Since the 1960s, dwellers in the fashionable neighbourhood of social history cannot but have noticed an unusual racket coming from the normally staid folks down the road. The reason for the ruckus was the birth of the "new economic history" and the noisy celebrations of its partisans. Social historians curious enough to steal a glimpse of the new arrival may well have thought it a pretty unlovely baby, covered with ugly equations and speaking an incomprehensible language.

Two decades have passed and the baby has grown up. The promised revolution has turned out to be rather less root-and-branch than forecast, but the new economic history has nevertheless done a lot of useful work. Its greatest impact has been in the United States, where historical interpretations of several important questions (e.g., the profitability of southern slavery, the economic importance of railway building) have been revised. British economic history has also benefitted from the new approaches, and the results of two decades of research have recently been summarized in a two-volume compendium edited by Floud and McCloskey.

By contrast the development of continental Europe during the industrial era—the subject of the books here under review—has experienced only limited probes by the new methods. The authors are therefore surveying a large but still essentially descriptive scholarly literature. To say this is not to insinuate an oblique criticism, for description does not demand an absence of analysis. It means merely that, as economic historians, Trebilcock and Pollard are obliged to draw out the theoretical presuppositions of this literature as well as the general lessons about European industrialization that they find therein.

Both books deal with essentially the same chronological period, the "long" nineteenth century. (Pollard’s Peaceful Conquest, it is true, carries the story onwards; but only two of the nine chapters are concerned with the years after 1914.) Both are surveys, with Trebilcock having designed his work to serve as an undergraduate textbook as well. Otherwise, however, they are quite different books. Trebilcock’s focus is the nation-state, and comparative themes are developed within the framework of national experiences. Pollard’s focus—this will come as no surprise to those who know his earlier work—is the industrial region, the integrated economic reality concealed behind the Potemkin villages constructed from "inapt and misleading" national accounting data.

Pollard belies his title by comparing the spread of industrialization to "a Blitzkrieg battlefield" where the rush of best-practice mechanized production sweeps from one strategic pocket to another, leaving much of the overrun territory still in the hands of a pre-industrial economy. As he views it, this leap-frog forward movement of the industrial revolution generally advanced along a salient outwards from northwest Europe—the Belgian river valleys and northern France, the Rhine-Ruhr regions and the Wuppertal, Alsace and the Upper Rhine, the Lyonnais. For the most part these regions shared a set of characteristics that made them receptive to the new technologies and forms of production: coalfields, protoindustrial concentrations in textiles and metal-working (here the Ruhr was an exception), plentiful labour supply, transport corridors. Lest this sound like an exercise in the economics of location, it must be stressed that Pollard criticizes traditional location theory for its "ahistorical and static" nature resulting from a failure to consider how existing patterns of economic and social development will influence regional receptivity to industrialization.
Peaceful Conquest's concentration on the regional growth poles of "Inner Europe" does pose a certain problem. Except in the case of Belgium, the state, and hence national economic policy, was not coextensive with regional boundaries. This fact creates a difficulty when we face the issue of induced demand generated by state policies—railroad construction, for example. How "autonomous", we want to ask, was the development of, say, the Lyon-Saint-Etienne metal-working complex in relation to state-encouraged railway construction in France? To answer this question would require a highly specified counterfactual enquiry; but merely to ask it is to put on the table the basic issue raised by Pollard's supply-side approach, in which "overall (though not necessarily localized) demand is taken for granted".

But should it be? That external demand was important to the industrialization process of these growth regions is patent; that state-induced purchasing and national commercial policy shaped external demand is also demonstrable. How independent, therefore, can we call the development of these organic economic realities—the regions—vis-à-vis the constraints or incentives put in place by the "artificial" state? Pollard's answer is implicit in his treatment of the "role of government" in chapter four, a role he finds distinctly unimpressive, frequently even inimical and resource wasting. Not only would the private sector have done it better; more importantly, it would have done it anyhow. That's a big assumption, one that should confront Gerschenkron's state substitution theory head on. This is not done at anything close to the required length, and the author is content to list blunder after bureaucratic blunder. His implied counterfactual argument, that relative prices would everywhere have guided la bourgeoisie conquerante to the requisite industrial investments, deserves to be developed more fully—and in a form more susceptible to testing.

Pollard's downplaying of the role of government derives partly from his hostile view of the state as an agent promoting economic nationalism. For Pollard economic nationalism ushered in the phase of international economic disintegration which he sees as the dominant trend in European economic history from the "Great Depression" through the world wars.

This, the second major theme of Peaceful Conquest, will also come as no surprise to those familiar with the author's earlier writings on European economic integration. Pollard surveys the growth of neo-mercantilist commercial policy after the 1870s with the distaste of a Cobdenite. Uppermost in his mind is not just the welfare losses that tariffs imposed on consumers nor even the misallocation of resources following upon "this dominance of the political over economic rationality". Rather, it is Pollard's belief that "in the end, true liberalism is indivisible, and its defeat on one front (free trade) endangers all the others"—those being the prolongation of the political power of reactionary agrarian classes in central Europe and the drift towards a generalized conflictual stance in international relations. Once engaged upon this slope we move rapidly downhill into the disasters of our own century. It is only after 1945 that a rising trend is reached in the form of movements towards European economic integration, albeit in the "two Europes" divided by the Iron Curtain.

Trebilcock's Industrialization of the Continental Powers starts with a chapter on historical models of growth, where the author passes in critical review the main theories of industrialization derived from European historical experience. Here Trebilcock makes a point social historians will find welcome (and probably self-evident!), namely, that the character of a society will have as much influence over the process of its industrialization as its more readily quantifiable factor endowment—a consideration particularly important to the analysis of entrepreneurship. He acknowledges the importance of regional nodes of growth and accepts the fact that industrialization inevitably engenders economic dualism, with enclaves of modernity scattered amidst a traditional economic landscape. Yet at the end of the day Trebilcock holds that the industrialization process has to be seen within a national framework, especially in those more backward follower countries where the state played an active role.

The author devotes a chapter each to Germany, France and Russia, with Italy, Austria-Hungary and Spain considered together in a section on the "powers of deprivation". These
are followed by a comparative chapter which debates theme by theme the lessons to be derived. The book concludes with a very useful chapter devoted entirely to comparative statistics. Just as limits of space precluded detailed discussion of Pollard's various regions, so too a review of each of these national experiences is out of the question. But just a word on what I found to be the best chapter, that on Imperial Russia.

Trebilcock points to the oft-neglected fact that "the state" in Russian industrialization was no unified, single-willed body, but rather a set of development-oriented officials scattered amidst a generally hostile court and bureaucracy. That the government of Witte's day contained "an unusually substantial complement of intriguers, eccentrics, and criminals" may be overstating the case a bit; but such off-the-wall pronouncements remind us that the larger part of Russian officialdom was opposed to the modernization-from-above men—and probably to modernization from any quarter, given the extent to which the old agrarian order suited its interests. Trebilcock rightly puts the burden of counterfactual reasoning on recent historians who have stressed, from a purely economistic angle, the shortcomings of Witte's policies. Given the political and social context, what alternatives did he have? It is this awareness that economic policy is never historically autonomous, but rather moulded by political and social forces which economic history ignores at its peril, that will make Trebilcock's approach appealing to social historians.

On the major issue of Stolypin's agrarian policies Trebilcock is generally optimistic, underlining those indicators which point to agricultural innovation and rising commercialized output in the pre-war decade. Yet he sides with recent revisionists when it comes to interpreting the social impact of that remarkable minister's "wager on the strong". He holds Chayanov's life-cycle approach to peasant social mobility (from which the revisionist position is derived) as more helpful than the polarizing peasant-differentiation model of Leninist orthodoxy. I doubt if research has gone far enough to permit a definitive answer here; but this is certainly the most important question in the social history of rural Russia from the revolution of 1905-06, through February and October of 1917, to the collectivization onslaught of the late 1920s.

In any case, Trebilcock's treatment of the agrarian problem has the merit of reminding us that from the emancipation onwards the imperial government continued to look at traditional rural institutions (e.g., the field commune) as instruments of social control. Economic development, in other words, could not be allowed to override fundamental political goals. (In this context it will be interesting to see if recent and current research on Stalinist collectivization will confirm that the kolkhoz was seen primarily as a means for imposing effective state control over the peasantry rather than simply as a device for pumping surplus from agriculture to industry.)

Trebilcock must be a dandy lecturer. The Industrialization of the Continental Powers abounds in obiter dicta and dry one-liners. A lot of this is good fun; it certainly makes the book "entertaining". But after a while one wonders if the demand schedule for this sort of high-table cleverness is as perfectly elastic as the author appears to believe. This constant striving after effect can even leave an aftertaste, notably when there is much rib-poking at "peddlers of prerequisites" and poor old Rostow's "airborne economy" (from the "take-off", get it?). Mind, this is not a plea for battleship-grey prose; but there is a point after which felicitous lightness of touch risks slipping downhill towards something less pleasant.

Both Peaceful Conquest and The Industrialization of the Continental Powers are readily accessible to non-specialists, but on the whole Trebilcock has the edge when it comes to putting theoretical considerations into everyday language. Whilst his explanations can occasionally be elliptical, Trebilcock has made more of an effort to steer clear of the trade's jargon; and sometimes his glosses on analytical problems are feats of conciseness (e.g., the discussion on page 225 of the links in a capital poor country between capital goods imports, currency stability and balance of payments pressures). Pollard tends to assume more of an
acquaintance with economic theory from the reader; but he too has crafted some impressive summaries of this kind, for example, his overview of the development of trade theory in chapter four.

In summary, the non-specialist is well served by both authors, and social historians will encounter no artificial barriers to understanding the major issues which currently preoccupy economic historians of the industrial era (with the exception, it should be noted, of the "condition of the working class" debate). Both books include extensive bibliographies (lists, not essays); both suffer from cumbersome systems of annotation. Although a survey, Peaceful Conquest is clearly written for an academic readership, whilst Trebilcock's work is supposed to do double-duty as a university textbook. Either Trebilcock, lucky man, encounters some formidably prepared undergraduates, or he is prone to great expectations. My guess is that The Industrialization of the Continental Powers is pitched a little too high for a successful textbook; but here his misfortune is our gain. Both surveys can definitely be recommended to social historians researching and teaching in the modern European field.

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DOMINIQUE LERCH


« Les lithographies publiées par M. Wentzel... sont grossièrement faites et n'ont aucun caractère artistique; elles ne peuvent dès lors convenir qu'à orner les auberges de campagne et les habitations ouvrières », déclarait en 1866 un fonctionnaire de la Préfecture du Bas-Rhin. En effet, sauf exception, l'imagerie du xixe siècle n'est pas « belle », tant elle est encombrée de mièvreries et de clichés, et a été de ce fait longtemps dédaignée par les historiens de l'art. Si des études sont aujourd'hui entreprises dans ce domaine, c'est parce que l'histoire a élargi son champ à l'histoire des mentalités et que cette imagerie des débuts de l'industrie et de la production de masse nous apparaît riche en particularismes et séduisante par les révélations qu'elle peut nous apporter sur l'art et les conceptions populaires d'une époque. C'est dans cette perspective fructueuse que D. Lerch a interrogé les images de Wentzel et nous en livre les secrets.

L'isolement commercial de Wissembourg ne predisposait pas cette petite sous-préfecture alsacienne de 7 000 habitants à l'installation d'une industrie de grande diffusion; repliée sur son agriculture et sa garnison, rien n'y explique la création de cette imagerie à dimension européenne.

Pourtant, dès le milieu du xviiie siècle, Jean-Henri Hierthès (1720-1785), fabricant de tissus, a édité des « lettres de baptême », document décoré chez les luthériens que les parrains ou marraines offrent à la famille du baptisé; une imprimerie créée dès 1787 est acquise en 1794 par Philippe Frédéric Bock; mais ces modestes entreprises familiales ne laissaient pas non plus présager la puissante industrie de l'image que fonde Wentzel en 1837 et qui éditera jusque dans les années 1930. L'ampleur du sujet, d'ailleurs, a contraint D. Lerch à se limiter presque entièrement à la période où le fondateur Jean Frédéric Wentzel a dirigé son entreprise, c'est-à-dire de 1837 à 1869.

Né le 15 octobre 1807, fils d'un artisan gantier, dernier d'une famille de six enfants, de religion luthérienne et de langue allemande, Jean Frédéric, semble-t-il, apprit le métier