Modernization Forces in Maria Theresa's Peasant Policies, 1740-1780

by Helen LIEBEL-WECKOWICZ* and Franz J. SZABO*

The article explores much neglected aspects of the antecedents of peasant emancipation in Austria and Bohemia on the eve of the French Revolution. The Bohemian peasant uprising of 1775 and the unrest of the 1770s in Silesia and Austria are described according to recent trends of interpretation. The main emphasis is on Maria Theresa's peasant policies in the era 1760-80. It is argued that the Theresian reforms aimed to modernize rural society by encouraging the conversion of the tenant farmers into private property owners. This was to be achieved by encouraging private contracts and by restructuring the exploitation of the lower orders of the peasantry, by enacting laws which limited the Robota (labour obligations) exacted by the feudal landlords. The conflicts at court and the difficulties faced in achieving this legislation are described. Joseph II is depicted as on the whole more sympathetic to the landlords despite his sometime popularity with the peasantry.

À bien des égards, on avait jusqu'ici laissé dans l'ombre les antécédents de l'émancipation paysanne en Autriche et en Bohême à la veille de la Révolution française. Nous situons ici le soulèvement de 1775 en Bohême et les troubles des années 1770 en Silésie dans l'historiographie récente, tout en mettant l'accent sur les politiques pratiquées par Marie-Thérèse entre 1760 et 1780. Les réformes mises en œuvre pour moderniser la société rurale encouragèrent la conversion des tenanciers en propriétaires et visèrent à transformer l'exploitation des couches inférieures de la paysannerie, par le biais d'une limitation des Robota (corvées) exigés par les seigneurs féodaux. Ces efforts législatifs suscitèrent des conflits à la cour, qui se prolongèrent sous Joseph II pourtant mieux disposé envers les grands propriétaires fonciers.

The emancipation of the peasantry has been given a pivotal role in the evolution of modern society. In the past generation a renewed interest in the social and economic status of the European peasantry after 1500 has produced a significant amount of new research. What emerges is that contemporary peasant research has emphasized the peasant uprisings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and neglected the social conflicts of the eighteenth century. The few modern studies of Austrian and Bohemian agrarian history after 1700 have either concentrated on the peasant rebellions of the 1770s or on Joseph II's abolition of serfdom of 1781. The reforms of the Theresian age (1740-80) have been overlooked even though they provide the foundation for the emancipation of the peasantry which in turn made possible the transition to a modern industrial society.¹

* Department of History, University of Alberta.

¹ Winfried SCHULZE, Bäuerlicher Widerstand und feudale Herrschaft in der frühen Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 1980), pp. 314-17, 332-35.

Histoire sociale - Social History, Vol. XV, Nº 30 (novembre - November 1982): 301-331.

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Any study of the development of the Austrian and Bohemian peasantry in the crucial era of enlightened absolutism must inevitably include a consideration of the conflicting schools of Marxist and non-Marxist historiography which have appeared in East Central Europe since 1948. The Soviet-influenced schools have emphasized peasant uprisings and class struggle as the major ingredients of the historical process at work in peasant society. Led by J.A. Poršnev (USSR) and his students Gerhard Heitz (DDR) and J. Petran (CSSR), this school has de-emphasized agrarian reform and tried to demonstrate a pattern of increasing severity for the peasant uprisings which took place between 1525 and 1789. The resistance of the peasants to their "feudal landlords", is thus seen as an explanation for the rise of centralized, absolutist, national monarchies. Among the critics in this group of historians, J.A. Kosminski has pointed out, however, that the feudal state was not a merely passive reactor bent upon suppressing all uprisings. Heitz has also re-emphasized the importance of the agrarian structure.² Austrian and West German historians like W. Zorn, F. Lütge, and K.S. Bader have also emphasized the transformation of social and juristic structures in peasant studies. The peasant moved from bondage to the acquisition of modern personal freedoms and property rights. Peasant rebellions are viewed as reactions to economic and political conditions which politically directed reforms may alleviate.³

The new interest in the history of agrarian reform has appeared in association with the influence of sociological theories of modernization which became current during the 1960s and 70s. The idea of the increased pressure of peasant resistance to a disintegrating class of feudal landlords is completely rejected. Instead the social process characteristic of the entire system of modern society is studied in contrast to the main features of the whole system of a "traditional" society. The shift from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly industrial society has become the main focus of research. In consequence, the "modernization" of peasant society has come to be studied in terms of the processes by which the economy became more capitalist in organization. The shift from a bureaucratic to a

² These arguments are summarized in ibid., pp. 27-32. See also S. PASCU et al., "Mouvements paysans dans le centre et le sud-est de l'Europe du XV^e au XX^e siècle", in Rapports IV..., ed.: COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES HISTORIQUES (Vienna: Ferdinand Berger & Söhne, 1965), pp. 211-35. Also Gerhard HEITZ, "Der Zusammenhang zwischen den Bauernbewegungen und der Entwicklung des Absolutismus in Mitteleuropa", Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 13 (1965): 71-83; Josef PETRAN, "Typologie der Bauernbewegungen in Mitteleuropa unter dem Aspekt des Übergangs vom Feudalismus zum Kapitalismus", in Der Bauer im Klassenkampf..., ed.: G. HEITZ et al. (Berlin DDR: Akademie Verlag, 1975), pp. 449-67.

³ See the summary in SCHULZE, Bauerlicher Widerstand, pp. 32-42. See especially Friedrich LÜTGE, Geschichte der deutschen Agrarverfassung (Stuttgart: Eugen Ulmer, 1963); Karl S. BADER, Dorfgenossenschaft und Dorfgemeinde. Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte des mittelalterlichen Dorfs, 3 vols (Cologne-Vienna-Graz: Böhlau Nachf., 1962-73); Hermann Hörger, Kirche, Dorfreligion und bäuerliche Gesellschaft (Munich: Seitz, 1978); Wilhelm ABEL, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorindustriellen Deutschland, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1977); Ferdinand TREMEL, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Österreichs (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1969).

parliamentary state, from traditional rural values to modern ideas of individual freedom are connected to the dissolution of the old rural order.⁴

The great shifts in the relations of lords and peasants which mark the end of the *ancien régime* in East Central Europe had begun after the Thirty Years' War. Erich Zöllner has pointed out that the crown had decentralized control of the rural economy in the late seventeenth century by alienating the crown manors and supporting the rise of an independent class of officials, merchants, and craftsmen who came into possession of the *Grundherrschaften* (great manor farms). The new lords restricted the rights of the peasants and increased their rents and labour services. The crown reacted by attempting to curb arbitrary practices, high interest rates, and heavy labour obligations. Leopold I in 1681 instructed his treasury officials to beware of "unjust impositions". Both he and Charles VI (1711-40) tried to regulate the *Robota* or labour and ploughing services. Yet both failed to harness the authority of the absolute state against the malpractices of the landed aristocracy.⁵

The effectiveness of Maria Theresa's peasant policies set a new course and steered the Austrian and Bohemian provinces of the Habsburg monarchy towards full-fledged modernization of rural society. The Theresian reforms constituted a full-scale attack on traditional landholding, tenancy and labour services. The innovative features of the Theresian era went beyond the efforts made by previous rulers to restrict the Robota. Maria Theresa's policy goal was to effect those social transformations needed to modernize the peasant's status. Private property ownership was to be achieved wherever possible. The peasant was to be emancipated and to be turned into an efficient producer and high-earning taxpayer. The attention of historians of this reign, notably William Wright and R. Rozdolski, has centred on the *Robota* question. The attempts made at creating freehold properties during Theresa's reign have not received adequate treatment by historians.⁶ In addition, the reform of the tax system during this era has been interpreted exclusively in terms of the development of enlightened absolutism. The power of the local estates was to be suppressed in the interest of the centralized monarchy. The extent to

⁴ Friedrich-Wilhelm HENNING, "Der Beginn der modernen Welt im agrarischen Bereich", in *Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt*, ed.: Reinhart KOSELLECK (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1977), pp. 97-114.

⁵ Erich ZÖLLNER, Geschichte Österreichs. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1979), pp. 279-80.

⁶ William E. WRIGHT, Serf, Seigneur, and Sovereign. Agrarian Reform in Eighteenth Century Bohemia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966); Roman ROZDOLSKI, Die Grosse Steuer- und Agrarreform Josefs II (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1961). Also HENNING, "Beginn", p. 103. Further: Antonio DI VITTORIO, "Economic History in Austria over the Last Twenty-Five Years as Represented in National and Local Historical Reviews (1945-1970)", The Journal of European Economic History, I (1972): 181-92. On the role of peasant emancipation in the modernization of society, C. J. A. MITTERMEIER, "Bauer", in Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste in alphabetischer Folge, eds: J. S. ERSCH and J. G. GRUBER (Leipzig, 1822), VIII: 168. Also: Karl Martin GRASS, "Emancipation", in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, eds: Otto BRUNNER, Werner CONZE, Reinhart KOSELLECK, 2 vols (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1972-75), II: 153-97. which state finance would be manipulated in order to elicit a growthoriented effect on the developing economy, has not been considered. Yet it was precisely the influence of enlightenment economic thinking in the royal household which was to play a conspicuous role in how taxation was to be used as an instrument of social change.⁷

No discussion of Maria Theresa's peasant policies could be intelligible without some mention of how they related to the fiscal urgency which affected the Empress' early reign. Certainly economic need had been a persistent problem for the Habsburgs throughout their history. At Maria Theresa's accession in 1740, state finances were close to collapse. The loss of wealthy Silesia to Prussia in the Austrian War (1740-48) and then the still more disruptive defeat of the Seven Years' War (1756-63) gave rise to two decades of political and economic reforms known to historians as "enlightened absolutism". But the demand for financial stability had already appeared in Vienna in the 1740s.⁸

It is not surprising that Maria Theresa proved responsive to the new trends of thought among political economists. These had also begun to influence the training of the younger generation of state officials. She adopted as a general principle for policy formulation, the basic ideas of German political science: cameralism. Its writers reiterated the maxim that the happiness of the ruler was inextricably tied to the welfare of his people. If the lot of the peasant was to be improved, it was in order to maintain his taxpaying capacities.

Theresian peasant policy followed a centuries-old royal tradition of protecting all classes of society. Its modern and untraditional elements, however, were derived from the modified mercantilist economics of the Austrian cameralists who were then in favour in Vienna. Its doctrines could be reduced to the principle that a large population is the greatest asset of the state. More people meant more wealth and power for the state.⁹ The most influential advocate of this school was the Saxon cameralist Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi (1720-71). He had come to Vienna to work and attracted attention as tutor to the son of Count Karl Friedrich von Haugwitz, later chancellor, and the leading reformer of the 1740s. Haugwitz recommended him for appointment as a lecturer in cameralism at the Theresianum, the new academy of politics and economics that Maria Theresa founded in 1746. All the leading ministers at court attended his

⁷ Rudolf BRAUN, "Steuern und Staatsfinanzierung als Modernisierungsfaktoren. Ein deutsch-englischer Vergleich", in KOSELLECK, *Studien*, pp. 241-63. See also Helen LIEBEL-WECKOWICZ, "Modernisierungsmotive in der Freihandelspolitik Maria Theresias", in *Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit*, ed.: Walter KOSCHATZKY (Salzburg: Residenz Verlag, 1979), pp. 153-58.

⁸ Hugo HANTSCH, *Die Geschichte Österreichs, 1648-1918,* 2 vols (Vienna: Verlag Styria, 1962), II: 137ff. Also Adam WANDRUSKA, "Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit", in *Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit*, ed.: KOSCHATZKY, pp. 17-39.

⁹ On cameralist theory in general see the basic work: Kurt ZIELENZIGER, Die alten deutschen Kameralisten (Jena, 1914), and the discussion in Helen P. LIEBEL, Enlightened Bureaucracy versus Enlightened Despotism in Baden, 1750-1792 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1965), pp. 9-10.

inaugural lecture. Through Haugwitz and through his student Joseph von Sonnenfels, Justi exerted a pioneering influence on economic policy during Maria Theresa's early reign.¹⁰

Justi was the first cameralist to describe a complete system of political economy. Basing himself on enlightenment thinkers like Montesquieu and Christian Wolff, he combined a modern approach to economic policy with a theory of social progress. Man was not merely a creature of natural drives, but was governed by reason. Civil society developed only gradually out of the primitive stage of a patriarchal household economy. But even in a modern society the family remained the main productive unit. The welfare of the state always depended on that of its families. Justi consequently opposed all restriction of household heads while at the same time arguing that the landless peasant who worked as a servant only became a member of society when he established his own household.¹¹

Justi already espoused ideas of free enterprise. Government was to leave its subjects "all possible and reasonable freedom". Freedom of religion was to be assured so that merchants of all faiths would bring their commerce and industry. Mere population increase, however, would not assure the strength of the state. It had to be tied to a favourable standard of living.¹² Increasing the state revenues was to be the major goal of all economic policies. Efficiency had to be introduced to crown domains. These were not to be alienated. Leasing such lands or giving them in assured hereditary tenure was recommended. The main obstacles to agricultural prosperity lay in ignoring the interest of peasants and landlords. Large estates were to be divided into smaller ones. Yields could be improved by a better technology and by emancipating the peasants. This

¹⁰ On Justi's influence on the reforms, see Gerda and Gottfried MRAZ, Maria Theresia. Ihr Leben und ihre Zeit in Bildern und Dokumenten (Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1979), pp. 237-38; Hans HAUSSHERR, "Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi", in Verwaltungseinheit und Ressorttrennung vom Ende des 17. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, ed.: Hans HAUSSHERR (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1953), pp. 79-96; Biographisches Wörterbuch zur Deutschen Geschichte (Munich: Francke Verlag, 1974), II: 1365-68; Ferdinand FRENSDORF, Über das Leben und die Schriften des Nationalökonomen J.H.G. Justi, Akademie der Wissenschaft Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Abhandlung, neue Folge, 8 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1903); Gustav OTRUBA, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft", in Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit, ed.: KOSCHATZKY, pp. 144-52; Grete KLING-ENSTEIN, "Bildungskrise, Gymnasien und Universitäten im Spannungsfeld theresianischer Aufklärung", in ibid., pp. 213-23; Ludwig IGALFFY-IGALY, "Das Theresianum — Seine Wandlungen zu Lebzeiten seiner Stifterin", in ibid., pp. 239-42; Herbert ZEMAN, "Die österreichische Literatur im Aufbruch — 1740 bis 1780", in ibid., pp. 370-78. On Sonnenfels see: Karl-Heinz OSTERLOH, Joseph von Sonnenfels und die österreichische Reformbewegung im Zeitalter des aufgeklärten Absolutismus, Historische Studien, Heft 409 (Lübeck, Hamburg: Matthiesen Verlag, 1970).

¹¹ Jutta BRÜCKNER, Staatswissenschaften, Kameralismus und Naturrecht. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Wissenschaft im Deutschland des späten 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Verlag Beck, 1977), pp. 228-34.

¹² Johann Heinrich Gottlob VON JUSTI, Staatswissenschaft, oder Systematische Abhandlung aller ökonomischen und Kameralwissenschaften die zur Regierung eines Landes erfordert werden, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1758; reprint ed., Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963), I: 164-66. Also, Louise SOMMER, Die österreichischen Kameralisten in Dogmengeschichtlicher Darstellung (Vienna, 1920-25; reprint ed., Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967), p. 235. meant encouraging private property ownership. Ownership would spur the peasant on to exerting his maximal efficiency. Justi also argued that the landlords had to realize that it was also in their interest to convert the *Robota* into cash payments to achieve greater labour productivity. Justi suggested pressuring the landlords into selling their property to the peasants by taxing land not farmed by the owners. The lords and not the peasants were to pay such taxes, the policy that Maria Theresa eventually introduced.¹³

Ideas like Justi's had also appeared among Maria Theresa's advisers, notably represented by Prince Wenzel von Kaunitz, her strongest minister. His advice to the Empress was that the real power of the state was located in the vast majority, the third estate. They also deserved the crown's chief attention. Strongly impressed by these arguments, Maria Theresa was to make alleviation of the peasant burdens a major goal of her domestic administration.¹⁴

The social condition of the Austrian-Bohemian peasants at the accession of Maria Theresa in 1740 has been analysed in terms of the legal structure of their rights. The peasants were the subjects of their lords. The predominant type of manorial estate was the Grundherrschaft, an estate farmed by tenant farmers. Here the types of tenancy varied. The best kind, the eingekauft, involved a firm contract when the peasant had "bought in". Such lands could be inherited and treated as property. Less secure was the peasant who was only a tenant at will and had a rent contract, but could not freely dispose of his land. He was not "bought in", and hence uneingekauft. The Obrigkeiten (manorial lords) exercised a large range of judiciary powers over the peasants on their estates. Despite the fact that many peasants held land as tenants, many remained leibeigen (personally servile). Leibeigenschaft constituted a form of hereditary bondage adhering to the serfs individually, even though they were not slaves. The lords received certain token fees as recognition of their authority over such serfs who could neither marry nor move to another village without the lord's permission. Joseph II abolished this institution in 1781. However the labour obligations exacted from the peasants arose from their landholding status. They had nothing to do with personal servitude. These services, Robota in Bohemia and Austria, also called Frohndienste in Germany, resembled the French corvées. They involved regular weekly labours on the lord's domain as Handrobota (manual labour), and Zugrobota (ploughing and hauling services with teams of horses or oxen). During wartime the expedition of military convoys was met by extraordinary Robota for

¹³ Ursula A. J. BECHER, Politische Gesellschaft. Studien zur Genese bürgerlicher Offentlichkeit in Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), pp. 79-85.

¹⁴ François FEJTÖ, Un Habsbourg révolutionnaire, Joseph I. Portrait d'un despote éclairé (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1953), p. 85; Carl Freiherr von Hock and Hermann I. BIDER-MANN, Der österreichische Staatsrath (1760-1848) (Vienna, 1879; reprint ed., Vienna: Hans Geyer, 1972), p. 68. On Kaunitz see: Franz A. J. SzABO, "Staatskanzler Fürst Kaunitz und die Aufklärungspolitik Österreichs", in Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit, ed.: KOSCHATZKY, pp. 41-45, and Grete KLINGENSTEIN, Der Aufstieg des Hauses Kaunitz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975).

hauling and trucking supplies. Many baroque palaces also owed their construction to the lord's right to exact *Robota*.¹⁵

The peasantry bore the main burden of taxation. In 1654 and 1683 two broad classifications for farmland had been created for tax purposes. The land registers or cadastres listed land as either rustikal (farmed by peasants), or *dominikal* (farmed as lord's domain). Since seigniorial land was generally exempt from taxation, the tax burden fell on the peasant-tenants on the Grundherrschaften. Taxation rather than regulation had the highest priority in the crown's programme for controlling the landed aristocracy. In 1748 in response to the political crisis of the Austrian War, Maria Theresa embarked upon radical fiscal reform. Guided by Count Haugwitz, it sought to raise fourteen million gulden to support a standing army of 108,000 men by turning the appropriation voted by the estates into a fixed tax on noble and peasant properties to be collected by the crown. Haugwitz argued that the peasants could no longer pay the expenses of defence. "Justice and natural equity" demanded that the "nobility should contribute to this necessary defence in proportion to the full extent of their resources".¹⁶ The new tax law, the Sistemal Patent of 6 September 1748 was to be the first new regulation of taxes for Austria and Bohemia since 1527.¹⁷

Under the Sistemal Patent of 1748 the peasants were responsible for an ordinary Rustikal Contribution (peasants' tax). By 1770 this made up between 54 and 85 percent of the total revenue derived from direct land taxes in Austria and Bohemia.¹⁸ The Appendix shows that the lords of

¹⁵ On the Austrian Grundherrschaft see: Helmuth FEIGL, Die niederösterreichische Grundherrschaft (Vienna: Verlag für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich und Wien, 1964); Georg GRÜLL, Bauer, Herr und Landesfürst (Linz: Böhlaus Nachf., 1963), pp. 396ff., 421ff. Also: Ludwig von MISES, "Die Entwicklung des Gutsherrlich-Bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Galizien (1772-1848)", Wiener Staatswissenschaftliche Studien, IV, no. 2 (1902): 13-26. On Leibeigenschaft see: Hannah RABE, Das Problem Leibeigenschaft, Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft 64 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977).

¹⁶ Friedrich WALTER, "Die Geschichte der österreichischen Zentralverwaltung in der Zeit Maria Theresia (1740-1780)", in Österreichische Zentralverwaltung, ed.: Heinrich KRETSCHMAYER (Vienna: Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Österreichs, 1938), Part II, Vol. I: 157-61. See also HAUSSHERR, "Gottlob von Justi", in Verwaltungseinheit, ed.: HAUSSHERR, pp. 92-193; Ignaz BEIDTEL, Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung, 1740-1848, 2 vols (Innsbruck, 1896; reprint ed., Frankfurt a. Main: Sauer & Auvermann, 1968), I: 30-34; Franz A. J. SZABO, "Haugwitz, Kaunitz, and the Structure of Government in Austria under Maria Theresia, 1745 to 1761", in THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, Historical Papers 1979, pp. 115-16; Hanns L. MIKOLETZSKY, Österreich. Das Grosse 18. Jahrhundert (Vienna Bundesverlag, 1967), pp. 204-11.

¹⁷ GRÜLL, Bauer, p. 370; William E. WRIGHY, "The Initiation of Robots Abolition in Bohemia", Journal of Central European Affairs, XVIII (October 1958): 243-44; Josef KocH, "Vyznamna edice k hospodárskym a sociálnim dějinám Moravy v 18 stoleti", Československý Casopis Historický, XII (1964): 54-56; Roman SANDGRUBER, "Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistik Österreichs 1750-1918", in Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft 64, pp. 74-83; Alois BRUSATTI, "Reform der Finanzverwaltung als Verfassungsreform", in Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit, ed.: KOSCHATZKY, pp. 165-69. The taxes introduced are listed in Stephan VADJA, Felix Austria. Eine Geschichte Österreichs (Vienna: Uberreuter, 1980), pp. 356-67 as: 412 kreuzer per annum for manual workers, 48 kreuzer for peasants, one to three gulden for craftsmen, 200 to 300 gulden for landlords and 600 gulden for clergy (lords).

¹⁸ Sammlung aller k.k. Verordnungen (1740-1780) (hereafter Verordnungen), 9 vols (Vienna, 1786-87), I: 71ff. The 6 September 1748 tax law is also analyzed extensively in Ignaz

Lower Austria paid only 18 percent of the total rural property tax, while the peasants paid 82 percent. But in Bohemia and Moravia the lords paid more, 34 and 30 percent respectively. The peasants there paid less than in Austria, viz. 66 and 70 percent.

One month after the Sistemal Patent, the Tax Patent of 9 October 1748 reaffirmed the division of taxable rural properties into the rustikal and dominikal categories. More important, it decreed that the peasants' rustikal holdings could no longer be absorbed into the domain land of the lord in order to escape taxation.¹⁹ The October law required the establishment of a comprehensive Grundkataster (land registry). It created a graduated tax system. The lords paid a heavier tax, but paid it on their net product, while the peasants paid a flat rate of eighteen percent on their gross product.²⁰ All land held in customary tenure as uneingekauft was classified as rustikal. Even where a fixed tenure existed and the land was eingekauft, the rustikal classification continued for tax purposes. Landless peasants who lived by doing labour on the lord's domains, Inleute, paid no tax; but cottage-holders who had some garden land but no field land, Häusler, were taxed.²¹

Among the first steps taken to implement the new Theresian tax policy was a reform of the bureaucracy at the district level. As part of Haugwitz' reform, the officials in the circles, in particular the *Kreishaupt*mann (captain), were given new powers in 1748. It was hoped that the captains could defend the interests of the rural masses and bring royal impartiality to an office once so largely controlled by the local nobility. The captains had usually allied with the landlords of their district, but Maria Theresa now wanted to use them to reduce the powers of the landed aristocracy. The circle captain was to mediate between crown and peasantry.²² A decree of 24 July 1753 made the captains primarily responsible

DE LUCA, Politischer Codex, oder wesentliche Darstellung im politischen Fache, 14 vols (Vienna, 1789-96), IX: 353ff. under "Steuer". The law was intended to regulate the Contribution collections after Haugwitz had in 1748 taken them out of the hands of the estates and their revenue service. The estates had agreed to pay for ten years without annual review, an annual sum of 5 million gulden. In addition they agreed to pay twice, 170,488 gulden 44 kreuzer to support the military budget. This so-called *Decennal Systematis* was administered by a committee of the Bohemian estates under the Archbishop of Prague (Primate of Bohemia) Johann Mauritis Gustav. The article also describes the management of taxes in arrears. On the origin of the tax system in the middle ages, see Otto BRUNNER, Land und Herschaft (Vienna: Rudolf Rohrer, 1965), pp. 273-309. The Extraordinarium, payable by lords and towns arose from a voluntary agreement of the estates (parliaments) to assist the crown. It was not, as was the Ordinarium and the excises, a right of the crown to tax the land or the usufruct thereof.

⁹ GRÜLL, Bauer, p. 370; DE LUCA, IX: 353ff.

²⁰ GRÜLL, Bauer, p. 370.

²¹ Edith MURR LINK, The Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant 1740-1798 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 14-16; C. A. MACCARTNEY, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), pp. 63-71. MITTERMEIER ("Bauer", p. 168) describes a class of peasants who owned or rented a cottage but did not possess lands in the fields as Häusler or Köthner. In Silesia they were called Kotsassen, Hintersedler, Hintersassen.

²² The circuli (Kreise) or Bohemia and Austria are described in J.C. Röttiers' table of the Monarchia Austriaca (1770), which is reproduced in WANDRUSKA, "Maria Theresia" in Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit, ed.: KOSCHATZSKY, pp. 21. Bohemia had twelve Kreise,

for the protection of the peasants. They were instructed to inspect manorial estates as well as monasteries and schools. In addition they were to become the instruments of the new cameralist science. They were made responsible for encouraging commerce and for supervising local agricultural improvement projects. The peasants were also allowed to bring suits against their landlords, and the state now provided them with a special *Unterthansadvokat* (people's attorney).²³

An adjunct of Maria Theresa's policy of protecting the peasants from manorial abuse was a programme of land reform. Decrees of 23 January 1751 and 31 July 1756 expressly prohibited the noble lords from absorbing peasant land into their own domains. Properties previously absorbed were to be returned. Yet the lords obviously violated the law and its provisions were repeated in decrees of 1769 and 1775.²⁴

The frequent bankruptcies of the landlords also exposed their tenants to arbitrary exploitation. The Theresian laws on manorial bankruptcies of 1754 and 1765 acted to re-enforce the state's support of the peasantry against manorial abuse. All cases of manorial bankruptcy involved an investigation by the provincial government's representatives and by a delegate from the landowners' association. These were required to audit the accounts of *Kridefall* (bankrupt estates). The crown was especially interested in the amount of tax indebtedness to the *Contribution* account from which the lord might have borrowed money. Payment of any arrears to the *Contribution* was to have priority over payment of all other debtors.²⁵

In both the Bohemian and Austrian bankruptcy ordinances of 29 January 1754 and 29 June 1765, all *Robota* services were capitalized according to a fixed schedule and listed as assets. The method established here laid the foundations for the procedures which were to be employed in the full-scale peasant emancipation of the next century. Although build-

Moravia six, Tyrol six, Lower Austria four, Upper Austria four, Lower Styria three, and Upper Styria two. See also BEIDTEL, *Staatsverwaltung*, I: 30-34.

²³ Codex Austriaici, 6 vols (Vienna, 1704-77), V: 782ff; FEIGL, Grundherrschaft, p. 50; BEIDTEL, Staatsverwaltung, I: 22; MURR LINK, Emancipation, p. 119; Otto STOLZ, Grundriss der österreichischen Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte (Innsbruck, Vienna: Tyrolia Verlag, 1951), pp. 150, 161. See also Otto HINTZE, "Der österreichische und der preussische Beamtenstaat im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert", in Staat und Verfassung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen, 3 vols, 2 nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), I: 327ff.

²⁴ Verordnungen, I: 249; III: 339-40. Cf. Karl GRÜNBERG, Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1894), I: 153, who did not think the earlier reforms of Maria Theresa as yet represented a systematic intervention by the crown in peasant-landlord relations. There is, however, a general coincidence between these moves and the beginning of the Theresian codification of the laws in 1753. A more uniform system of personal and property relations was aimed at. See Philipp Harras Ritter von HARRASOWSKY, ed., Codex Theresianus, 4 vols (Vienna: Verlag Carl Gerolds Sohn, 1883-86), I: 2ff. and 41ff.
²⁵ Decrees of 6 November 1751 and 18 December 1751 in Verordnungen, I: 314-15,

²⁵ Decrees of 6 November 1751 and 18 December 1751 in Verordnungen, I: 314-15, 328-29. Only members of the three highest classes: "Geistliche, Herren und Ritter", which included monasteries and corporate towns, could acquire manorial estates. GRUNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, I: 2-3. See also Horst GLASSL, Das österreichische Einrichtungswerk in Galizien (1772-1790) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1975), p. 106. ings and lands of different quality were assessed at the same rate in Bohemia and Austria, the rates for *Robota* were pegged much higher in Austria, as Table 1 illustrates.²⁶

Type of Robota	Bohemian	Rate, 1754	Austrian Rate, 1765		
	Gulden	Kreuzer	Gulden	Kreuzer	
Zugrobota:					
4 Horses	3	30	14		
2 Horses	2	20	8		
2 Oxen	1	10	6		
Handrobota:					
Häusler			4		
Inleute				7	

Table 1. — ROBOTA CAPITALIZATIONS IN BOHEMIA AND AUSTRIA.

Source: Sammlung aller k.k. Verordnungen (1740-1780), II: 267-320, and IV: 408-45.

The modernization of *Robota* had been suggested by Justi as well as other cameralist writers who wanted to see them converted into simple cash payments. This was already more common in Austria than in Bohemia. As such the Austrian services were added to the capital value of the manor. Their sum was calculated according to the five-percent annual dividend of an estimated ten-year average yield. The Bohemian *Robota* varied much more. Local estimates fixed their capital value, but no more than twenty gulden capital could be added for every gulden of *Robota* value. Capitalization of the lord's hunting rights could not exceed 1,500 gulden in Bohemia.²⁷

Robota regulation had been a consistent policy of the crown since the seventeenth century. Maria Theresa did not turn to this problem until the crisis after the Seven Years' War demanded new attention. Patents of 1716 and 1736 had prohibited labour on Sundays and holidays. Charles VI had limited the ploughing services in Bohemia and Austria to 156 days and 102 days a year respectively in 1738. Provinces like the Tyrol had abolished labour services in the sixteenth century, and in the area around Trieste and the Littorale, *Robota* were also virtually unknown.²⁸

²⁶ Verordnungen, II: 267-320; IV: 408-45.

²⁷ Ibid., II: 267-320. The assessed value of castles in Bohemia and Austria ranged from 600 to 2,400 gulden. Since the tax reform of 1749 all noble incomes from properties and annuities (*Gülten*) had been subject to taxation. The tax also affected the *Robota* owed to the lords since it was part of their income. GRULL, *Bauer*, p. 371.

²⁸ Peter Karl JAKSCH, Gesetzlexikon im geistlichen-, Religions- und Toleranzfaches ... für das Königreich Böhmen von 1601 bis 1825, 10 vols (Prague, 1828-30), V: 236. Verordnungen, VII: 305-48; MURR LINK, Emancipation, pp. 48-61; MACCARTNEY, Habsburg Empire, pp. 63-71; Alfred Ritter von ARNETH, Geschichte Maria Theresia, 10 vols (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1863-79), IX: 593. Otto STOLZ, "Die Bauernbefreiung in Süddeutschland im Zusammenhang der Geschichte", Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, XXXIII (1940): 24-26. See also: Paul MITROFANOV, Joseph II: Seine politische und kulturelle Tätigkeit, trans. V. Demelic, 2 vols (Leipzig, Vienna: C. W. Stern, 1910), II: 588.

Not until the 1760s and 70s had modernization of the peasant economy become a leading issue in German political science. Justi's works were widely read and in Baden, the work of privy councillor J. J. Reinhard came to public notice. Reinhard's papers indicate that he was consulted by Maria Theresa even if traces of any correspondence have disappeared. Reinhard viewed the abolition of labour services as a necessary step to introducing modern agricultural technology. Only then could crop rotation, new crops for the fallow field, new machines, and the creation of more efficient farmsteads take place. Substitution of cash payments was the most frequently suggested way of abolishing the labour obligations.²⁹ Joseph II, Maria Theresa's son and co-regent from 1765 to 1780, had accepted this idea in principle before his accession. His memorandum of 3 April 1761 favoured a cash conversion of Robota, but also suggested that the cash be paid to the state which would then provide soldiers to do the labour services for the lords. 30

Joseph II's interest in the peasant question continued in the first major policy memorandum he submitted after 23 September 1765 when he became co-regent. Above all it was necessary to improve the state's revenues. Lord, bourgeois and peasant ought each to contribute a "just proportion".³¹ This was to some extent a reiteration of Haugwitz' view and had also been supported by Kaunitz in 1760 when he warned Maria Theresa that the peasant question required priority attention. Other sovereigns of Europe had already begun to curb the privileges of the nobility. The outbreak of a new wave of peasant rebellions in Bohemia during the 1760s then compelled the Empress to take the steps necessary for a major reform.³²

Peasant uprisings began in Austrian Silesia in 1766. By the following year some 137 villages had revolted against the Robota. Vivid reports of seigniorial despotism were sent to the Bohemian-Austrian Hofkanzlei (chancellory) by the Silesian circle captain Baron Ernst von Locella. It reached Maria Theresa's desk by December 1767 and she promptly set up a special agrarian commission in 1768. Headed by von Locella, it was to investigate abusive Robota exactions.³³ Early in 1769 the investigators concluded that the Silesian peasantry had been reduced to virtual slavery. They were scrawny and dressed in rags. They had become "savage, brutalized and apathetic to farming their assigned lands".³⁴ Both Maria Theresa and her chancellory officials were appalled by these findings. Baron Tobias von Gebler of the Staatsrat (State Council) read the report with disgust and painful sympathy. He was shocked at the "suffering that the poor subjects endure at the hands of the lords".³⁵ His colleague, Egyd

²⁹ LIEBEL, Enlightened Bureaucracy, pp. 54ff., 60ff.

³⁰ Alfred Ritter VON ARNETH, ed., Maria Theresia und Joseph II: Ihre Correspondenz sammt Briefen Josephs an seinen Bruder Leopold, 3 vols (Vienna: Verlag Carl Gerolds Sohn, 1867-68), I: 6.

³¹ Ibid., III: 335-61; FEJTÖ, Un Habsbourg révolutionnaire, p. 87.
 ³² Ibid., p. 85.

33 Ibid.

34 Cited in ibid., p. 130.

35 VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, p. 68. Valerian von Borié thought the Silesian situation worse than the Hungarian.³⁶ Maria Theresa took immediate action. In June 1769 she decreed a *Robota* regulation for Silesia modelled on a Hungarian one of 1766. Her note to the Bohemian-Austrian chancellory of 25 July 1769 explained the basic principles of the new law, which shows evidence of Justi's and Kaunitz' influence:

The peasants, as the most numerous class of subject, the foundation and the greatest strength of the state [are to] be supported in such a condition that they can care for themselves and their families and also be able to pay the general land taxes both in peace and war ... neither ... a contract and least of all a custom ... will be allowed which cannot be brought into agreement with the goal of maintaining the subject.³⁷

The regulation of Silesian labour services left the court divided. Two reform parties emerged. The first, an "accountant's party", grouped around von Borié and seemed to have Maria Theresa's backing. His argument was that the *Robota* originally represented a payment to the lord for protection, both of the landless and the landed peasants. Borié argued that the type of *Robota* which the landless peasants performed could be regulated according to their tax category. Taxes were to be based on net income.³⁸

The "accountant's party" was opposed by Prince Kaunitz who supported a programme of land reform suggested by Franz Anton von Blanc. Blanc had been promoted to the Chancellory from the Freiburg/Breisgau administration and had been on von Locella's commission in 1768. Perhaps he had been influenced by Reinhard's work in Baden (which was near Freiburg), for he advocated similar plans. The peasant could be made a better producer if new feed crops were introduced, the three-field system abolished, labour services abolished, peasant tenancies turned into private

³⁶ Ibid. Peasant unrest had also occurred in Western Hungary between 1762 and 1766, especially in the vicinity of Eisenstadt. This too had been put down by military force. Since the royal investigating commission afterward reported that the unrest could be attributed to the reluctance of the local officials to enforce existing peasant rights, the Empress ordered a written registration of all Hungarian Urbarien (where these were listed) in 1767. See Rudolf KROPF, "Agrargeschichte des Burgenlandes in der Neuzeit. Vom Beginn des 16. Hahrhunderts bis zur Aufhebung der Grundherrschaft im Jahre 1848", Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 20/1 (1972): 17-18; and "Der Bauernaufstand von 1765/66 in der Herrschaft Schlaining", Burgenländische Heimatblätter, 31 (1969): 121.

³⁷ HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, pp. 68-69. One reason there was so much unrest after the Seven Years' War seems to have been the population increase. KROPF's study shows ("Agrargeschichte", p. 16), a 168 percent increase in the number of landless Söllner and Häusler between 1715 and 1767. The landless population of rural Bohemia had been employed in industry and commerce, which the annexation of Silesia had seriously disrupted. Helen P. LIEBEL, "Free Trade and Protectionism under Maria Theresa and Joseph II", Canadian Journal of History, XIV, 3 (1979): 355-73. However the number of persons employed in agriculture rose in rump Silesia from 89.5 percent in 1762 to 90.3 percent in 1766-69. In Bohemia it remained at 88 percent for both periods. See Roman SANDGRUBER, Österreichische Agrarstatistik 1750-1918 (Munich: Beck, 1978), p. 222. Labour productivity remained low until 1750 because of the heavy burden of labour service. See František LOM, "Die Arbeitsproduktivität in der Geschichte der tschechoslowakischen Landwirtschaft", Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 19/1 (1971): 9.

¹⁸ VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, pp. 71-72.

property and peasant rights protected. Blanc's general programme was suggested to Maria Theresa but at first opposed at court.³⁹ Another plan for transforming peasant leaseholds into private properties had been proposed to Maria Theresa in 1766 by a Carinthian *Kommerzienrat* (commerce councillor), Baron von Thyss. Against the objections of Count Hatzfeld, Maria Theresa's financial adviser, Kaunitz had strongly urged support for Thyss' project.

Thyss himself had been sent to try out his ideas on the crown manor of Bamberg in Carinthia in 1767 where he was to turn the peasant tenancies into private properties. Maria Theresa had considered the experiment highly important and imposed no deadline. By 1768 its success had been recognized. Kaunitz was inspired to include some general ideas on agrarian reform in a general memorandum of 25 January 1768 in which he argued that Thyss' project could serve as a model for the nobility. It was hoped they would imitate the crown's example. Kaunitz hoped to modernize agriculture by abolishing communal pasture rights, by commuting *Robota* to cash payments, and by transforming tenancies into private properties.⁴⁰

These plans seem to have been thwarted by the severe depression of the 1760s which followed the end of the Seven Years' War. The cost of living increased while business was slack. Beef prices, which had fallen since the 1730s, suddenly leaped up on the Vienna market, while rye prices continued to shoot up. Agricultural income proved insufficient to meet the rising prices of manufactured goods. By the spring of 1770 the Bohemian peasants were on the brink of rebellion. Unusually heavy rains and floods threatened the crops. The harvest was to be one of the worst in the century. To head off the uprising, a new Robota regulation was given top priority in the Hofkanzlei. It was to this chancellory that the Kreis officials reported any violations of the laws protecting the peasants. The 1751 instruction to the circle captains ordered them to watch for signs of seigniorial oppression. As a result of the continued unrest of the 1760s, the Empress did not have full confidence in her circle officials. They seemed still to support the aristocratic lords against the peasants. Yet in case the peasants refused to do the *Robota*, or refused to pay taxes, an edict of 1767 allowed the circle to request a military intervention.⁴¹

Between 1765 and 1767 the Viennese court and the *Hofkanzlei* were inundated with peasant petitions. Most grievances attacked the abuse by

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 72ff. Blanc espoused a "law of the maximum" for *Robota*. See also WRIGHT, Serf, pp. 41ff. Franz Anton von Blanc had come up through the Vorderösterreich administration at Freiburg/Breisgau. See Franz QUARTHAL, Die Behördenorganisation in Vorderösterreich von 1753 bis 1805 und die Beamten in Verwaltung, Justiz und Unterrichtswesen, Veröffentlichungen des Alemannischen Instituts Freiburg, 43 (Bühl/Baden: Verlag Konkordia, 1977).

⁴⁰ Franz A.J. SZABO, "Kaunitz and the Reforms of the Co-Regency of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, 1765-1780" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Alberta, 1976), pp. 299ff.

⁴¹ VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, IV: 38-41; Verordnungen, V: 200. See also Wilhelm ABEL, Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur (Hamburg: Paul Parey, 1966), pp. 152-53 Zöllner, Geschichte Österreichs, p. 280.

landlords of the *Robota* system. Labour services had been increased from three to six days a week. Higher cash payments for commutation had been demanded. The crown's main concern seems to have been for the landless peasants whose rebellions were easier to suppress than those of the tenant farmers. Between 1764 and 1773 Maria Theresa aimed at achieving a wage increase for this group of rural workers. Their *Robota* obligation was fixed at one day a week in 1767. To prevent unrest, the Bohemian provincial government decreed that no increase in either the *Robota* or in wages could be made.⁴²

Towards the end of the 1760s the number of uprisings by tenant farmers on the large estates of Bohemia had increased. These combined with the rebellions of landless rural workers and glass workers, and with widespread unemployment in the rural textile industry during this depressed era, created a situation where anarchy threatened. Some revolts like those of the Katovice peasants against their Jesuit landlords in 1768 lasted for several years. Troops were sent in, but military intervention did not end the revolt. Nor did the imprisonment of some inhabitants, a move ordered by the Bohemian *Gubernium* (provincial government) on 23 June 1768. Only in 1774 after the *Robota* were reduced to three days a week did the mutiny stop.⁴³

In May 1768, another uprising broke out at Litomysl, one of the largest estates in Bohemia. It was accompanied by a petition of grievance which the *Kreisamt* (circle office) supported. The peasants claimed that the new Theresian *Robota* regulation established a lower schedule of services than the one the landlord wanted to exact. A royal commission investigated, and forced the lord, Count Jiři Valdštejn Vartemberk, to repay 6,500 gulden in illegal *Robota* to his peasants. Still the peasants resisted and refused to pay either in cash or in labour until the new regulation of 1775 settled the question. Even after that, another rebellion broke out which was ended by military intervention in 1780-81.⁴⁴

Confronted with uprisings in town and country during 1768, Maria Theresa concluded that her circle captains could not be ignorant of the *Bedrückungen* (oppression) of the peasants by the manorial lords. All abuses represented a clear violation of the 1738 *Robota* patent. Convinced that the malpractices of the lords were behind the uprisings, she sent a list of manors suspected of illegal practices to her Bohemian chancellor, Count Rudolf von Chotek, on 15 September 1769. She wanted him to begin a new investigation and by pass the circle captains in doing so. A provincial official and the representative of her court in Vienna, or a captain taken from another circle, were to conduct such investigations. If abuses existed, the captain in that circle was to be dismissed immediately.⁴⁵

⁴² Jiří SVODOBA, Protifeudálni A Sociálni Hnuti V Čechách Na Konci Doby Temna (1740-1774), Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Historica Monographica XVIII (Prague, 1967), pp. 29, 54, 58.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

44 Ibid., pp. 26-31.

⁴⁵ Friedrich WALTER, ed., Maria Theresia Briefe und Aktenstücke in Auswahl, Ausgewählte Quellen zur Deutschen Geschichte der Neuzeit, Bd. XII (Darmstadt: Wissen-

As a result of this investigation, a major scandal erupted in Bohemia in early 1770. The *Hofkanzlei* had replaced the biased circle officials who had seemingly covered up malpractices on the estates of Baron Lazansky at Manetin, of Baron Klenau at Benatek, and of Prince Mannsfeld at Dobřiš. The crown investigation revealed the worst features of Bohemian serfdom on the Mannsfeld estate at Dobřiš. The peasants were forced to buy goods from the landlord at inflated prices. He also cheated them in sales of fire and building wood. The other landlords ruined the fields during their hunting expeditions, too. They refused grazing rights and forced the peasants to exchange good land for bad. They pressured them to sign their land over to their children, and they demanded excessive *Robota* in fields, mines and foundries. They added cash payments on top of labour services instead of commuting them. All objections were met with inhuman punishment.⁴⁶

The Dobřiš scandal immediately resulted in two new edicts in April and May. The first, dated 14 April 1770, aimed to "Abrogate the Exploitation of the Peasants". It prohibited the manorial lords from forcing the peasants to sell to them below a good market price, since this reduced their taxpaying capacity. The lord's option to buy the peasant's produce was severely restricted. The farmer was to be allowed to sell freely on the open market if he could not agree with the landlord's price.⁴⁷ The second edict, dated 12 May 1770, ordered all circle officials and manorial managers as well as local magistrates to make known the *Robota* and tax decrees. These were to be made available in the manorial offices and in the village courts. Extensive trucking services during sowing and harvesting seasons were prohibited. Any long-distance hauling services had to be made known to the *Kreisamt* in advance. All tax collectors were to be sworn in by the *Kreisamt* officials.⁴⁸

The Dobřiš affair had meanwhile reached the State Council which decided to make a public example of Prince Mannsfeld. He was fined 3,000 gulden and ordered to compensate his tenants for damages. The management of his estates was taken out of his hands. The *Kreis* official who investigated the scandal was rewarded with 100 ducats (450 gulden) by Maria Theresa. Mannsfeld's officials were tried for their crimes.⁴⁹

48 Verordnungen, VI: 205-8.

⁴⁹ WRIGHT, Serf, pp. 41-42; GRÜNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, II: 162-63, 172-85. The size of the reward (tax-free) is important. See Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien (hereafter HHStA), Kabinetsarchiv, Staatsratprotokolle, vol. 34, no. 671. The sum of 450 gulden was an average annual salary for officials. University professors made 600 gulden. See Leslie BODI, Tauwetter in Wien (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1977) Johann PEZLL, Skizze von Wien (Vienna, 1786) estimated that one could live "quite comfortably" on 500 to 550 gulden a year (pp. 344-45).

schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), p. 250. See also VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, IX: 593, n. 540.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 593; GRÜNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, I: 196-97. See also Freidrich-Wilhelm HENNING, Dienste und Abgaben der Bauern im 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1969), pp. 97-98, who argues that the Austrian and south German peasants were subjected to about the same "oppressive" burdens.

⁴⁷ GRÜNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, I: 196-97.

Incensed at the findings of the Dobřiš investigation, Maria Theresa on 12 July 1770 ordered Count Chotek, the chancellor, to investigate all peasant complaints in Bohemia in every local *Kreis*. Two days later, a new decree reiterated the responsibility of the *Kreisamt* for enforcing the *Robota* regulation of 1738. Any official who accepted bribes for allowing dispensation of the *Robota* laws, was to be reported to the provincial authorities.⁵⁰

What emerges here is Maria Theresa's concern for developing a free and independent peasantry in Bohemia. Early in 1770, on 6 February a new edict tried to encourage the peasants on rustikal land to become private property owners. Peasants who owned tenancies were registered in the land rolls and were given the right to ask for an option to purchase their tenancies from the landlord. Ownership meant independence. It gave the peasant greater security and a right to leave his land to his children. Ownership agreements which were negotiated with the landlords, also had to be registered with the Kreisamt. Such contracts were to list all houses, fields, gardens, meadows and woods which passed to ownership as well as the name of the peasant and his place of residence. If the purchase price of a property was 200 gulden, then the peasant needed only 10 gulden for his downpayment, a generous term. The remainder was to be paid on the installment plan. The annual quitrent on such property was a minimal one gulden and 15 kreuzer. The Robota obligation adhered to the property and not to the person of the peasant. In spite of this the *Robota* were not automatically converted into cash payments when the property was converted into "owned" land. The peasant continued to do a two-oxen ploughing service three times a week, and two additional days of manual labour. 51

Before 1770 then, the Theresian decrees did not involve a thoroughgoing peasant reform policy. A natural disaster was needed to expose the inadequacies of the older agrarian laws. Bad weather ruined the crops of 1770 and 1771 in Bohemia. During the famous famine of 1771 at least 16,000 peasants were said to have died of starvation. Perhaps even 100,000 died or fled the country. The agrarian problem became suddenly acute. The starving peasants revolted. Rebellions occurred on seventy-two estates in Bohemia during 1771-72. The landless peasants were the worst off. If they survived, they ran away, often to Prussia, where labour was scarce and they were welcomed. In 1771 it was mainly the remaining tenant farmers who rebelled against the increased *Robota*. Rumours had spread that since Maria Theresa opposed the *Robota*, she would surely refuse to back the lords. The rebels agreed to work only three days a week and fined any peasant who did more. The *Kreis* officials sided with the lords.

The 1771 rebellion had broken out in February. It reached its peak in June when the lords, demanding a showdown, wanted to meet the peasants

⁵⁰ VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, p. 69.

⁵¹ Verordnungen, VI: 257-58. See also the decree of 20 December 1770 (ibid.: 310-11), which guaranteed rights of inheritance to holders of "bought in" holdings up to the tenth degree of relationship. See also VON HARRESOWSKY, ed., Codex Theresianus, I/II: 286ff.

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out in the open, in a central place. But the peasants were afraid they might be cut down if they agreed, and refused. Joseph II ordered the army in, but the troops remained aloof. Count Erlach, the commander, advised the Bohemian provincial government on 21 June 1771 that he was reluctant to undertake any action against the peasants. In the end the rebellion ended because Maria Theresa did not support the peasant demands. Several of her circle captains disagreed on this, and even proposed that the *Robota* of the landless peasants be abolished altogether. On the lower level, the village magistrates appear to have been divided. Some sided with the lords, some with the peasants.⁵²

During the fall of 1771, Joseph II decided to visit Bohemia to investigate the emergency first hand. The visit to these disaster areas appeared as a "spectacle", which aroused his "heart". Whole villages had been wiped out by disease and starvation. Incensed at the conditions, Joseph threw himself into organizing relief measures. Grain was to be sent from Hungary which had surpluses. This meant a temporary lifting of the trade barriers. Bureaucratic red tape nearly stopped the relief. The Hofkammer (Treasury) hedged and observed that delivery of so much grain would entail a very complicated operation.⁵³ On the verge of despair, Joseph wrote to his younger brother and heir, Leopold, in September 1771: "We are still in the same sad state here. This apoplectic lethargy and langour still remains; we have not come out of it yet. In the end, despite all my appeals, nothing has been done to relieve Bohemia."⁵⁴ Even in this emergency, however, Joseph never questioned the fundamental need for the Robota. Maria Theresa's reforms did not originate with her son, the "revolutionary emperor". Her advisers played the leading role as did some of the local officials who investigated conditions.

Maria Theresa's most important economic advisers during the 1770s were Anton von Blanc and Joseph von Sonnenfels. Like Justi, they argued that the *Robota* should be abolished so that the peasant could maximize his production. Above all else the peasant had to remain a good taxpayer. The best way of ensuring this was to limit the *Robota* if not to abolish them. Under pressure of the 1771 rebellions, the Theresian bureaucracy was

52 SVOBODA, Protifeudálni, pp. 38, 45, 48, 76-79.

⁵³ WRIGHT, Serf, p. 44; Gaston von PETTENEGG, ed., Ludwig und Karl, Grafen un Herren von Zinzendorf, Minister unter Maria Theresia, Joseph II, Leopold II und Franz I: Ihre Selbstbiographien nebst einer kurzen Geschichte des Hauses Zinzendorf (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1879), p. 136.

⁵⁴ VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia und Joseph II, I: 344. Joseph's own report on the visit dated Prague, 27 October 1771, is in HHStA, Familienarchiv, Hofreisen, K.4. Joseph's journey from 1 October to 17 November showed the catastrophe at its worst. The poor harvests were worse than those of 1769 and 1770 and one-third more had died of hunger than in the previous two years. Joseph had also gone to Moravia in 1769 to investigate the famine of that year. At that time he had himself put his hand to the plough, an event which was documented by an engraving of 1770. It is depicted in the exhibition catalogue Maria Theresia und ihre Zeit. Schönbrunn. Mai-Oktober 1980 (Salzburg, Vienna: Residenz Verlag, 1980), p. 237. The extent of population loss may be seen in the census statistics for Bohemia which were 2.4 million for 1771 and 2.2 million for 1772. See Alfred GURTLER, Die Volkszählungen Maria Theresias und Josef II. 1753-1790 (Innsbruck: Wagner Universitäts buchhandlung, 1909), Tabelle I, Appendix. instructed to work on a new landholding regulation, an urbarian law. The order of 1 June 1771 stipulated that an exact inventory of the Robota obligations was to be made and recorded on the land rolls so that the existing laws which limited the Robota could be enforced.55

The Bohemian Urbarian Commission was officially established on 10 October 1771, mainly upon the urging of Count Leopold von Kollowrat-Krakowsky. An experienced official of the Bohemian provincial government in Prague, he had been promoted to the post of vice-chancellor in the Bohemian-Austrian Hofkanzlei in 1769. In December 1771, he was again promoted to Treasury president and made head of the Banco (State Bank). The Urbarian Commission had been created for the specific purpose of ending the Bohemian rebellion. It had full authority to investigate all existing labour services and to confirm or alter them as the situation warranted. If necessary, new land registers were to be drawn up in each manor, 56

The commission report was hardly calculated to be popular with the Bohemian lords. It recommended a maximum of three days a week for the Robota. This coincided with the limit the peasants had demanded in almost every uprising. Landlords were to be encouraged to make voluntary agreements limiting the Robota, but had to stay within the regulation guideline. No agreement was valid unless it was approved by the commission. A majority of the *Hofkanzlei* immediately opposed these proposals, but Maria Theresa quickly indicated that she meant business in her decree of 9 December 1771. It reiterated the warning that if peasant grievances were not brought to the attention of the circle officials, the guilty persons would be fined and punished, especially if they aided and abetted in the "oppression" of subjects. 57

By the end of February 1772, the legal machinery for handling cases of peasant grievance against landlords had been put into operation. One year later, a list of specific punishments for guilty landlords was published. It took the Bohemian Urbarian Commission two years (1772-73) to complete its investigations. A more immedaite regulation of the *Robota* was decreed for Lower Austria on 7 June 1772. All services were limited to 104 days a year. If the old contracts had set the total at 156 days a year, these were now to be limited to three days a week. If old contracts set a limit above 156 days, such services were to be limited to four days a week. The

56 For Silesia, see ibid., nos 262-67, 270, 302, 450. Verordnungen, VI: 406-7; VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, IX: 347. ⁵⁷ Verordnungen, VI: 386, 417.

⁵⁵ VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, pp. 68-70. On Blanc, see Karl GRÜNBERG, "Franz Anton von Blanc. Ein Sozialpolitiker der Theresianisch-Josefinischen Zeit", Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, XXXV/3 (1911): 119. On Sonnenfels, see OSTERLOH, Joseph von Sonnenfels, pp. 81-85. Prince Kaunitz had urged introduction of uniform laws wherever possible (1770). See Henry STRAKOSCH, State Absolutism and the Rule of Law (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 1967), pp. 90-91. Documents on the Urbarien regulation in Bohemia are in HHStA, XI/11, Nachlass Kollowrat-Krakosky, Leopold, nos 303, 305-6, 308, 322, 326-27, 363, 379, 395.

landless *Inleute* were reduced to twelve days a year, small holders to twenty-six days and large holders to fifty-two days.⁵⁸

Wholesale agrarian reform now seemed well on its way. Partly because the peasants had demanded it during the 1771 rebellion, Maria Theresa brought out the still more radical solution of abolishing serfdom. In fact, in November 1772 she wrote to Prince Kaunitz that the abolition of serfdom was the only project which might prevent her from abdicating.⁵⁹ Even though none of the high-ranking officials supported her suggestion, her personal sympathy for the plight of the peasants remained undaunted. Above all, it was her moral duty, her own will, to help the "oppressed" Bohemian subjects. This was to be done as soon as possible, even if only a temporary *Robota* patent were issued. The renewed outbreak of violence during 1773 then served to strengthen her resolve.⁶⁰

The opposition of the nobility had meanwhile surfaced in Styria when the crown tried to extend the Lower Austrian law of 1772 to that province. An *ad hoc* committee of Styrian nobles presented their views to Maria Theresa on 18 December 1772. Mainly they considered the imposition of a two-day *Robota* maximum as an unjustified interference in their rights by the crown. As proof of the estates' devotion, they were willing to agree to a weekly maximum of four days. At the same time they tried to persuade Maria Theresa that it would be in her interest to maintain the existing equilibrium between lord and peasant.⁶¹ After the *Hofkanzlei* mediated a compromise, a three-day weekly maximum for Styria was agreed to on 13 February 1773.

A new rebellion had meanwhile broken out in Bohemia during 1773. Maria Theresa and Prince Kaunitz were compelled by these circumstances to make a new assessment of the critical position of the monarchy. On 1 May Kaunitz submitted a special memorandum to the Empress. As a primary cause for the decline of states, Kaunitz pointed to the heavy burden of taxation weighing upon the people. The *Contribution*, in particular, was set much too high. The *Robota* were excessive as were most other obligations paid to the landlords. He deplored the use of military force in Bohemia.⁶² Joseph II did not share Kaunitz' views and replied that high taxes were necessary for maintaining the state. He pointed out that a nine-percent reduction had already taken place, but admitted that a *Robota* regulation might be overdue. On 4 June 1773, Maria Theresa asked her new chancellor Blümegen to expedite at least a provisional *Robota* patent for Bohemia.⁶³

⁵⁸ GRÜNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, II: 204-6; Verordnungen, VI: 425, 530-31; WRIGHT, Serf, pp. 45-46; VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, p. 70; GRÜLL, Bauer, p. 240; MURR LINK, Emancipation, pp. 48-52; MACCARTNEY, Habsburg Empire, p. 65. HHStA, XI/11, Nachlass Kollowrat-Krakowsky, Leopold, nos 374-76, 417.

⁶¹ Anton MELL, Die Anfänge der Bauernbefreiung in Steiermark unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II (Graz: Verlagsbuchhandlung Styria, 1901), pp. 88-92.

⁶² HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vorträge 112/A Kart. III: 1773 (IV-VI).

63 Ibid.

⁵⁹ VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, IX: 349.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 351.

Kaunitz' reaction was negative. His advice to the Empress of 18 June cautioned against a temporary patent. A firm resolution or a clear statement would be better. Under Blanc's influence, Maria Theresa persisted. She ordered both Blanc and Kaunitz to work on a draft *Robota* regulation. Her determination consequently forced the hand of the Bohemian estates who opposed any state intervention. Oddly enough, the counter proposals they made to the *Hofkanzlei* on 27 October 1773 were later to become the basis of Joseph's policies during the 1780s. The estates suggested that the landlords and peasants negotiate voluntary *Robota* contracts as required by the urbarian law of 1771. Where agreement could not be reached, the circle official was to decide the issue. Most Bohemian lords favoured keeping the ploughing services which consisted of six days a week with horse or ox. In addition to this, the tenants were also to do manual labour six days a week and the tenants at will, seven. The lords wanted an estates delegation to sit with the agrarian commission.⁶⁴

The proposals of the Bohemian nobles were sent to Maria Theresa on 24 January 1774. Blanc attacked their plan the same day, arguing that in practice no agreements could be reached under their terms. Any appeal to local custom would only maintain the status quo. Both Kaunitz and Count Hatzfeld, who by then was the financial specialist in the State Council, supported Blanc. In the State Council sessions held from 4 to 14 February, it was decided that one of two policies was possible: either to set a specific limit to *Robota*, or to withhold a new regulation until all hope of negotiating voluntary agreements had failed.⁶⁵

Both Maria Theresa and Joseph II agreed that a *Robota* regulation was needed. Both State Council and *Hofkanzlei* had asked for one. The court, however, was still divided into two parties on this question. The Borié group, opposed by Kaunitz, believed in a three-day maximum and a regulation linked to tax categories. The Blanc party favoured a system based on the 1738 law and a classification according to the size of tenancies. Baron Kressel, who had emerged as Maria Theresa's economic specialist for Bohemia, opposed both plans. He argued that the variation in practice was so great that no regulation was feasible. Maria Theresa, who was afraid that new uprisings were imminent, wanted to implement a new regulation to present them. Joseph hesitated since he was afraid of alienating the support of the Bohemian lords. His memorandum of 23 February 1774 suggested a middle course.⁶⁶

His proposal shows how conservative he really was when faced with the opposition of the nobles. His primary concern was with the state's income. He feared a drastic decline if none of the main classes of taxpayers, peasant, lord, or bourgeois, could pay their share of the taxes. The dispute between the Blanc and Borié parties at court appeared to continue. One side argued that if the *Robota* were not limited, Bohemia would "go

⁶⁴ VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, p. 71. Henry MARCZALI, Hungary in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), p. 192.

⁶⁵ VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, p. 70-71.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 71-73.

aground". To this the lords objected that they would be ruined if there were a regulation. He agreed that the nobles were probably prejudiced by their own interests. Yet any official who favoured a reduction of the *Robota* had to be ignorant of the local situation. He had seen for himself how serious the crisis in Bohemia was. Joseph doubted that a solution could be found in the councils of government. He thought it absurd to impose a *Robota* norm or to tamper with local usages in any way. Instead each manorial estate could establish its own guidelines by contracting voluntary agreements with the peasants. If none could be effected within six months, the decision had to be left to the *Kreisamt*.⁶⁷

Joseph's proposals reiterated the recommendations of the Bohemian estates. A new round of discussions in court circles ensued. Was it possible to negotiate any Robota agreements at all? The debate lasted from February to April 1774. Only after Joseph absolutely insisted on action, did Maria Theresa agree to his policy.⁶⁸ Voluntary agreements were then ordered in a decree dated 7 April 1774. If the landlords could not reach an agreement with their tenants under the proper supervision of the village courts, then the circle officials were to draw them up. Maria Theresa's own views had triumphed. Borié's scheme for regulating the Robota according to tax categories was incorporated into the guideline. Still, the peasants were protected if their *Robota* obligations were below the norms set by law. They could not have them raised. But those working above them could not be reduced. All villages which had not yet done so were to draw up a register or inventory listing local obligations. This included the rents as well as the *Robota*. If the terms of the existing *Urbarium* were too harsh, a new agreement was to be made. Norms were set according to tax categories. The highest class of taxpayer was limited to three-days-aweek ploughing service plus three days of manual labour. The peasants in the lowest income bracket were limited to manual service only, and to twenty-six days a year for women, and thirty-nine for men. Ploughing services could not be converted into manual ones.⁶⁹

Both the noble landlords and the peasants proved reluctant to sign voluntary agreements. By 3 June 1774, Maria Theresa was ready to revise the maximums set earlier. In August, Count Blümegen, the chancellor, Count Kollowrat of the Treasury, and Count Hatzfeld of the State Council drafted new proposals. Joseph II's idea of voluntary agreements between tenant and lord had failed, certainly by November.

Bohemia once more stood on the brink of the abyss. By 25 December 1775, Maria Theresa was even prepared to abdicate. She believed that it was only her interest in abolishing *Leibeigenschaft* (servitude) which gave her the will to remain on the throne.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, IX: 353-55; GRÜNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, II: 226-34.

⁶⁸ VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, pp. 73-74.

⁶⁹ Verordnungen, VII: 28-54. Robota quittance payments had also to be listed in the Urbarien. They too were subject to a ceiling which was linked to the peasant's tax category.

⁷⁰ See Kollowrat's plan for the *Urbarien* in the memorandum to the *Hofkanzlei* in HHStA, XII1, Nachlass Kollowrat-Krakowsky, no. 422. Maria Theresa sent Kaunitz a note

A new series of Bohemian rebellions had already broken out in the spring of 1774. The case of the Nepomysil estate once more brought the army's intervention. Abolition of the Jesuit Order and the seizure of its lands in 1773 and 1774 had not reduced the social tensions on its manors. During 1774 some twenty-eight noble manors in Bohemia were the scene of unrest, demonstrations and protest marches. Outright rebellion and *Robota* strikes broke out in another seven. The 1774 harvest failed. Hysterical figures appeared in Czech villages to prophesy the end of the world.⁷¹

In January 1775, a widespread peasant revolt broke out in Bohemia. The crown sent an army of 40,000 regulars and four regiments of cavalry to put them down. Prince Kaunitz immediately cautioned the Empress that it would be unwise to deal with the agrarian problem in Bohemia until the unrest had subsided. Joseph II was sufficiently shaken by the events to press for the immediate new regulation of the *Robota* abuses which were considered to be the main cause of the uprising. Maria Theresa seems to have ignored Kaunitz' advice. She decided to send troops and to implement the new urbarian regulation at the same time. On 28 January 1775 the agrarian commission established at the end of 1774 had suggested that a three-day maximum be decreed officially. No increase in the obligations was to be allowed. These recommendations were accepted by the Empress and made public on 28 February 1775. The Bohemian estates immediately demanded that she rescind the resolution.

The peasant rebellion of 1775 made implementation impossible. Maria Theresa was distressed at the continuing unrest, but she proved responsive to the peasants' grievances. Beginning on 17 March 1775, the sale of manorial estates was regulated. Noble lords could not sell villages without also selling enough adjacent field land to enable the villagers to subsist as a viable unit. On 25 March she introduced the new urbarian plans. Against Kaunitz' advice it was decided to make them public during the uprising.

By 29 March the uprising appeared to have gotten out of hand and Generals Wied and Hadik were ordered to use military force to put it down. On 6 April an ordinance for Bohemia prohibited all incitement to riot. On 7 April an end to all malpractice in tax collections was ordered. It stipulated that the circle officials were to audit the peasants' monthly cash payments so that their accounts could remain properly separate. Since the lords never paid the *Contribution* monies themselves, a decree of 9 Oc-

to say that the abolition of *Leibeigenschaft* was the only question which could still hold her at the rudder. See her resolution of 25 December 1774 to Kaunitz *Vortrag* (presentation), in *Maria Theresia Aktenstücke*, ed.: WALTER, p. 381. Also VON ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, IX: 349; VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, *Staatsrath*, pp. 74-75.

⁷¹ SVOBODA, *Protifeudálni*, pp. 39-40, 23, 97. On the abolition of Jesuit privileges, see *Verordnungen*, VII: 23 for the decree of 12 February 1773. Joseph himself believed that "poor Bohemia" was going under. The government was enmeshed in a paper war and would not act to save it. Since the winter was also extremely severe and poverty widespread, marauding bands marched through the countryside. Some 15,000 men marched on Prague singing their own version of the Lord's prayer: "Our father, father of peasants, see how they beat us, our father, we cannot stand it anymore because they are taking away our daily bread." Quoted in Hans MAGENSCHAB, *Josef II, Revolutionär von Gottes Gnaden* (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1979), p. 117.

tober prohibited their sending peasants as messengers. A bookkeeper or someone from the manorial office was to come. Otherwise the *Kreisamt* was to report the case for investigation.⁷²

The rebellion had meanwhile been crushed by the army and prisoners had been taken. Joseph reported this to Leopold on 3 April 1775. The peasants had refused to plant the crops during 1775 and struck against the Robota. Rumours circulated that Maria Theresa was going to abolish all *Robota*. No action had been taken in this direction, however, even though on June 28 the Empress had, on Blanc's urging, asked him and Kaunitz to draft a *Robota* patent. Early in July, the State Council still seemed reluctant to take drastic steps. Baron Kressel agreed that nothing could be done about it, or even about new urbarian agreements. On 20 July Joseph II described the situation to Leopold as still undecided, much to the detriment of lord and peasant alike. He thought that the conflicting arguments of the parties at court had only confused Maria Theresa and contributed to her vacillating attitudes. He was bitter about the savage attacks on her own friendly gestures. They emanated from the intrigues of an opposition which had grouped itself around Maria Theresa. To show his own good will, Joseph had offered to go to Bohemia in person in order to restore order.⁷³

By 21 July the Blanc party which advocated *Robota* regulation according to landholding types, gained a majority in the State Council. Possibly because Baron Kressel seemed to side with Joseph's view, he was dispatched to Prague to assess the situation. Kaunitz made a last effort on 7 August to persuade Joseph that the dignity of the crown would suffer if the government gave in to the rebel demands. He thought the *Robota* regulation should be postponed until order had been restored. But it was too late. Joseph had decided that only the *Robota* patent could now restore peace. Although Maria Theresa was described as confused, uncertain and still undecided in the agrarian matter in letters written by Joseph to Leopold in early August, the Empress seems to have been spurred to action by Baron Kressel's report of 11 August. The main thrust of Kressel's advice was to stop the uncertainty among the peasants by decreeing a new

 $^{^{72}}$ Verordnungen, VIII: 196-98; 203-4, 364-65. Material on this peasant uprising is in HHStA, XI/11 Nachlass Kollowrat-Krakowsky, nos 439-40, 480, 482-82. Plans for simplifying the burdens are in nos 434, 438, 444, 439. On the military intervention see nos 440-441.

⁷³ Although Joseph had believed the rebellion crushed in March, worse outbreaks occurred during July, August and early September. The peasants continued to march o manorial offices and to demonstrate to the *Kreis* officials even though troops were present. They did not intervene. In July the landless peasants of northern Bohemia joined the tenant farmers in demanding enforcement of the 1771 patent which they mistakenly believed had abolished the *Robota*. See: SVOBODA, *Protifeudálni*, passim; O. Janeček, *Povstáni nevolniků* v českých zemich roku 1775 (Prague: Naše Vojsko, 1954), pp. 127-67; VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, p. 76; VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia und Joseph II, II: 71, 18. The revolt is treated in the bi-centennial volume: M. TOEGEL, J. PETRAN and J. OBRSLIK eds, *Prameny k nevolnickému povstání v Čechách i na Moravě v roce 1775*, vydání připravili (Prague: Akademia, 1975). See also Josef PETRAŇ, *Nevolnické povstání 1775*, Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Historica Monographia XLII (Prague: Universita Karlova, 1973).

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patent. This was the only way to restore order. Kressel recommended selective punishment for rebel leaders; he opposed harsh executions. A hurried consultation in the State Council in mid-August resulted in Joseph himself now urging the enunciation of a new *Robota* law in order to restore order. Maria Theresa agreed to the step on 19 August 1775. The law itself was retroactively dated to 13 August. A patent for Moravia, identical with the Bohemian one, was dated 7 September and one for the Austrian duchies, 31 July 1775. The new law was to be made public in every main town and village of Bohemia by General Wallis, the Special Imperial Commissar. The rebellion did end when the new law was published.⁷⁴

Landless Peasants	1773 Tax Category*		Handrobota Maximum			
	Gulden	Kreuzer	••			
Inleute	none	none		13 da	vs per year	
Häusler			26 days per year			
Häusler		57	1 day per week			
Häusler	2	51	$1\frac{1}{2}$ days per week			
Häusler	4	45	2 days per week			
Häusler**	7	71/2	2 days per week			
Peasants Holding Land	1773 Tax Category*		Zugrobota Weekly Maximum		Handrobota (in Season) Weekly Maximur	
	Gulden	Kreuzer	Animals	Days	Number	Days
Up to ¹ / ₄ Tenancy	_		1	3		_
From ¹ / ₄ up to ¹ / ₂ Tenancy	14	15	2	3	1	1
From 1/2 up to 3/4 Tenancy	28	30	3	3	1	2
Over ³ / ₄ Tenancy	42	45	4	2	1	3

Table 2. — 1775 ROBOTA PATENT FOR BOHEMIA.

Source: Sammlung aller k.k. Verordnungen, (1740-1780), VII: 265ff.

* Sums listed are lower limits of tax categories.

** For this group the upper limit is 9 gulden 30 kreuzer.

The 1775 Robota reform limited the type and length of labour service according to the tax category. Since the tax status of 1773 was taken as a norm, the fact that the manorial lords had previously underdeclared their incomes now worked against them. The peasant's status depended on the land tax which he paid himself. It did not include the noble's tax. The law made that clear. It had, after all, been Maria Theresa's policy to prevent lords from shifting the burden of their taxes onto the peasants. The main

⁷⁴ Verordnungen, VIII: 265ff., the patent of 13 August 1775. Also VON HOCK and BIDERMANN, Staatsrath, pp. 75-78; WRIGHT, Serf, pp. 48 ff. For the spring revolt. During the 1775 uprising Joseph also backdated a new Robota patent to 1771. See Josef Koci, "Hnuti Nevolného Lidu na Některých Severočeskýích Panstvích v Léte 1775", Československý Casopis Historický, VIII (1960): 645. For the revolt, ibid.: 636.

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classifications of *Robota* are described in Table 2.⁷⁵ The manual *Robota* were limited in the case of the landless peasantry to not more than two days a week. The tenant farmers paid a much higher tax and also had a heavier burden of ploughing services (up to three days a week), and of manual services. This varied according to the size of the holding.

Zugrobota (ploughing services) were done either with horses or oxen depending on whatever had been agreed on. Substitutions were permitted at the rate of one horse equalling two oxen.⁷⁶

Joseph II himself thought that the 1775 law was badly written, "in an incredibly bungling and nearly unintelligible manner".⁷⁷ Yet it did represent a compromise between the Borié and Blanc factions at court. The classification according to types of landholding proposed by Blanc's party had been combined with the idea of the Borié group to use tax categories for setting the *Robota* maximum. Wherever the new law did not cover the case, the 1738 patent was to remain in effect. The tax categories which were made the basis of the maximums were based on Bohemian registries established in the 1730s. These were on file in the manorial offices.⁷⁸

The new law also increased the authority of the circle officials. They were entrusted with heading off peasant grievances by initiating their own investigations of manorial abuses. The manorial bailiffs were to be closely watched and could be fined if they violated the law. If the landlord himself was implicated, the provincial government was to fine him from 100 to 200 ducats (450 to 850 gulden). Cases of extreme cruelty were to be brought to the attention of the crown. Guilty officials were to be put into irons and punished publically. On the other hand, peasant mutinies fell under the criminal law. This meant that the peasant could incur the death penalty, although the provincial government had the power to modify its application. Peasants were to be allowed to bring suit against their lords if they violated the *Robota* law. At some risk it seems, because if the charges proved to be unfounded, even the peasant's attorney could be arrested.

The new law did not become immediately effective. In many places the lords did not even let their serfs know about the patent. Often it was not enforced.⁷⁹ Maria Theresa had drawn her own conclusions from the 1775 uprising and was firmly convinced that the peasants had been pushed to extremes because of the harsh *Robota* services. She blamed the noble lords for creating a confused situation so that no one could see clearly what to do. In the end the peasants always remained under the same "oppression".⁸⁰ In so far as the rebels of 1775 had any programme at all, it aimed at abolishing all *Robota*. That demand had strongly impressed itself on

- ⁷⁵ Verordnungen, VII: 265ff. for the patent.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid. See also JAKSCH, Gesetzlexikon, V: 246.
- ⁷⁷ ARNETH, Maria Theresia und Joseph II, II: 87.
- ⁷⁸ Verordnungen, VII: 265ff.
- ⁷⁹ Ernst DENIS, La Bohême depuis la Montagne-Blanche, 2 vols (Paris, 1903), II:

561.

⁸⁰ Alfred Ritter von ARNETH, ed., Briefe der Kaiserin Maria Theresia an Ihre Kinder und Freunde, 4 vols (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1881) II: 66-67.

the Empress as well as on her radical advisers. Among them, Franz von Raab had experimented with complete abolition of *Robota* on two crown manors in Bohemia. Their profits had been increased. He had been promoted to the *Hofkanzlei* and now advised her to lease all crown domain land to the peasants and abolish all services.⁸¹ Blanc too described the existing system as a "despised bond of humanity".⁸² Further, after the annexation of Galicia in 1771 and a survey of the new territories, Count Pergen, the Galician governor-general, had also suggested the abolition of serfdom.⁸³ Eighty-four percent of the Galician peasants were in servile bondage as cottagers. They did at least six-days-a-week service. Added to this was a tax burden of a half-gulden per family member and per servant. Although Joseph introduced the *Kreis* officials to Galicia and gave them strong powers of law enforcement modelled on those exercised by their counterparts in Bohemia, he also reduced taxes. Yet the three-day weekly maximum for the *Robota* was not instituted in Galicia until 1784.⁸⁴

Although it had been discussed on and off for several years, by 1776 Maria Theresa was ready to enact total abolition of *Robota* as the only solution for persistent peasant unrest. Enforcement of the 1775 law had already broken down, so that the Empress was eager to seek out Kaunitz' advice on what further steps to take. His reply of 17 November 1776 was cautious. He had had no information about the local situation since 1775. What disturbed him most was the way in which the army had been used to enforce the patent. The military ought not to be used as an arbiter in disputes between lord and peasant.⁸⁵ By December, Blanc too joined in the new attack on serfdom. In a strongly worded memo to the Empress he was particularly severe in his attack on *Robota* abuses. This so outraged the far more conservative Count Hatzfeld, member of the State Council, that he demanded that Blanc be excluded from all further policy-making in the agrarian question.⁸⁶

Maria Theresa decided to support the Blanc party. On 6 January 1777, she informed Hatzfeld that she wanted the *Robota* strictly limited. All complaints from the peasants were to be investigated and cleared up.⁸⁷ Ten days later Joseph reported the Empress' reinvigorated reform zeal to Leopold. He described her mood as highly agitated and was afraid that she wanted a "bouleversement général". In fact he had never seen his mother in such a state. She not only wanted to change the 1775 law, but

- ⁸¹ WRIGHT, Serf, p. 54; FEJTÖ, Un Habsbourg révolutionnaire, p. 138.
- 82 GRÜNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, II: 294.
- ⁸³ VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, X: 79.

⁸⁴ GLASSL, Einrichtungswerk, pp. 165-78, 31. Labour services were not clearly regulated in Galicia. Maria Theresa had asked the lords not to increase them in 1775. Joseph II abolished Leibeigenschaft there in 1782. See Edicta et mandata universalia Regnis Galiciae et Lodomeriae (Leopoli, 1772-92); Freidrich KRATTER, Briefe über den jetzigen Zustand von Galizien, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1786); Jan WYDRO, "Kataster gruntowy austriacki i jego znaczenie dla Galicji", Studia historyczne, 10 (1967): 145-57.

⁸⁵ HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vorträge 121, Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, 17 November 1776. See also SZABO, "Kaunitz", p. 312.

⁸⁶ VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, IX: 598; GRUNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, II: 294-97.

87 Ibid.: 296-97.

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intended to abolish the traditional Zins (tenant's rent), which had been paid for centuries. It horrified him to think that this would change the entire system of ownership, an idea not foreign to the modern mind, but for Joseph it meant dissolving the ownership relations of the aristocracy (who still owed their ownership prerogatives to their social status and their state of vassalage to the crown).⁸⁸ Joseph calculated that the lords would lose at least one-half of their incomes. Land prices would fall and many estates would go bankrupt. The opposition to the new proposals had been immediate and bitter. The Empress complained that her allies had deserted her and accused Joseph, too, of betraying her.⁸⁹

Maria Theresa, not her son or her advisers, had moved towards social revolution. The new reform programme of 1777 involved complete peasant emancipation, and no longer just the restriction of the *Robota*. Certainly the social impact of such a reform would have been more profound than Joseph II's unsuccessful land tax projects of the 1780s. Both Joseph II and Prince Kaunitz quickly combined to block the Theresian radical group by taking a strong gradualist position against the reform. Joseph was convinced, as he wrote to his mother on 18 January 1777, that still further changes in the *Robota* regulation would only undermine the crown's credibility. Instead he favoured a stronger enforcement of the 1775 law. This could be done by drawing up a new decree which would be more effective. The harsher aspects of serfdom, which Blanc had so vehemently attacked at the end of December 1776, could be dealt with only after the government's commands were obeyed. The reform of 1775 first had to take root.⁹⁰

Kaunitz supported Joseph's position completely. In a series of reports addressed to both Joseph II and Maria Theresa, dated between 31 January and 6 February 1777, Kaunitz based the respect for authority which the crown expected on the crown's willingness to respect private property laws. He again suggested the *Robota* could be commuted to cash payments, but on the basis of voluntary agreements only. It would be a mistake to force the lords to do so. Persuasion by demonstration of how profitable this would be, ought to be the preferred way of dealing with this question. Like Joseph, Kaunitz favoured enforcing the 1775 law by new decrees of implementation. Above all, he thought it necessary to restore peace to rural areas without using military force. Joseph did not like the implementation decree which Kaunitz had drafted because it blamed the peasant uprisings and the hostility of the nobles on their ignorance of what

⁹⁰ HHStA, Familienarchiv, Sammelbände 5/A, nos 349-50, Joseph II to Maria Theresa, 18 January 1777.

⁸⁸ Attempts were made to create better property relations for the peasants even before Maria Theresa's reign. See Erna PATZELT, *Entstehung und Charakter der Weistümer in Österreich*, (Budapest, 1924; reprint ed., Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1979). The intricate and still legal fiction of *Lehenswesen* (fiefdom) viewed the noble landlord as the ultimate owner of property and the commoner peasants as only tenants. See Jos. P. VON HEINKE, *Handbuch des Nieder-österreichischen Lehenrechtes*, 2 vols (Vienna: B. Ph. Bauer, 1811-12).

⁸⁹ HHStA, Familienarchiv, Sammelbände 7/7, nos 277-78, Joseph II to Leopold 16 January 1777. See FEJTÖ, Un Habsbourg révolutionnaire, pp. 139-40.

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the crown planned to do. Instead he modified it to emphasize the need to respect private property. Both he and Kaunitz agreed on a statement encouraging voluntary *Robota* commutation agreements. Lords and peasants were admonished to obey the *Robota* law of 1775.⁹¹

Despite Blanc's attempts to prevent it, Joseph succeeded in winning Kaunitz' support for his gradualist views. This influenced Maria Theresa who agreed, somewhat reluctantly, to Joseph's proposals by the end of February 1777. She herself resented the intrigues of her ministers and noble lords for they had destroyed her reforms almost overnight. Even Blanc had now become impossible at court and had to be sent back to his old job in the Breisgau administration. She did not think that the existing legislation could really keep the peace. People without hope had nothing to lose, so they resorted to violence. Nonetheless, despite all her reservations, she gave royal assent to the enforcement decree for Bohemia on 28 February and made it public on 1 March 1777.⁹²

Maria Theresa's attempt to introduce an abolition of *Robota* in 1777 had meanwhile roused the Styrian nobility to angry protests. Its spokesman, Count Sauer, supported Joseph's gradualist position and insisted that only voluntary agreements between lord and peasant could succeed. The Styrian provincial governments sided with the Empress and argued that the welfare of the state demanded that it protect its main taxpayers, the peasants. The crown had the right to lighten the burden of the peasantry, all noble prerogatives notwithstanding. Voluntary agreements just would not work. But in Vienna the *Hofkanzlei* allied with the nobility and supported Count Sauer's arguments. In spite of the efforts of the Styrian nobility to block it, Maria Theresa signed a new *Robota* decree for Styria on 5 December 1778. Like the Bohemian one it set a maximum of three days a week on the labour services, with the annual total not to exceed 165 days. The whole of this patent, which was applicable also in Carinthia, closely paralleled the Bohemian law of 1775.⁹³

Despite the failure of the Blanc abolition movement, Maria Theresa encouraged supporters like Raab to experiment with the negotiation of abolition on her Bohemian crown lands. Leopold of Tuscany, who was not to succeed Joseph until 1790, when he continued the same policies, as did his son Francis II after 1792, strongly supported his mother. In a letter to

⁹¹ HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vorträge 122/A, nos 266-345, Correspondence betwee Joseph, Kaunitz, and Maria Theresa dated 31 January and 1, 4, 5, 6 February 1777.

⁹² VON ARNETH, Briefe Kinder, II: 69. See also WALTER, ed., Maria Theresia Briefe, pp. 401-2. GRÜNBERG, Bauernbefreiung, II: 79; VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia, IX, 380-81. HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vorträge 122/A, nos 406-9, Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, 28 February 1777. The Empress was glad that the crisis had ended and thanked Kaunitz for his help. HHStA, Familienarchiv, Sammelbände 70/A/13, Maria Theresa to Kaunitz, 28 February 1777.

⁹³ MELL, Anfänge, pp. 94-102; 105-7; Georg GRÜLL, Die Robot in Oberösterreich (Linz: Landesverlag Ried, 1952), pp. 242, 250-51. See also Ferdinand Edlen VON HAUER, Praktische Darstellung der in Österreich unter der Ens für das Unterthansfache bestehende Gesetze, 3 vols (Vienna, 1808-9), I: 61-108, which explains the Robota regulations of 1772-73. See also Erna PATZELT, "Bauernschutz in Österreich vor 1848", Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 58 (1950): 650ff. See also MELL, Anfänge, pp. 109, n. 138, and 138-50; MURR LINK, Emancipation, pp. 6, 60; MACCARTNEY, Habsburg Empire, p. 65.

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Maria Theresa dated 28 June 1778, he praised Raab's projects and the ambition to turn "badly treated slaves" into free people who could acquire property. The peasants were just as much subjects of the monarchy as were the lords. The "oppression" of the peasants by the lords was, Leopold thought, the sort of tyranny which made the aristocracy a dangerous "state within the state". The rich lords oppressed the poor and were only useless drones while the peasants made up the most useful class in the kingdom.⁹⁴

Joseph II himself searched for better solutions. He had visited France during the spring of 1777, ostensibly to study new economic doctrines and French economic institutions, although while in Paris he only had one long conversation with the deposed finance minister Turgot. Turgot had tried in vain to abolish the French *corvées* in 1776. Joseph's state papers for that journey include a copy of the Turgot edicts on the abolition of the *corvées*. Probably Turgot himself gave him the texts for his general information. In spite of his encounter with Turgot, it is clear that the Emperor spent far more time in conference with Necker. It was also remarked that he showed a greater interest in immediate fiscal remedies than in economic theories.⁹⁵

By the time Joseph succeeded Maria Theresa in 1780, new rebellions had broken out in Bohemia. A full-scale uprising at Litomysil resulted in military intervention in 1780-81.⁹⁶ By 1783 Joseph had decided that a commission should supervise the gradual abolition of the *Robota*. Since he believed, however, that his was a state of laws and that the laws protected the freedoms of the peasants far better than the American plantation system, his first line of attack was the institution of *Leibeigenschaft*. Certainly he had been shocked at the misery of the Galician peasantry in 1773 and realized that such subjects owned little more than life and body. *Leibeigenschaft* was first abolished in the Austrian duchies during 1781-87,⁹⁷ but the slow efforts to abolish the *Robota* system combined with his

⁹⁴ Leopold's letter cited in SCHULZE, Bäuerlicher Widerstand, pp. 298-99.

⁹⁵ Helen LIEBEL, "Count Karl von Zinzendorf and the Liberal Revolt against Joseph II's Economic Reforms, 1783-1790", in Sozialgeschichte Heute. Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag, ed.: Hans-Ulrich WEHLER (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), pp. 89ff. See also Hans WAGNER, "Die Reise Joseph II nach Frankreich 1777 und die Reformen in Österreich", in Österreich und Europa. Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag, eds: H. PEICHL and H. FICHTENAU (Vienna: Verlag Styria, 1965), pp. 221-46. Also Hans WAGNER, "Die Reise Joseph II nach Frankreich 1777", in Österreich zur Zeit Kaiser Josephs II, Catalogue, ed.: Carl GUTKAS (Vienna: F. Berger, 1980), pp 100-2.

96 SVOBODA, Protifeudálni, pp. 34, 31.

⁹⁷ VON ARNETH, Maria Theresia und Joseph II, II: 14. MITROFANOV, Joseph II, II: 605-8; Helen LIEBEL, "Der aufgeklärte Absolutismus und die Gesellschaftskrise in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert", in Absolutismus, ed.: Walter HUBATSCH (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973), pp. 45-46. The patent for Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia was dated 1 November 1781 and abolished the serfdom in Bohemia in order to introduce a more moderate system such as the one existing in the Austrian provinces. For the peasant it meant freedom of movement, freedom to marry without the lord's permission, and abolito of the compulsory household service owed the lord. The lord's power to punish his serfs for misdemeanours had already been modified in a patent of 1 September 1781. See Werner OGRIS, "Joseph II.: Staats- und Rechtsreformen", in Im Zeichen der Toleranz, ed.: Peter F. BARTON (Vienna: Institut für protestantische Kirchengeschichte, 1981), pp. 134-35. The

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rush to impose a heavy single tax on all agricultural yields produced still more unrest. Most of Joseph's provinces stood on the brink of general revolt when he died in 1790. The inflation of the 1780s had eroded the standard of living. Joseph had not carried through Maria Theresa's peasant policies. Where she had favoured free trade, he reverted to protectionism. Where she aimed at turning the tenant farmers into property owners, he tried to subject both lord and peasant to a uniform tax which neither could afford to pay. Revolution was averted because his successor, Leopold II (1790-92), rescinded most of the tax laws of the 1780s. On the other side he also followed Joseph's earlier policy of encouraging commutation of the Robota by voluntary agreements. The achievements of the Theresian era in beginning the modernization of the agrarian system were not to be completed until well into the nineteenth century. Full-scale peasant emancipation with the end of the Robota and full ownership rights, which Maria Theresa had envisioned in 1777, was achieved only after the 1848 revolution. 98

effect of the emancipation of the Bohemian serfs was to free mainly the *Kleinhäusler* (petty cottagers), to whom Raab had already given tenancies, but who after 1781 streamed into Vienna in search of work. Ultimately they were absorbed by urban manufactories. See Karl GUTKAS, "Die Böhmischen Länder zur Zeit Kaiser Josephs II", in Österreich, ed.: GUTKAS, pp. 113-16.

⁹⁸ Cf. Willy LORENZ, AEIOU. Allen Ernstes ist Österreich unersetzlich (Vienna, Munich: Verlag Herold, 1961), and the comments on his interpretation in MAGENSCHAB, Josef II, Revolutionär, p. 287. Both agree that Maria Theresa's reign represented a conservative tendency, contrasting with Joseph's progressive one. However the arguments above seem to refute this. See also LIEBEL-WECKOWICZ, "Modernisierungsmotive", pp. 153-58, who applies a similar argument to trade policy, where Maria Theresa was also more progressive.

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Appendix. — ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION OF DOMINIKAL AND RUSTIKAL TAXES, 1769-1770 (IN GULDEN).

Type of Contribution	Lower Austria	Bohemia	Moravia
Extraordinarium (Dominikal)	347,572	1,811,651	480,968
Gewerbesteuern (Excises)	11,961	46,860	127,301
Towns and Markets ¹	142,780		
Ordinario (Rustikale)	1,552,240	3,482,732	1,101,365
Payment Ratio (%) Lords: Peasants ²	18:82	34:66	30:70

A) LOWER AUSTRIA (1769), BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA (1770)

B) SILESIA, UPPER AUSTRIA, STYRIA AND CARINTHIA (1770)

Type of Contribution	Silesia	Upper Austria	Styria	Carinthia
Ordinario auf die Obrigkeit ³	81,837	155,131	228,912	98,514
Gewerbesteuern (Excises)	12,068			
Towns and Markets	47,915	42,750		18,425
Contribution auf die Unterthanen ⁴	96,839	846,047	874,167	355,480
Payment Ratio (%) Lords: Peasants ⁵	46:54	15:85	21:79	22:78

C) CARNIOLA (1770), GORIZIA AND GRADISCA (1769)

Type of Contribution	Carniola	Gorizia and Gradisca		
Ordinari Contribution ⁶				
Nobles and Clergy	219,048	35,314	24,648	
Freemen	4,464	10		
Towns				
Freeholders' Land Tax	3,247			
Wine excise	28,556			
Rustical Contribution	241,424			

Source: Hofkammerarchiv, Wien, Handschrift 299. Karl von Zinzendorf's estimates of the *Contribution* derives from all classes of tax.

¹ These taxes paid by towns (including Trieste and Fiume) arose from diverse sources. The City of Vienna paid a 200,896 gulden *Contribution*, of which 200,000 were deducted from the budget and assigned to military purposes.

² As percentage of total land tax, Extraordinarium plus Ordinario only.

³ Payable by the lords and comparable to the Bohemian Extraordinarium.

⁴ Payable by peasant tenants.

⁵ As percentage of total tax on lords' and peasants' land only.

⁶ Payable by the lords and comparable to the Bohemian *Extraordinarium* and the Silesian *Ordinario*; it was, however, subtitled *Extraordinarium* to preserve its old status.

⁷ Held to be uncollectable, according to Zinzendorf's statement in his Note on Carniola: "In this province the *dominikal* seems to be much greater than the *rustikal* tax, which would seem to be improbable, and all the more so because the Carniolian estates reported to the Treasury that the sum of the *rustikal* tax given at 241,424 gulden 51³/₄ kreuzer could not at all be collected there".