greater detail, it is safe to predict that research along these lines will be inspired by Jennings’ account of their political history.

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These books by Joyce Appleby and J. R. Pole share a number of characteristics. Both derive from lecture series. Appleby’s from the long-established Anson G. Phelps Lectureship in Early American History at New York University, Pole’s from the first Richard B. Russell Lectures at the University of Georgia. Both deal with political thought. Both view Anglo-America transatlantically, though they write primarily for early American historians. Their major difference is that Appleby is a lumper and Pole is a splitter.

Appleby defines her approach as the analysis of “how the market economy influenced the way people thought about politics and the human potential for purposefully reordering social institutions” (p. ix). In the context of the recent historiography of early modern ideology, particularly that taking its lead from J. G. A. Pocock, this is a revisionist task. The Jeffersonians, she argues, were not blinkered by the political language of classical republicanism, with its distrust of self-interest and its awkwardness with economic relations. They were intellectually challenged by the advantageous terms of trade for American agricultural products, particularly grain, after 1750. By the 1780s proto-Republicans were people who were at ease with the prospect of commercial development and its political implications. They were preoccupied with the prospect of comfort, not the discipline of industry and frugality. They had gone through the same ideological process that English political economists had gone through in the seventeenth century, a process Appleby described in her fine book, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Princeton, 1978). Consumerism, free markets, and easy credit came to be seen as benign.

To be a lumper is not be an over-simplifier. Appleby’s discussion is full of precise distinctions — such as those between those classical and historical definitions of rights and that which would eventually be known as egalitarian liberalism. After the Revolution, “the several meanings of liberty were like elements suspended in a solution, awaiting the catalyst that would crystalize them” (p. 22). That catalyst was the French Revolution. The Republicans saw the Federalists’ true hierarchical and repressive colours in their denunciations of French Republicans. Appleby plays down the fiscal disputes of the 1790s; these were issues that fit the classical republican paradigm well. She identifies approval or denunciation of the democratic societies of the 1790s as the true test of political orientation. The question being decided was the relative legitimacy of popular and elite authority.

Since Appleby had situated these issues in a context of economic change, her discussion does not have the over-familiarity that may be suggested by a sheer recapitulation of her topics. It is paradoxical, however, that she has little to say about the economic circumstances of the period of the Jeffersonian triumph itself. Having started from an apparently reductionist position, she finishes at an idealist one. What the Jeffersonians really imposed was less a
set of interests than a political vocabulary which "endowed American capitalism with the moral force of their vision of a social order of free and independent men" (p. 104).

J. R. Pole deals with even larger questions. It is difficult to think of anyone, with the exception of Michael Kammen, who has addressed large questions in early American history more frequently, on appropriately large scale, than he. To his books on representation and equality, he adds this one on colonial self-government. His book complements Appleby's well. He points out that colonization by definition relied on self-interest for success and therefore from the start compromised authoritarian definitions of the public good.

Words seem to come very easily to Pole. His writing is more forceful than Appleby's but it is less clear where he is going. His strength is with virtually aphoristic statements that are irresistible to quote. "Natural rights may be described as the divine rights of common people; a king who was reduced to appealing to natural rights would not be in a strong position" (p. 40). "The language of the law and the constitution has led generations to conclude that the revolutionary crisis was ultimately a crisis over sovereignty, but this is correct only to the extent that questions of constitutional definitions can be considered 'ultimate'" (p. 86)! There is a liability in sophisticated points being made so succinctly and that is the temptation to dispense with the extended development necessary to do them justice. Pole states explicitly what the question for a particular chapter is, but it is difficult to be sure that what one is reading is the answer. For example, a chapter on "The Challenge of Parliament" studies how colonial assemblies tried to identify their powers with those of Parliament. Pole's aphorism here is that "In a sense they [the colonists] were pitting the myth of the seventeenth century against the reality of the eighteenth and then transferring the qualities of the mythological seventeenth century to their own assemblies" (p. 66). To work out this relationship of myth and reality Pole sets himself the task of looking "more closely at the historical development of English government in the long aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and to relate this history to the government of England's colonies" (p. 66). This reader immediately found his view slipping from focus on this sizable topic. He learned that there was no revolutionary settlement in 1689 because a distinction must be made between "balanced constitution" and "limited monarchy" (p. 66). Then it is asserted that there was no vocabulary for referring to parliamentary government. In fact later in the chapter it is revealed that there really was no institution of Parliament, just parliaments. The splitter's virtue of doing justice to the complexity of the past is amply evident here, but at the risk of defining a problem out of existence. How readily could the colonial assemblymen model their everyday political behavior on such an amorphous institution?

Pole's most effective, sustained discussion of a point is a chapter on the reporting of parliamentary proceedings from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. This involves a fascinating explanation of how Parliament's representation of the nation, not its components, actually obliged its members to respect the body's privilege of privacy. Until the 1760s, when parliamentary proceedings became commercially newsworthy, the reporting of divisions, speeches, and the contents of bills were usually symptomatic of the purposes of opposition minorities. Here is an additional element of the transatlantic political culture that Appleby might have synthesized with her analysis.

These are both intelligent, deeply informed, humane books, but it is the lumper who is convincing and the splitter who is provocative.

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