besides, could not Alsatians be proud of the "fils glorieux d'Alsace", like Wolff, Rapp and Kleber? Streets in Mulhouse itself were named after these heroes.

<sup>61</sup> See CV, F1/40. Report of government spy, Pierre Carlieu (?), "Solidarité Républicaine, Propagande électorale", 21 January 1849. According to undercover agent Carlieu, "L'idée (de l'association) est d'avoir une organisation toute prête... si un nouveau 23 février se présente... en 24 heures un nouveau gouvernement serait organisé sans hésitation."

Edouard Zurcher, president until 1850 when he had to flee the country, and above all Georges Joseph Schmitt, former alderman dismissed by decree.<sup>62</sup> Schmitt began publishing *Die Volksrepublik* on 10 March 1849, and the journal attained a circulation of 1,000 within a few weeks. It was written in the German language with an engaging style and it was popular among factory workers. *Die Volksrepublik's* collaboration with *La Solidarité* became evident during the legislative election of 12 May, when Schmitt published a list of candidates backed by the same association founded by Ledru-Rollin and his journal, *La Réforme*.<sup>63</sup>

Though the campaign proved a resounding success for the left in the electoral district, it illustrates two remarkable aspects concerning the scope of socialist republican propaganda and the character of political participation. The unified effort of *Die Volksrepublik* and *La Solidarité* enabled the left to carry its message to town and country, against the *party of order* supported by large landholders and commercial-industrialists. Pamphlets were circulated and some conveyed extremely provocative statements. For example, the brochure *Unsere Feinde* (Our Enemies) appealed to the peasants not to vote in favour of conservatives; it warned that otherwise, "so wird wieder die alte Ordnung der Junkerzeit und des Herrschaftenwesens eingeführt. Dann bekommen wir einen König, oder einen Kaiser."<sup>64</sup> (the old order of the Junkers and of the feudal system will be reintroduced. We shall then have a king or an emperor.) The brochure even cited the name of Jean Dollfus of Mulhouse for having contributed Fr. 400.00 to candidates of the right.<sup>65</sup> While this strident campaign extended to the countryside, an attenuation of direct popular participation became evident. When *Die Volksrepublik* proposed the candidates supported by Ledru-Rollin's association, there were no aspirants designated from the ranks of workers. The strategy to link town and country thus excluded lower-class initiative from the political arena; in the process, popular agitation was increasingly defined within the context of the left's involvement in issues of national perspective.

<sup>62</sup> Edouard Zurcher (born at Mulhouse on 22 June 1821) took refuge in Algeria, following the 13 June Affair (1849), in order to avoid government persecution. See AN, F/15 4076, a useful source of information on the plight of Alsatian refugees harassed by Louis Napoleon. The documents relate ostensibly to requests by the victims for compensation in response to the law of 6 December 1881: see Guy THULLIER and Vincent WRIGHT, "Pour l'histoire du coup d'état, une source à exploiter. Les dossiers des pensionnés du 2 décembre 1851", *Le Mouvement social*, no. 94 (janvier-mars 1976), pp. 97-106.

<sup>63</sup> See *Die Volksrepublik*, 28 April 1849. For interesting details concerning the press during the Second Republic, see Paul LEUILLIOT, "La Presse et l'histoire: notes sur 'l'Industriel Alsacien' (1835-1870)", *Bulletin du Musée historique de Mulhouse* (1960), pp. 103-11. The publication of *Die Volksrepublik* by Schmitt, as well as that of *La Revue d'Alsace* in 1850 by Joseph Liblin of Colmar, represented the growth in regional consciousness against the excessive centralization of government and the domination of the capital over the provinces. See the first edition of *La Revue d'Alsace* and AN, F/15 4076. Liblin's letter of "Protestation", 6 December 1881.

<sup>64</sup> The pamphlet is located at the Archives nationales de Suisse — Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv (hereafter abbreviated as SA), series Justiz-Flüchtlinge, No. 18.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. the view that industrialists were primarily republican partisans and that they encouraged their workers to read radical journals and to vote in favour of the left. See, for example Charles SEIGNOBOS, *La Révolution de 1848 — Le Second Empire*, ed. by Ernest LAVISSE, *Histoire de France contemporaine* (Paris: Hachette, 1921), vol. VI, p. 163. But Mulhouse was not a one-company town like Thann (dominated by Charles Kestner); in Mulhouse, only a few industrialists such as the Hofer brothers and Zickel-Koehlin (both in extreme financial difficulties) were overtly radical. André Koehlin was more and more reluctant to express opposition to the central government. While some, like Emile Dollfus simply quit the political arena, most of the Mulhousian notables (especially Emile's brother, Jean Dollfus) turned to the right and Louis Napoleon.

The affair of 13 June offers an example of the mobilization of lower-class agitation during this second phase. Since the arrival of news from Paris concerning violation of Article V of the Constitution (the intervention of French troops in Italy by order of Louis Napoleon), posters were affixed throughout the city, demanding that the population defend the Italian patriots and the French Republic against Prince Napoleon.<sup>66</sup> At 11:00 a.m., a delegation, headed by Alfred Bagot-Pellerin, *artiste peintre* (likely employed in the printing industry and adherent of *La Solidarité*), went to city hall to request membership in the National Guard, to obtain weapons, and to receive permission from the mayor to go to Paris to assist the *Montagne*.<sup>67</sup> The delegation grouped a number of petty bourgeois like artisans Egler (shoemaker), Zerling (typographer), Schmaltzer (blacksmith), and C. Guthknecht (typographic printer), as well as factory workers, like Geiger (mechanic), Grandjean (iron turner), Huser (locksmith) and Eckling (mill-roller).<sup>68</sup> Mayor Emile Koechlin, who had recently replaced Thierry, informed them that he had no authority to send civilian forces outside the department. As for the demands concerning incorporation and armament, the administrator noted that these matters would be resolved by the recruitment committee of the National Guard, which would meet during the afternoon.<sup>69</sup>

In the meantime, a large assembly gathered on the banks of the River Doller. More than 2,000 persons listened to a series of speeches ending with a discourse given by teacher Antoine Davin. He rallied the crowd with the familiar shout: "Vive la République démocratique et sociale!"<sup>70</sup> Another meeting was held in the evening so that factory workers could participate; and then a petition was signed by more than 5,000 individuals, mostly workers. But on account of rapid developments in Paris, where opposition was repressed by force, and due to the local administration's strategy of postponing any decision concerning the arming and membership of *montagnard* delegates (the decision was not made until 17 June and only in favour of a minority of the delegation), no aid was given to the defenders of the

<sup>66</sup> For example, one poster had the following appeal: "Aux armes, aux armes! La Constitution est violée; On assassine nos frères de Rome; Vengeons-les dans le sang; Aux armes, aux armes!", cited by Paul LEULLIOT, "Le 13 juin 1849 à Colmar et dans le Haut-Rhin et le procès de Besançon (novembre 1849), d'après le 'compte-rendu des Assises' du Doubs", *Annuaire de la Société historique et littéraire de Colmar* (1960), pp. 106-22.

<sup>67</sup> On Bagot-Pellerin, see report concerning political radicals, AN, BB 30/414.

<sup>68</sup> For insight into Eckling's personal ties with other workers and petty bourgeois, see ADHR, 5E 337. Marriage registers no. 110, 30 July 1835 and no. 278, 1 August 1859.

<sup>69</sup> See AMM. Procès-verbaux des séances du conseil municipal de Mulhouse, séance 17 June 1849. It has become common to emphasize the negative reaction of the inhabitants in the provinces toward the Parisian rioters of June, without taking into account the numerous administrative obstacles placed in the path of *montagnard* partisans by local reactionary authorities. The uninterrupted inflow of anti-republican forces from the provinces is thus seen as a sort of authentic expression of the majority's will. See, for example, PRICE, *French Second Republic*, p. 2. Given the fact that local administrations could effectively obstruct the pro-*montagnard* faction in the provinces, it is not surprising that no Alsatian was arrested during the June Days in Paris. See figure 5 in Charles TILLY and L. LEES, "Le Peuple de Juin 1848", *Annales, E. S. C.*, 29<sup>e</sup> année, 5 (septembre-octobre 1975). For an interesting study on government repression during the Second Republic, see John M. MERRIMAN, *The Agony of the Republic: The Repression of the Left in Revolutionary France, 1848-1851* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1978).

<sup>70</sup> Davin, it should be recalled, almost won a seat in the municipal elections of July 1848, obtaining 1,138 votes.

Constitution.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, popular agitation at Mulhouse had been well-ordered during the June affair, indicating the pervasiveness of socialist republican propaganda among the lower classes. Among the radical activists, cloth printers and metal workers were particularly numerous. The powerful notables, designated as aristocratic, increasingly placed themselves on the side of conservative reaction.

In fact, the commercial-industrialists had hoped for a moderate Republic in the wake of the June Days, and, in accord with this desire, they had espoused the candidature of Cavaignac during the presidential election of December 1848.<sup>72</sup> Following this setback, they turned to Louis Napoleon and the *party of order*. They would be all the more embarrassed by the discourteous reception given the Prince President on 9 August 1849.<sup>73</sup> When Louis Napoleon arrived in the city, a multitude of factory workers, petty bourgeois and notably members of the National Guard, greeted him with shouts of "Vive la République!" If one found these shouts ambiguous, there could be no doubt as to the sentiments of workers who chanted a frankly anti-conservative refrain:

Zimboum, Rataplan!  
Vive les Rouges!  
A bas les Blancs!<sup>74</sup>

The presidential voyage had not hitherto encountered such a hostile demonstration.<sup>75</sup> In the *Nouveau Quartier* district, where the financial and commercial institutions were concentrated, all that manufacturer Isaac Koechlin could say to the head of state was the meek supplication: "Donnez-nous un lendemain... et vous comblerez notre bonheur."<sup>76</sup> When Louis Napoleon mounted the platform of the stock exchange, he again encountered the outcry, "Vive la République!", shouted aloud by national guardsmen. He left the city after a short visit to Charles Naegely's spinning mills. The significance of the discourteous reception was multiple: if the chief executive had secured the support of the upper class who feared the *red spectre*, his excursion must have pointedly reminded him, as Swiss diplomat Barmann surmised, that the idea of the Republic was a lot more popular than he supposed.<sup>77</sup> At Mulhouse, the socialist republican movement won an important segment of the population.

The period from September 1848 to August 1849 represents a transitional phase in lower-class agitation: the manifestation of popular discontent increasingly

<sup>71</sup> On 15 June 1849, the mayor could write to the Prefect that, "nos Montagnards ne parlent plus de leur projet de promenade sur Paris et paraissent parfaitement calmes" (ADHR, 1M 232).

<sup>72</sup> See M. M. KAHAN-RABEQ, "Les idées politiques et sociales", *L'Alsace française*, 10 March 1937, p. 126.

<sup>73</sup> According to Pierre DE LA GORCE, Louis Napoleon purposefully decided to visit "les provinces les plus hostiles, les plus infectées par les doctrines socialistes". *Histoire de la Seconde République française* (Paris: Plon, 1898), 2: 359-60.

<sup>74</sup> Cited by MULLER, *La Révolution de 1848*, p. 139.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>77</sup> SA, Schweizerische Gesandtschaft, 2300 Paris, Band 1-5 (1850). Letter, 29 August 1850.

fell under the influence of the left and embraced issues of national import.<sup>78</sup> At the same time, conservative reaction at the local level progressively linked up with government forces of the right. From September 1849 to December 1851, these forces would persecute the radicals, thereby dismantling the structured mobilization of lower-class unrest. Following the embarrassing reception of Louis Napoleon, attempts were made to purge the National Guard of Mulhouse. The case of Marius Bornand is a curious affair. The Swiss national, who worked as a travelling salesman for a textile company in the city, had been given a prison term of twenty-four hours by the disciplinary council of the National Guard, for having been absent from military exercises.<sup>79</sup> With the encouragement of mayor and prefect, Bornand successfully appealed the verdict in October 1849, before the *Cour de Cassation* of Paris. The High Court decision rendered uncertain the membership status of all foreign-born national guardsmen, in Mulhouse and throughout the country, who did not have the right to officially reside in France.<sup>80</sup> Since the political situation was unstable, it was not until 25 November 1850 that the National Guard of Mulhouse was dissolved by Presidential decree. Troops disarmed the civilian force during working hours in order to avoid opposition from factory workers.<sup>81</sup> One year later, the Prince President carried out his *coup d'état*.

What was the response of Mulhousians to the *coup d'état* of 2 December 1851? According to the common interpretation, the lower classes had nothing to gain in defending a national assembly which just excluded them from participation in the body politic by limiting universal suffrage.<sup>82</sup> At Mulhouse, the climate worsened in early 1851 because of two major factors, the deteriorating economic situation and the intensified activity of secret associations. Since late 1849, the textile industry showed signs of recovery, despite the increased costs of raw materials.<sup>83</sup> Although workers' wages were kept low by factory owners, the workday was increased beyond the limits set by law, especially in the case of children. Competition among industrialists became so intense that complaints were addressed to the prefect. For example, in April 1850, Haussmann, Jordan, Hirn et Cie of Logelbach (near Colmar) pointed out that 'l'établissement qui est en défaut est celui de M. J. Koechlin-Dollfus dont l'un des associés est Maire de Mulhouse... le travail dure nuit et jour, sans autre interruption que le dimanche. La loi relative aux enfants des manufactures y est donc violée, dans un de ses articles les plus importants!'<sup>84</sup>

<sup>78</sup> For general considerations concerning this change in the perspective of popular discontent, and its increased organization in the context of political opposition, see Charles TILLY, 'How Protest Modernized in France, 1845-1855', in *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History*, eds: William O. AYDELOTTE, Allan G. BOGUE and Robert W. FOGEL (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), esp. p. 247; and his article, 'The Modernization of Political Conflict in France', in *Perspectives on Modernization: Essays in Memory of Ian Weinberg*, ed: Edward B. HARVEY (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), esp. p. 78. Also see Edward SHORTER and Charles TILLY, *Strikes in France, 1830-1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

<sup>79</sup> See SA, Schweizerische Gesandtschaft, 2300 Paris, Band 1-5 (1849-1850). Marius Bornand to diplomat Barmann.

<sup>80</sup> See *L'Industriel Alsacien*, 13 October 1850.

<sup>81</sup> See CV, F1/40. Lieutenant-Général au Ministre de la Guerre, 6 December 1850.

<sup>82</sup> This is, for example, MULLER's interpretation, *La Révolution de 1848*.

<sup>83</sup> From 1849 to 1850, prices of raw materials in textiles and metallurgy increased by at least ten percent. See ADHR, 1M 127/7 & 8, 'Commune de Mulhouse'.

<sup>84</sup> ADHR, 1M 123/c1. Letter, 10 April 1850.

Metallurgical production also recovered. But by the beginning of 1851, improvement slowed and the situation was complicated by rising food prices: bread increased 11 percent while potatoes rose 50 percent during this year, in comparison to the annual averages of 1850. In a time of economic crisis, the general prosecutor remarked that the socialist movement directed by Schmitt was leaving “des traces profondes” among factory workers.<sup>85</sup> In the assembly hall of cloth printers, the slogan “L’UNION FAIT LA FORCE!” had been written in large red letters, and one suspected the influence of Louis Blanc.<sup>86</sup> The official observed that, “en effet les socialistes ont depuis longtemps absorbé les républicains; et la République, telle qu’ils la comprennent, n’est autre chose que la réalisation de leurs utopies.”<sup>87</sup> Though administrators likely exaggerated the state of affairs, the government reacted swiftly: on 25 April 1851, a decree ordered the expulsion of all foreigners reputed to have “des idées avancées” — socialist ideas. German refugees like Kurtz (a close associate of cloth printer Jean Guthknecht) fell subject to this law, despite the persistent objections of François Zickel-Koechlin, former radical member of the 1848 provisional government and now a bankrupt industrialist.<sup>88</sup> *La Société démocratique et sociale*, a secret association outlawed since 1850, was found to be active in the province. Georges Joseph Schmitt and other republicans involved in the 13 June Affair belonged to the group and they attracted constant surveillance.<sup>89</sup> Hence, before the *coup d’état* of 2 December 1851, numerous measures of public security were effected to repress the left as economic recession set in and food prices climbed.

Opposition immediately followed the news of Louis Napoleon’s takeover of power. The municipal council, which still seated three socialist members, refused to vow “adhésion pure et simple” to the usurper, limiting itself only to a public appeal for peace.<sup>90</sup> On 7 December, about 850 persons assembled in the *Place des Victoires* near the *Nouveau Quartier*; during the afternoon, a squadron of soldiers dispersed a crowd. In the evening, there were more demonstrations; and thirteen

<sup>85</sup> AN, BB 30/376. Procureur général au Ministre de la Justice (Garde des Sceaux), 7 January 1851. ADHR 1M 56/3. Préfet du Haut-Rhin au Ministre de l’Intérieur, 25 April 1851.

<sup>86</sup> AN, BB30/376. Letter, 6 February 1851.

<sup>87</sup> AN, BB 30/376. Letter, 22 January 1851.

<sup>88</sup> Kurtz, along with Guthknecht, belonged to the Loewenfels Club at Mulhouse during the 1830s. They were associated with the *Young Europe* movement inspired by Mazzini. See ADHR, 1M 10/a & 3. For Jean Guthknecht’s personal associations, see ADHR, 5E 337. Marriage registers no. 34, 3 July 1820 and no. 84, 7 August 1827. Concerning Zickel-Koechlin’s financial state, see AN, BB 30/414, report concerning political radicals.

<sup>89</sup> *La Société démocratique et sociale* had at least about fifty members in Alsace and carried on a virulent propaganda movement in the countryside. Groëilly, a carpenter in Berentzwiller, stated his plan that, “nous nous en prendrons aux fabricants et aux Juifs, ils sont seuls cause de tous nos maux”, while wheelwright André Baumann of Hunsbach wanted an even more radical program: “Il veut que l’on tue le maire et le curé dans chaque commune, et même l’instituteur.” The association was directed by a certain Methua, refugee from Baden living in Switzerland. His house was raided in 1851 by Swiss police. See SA, Justiz-Flüchtlinge 1848-1895, dossier no. 59, “Methua... Hermann”, 1 July 1851. Schmitt’s affiliation with the secret society is evident in a letter wherein Methua writes that “dès que la Société sera constituée, nous écrivons à Schmitt, et à Paris que nous avons formé un comité.” See AN, BB 30/400. Letter, 1 January 1851.

<sup>90</sup> See ADHR, 1M 212. Maire de Mulhouse au Préfet, 5 December 1851; and letter, Préfet, 6 December 1851.

individuals were arrested as instigators, and placed in prison.<sup>91</sup> As for the make-up of this crowd, the subprefect concluded that the participants were "des jeunes gens du commerce ou des fils d'artisans aisés. Un seul appartient à la classe ouvrière des fabriques."<sup>92</sup> Indeed, among the thirteen arrested, there were lower middle-class persons like the artisan François Vetter (shoemaker). Besides, former socialist republicans were notable such as ex-manufacturer Zickel-Koechlin, alderman Albert Ehrsam and lawyer Chauffour. But factory workers were more numerous than the official observed. Rudolph Baumann (weaver), Auguste Denckler (mechanical fitter) and Henri Grosheintz (cloth printer) were also arrested, and the most seriously wounded demonstrator was a worker who received a head concussion.<sup>93</sup>

Opposition continued at Mulhouse, despite the incarceration of radical leaders and the flight of Georges Joseph Schmitt to Switzerland. On the eve of the plebiscite of 20-21 December 1851, posters were placarded throughout the city, advising the electorate to vote "NON!" Representative Cassal (later, editor of the dictionary which bears his name) came to exhort the population to vote negatively or abstain.<sup>94</sup> As for working-class reaction, Mayor Emile Koechlin was frankly pessimistic in his report to the prefect:

Je ne sais pas du tout comment votera la classe ouvrière à Mulhouse, mais elle votera... Jamais nous n'avons eu autant d'empressement pour retirer les cartes d'élection, pour en faire inscrire. Cela n'est pas bon signe, pour le bien ils ne seraient pas aussi empressés, ils seraient surtout plus communicatifs. Tandis qu'on ne peut rien apprendre d'eux, je suis donc à peu près certain d'avoir de mauvaises nouvelles à vous donner dimanche soir. Dieu veuille qu'ailleurs cela aille en sens contraire.<sup>95</sup>

It did turn out badly for Louis Napoleon at Mulhouse, for among the 4,967 voters registered in the city, only 3,498 went to the polls, with 1,683 voting affirmatively and a majority of 1,800 voting "NON!"<sup>96</sup>

What was the essential character of lower-class agitation in this Alsatian city? It should be noted that other important urban centres also experienced comparable manifestations, which permit us better to situate the case of Mulhouse. For example, John M. Merriman underlines the role played by the working class in the Limoges Affair concerning the constituent assembly election of April 1848.<sup>97</sup> In fact, the information to which he refers also reveals that the participation of the petty bourgeoisie was more active than he admits.<sup>98</sup> William H. Sewell, Jr., concentrates on the

<sup>91</sup> See AN, BB 30/403 and ADHR, 1M 212. Report, Brigadier au Commandant, 7 December 1851.

<sup>92</sup> ADHR, 1M 212. Sous-Préfet au Préfet, 8 December 1851.

<sup>93</sup> See ADHR, 1M 212. Report, Directeur de la Maison Centrale de détention d'Ensisheim au Préfet, 8 December 1851; and AN, BB 30/400. "Etat nominatif des individus...", 3 February 1852.

<sup>94</sup> See ADHR, 1M 212. Sous-Préfet au Préfet, 8 December 1851; Maire de Mulhouse au Préfet, 16 December 1851.

<sup>95</sup> ADHR, 1M 212. Maire de Mulhouse au Préfet, 19 December 1851.

<sup>96</sup> Cantonal results are given in ADHR, 1M 212. Report, "Lieutenance d'Altkirch. Etat constatant le résultat des élections de l'arrondissement d'Altkirch". City results are present in ADHR, 1M 4/1. Report, Maire de Mulhouse au Préfet, 21 December 1851.

<sup>97</sup> See John M. MERRIMAN, "Social Conflict in France and the Limoges Revolution of April 27, 1848", *Societas — A Review of Social History*, 4 (Winter 1974): 21-39.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, cf. pp. 35-36, where Merriman observes that "the list of those brought to trial is indicative of the predominantly working-class character of the *Affaire de Limoges*." But the rate of petty bourgeois is comparable to that of workers according to this list.

social structure of Marseilles during the Second Republic in order to explain the political behaviour of workers.<sup>99</sup> However, in constructing his profile of political propensity, he bases his indices on data derived from marriage registers which do not adequately distinguish employees from employers in occupations characterized by a low master-dependent ratio.<sup>100</sup> *A priori*, the bias is in favour of the employers, but without controlling for this statistical distortion, he designates these low ratio "open skilled trades" as the most susceptible to engage in democratic socialist movements. All under the rubric of the "working class" and within the midst of this key group, he unites at the same time certain petty bourgeois (e.g., bakers) who are distinguished by their activity in market exchanges, and workers (e.g., mechanics) who are marked by their place of employment which is often the factory.<sup>101</sup> Such a classification hides a dynamic that Merriman excludes.

In his study of Toulouse, Ronald Aminzade also touches upon the revolutionary period. He investigates the process of "breaking the chains of dependency" of workers in relation to upper aristocratic society, in order to explain the decline of popular royalism.<sup>102</sup> According to him, the shift in political perspective was due in large part to the redistribution of wealth in Toulouse in favour of the bourgeois class of employers who refused all responsibility vis-à-vis their personnel.<sup>103</sup> What is most interesting about his thesis is the argument concerning the development of a spirit of solidarity within the working class. He maintains that this solidarity was disclosed in the formation of counter-institutions among workers. But the world of taverns, cabarets and inter-professional mutual aid societies, to which Aminzade refers, better illustrates that there was an affinity, if not an identification, of perspectives between workers and petty bourgeois. At Mulhouse, some of these institutions aptly manifest the political tie between the lower middle class and factory workers. For example, beerhalls and taverns were notorious places of rendez-

<sup>99</sup> See William H. SEWELL Jr, "La Classe ouvrière de Marseille sous la Seconde République: structure sociale et comportement politique", *Le Mouvement social*, n° 76 (juillet-septembre 1971): 27-66.

<sup>100</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 62. SEWELL assumes that, in his sample, the ratio in these occupations is still skewed in favour of persons of dependent status, like *garçons*, *apprentis*, *compagnons*, etc., such that the statistical distortion due to inclusion of employers is insignificant. In another article, he recognizes that the lack of specific information in marriage registers leads to certain unacceptable results if no control over the data is imposed; and he offers an estimate of how many employers were included along with employees in his sample intended to permit generalizations about "workers". See his article, "Social Mobility in a European City: Some Findings and Implications", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, VII (Autumn 1976): 219. But here, as in his previous work, he has inappropriately assumed that the worker-employer ratio (5.2:1 as given in the 1851 population schedule) for the occupations found in the population at large, is indicative of the worker-employer ratio supposed to obtain in marriage registers for persons belonging to the same occupations. Instead, his sample was probably overwhelmingly comprised of employers, because persons of dependent status simply could not marry while remaining in the state of dependency. They lacked the financial means owing to low wages, they were too young (say less than 25 years old in the case of apprentices), they were extremely mobile geographically (e.g., *garçons* and *compagnons*), and they suffered generally from other aspects of an unstable life (e.g., lack of roots in the community, little education and hence high rates of illiteracy).

<sup>101</sup> SEWELL, "La classe ouvrière de Marseille", appendix II: "Caractéristiques sélectionnées des professions de la classe ouvrière de Marseille", p. 63.

<sup>102</sup> Ronald AMINZADE, "Breaking the Chains of Dependency: From Patronage to Class Politics, Toulouse, France, 1830-1872", *Journal of Urban History*, III (August 1977): 485-506.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 492-93 and p. 500.

vous, constantly watched by the authorities.<sup>104</sup> Not only did secret societies hold meetings in establishments like *La Couronne* (frequented by Emile Dollfus' own workers) during the July Monarchy;<sup>105</sup> but proprietors of this type of business often played an active role in popular disturbances. Beerhall keeper Pierre Becker(t) participated in the riot of 26 June 1847.<sup>106</sup> Pierre Danner was a notable agitator in the electoral revolt of July 1848.<sup>107</sup> Beckert's establishment (*New York*), along with others like the *Café de la Cigogne*, hosted gatherings of socialist radicals throughout the Second Republic.<sup>108</sup> In short, their clientele of numerous factory workers was often their ally.<sup>109</sup> Thus in Aminzade's study, the sense of solidarity is restricted and the alliance of classes is reduced.

Finally, Peter N. Stearns, in his general work entitled *1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe*, implies that the significant alliance, albeit shortlived, obtained between the articulate middle-class leaders who gave direction and certain segments of the lower classes (in particular, urban craftsmen who "provided the muscle" yet lost out on the fruits of the Revolution).<sup>110</sup> He asserts that "we could virtually omit factory workers from a discussion of the revolutions without major distortion... The notion, still surprisingly common (sic!), that factory workers and factory-caused grievances played a major role in the revolutions of 1848 exaggerates the extent of industrialization on the continent and ignores its actual location."<sup>111</sup> However, Mulhouse — "a major factory center" — does not receive much attention in Stearns' book, though the author does call Roger Price's social history a "solid job".<sup>112</sup>

<sup>104</sup> See ADHR, 1M 13/71. Procureur général au Procureur de la République, 26 July 1849. Also AN, BB 30/376. Letter, Procureur général, 6 February 1850.

<sup>105</sup> See ADHR, 1M 29/3. Testimony of Kirchmann, 2 June 1847.

<sup>106</sup> See the biographic sketch in Jean MAITRON, et al., *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français. Première Partie: 1789-1864. De la Révolution française à la fondation de la Première Internationale* (Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1964), p. 181. Becker(t) was born in Küssel (Bavaria), and worked at André Koechlin's foundry in Mulhouse from 25 March 1834 to 8 September 1836. See AMM, 18 T 1H1/4. Arbeiter Buch, 1827-1871, entry no. 01080. He married Caroline Röcké, repasseuse, on 21 July 1827. ADHR, 5E 337. Marriage register no. 80. By 1841, Becker(t) indicated his profession as *aubergiste*. *Ibid.* Marriage register no. 204 (witness for Joseph Fuessinger, *menuisier*).

<sup>107</sup> See AN, BB 30/414. Report concerning political radicals.

<sup>108</sup> See ADHR, 1M 13/70. Lieutenant du 14<sup>e</sup> légion au Général, 19 January 1850. ADHR, 1M 13/71. Procureur général au Procureur de la République, 26 July 1849.

<sup>109</sup> Note the distinction which G. CROSSICK makes in asserting that "l'appartenance de classe ne peut venir de la clientèle", in his article, "La petite bourgeoisie britannique au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle", *Le Mouvement social*, n° 108 (juillet-septembre 1979): 60. Also see Thea VIGNE and Alun HOWKINS, "The Small Shopkeeper in Industrial and Market Towns", in *The Lower Middle Class in Britain*, ed: Geoffrey CROSSICK (London: Croom Helm, 1977), esp. p. 187.

<sup>110</sup> See Peter N. STEARNS, *1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), p. 12.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 257. A direct reference to Mulhouse is found on page 221, concerning the negative vote Louis Napoleon received in the plebiscite of 20-21 December 1851, in which "important segments of the lower middle class and working class expressed their republicanism." But this remarkable coincidence in perspectives among the lower classes of Mulhouse is not explained substantively by the author. Cf. his comments on charity and middle-class liberals (*ibid.*, pp. 227-28) with the argument presented in this paper. It is surprising that Stearns did not follow through in his interpretation of the revolutionary tide in Europe according to his illuminating comments on city governments, made in his previous work: *European Society in Upheaval: Social History Since 1800* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), pp. 116-19.

My position is that lower-class agitation in Mulhouse reveals two aspects which deserve attention. On the one hand, in the industrial sector, we observe an example of class conflict which, according to the Marxist schema, indicates an inherent antagonism between the patron and his personnel, between those who possess the means of production and those who produce the merchandise — in a word, between capital and labour. On the other hand, in the political sphere, we observe a complex configuration of alliances between certain members of classes, notably between petty bourgeois and factory workers, against the commercial-industrial notables.

This article began in reference to the question of industrialist paternalism. In my opinion, it is largely in connection with this question that an explanation of lower-class agitation is to be found. If it is evident that factory workers were much more autonomous than Roger Price supposes, it would still be useful to pursue the implications of philanthropy in relation to the function of the market at Mulhouse.

Although industrialist paternalism addressed itself to the moral and material well-being of the working class, this activity proved to be detrimental to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, inasmuch as philanthropy constituted an intervention in the conventional market-exchange of goods and services. In the exchange of goods, especially foodstuffs, several industrialist projects were cause for grievance. In the aftermath of the 1847 riot, some large enterprises such as Frédéric Zuber et Fils (paper printing), Dollfus-Mieg et Cie (spinning-weaving-cloth printing) and André Koechlin (metallurgy) founded bakeries or stores in their factories, in order to sell food at reduced prices for their workers. Their activities in this area would assume a massive level when bread prices rose at the outset of the Second Empire.<sup>113</sup> A similar response took place among smaller manufacturers, in their attempt to found a share-holding bakery in October 1847. Simon Paraf (printing), Daniel Linck (spinning), Huguenin, Ducommun et Dubried (metallurgy), and others, were “désireux de concourir au bien général et particulièrement à celui de la classe déshéritée de la fortune”.<sup>114</sup> Shares would number 1,000 and sell for Fr. 25.00 each: “On voudrait par là engager la classe ouvrière et des petits ménages.”<sup>115</sup> Although they assured the public that they had no intention of harming the baking profession, they estimated that their bread would sell from five to ten centimes per loaf less than the baker’s price: “Une réduction de 5 centimes produirait une économie d’au moins cent to a number of controls in favour of the consumer. The Revolution of 1789 proclaimed philanthropy represented direct competition and the only resort shopkeepers had

<sup>113</sup> See ZUBER, “Frédéric Zuber”. This system of factory bakeries apparently started in Guebwiller where “le pain est confectionné pour le compte des consommateurs, suivant une organisation introduite par la maison Nicolas Schlumberger et Cie et d’après laquelle il n’y a pas à payer de bénéfice de boulanger” (ADHR, 1M 104/3. Ministre de l’Agriculture et du Commerce au Préfet du Haut-Rhin, 19 August 1844). Describing the situation at the commencement of the Second Empire, Mayor Jean Koechlin-Schlumberger noted: “A côté des boulangers il y a des boulangeries que j’appellerai philanthropiques, établies par des fabricants. Plusieurs établissements considérables, dont un entr’autres emploie 1600 à 1700 ouvriers possèdent des boulangeries, et distribuent à leurs ouvriers le pain... à un prix réduit” (ADHR, 1M 104/4. Letter, 16 October 1854).

<sup>114</sup> *L’Industriel Alsacien*, 17 October 1847.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

was to lure the factory worker with credit, thereby exposing themselves to bankruptcy when industrial activity slackened and their clients were laid off.<sup>116</sup>

At the same time, those engaged in the conventional market were subjected to a number of controls in favour of the consumer. The Revolution of 1789 proclaimed liberty of commerce, but it belied the principle through the application of diverse regulations. Shortly after the union with France, butchers, for example, expressed their discontent with the new regime:

D'après les Anciens Statuts et règlements exécutés jusqu'à ce jour et en conséquence desquels les Exposants ont formé leur Etablissements, il a toujours été libre à tous marchands bouchers patentés de vendre et de biller de la viande, où bon leur semblait, que la police ni autre autorité compétente n'y ont interdit personne.<sup>117</sup>

Now, butchers had to get their supplies only from the municipal slaughter houses and they were forbidden to set up stalls in the city square. As for other trades, hotel keepers had to register their guests, tavern owners had to close early, and any dealer selling alcoholic beverages had to obtain a special licence which was difficult to procure.<sup>118</sup> The imposition of this same principle opened the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie to newcomers of different backgrounds, made evident by statistics relating geographical, cultural and religious differences. In addition, the abolition of corporations removed all effective means of collective defence of their interests — an important point because these professions used to share political power in the governing council of the ancient Republic prior to unification with France.<sup>119</sup> Although numerous controls hedged the entrepreneurial artisans, the dominant class would permit absolutely no regulation of their own activities.

The inequitable system was irritation enough for petty bourgeois, without the added vexation of industrialists' incursions in the realm of small-scale proprietary interests. The lower middle-class households frequently augmented financial resources by lodging factory workers in their homes, besides specializing in this activity as hotel keepers.<sup>120</sup> They could only view with alarm any attempts by manufacturers to finance low-cost housing for their personnel. The famous *Cités ouvrières* of Mulhouse which numbered about 892 household units by 1870 was not

<sup>116</sup> Credit among workers was an ingrained habit at Mulhouse, often decried by such persons as Dr. Achille Penot (closely associated with the *Société Industrielle de Mulhouse*) and one of the mandatory conditions set by factory bakeries and stores was that workers pay in cash. The habit continued, despite their efforts. See, for example, l'Abbé H. CETY, *La Famille ouvrière en Alsace* (Rixheim: A. Sutter, 1883). For a description of the plight of shopkeepers in a time of strikes, see Robert ROBERTS, *The Classic Slum: Salford life in the first quarter of the century* (London: Butler & Tanner, 1971), p. 73; and for their attitude towards co-operatives, *ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>117</sup> ADHR, 1M 105/1. Petition, Marchands bouchers au Citoyen Préfet, frimaire An X.

<sup>118</sup> See the various municipal bylaws (*arrêtés*) in AMM, "procès verbaux de 1798 à 1850".

<sup>119</sup> On the juridico-political character of corporations at Mulhouse, prior to 1798, see Philippe MIEG, "Bourgeois et manants à Mulhouse du XVI<sup>e</sup> au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle", in *La Bourgeoisie Alsacienne* (Strasbourg: Istra, 1967), pp. 205-11, and "Les Métiers des bourgeois d'après des recensements de 1699 et 1798", in *Artisans et ouvriers d'Alsace* (Strasbourg: Istra, 1965), pp. 205-11; and in the same collection, Raymond OBERLÉ's article, "Les Corporations et les débuts de l'industrialisation à Mulhouse", pp. 369-79.

<sup>120</sup> For an interesting analysis of petty bourgeois interests as small proprietors in matters of lodging, see CROSSICK, "La petite bourgeoisie britannique", especially pp. 51-56; however, the author does not consider in depth such important industrial centres as Leeds and Manchester, but rather concentrates on less specialized areas and refers mainly to conflicts between the lower middle class and workers.

begun until 1853, but planning for the project was suggested by Jean Zuber before the *Société industrielle de Mulhouse* in 1851, and strongly supported by Jean Dollfus.<sup>121</sup> Indeed a precedent had already been established in the city for social engineers. In 1835-1836, André Koechlin built workers' tenements (each with two rooms, kitchen, basement and attic) adequate for thirty-six households at a charge of Fr. 13.00 per month.<sup>122</sup> The initiative could only forebode ill for small proprietors in town.

Above all, the most serious cause of grievance for petty bourgeois occurred in moments of crisis, when industrialists interfered in market transactions of wheat and bread. The crisis of 1847 is a case in point. The municipal council, headed by Emile Dollfus — himself a factory owner in the spinning trade — sanctioned the formation of a grain commission which grouped several notables. The objective was to purchase grain abroad and to sell it on the local market at reduced prices.<sup>123</sup> In combination with this measure, the municipal administration modified the *taxe du pain* (a procedure for fixing the price of ordinary bread according to the average price of wheat sold during previous market-days), in order to translate the recently lowered price of wheat into the price of bread consumed by factory workers. As for the import of this modification, the mayor explained to Subprefect Mathias Doll that, "vous savez comme moi, Monsieur le Sous-Préfet, que l'initiative de cette mesure (rigoureusement parlant illégale et injuste envers les boulangers mais enfin avantageuse au consommateur au moment où elle fut prise), appartient tout entier à l'autorité municipale."<sup>124</sup> Here we have in broad outline the reason why we encounter a coincidence of interests, if not an alliance, between the lower middle-class and factory workers during the Second Republic. Although petty bourgeois had been subject to attacks by workers in the riot of 26 June 1847, now (during an epoch when universal manhood suffrage nourished their sense of dignity), they found occasion to avenge themselves against the industrialists by aiding and abetting the working class in their battle to protect wages. During the August strikes of 1848, Police Chief Comte addressed the issue of strikers receiving financial and moral assistance from the petty bourgeoisie:

Où feront-ils cette quête, si ce n'est chez les artisans ou Bourgeois, ils y rencontrent donc des sympathies, un appui ou encouragement tacite, sinon ostensible? Or si ces artisans s'intéressaient aux ouvriers, ils devraient les encourager à reprendre le travail, leur donner de bons conseils, les éclairer sur leurs véritables intérêts; au lieu de ça ils

<sup>121</sup> See ZUBER, "Frédéric Zuber", p. 44; and LAZARUS, *Origines des oeuvres sociales*, pp. 71-79; and the biographical sketch on Jean Dollfus, by Edouard SITZMANN, *Dictionnaire de biographie des hommes célèbres d'Alsace* (Paris: Editions du Palais Royal, 1972), I: 392-93.

<sup>122</sup> See Louis René VILLERMÉ, *Sur les Cités Ouvrières* (Paris: L. Martinet, 1850), p. 13; Maurice DESLANDRES and Alfred MICHELIN, *Il y a cent ans: Etat physique et moral des ouvriers au temps du libéralisme. Témoignage de Villermé* (Paris: Editions SPES, 1938), p. 36; and generally, Emile MULLER and Emile CACHEUX, *Les Habitations ouvrières en tous pays: situation en 1878. Avenir* (Paris: Dejevy, 1879).

<sup>123</sup> See ADHR, 1M 103/5. Brochure, *Rapport fait par le maire de Mulhouse dans la séance du Conseil Municipal du 16 juillet 1847, sur les mesures prises pour venir au secours de la classe nécessiteuse et assurer l'approvisionnement du marché pendant la cherté des subsistances* (Mulhouse: P. Baret, 1847).

<sup>124</sup> ADHR, 1M 103/5. Emile Koechlin au Sous-Préfet Mathias Doll, 8 July 1847 (parenthesis given as in original text).

concourent à organiser la résistance des ouvriers contre les patrons, ils satisfont leurs rancunes en faisant naître une situation dont le dénouement probable est l'effusion du sang.<sup>125</sup>

Elsewhere in Alsace, the petty bourgeoisie also exhibited hatred towards industrialists. As one contemporary noted, "les bourgeois, c'est-à-dire les boulangers, les bouchers, les cabaretiers, les épiciers, et cetera... détestent les chefs de fabriques... On n'aime pas les fabricants parce qu'ils sont riches."<sup>126</sup> But in the case of Mulhouse, where philanthropic activities were all the more developed, lower middle-class hatred of manufacturers received an added dimension due to competition in the market exchange of goods and services — a factor which drove them to support the working-class cause during the initial phase of popular discontent. During the rest of the revolutionary period, their alliance was assured by the left's profession of holding sacred the rights of private property.<sup>127</sup>

The character and intensity of workers' protest can also be related to the question of industrialist paternalism. On the one hand, it should be recalled, the solicitous behaviour of the patronat was a relatively recent development. For example, Raymond Oberlé remarks that, "cet esprit social n'est pas né de la première heure de l'industrialisation. On peut, jusque vers 1830 même parler de la passivité du patronat à l'égard de la classe ouvrière."<sup>128</sup> The tragic history of the province, moreover, has encouraged a certain idealization of all institutions, including social relations, that existed prior to the Franco-Prussian war. Consequently, the role of industrialist paternalism has been exaggerated. J. Acker, for example, recalls with a nostalgia that is as bitter as it is inaccurate: "Lorsqu'en 1871, l'Alsace devint terre d'Empire et fut violemment arrachée à la France, l'évolution du mouvement ouvrier, qui s'était harmonieusement développée jusque-là grâce aux larges vues du patronat, changea complètement de caractère."<sup>129</sup> On the other hand, industrialist paternalism at Mulhouse was not always tempered with solicitous concern for the workers' welfare, and when philanthropy was adopted, it was not uniformly extended in all branches of industry.

Precise data are often lacking, but the information available suggests that it was in large-scale establishments that industrialist paternalism of a philanthropic kind was most common, especially in the printing and metallurgical trades. André and Daniel Koechlin, Frédéric Engel-Dollfus, Jean Dollfus, Frédéric Zuber and their close associates were the leading exponents of the dictum that *a boss owes more than wages to his workers*. In their factories and within the community at large, they sponsored a number of charitable works.

<sup>125</sup> ADHR, 1M 126/1. Comte au Procureur général de la Cour de Colmar, 30 August 1848.

<sup>126</sup> Cited by Paul LEULLIOT, "Les Archives privées et l'histoire économique. Exemples alsaciens", *La Revue d'Alsace* (1949), p. 219.

<sup>127</sup> *Die Volksrepublik* was careful to point that as "rothe Republikaner" they had no intention of abolishing private property; rather, socialists wanted that "alle durch ihrer Hände Arbeit, zu Eigenthum kommen" (all who work with their hands be entitled to own property) (15 April 1849). The journal frequently attempted to dispel the view that communism is the division and destruction of property, noting that conservatives often use this argument to frighten the people into voting against the Republic.

<sup>128</sup> OBERLÉ, *L'Enseignement à Mulhouse*, p. 15.

<sup>129</sup> J. ACKER, *L'Organisation et l'action syndicale ouvrière en Alsace* (Paris: Domat-Monchrestien, 1932), p. 8.

What were these measures and how effective were they?<sup>130</sup> Prior to 1848, and during the revolutionary period, several programmes got underway: low-cost food provisioning and construction of workers' tenements would become considerable operations during the Second Empire. Others, such as homes for the elderly and public baths, never catered to more than a hundred or so persons. A minority of working-class families were touched by such institutions as day-care nurseries and by welfare committees like the *Société des Amis des Pauvres*, designed to help destitute households.<sup>131</sup> Perhaps the most famous measure was to have the government impose restrictions on employment of children in manufacturing, but the reform of 1841 hardly applied to the metallurgical industry and was never generally accepted in the textile sector. Attempts were made to provide workers with health or unemployment insurance, but, in these instances, industrialist efforts were likely nullified by periodic crises and sectorial instability, characteristic of capitalist production in this epoch: personnel turn-over was high (especially in metallurgy) and relief systems like mutual aid funds were not transferable from one establishment to another. Efforts were bound to be limited by the fact that printing and metal working were caught in a long-term phase of contraction, from the point of view of employment. By 1849, they respectively occupied twenty and fifteen percent less personnel than in 1841, a situation which doubtlessly caused a sense of insecurity among those fortunate enough to hold on to their jobs.

In contrast, manufacturers specializing in spinning and weaving, particularly owners of small establishments, were less inclined to engage in philanthropy. They felt restrained by their limited resources and their poor competitive position vis-à-vis their more substantial colleagues. The formation of mutual aid societies aptly illustrates the plight of workers in this sector. As a rule, highly skilled factory workers in Mulhouse were constrained to join these relief funds directed and controlled by the bosses, but women and children, as well as elderly employees, had no protection whatsoever against sickness and accident. These categories of workers represented the majority of personnel in spinning and weaving. In order to correct the fault, a *Caisse centrale* was founded in 1834, under the auspices of the municipal administration. By 1845, membership reached 4,349 persons — about a quarter of all factory workers employed in the city and its suburbs — but the crisis of 1847 intervened and the *Caisse* went bankrupt. Although it was reorganized, it had to reduce its operations and the number of workers never approached the 1845 level.<sup>132</sup> Thus, by the end of the July Monarchy, industrialist paternalism in its philanthropic form was not comprehensive and, at the outset of the Second Republic, the crisis forced the manufacturers to adopt wage reductions which placed the workers in a situation that was all the more desperate.

This crudest form of industrialist paternalism, that is authoritarianism with little or no aid to offer in a time of crisis, called forth an elementary reaction from

<sup>130</sup> What follows is a brief assessment of information given in previous references, especially indicated in footnote 7 above.

<sup>131</sup> See Ernest MEININGER, *Essai de description, de statistique et d'histoire de Mulhouse* (Strasbourg: R. Schultz, 1885), p. 134.

<sup>132</sup> See AMM, QV cd8; Achille PENOT, "Recherches statistiques sur Mulhouse", *Bulletin de la Société Industrielle de Mulhouse* (1848), p. 494; and esp., Denise HERRENSCHMITT, "Les Caisses de Secours entre ouvriers à Mulhouse de 1800 à 1870", *Bulletin du Musée historique de Mulhouse* (1958), pp. 99-111.

those concerned. The wave of strikes that initially started among spinners of smaller establishments illustrates the typical response among workers; only after their walkout did workers from larger companies like Charles Naegely et Fils join their comrades out of sympathy.<sup>133</sup> When food prices fell, however, spinners and weavers did not generally play a conspicuous role in the subsequent agitation that was primarily political in orientation, whereas cloth printers and metal workers did so throughout the Second Republic. This difference in responses points to the need to relate the two types of agitation — industrial and political — to the formation of the working class and the susceptibility of certain categories of factory personnel to become radicalized. The data on class differentiation suggest an answer.

Although printing and metallurgy were in a stagnant phase of growth, workers in these trades tended to be more literate and capable of using French, and more often native and affiliated with the Protestant churches in Mulhouse, than spinners, weavers and ordinary labourers. They, along with the petty bourgeoisie, apparently enjoyed a greater degree of economic stability and cultural sophistication which enabled them to organize themselves in sustained fashion, while at the same time making them capable of accepting the message of the radical left. Indeed, spinners and weavers became radicalized: the August strikes indicate an undercurrent of political awakening, but the economic recovery removed the immediate cause for agitation on an elementary social level. Lacking the requisite stability, they must have found it difficult to answer the call of *Die Volksrepublik* and *La Solidarité*. For personnel in printing and metallurgy, that call promised social equality and asserted personal dignity — in short, an end to *Knechtschaft* (servitude).<sup>134</sup> The result was that highly skilled workers assumed an autonomous attitude vis-à-vis their patronat and came to regard philanthropy as a demeaning imposition. The response is evident in 1851, when the *Association des imprimeurs sur étoffes et des graveurs sur rouleaux* opposed the manufacturers' attempt to set up a retirement fund (*caisse de retraite*) according to the 18 June 1850 law.<sup>135</sup> They wanted to control their own fund. Industrialist paternalism, albeit couched in terms of solicitude, could now only appear as an unmitigated form of domination by the bosses. Effective enough to constitute an ostensible menace to the petty bourgeoisie, yet not efficacious enough to convince the factory workers that their welfare was secured with dignity, the phenomenon of industrialist paternalism became a prime cause of lower-class alliances against the commercial-industrial notables.

In conclusion, this article has attempted to comprehend lower-class agitation at Mulhouse in the context of social relations in reference to the modalities of the operation of the market, in a society fundamentally transformed by the process of industrialization. Actually, we are observing a period of transition. In an epoch when France was making her experiment with universal manhood suffrage, workers' attitudes still retained an element of deference proper to a pre-industrial era and recently reinforced by industrialist paternalism of a philanthropic type. But the Revolution of 1848 offered them more radical ideas which threatened to undermine

<sup>133</sup> See ADHR, 1M 126/1. Comte au Procureur général de la Cour de Colmar, 30 August 1848.

<sup>134</sup> See *Die Volksrepublik*, for example, 25 August 1849 and 2 June 1849.

<sup>135</sup> See LAZARUS, *Origines des oeuvres sociales*, pp. 111-17; and AN, BB 30/400. Report, Procureur général au Garde des Sceaux, 22 January 1852.

this conception in preference of another. The modification in collective behaviour became evident during the July elections and the August strikes, when factory employees showed unprecedented disdain and audacity. The workers' cause found sympathy within the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, who still held the memory of ancient rights, a souvenir made poignant by their subjection to an inequitable system of market controls, assaults against proprietary interests, and flagrant impositions in times of crisis. The result was a remarkable sense of solidarity among the lower classes which threatened the hegemony of the commercial-industrial class. During the last two phases of popular agitation, food prices fell to moderate levels and the economic situation improved, except for the final year of the Second Republic. But the socialist republican party was able to win and conserve the loyalty of important segments of the lower classes, in particular petty bourgeois and highly skilled cloth printers and metallurgical workers, because the patronat's limited programme of philanthropy failed to ensure with dignity the well-being of workers whose wages had been sharply reduced, and because that philanthropy alienated the petty bourgeois whose livelihood was threatened in the marketplace. In the course of the left's attempt at mass mobilization, the combination of antagonisms could only be partially transferred onto the national plane, where wider issues were at stake. Consequently, lower-class protest at Mulhouse lost its immediate local aspect and fell exposed to the full brunt of conservative reaction.