

squandered many more men who could otherwise have been in the firing line. Senior officers were curiously slow to recognize the need for revision of infantry wastage rates and the urgency of the reinforcement problem in 1943 and 1944 respectively. *Broken Promises* does bring out this last weakness in a very low-keyed way but has nothing at all to say about the Canadian failure to implement the same sort of rigorous re-mustering and re-organization in the early fall of 1944 that marked the reaction of both our major allies — who each had universal conscription and a significantly greater proportion of men under arms — to similar crises in their armies.

There is, to take just one example, no mention of the damning memorandum reporting how an establishment strength for the army overseas had been:

arrived at simply by adding to the strength of the Army, as of 1 Jan 43, the number of troops that we could despatch overseas within a given period.... The question of our ability to maintain an Army formed within the present manpower ceiling did not enter as a factor into the determination of the manpower ceiling. [DSD to CGS, 23 Nov 43, in DHist 112.352.009 (D.200)]

That's a hell of a way to run an army! And surely such evidence should be an important part of any academic study of the conscription issue.

The Chief of the General Staff from December 1941 to December 1943 was Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart. From March 1941 until December he had been Vice Chief, and subsequently he was Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London. No one was closer than Stuart to the manning and operational policy-making cores of the Canadian Army from the very beginnings of its manpower problems and it can be convincingly argued that they were effectively of his making. Although Professor Granatstein admits (in a footnote) that "Stuart has often been painted as the villain of this piece", he follows that isolated criticism with a justification of the general by Chubby Power that concludes, "I think all along he had been playing the game honestly and fairly... I believed then in his integrity and have not changed my mind since". Apparently Granatstein himself has nothing to add. Anti-militarist he may be, but Radical Jack would sooner sock it to the Tories than point up the professional ineptitude (at best) or deliberate fudging (at worst) of the military hierarchy.

Since this review was originally submitted another book has been published which deals at length with the purely political background to the 1917 crisis. John English's elegant and objective study of *The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-1920* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), should be read in conjunction with *Broken Promises*.

Brereton GREENHOUS,
Department of National Defence, Ottawa.

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J.E. REA. — *Parties and Power: an Analysis of Winnipeg City Council, 1919-1975*. Appendix IV, *Report and Recommendations*. Winnipeg: Committee of Review, City of Winnipeg, 1976.

On January 1, 1972, one of the most significant events in the development of urban government in Canada occurred in Winnipeg. On that day the government of Manitoba brought into being through provincial statute a unique form of government for Greater Winnipeg. The area's many municipalities, including the historic

French-speaking city of St. Boniface, ceased to exist as distinct legal entities. Their local governments were replaced by a fifty-member city council which controlled an urban territory approximately seventeen miles in diameter with a population close to 550,000. With the formation of "Unicity", Winnipeg became the first major Canadian city to move beyond the stage of split-level metropolitan government to a single administration for its entire metropolitan area.

Aware of the novelty of the experiment, the NDP government in the legislation creating Unicity (The City of Winnipeg Act, 1971) provided for the appointment "in or before the year 1977" of a committee to review the operation of the Act and the activities of the city. This committee was duly appointed in September 1975 and its report was presented in October 1976. The report was eventually published in two volumes. The first volume contained an evaluation of the operation of Winnipeg under the Act (noting some impressive achievements and some failings and inconsistencies) and a total of seventy-one recommendations. The second volume, Appendix IV of the *Report*, was a study of Winnipeg city politics.

In time, the first volume of the *Report and Recommendations of the Committee of Review, City of Winnipeg Act*, will become an important historical document in its own right, deserving full study by both political and urban historians. Contemporary historians of Winnipeg, however, will find the *Report* of importance largely because of the inclusion of the study by J.E. Rea. The "Rea Report" became part of the larger report after Rea presented to the Committee of Review, as a formal submission, a research paper entitled "The Politics of Class: Winnipeg City Council, 1919-1945".* After making his presentation, Rea was invited by the committee to extend his research and analysis to 1975. With the assistance of two students, Anna Maria Magnifico and Robert Doyle, Rea completed his study by the summer of 1976.

The "Rea Report" consists of a reproduction of the article covering the period 1919-1945, a nine page analysis of the period 1946-1975, and no less than thirty-three appendices. The latter include detailed data on such things as: the civic affiliation of aldermen; occupations of aldermen; samples of political advertising; civic election and money bylaw turnouts; service records of aldermen; voting summaries; and election statistics. These appendices alone make the "Rea Report" a worthwhile document since they provide, in a convenient form, a wealth of material for future research.

Rea's two analytical papers are also important. In them he argues that the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 was a benchmark in the political history of the city. After that traumatic event, Winnipeg city council was the arena for two contending groups who sought political control in order to implement and make manifest their conflicting ideologies. Both groups changed their names several times in the years after 1919 but they can be readily identified by the generic terms, "citizen" and "labour". On all crucial economic and ideological issues they voted as two disciplined parties, but one of the groups, the citizens, consistently denied that they were a political party. Indeed, the citizens used the term "party" as an epithet with which to discredit labour. Despite their claim to independence and non-partisanship, the citizens' group was as tightly organized and as committed to certain assumptions as were their labour opponents.

In general, labour sought an extension of public services, a wider degree of civic democracy and what they considered to be a more equitable tax appor-

* This paper first appeared as an article in Carl BERGER and Ramsay COOK, eds., *The West the Nation: Essays in Honour of W.L. Morton* (Toronto, 1976), pp. 232-249.

tionment. The citizens demonstrated a concern for the city's credit, frugality (which usually meant restricted civic services), progress, and low business taxes.

Rea's research indicates that the pattern of Winnipeg politics has not only resulted in hypocrisy on the part of the citizens on the issue of political parties, but that several other serious problems have also ensued. The citizens have been enormously successful, maintaining control of city council ever since 1919. But control also implies responsibility and this has usually been evaded. The result has been not effective leadership but interest protection. There was, as Rea points out, nothing wrong with this situation *per se*, if the electorate had been able to assign group responsibility and judge accordingly. But the most damning charge against the citizens has been their failure to acknowledge the political responsibility which their position of power entailed.

In terms of our general knowledge of Canadian urban development, Rea's conclusions are important since they indicate that much of the ideology of current municipal politics — such ideas as non-partisanship and municipal politics as "business" — have deep roots in the past. Moreover, structural changes such as those instituted in Winnipeg in the aftermath of Unicity, do not have much impact. For Rea notes that there was a firm continuity between the old City of Winnipeg council and the new Unicity councils elected in 1971 and 1974. In other words, political values rooted far in the past appear to have congealed as permanent features of urban political culture.

Rea's analysis also points out a number of other interesting aspects about Winnipeg's two competing political groups. It was the conservative citizens rather than the "radical" labour group that was over the years most willing to recruit aldermen from outside the British charter group and to endorse female candidates. These trends, identified but not explained, certainly deserve more attention.

The main weakness of Rea's study is that it does not address itself to the question of the quality of leadership in either group. While there is some analysis and much data of occupations, sex, and ethnicity, there is no evidence offered or whether Winnipeg civic politics was attracting the city's most able persons. This is a crucial question since some historians argue that in the pre-1919 period Winnipeg's rapid growth was due, in part at least, to the skill of its leaders, while its decline in the post-strike period can be explained in part by a lack of effective leadership. In other words, the post-strike period was one in which the most able in the city turned to other areas of endeavour, leaving city politics to the less skilled. To date, no-one has been able to argue this case on the basis of clear evidence and it is unfortunate that Rea did not include it on his research agenda.

This criticism aside, Rea's study is certainly a valuable addition to the growing body of literature on the Canadian City. It is to be hoped, however, that Professor Rea will continue his research on the nature of Winnipeg civic politics and provide students of the city with a more rounded and digested version of his work in the near future.

Alan F.J. ARTIBISE,
University of Victoria.

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