Le dernier chapitre examine le contrôle de l’information par les autorités canadiennes. Cette section analytique, la seule du livre, n’apporte que peu d’éléments nouveaux par rapport aux travaux de Claude Beauregard si ce n’est qu’une adaptation du contexte de la censure aux besoins de l’ouvrage. Bizimana affirme que : « Par la censure et par la propagande, l’information médiatique a été manipulée pour correspondre aux points de vue officiels » (327). L’ampleur du phénomène obligea les correspondants à présenter des textes ou des reportages à saveur patriotique. Ceux-ci se soumettaient à ces règles sans objection, au nom de l’effort de guerre, participant par la même occasion à la propagande gouvernementale.

Puisque Bizimana ne prétend pas chercher une analyse approfondie du travail des correspondants, il est difficile de reprocher un manque de rigueur analytique dans la présentation de son sujet. Cependant, les problèmes structurels alourdissent la lecture et la compréhension. D’abord, une approche thématique plutôt que chronologique aurait permis une analyse plus prégnante du sujet, en centrant le contexte non pas sur la guerre, mais sur l’apport du conflit à l’avancement des techniques journalistiques et de communication. L’ouvrage demeure prisonnier des limites de son objectif de départ. Ainsi, lorsqu’il est question de guerre psychologique ou de la contribution des correspondants à la propagande, le texte se borne à la présentation des extraits qu’ils ont produits. Plusieurs de ces idées demeurent d’ailleurs incomplètes. Le dernier chapitre traitant du contrôle de l’information doit nécessairement être lu avant les autres compte tenu des nombreuses références tout au long de l’ouvrage concernant les obligations de leur travail envers les règles de censure. Le choix de l’auteur de nous présenter des extraits produits par les correspondants impose aussi une lecture préalable de ce chapitre puisqu’il détermine les limites de leur interprétation. Malgré certaines lacunes, le livre conserve le mérite d’exposer un pan intéressant de l’histoire militaire canadienne, en espérant que les bases établies par Bizimana inciteront les historiens à reprendre le sujet et nous présenter une analyse plus scientifique.

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The French Revolution has been the subject of numerous studies, heated discussions, and passionate debates. These have predominantly focused, however, on its origins, the pre-Directory period, and its positive impact on western society with the expansion of liberal and democratic principles. Historian Howard G. Brown’s Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon does not follow such historiographical trends. Not only does he consider
the revolution’s often ignored post-Directory period, but he also holds a different opinion regarding its legacy.

Despite the ringing slogans of 1789, liberal democracy was not the most important outcome of the French Revolution. Rather, after a decade of disorder, ordinary citizens made a Faustian act with enhanced instruments of repression. By doing so, they fostered the emergence of a modern “security state,” one founded on the legitimacy that came from at last providing public order. (p. ix)

Although overlooked by historians, the subject of violence and the French Revolution has produced the occasional study. In Violence et Révolution. Essai sur la naissance d’un mythe national, for example, historian Jean-Clément Martin considers how popular violence was manipulated and employed as a political tool by revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries alike. Brown’s study, a significant addition to the field, adds to Clément’s work by considering the consequences of such violence on the revolution and the Great Nation.

Divided into three sections, Ending the French Revolution demonstrates how, between 1795 and 1802, protecting the democratic principles of the constitution was secondary to ensuring public safety in France. Initially, the Directory intended that the rule of law, and the population’s submission before it, would finally put an end to popular violence. However, such moderate policies were unable to restore order. Widespread violence continued to plague the French nation as the countryside was overwhelmed with countless hold-ups, assaults, and riots. New methods were sought to manage the problem. Force, repression, and the military were thus used to restore peace and order. However, such methods led the Directory away from the liberal and democratic principles of the constitution and down a dangerous path toward authoritarian, and even, at times, absolutist practices. According to Brown, soldiers were sent to execute the government’s mandates, disperse illegal gatherings, seize criminals and fight banditry, siege towns, and patrol the countryside. Moreover, as a result of partisan civil authorities, military courts were used to judge criminals and other public disturbers. Although local authorities complained about the state’s interventions in matters that had traditionally been under their jurisdiction, Brown argues that these measures were adopted as a result of a public outcry for greater security. After years of living in fear of crime and violence, the people of France were ready to accept any measures that would restore public order.

One of the most contentious aspects of Ending the French Revolution is the author’s conclusion regarding the end of the revolution. Although it is still fiercely debated, most historians have maintained that 1799, the year in which Napoleon was named First Consul, marked the end of the revolutionary period. However, according to Brown, the revolution ended in 1802, a year that has yet to be considered by historians. Unlike most others, Brown does not base his conclusions on when the democratic principles of the revolution truly ended or when Napoleon’s dictatorship began, but rather on “conditions that generally mark the end of
revolutions” (p. 3). He explains that a post-revolutionary regime must be structurally secure and must no longer face the threat of being replaced. Such conditions are usually achieved when the new government is recognized by the political elite, the political elite is stable and under control, and, finally, government is able to regulate whatever opposition has yet to be fully vanquished. According to Brown, in 1802 the First Consul adopted a series of measures that ensured such conditions. For example, he gained the support of the traditional elite through an amnesty for émigrés who had left the country after 1789 and secured the future of the French nation, along with its legitimacy, by naming himself Consulate for life. More importantly, by purging the Tribunate and Legislative Assembly, Napoleon finally ended parliamentary opposition and thus ensured stability in the French nation.

Overall, Ending the French Revolution is an interesting and well-argued book that offers valuable insight and raises interesting questions about modern nation-building. Throughout, Brown relates the events of post-1795 France to modern crises such as the Chechen revolts in Russia and, closer to home, the FLQ Crisis in Quebec. Both, he argues, were “as dangerous to democracy [...] as fighting royalism and ending chouannerie was under the late First Republic” (p. viii). Such episodes of political violence, along with others witnessed in Mexico, Algeria, Sri Lanka, and currently Iraq, demonstrate how dangerous political violence can be to the survival of democratic states. The French experiment should thus act as a warning; political violence may force a democratic government to take illiberal and undemocratic decisions. That said, many historians will not agree with Howard Brown’s overall interpretation of the impact of the French Revolution. Similar to its origins, the impact of the French Revolution is equally complex and cannot be explained through one specific feature. The revolution itself had as many consequences as it had actors and participants. Thus arguing that the revolution’s impact was the creation of the “security state,” while ignoring the progressive nature of the constitution, the expansion of its ideals throughout the world, and the many similar movements and revolutions it inspired, for example, is a simplistic reinterpretation.

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Dans les années 1990, Jan Noël avait avancé l’hypothèse que les femmes de la Nouvelle-France avaient été « favorisées » par rapport à leurs consœurs européennes. Démographie (manque de femmes) et contexte colonial auraient permis aux premières de jouir d’une plus grande liberté d’action que celles restées en métropole (un phénomène rencontré dans les colonies anglaises par