Cette situation contraste considérablement avec celle des Allemands qui, comme Andrew Godefroy l’explique, ne purent exploiter pleinement leur avantage géographique. Selon lui, la lassitude de la stratégie défensive nuisit à la détection des signes avant-coureurs d’une attaque et par la même occasion empêcha la préparation d’une contre-attaque efficace. Godefroy affirme toutefois que les Allemands ne considéraient pas la bataille de Vimy comme une défaite, car ils réussirent à empêcher une incursion derrière les lignes de défense.

La dernière partie du livre s’intéresse à la commémoration de la bataille par ceux qui y participèrent et son influence sur les générations suivantes. Les poèmes analysés par Jonathan Vance montrent que non seulement Vimy devint un élément central de la construction nationale canadienne, mais s’éleva à un niveau spirituel sans précédent dans l’histoire du pays. Le chapitre suivant, écrit par Jacqueline Hucker, explique comment ce spiritualisme se matérialisa et influença le choix des figures du monument inauguré en 1936, créant par la même occasion un lieu symbolique du nationalisme canadien outre-mer. L’envergure de cette émotivité prend tout son sens dans le texte de Serge Durflinger qui présente la réaction médiatique et gouvernementale suivant la rumeur de sa destruction par les Allemands en 1940.

En général, ce collectif atteint les objectifs fixés par les directeurs. La force de l’ouvrage repose sur les explications du contexte militaire menant à la victoire canadienne. La dernière section manque toutefois de contenu pour fournir une argumentation complète à propos de l’influence de Vimy sur les générations suivantes. Les trois articles ne suffisent pas à donner une vision d’ensemble de la perception que s’en firent les Canadiens et n’expliquent pas comment l’union du pays sur le champ de bataille eut un effet sur l’ensemble de la population civile. Les poèmes et le monument commémoratif ne peuvent représenter à eux seuls une mesure de la perception de Vimy sur les générations suivantes puisque ce sont des objets de commémoration, c’est-à-dire une réaction des militaires et du gouvernement en réponse au devoir de mémoire. À ce sujet, le livre contribue d’avantage à véhiculer le mythe de l’unité nationale en supposant une véritable symbolisation pour l’ensemble des Canadiens derrière la commémoration de la bataille de Vimy. Malgré cette lacune, l’ouvrage est essentiel pour comprendre à la fois le contexte militaire de la bataille et les racines d’un élément important de la construction identitaire canadienne.

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It seems odd now, but one might recall that, in the heady days of the elder Bush’s New World Order following the Cold War’s stunningly swift demise, many people, including some who should have known better, boldly predicted that the end of
the world of espionage and intelligence gathering was nigh. Indeed, some charged
that even spy novels, that great staple of the literary world in the twentieth
century, would not long survive either. The end of History had come, the liberal
West had emerged supreme and unchallengeable, love would reign over the
planet, and no one would or could seriously challenge the new great peace.

Then, to deliberately use a charged phrase, 9/11 exploded literally and met-
aphorically upon the global scene; we are still facing the seemingly endless conse-
quences of that horrifying and fateful day. Those terrorist attacks, coupled with the
ongoing, perhaps ill-fated, and seemingly limitless War on Terror of the Bush
administration, have been a boon to those interested in the now ill-defined
world of espionage, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement. One could fill
a quite large library with the numerous works that have sought since
September 2001 to explain the complexities and failures of intelligence gathering
with the American intelligence community. This book, warts and all, seeks to add
to that burgeoning discussion.

A British scholar based at Edinburgh University is well placed to contribute to
the debate. A specialist in modern American history, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones has
written extensively on intelligence issues, including at least two monographs and
one edited collection on the history of the Central Intelligence Agency. As the
author makes clear in his short preface, however, the work in question is his
attempt “to produce a work from a stand-point that is liberated from the
bureau’s filing system: in other words, it is the story of the FBI set in the
context of broader historical events” (p. vii). The results are mixed.

First, as someone interested in twentieth-century American and Canadian mili-
tary intelligence operations, I know personally just how difficult it can be to lay
one’s hand on materials from bureaucratic intelligence communities. Those who
collect and analyse secrets are notoriously reluctant to let those tidbits see the
light of a revealing day. Some of Jefferys-Jones’s studies of the CIA have been cri-
ticized for employing limited original research. That charge can be levelled here as
well. A bit more delving into FBI case files would have improved the book,
especially in its earlier chapters, as the relevant records can be more easily
obtained. Not surprisingly, as one gets closer to the present time in the book’s
last five chapters, which deal with the post-1972 period, much of the cited material
comes from secondary materials. Original documents, in many cases, have not yet
seen the light of day, and may not for some time to come given recent American
laws that have forced the National Archives in Washington to reclassify previously
open material.

Secondly, as the author also states in his preface, his book intends to study the
American FBI as a model perhaps for creating a similar law enforcement and
domestic security-gathering body for the European Union. As someone who
has straddled academe and the policy-making world, I also understand just how
difficult it can be to reconcile the often conflicting needs of scholarship and
bureaucratic needs and desires. In this regard, the author is often keen to point
out the FBI’s great many failings — racism practised within and outside the
Bureau, political opportunism, clumsy anti-Communism, and the baleful influence
of J. Edgar Hoover over the FBI for 50 odd years — while playing down its accomplishments. The FBI is described variously as an “American Gestapo” and the “apparatus of an oppressive police state” (p. 11). While I share concerns about the power wielded by such enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies wherever they might be found, including the FBI, I think calling the FBI a Gestapo overstates matters somewhat. Many modern societies have endured police states, but the United States, despite its own great many faults, is not among them. Even at the height of the McCarthy era, the rule of law, however imperfect, still existed. The FBI did not strangle its opponents with piano wire nor put bullets in the back of their heads. Many German and Soviet citizens were not so well treated by their own hideous regimes in the 1930s and beyond.

The author is right to note that the FBI, led by the dangerously clever Hoover, keenly took advantage of circumstances — the Red Scare after World War I, the kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby, and Prohibition — to advance its particular interests. This, however, is not a new notion. It is said, often ruefully by American soldiers, that everywhere that the Marine Corps goes a camera is sure to follow. Like the Marines and General Douglas MacArthur, Hoover realized quickly how to use the media to shape his message that the FBI constituted America’s first line of defence against internal subversion and crime. As is rightly pointed out by the author, the FBI did not always do a good job, but the same could be said about most national agencies charged with the same undertaking. If anything, Canada’s renowned red-serge-clad Mounties, rather than always getting their man, often indulged in activities — barn burning, Red-baiting, and sloppy gathering of evidence — that make the FBI look quite professional by comparison. If the FBI verged on being a rogue agency, and the author certainly appears to be making that case, perhaps the fault lay in America’s political establishment — presidents, senators, and congress members — who failed to direct it properly and rein it in.

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As the eminent linguist Bernard Cerquiglini reminds us, nowadays scholars are “fond of whatever is unstable, multiple and precarious.” The observation encapsulates Kevin Madigan’s provocative monograph. By examining the interpretive strategies of high-medieval thinkers, who sometimes represented their patristic legacy in ways hardly consistent with an earlier Christology, Madigan underscores the “fissures” and “discontinuities” that render “any talk of dogmatic continuity deeply problematic” (p. 7).