Étude critique — Review Essay

Considering government and business in the Canadian political economy

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Review of:

Paul Axelrod, Scholars and Dollars: Politics, Economics and the Universities in Ontario, 1945-1980. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982), pp. 270.

Paul Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire', Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1980). pp. x, 386.

Laurel Sefton MacDowell, '*Remember Kirkland Lake*'. The Gold Miners' Strike of 1941-42. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1983). pp. xvi, 292.

John McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic Development in Quebec and Ontario until 1870. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1983), pp. ix, 148.

James Struthers, 'No Fault of Their Own'. Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State 1914-1940. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1983). pp. xl, 258.

Tom Traves, The State and Enterprise, Canadian Manufacturers and the Federal Government, 1917-1931. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979). pp. viii, 175.

All from "The State and Economic Life Series", Mel Watkins, Leo Panitch, editors.

The State and Economic Life Series is an ambitious enterprise undertaken by the University of Toronto Press. To date the series shows the earmarks of the interests of the well-known co-editors, economist Mel Watkins of the University of Toronto and political scientist Leo Panitch of York University. The range of subjects includes a comparison of agricultural and economic growth in Quebec and Ontario in the nineteenth century; the Ontario government's involvement in university education; relations between business and government when formal government interventionism accelerated after World War I; the

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federal government's response to working-class problems: unionization, industrial relations, strikes, collective bargaining, and unemployment. These subjects are dealt within the capitalist paradigm.

The scope of the collection is impressive. Nonetheless, like most such series this is an uneven mix. The studies are generally informative, but some, despite their considerable potential, are less stimulating than others. Except for the McCallum and Axelrod books, these works concentrate on the attempts of the federal state's apparatus to deal with different problems; the provincial governments may be implicated, but only slightly. The studies concentrating on the federal government are consistently critical of the state, the business community and some politicians.

The volumes by McCallum and Axelrod stand somewhat apart from the series' general perspective. There has long been a need for an objective, analytical comparison of the agricultural (and in general, economic) development of Ontario and Quebec and McCallum's study provides it. The author uses a modified staple approach to compare the two provinces but other factors are included. It is clear that the traditional explanation of Quebec's 'lag' requires a re-interpretation. That province's situation compared favourably with the plight of New England's agriculture and McCallum shows that Ontario too was unable to compete with the central and mid-western U.S. states. While wheat was the motor force for Ontario, it was not the case for Quebec and the author questions the Creighton-Ouellet school that criticizes Quebec's inability to cope. All in all, the work is an interesting exercise in revisionism.

Various conditions influenced Ontario's growth, conditions not present in Quebec. The latter's inability to match Ontario was not due to the 'backward culture' of French Canada, the failure to adopt more scientific agricultural methods or to shifts in seigneurial practices. Indeed, even in the best of times Quebec's wheat lands were less productive than Ontario's. And the same type of situation existed in the urban, commercial, and industrial development of the two provinces. Quebec had two major centres, Montreal and Quebec. In Ontario a number of towns, cities and regions contested for hegemony and only by the 1880s did Toronto's hinterland establish its central focus. The wheat staple and the economic infrastructure it created ensured this development. Fed by the dominant staple, a dynamic new type of industrial growth occurred in Ontario, growth characterized by small scale enterprises which attracted investment. Quebec's timber trade, however, did not produce the same type of urban industrial development.

Nonetheless, McCallum's compelling study does not present an entirely complete picture. While the docile and cheap French Canadian labour pool is mentioned frequently, little is made of the Irish, demographically or as a cheap source of labour. The Irish had a significant impact on the development of the two provinces, and their omission is an unfortunate oversight.

Axelrod's study considers the interaction of the Ontario government and the universities. The government's role is central to the author's investigation of how and why universities functioned in the changing economic circumstances following World War II, but the business communities' involvement in developing the university educational system in a capitalist society is also examined. So are the difficulties attendant upon bureaucratizing the administration of higher learning and the reactions to this phenomenon by the institutions and their teaching staffs — the latter of which organized and unionized. For Axelrod, universities became 'mammoth corporate entities in a recessionary state' (p. 213) that

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continued to perpetuate an élitist, capitalist, society. This view coincides with part of the Marxist interpretations of universities, but it also suggests that they were ill-equipped to carry out the functions expected of them and were frequently concerned with mere survival.

It is clear, of course, that they have survived, somewhat battered, almost in spite of the governments' *ad hoc* approach to them. One of Axelrod's strengths is that he provides a clear exposition of the chronology of that survival. As he sees it, in the 1950s and 1960s the universities became a growth industry. Emphasis was placed on utilitarianism and rugged individualism. As university expansion required additional funds, institutions turned to the private sector. Business, however, preferred the government to pay for universities and research — but it wanted unlimited access to the universities' products. Large companies and American branch plants contributed little; it was the smaller firms which were the largest donors, but this source of funding proved inadequate.

Axelrod uses York University as a case study to illustrate the problems of a new institution of higher learning. Business was involved in the creation of the university through a series of time-honed devices: employment of fund raising specialists; inclusion of high profile businessmen in the enterprise; creation of founders' organizations; and the formation of committees to deal with planning and enrolment. The eventual net result was the decline of corporate contributions and the insufficient increase of government money.

With the severe economic problems of the 1970s the bogey of inflation was paraded as an excuse for cutting government grants and this became an integral part of the government's restraint programme. The universities' availability to students declined. The earlier élitism, regardless of the rhetoric of easier access to universities, was reinforced. Funding formulas did not resolve the problem. The financial stability of the institutions became uncertain.

The problem of funding and rapid expansion prompted the government to establish greater control over the institutions through increased to bureaucratization. A separate Department of University Affairs was created which was merged later with the Department of Education. Various reports and commissions investigated the situation and universities formed their provincial associations to little avail. Autonomy, like the proclamation of universal accessibility, was a myth, as governmental agencies were established to assist the universities. The government was not prepared to jettison the system nor were they prepared to give it blanket endorsement and autonomy.

Axelrod shows that the government attended to the curriculum and students in the context of the economy. Some businessmen believed that the humanities were as important as the specialized programmes, for business could "train an educated man, but it cannot necessarily educate a trained man" (p. 107). The most significant goal it appears, was to propagate the values of the free enterprise system and to propagandize as to its superiority. Students' militancy turned to skepticism, cynicism, opposition to business, and apathy. Their organizations were legitimized and institutionalized, even as they lost genuine vigour. Universities for students became quiet grounds; they were ciphers for the market economy.

University employees responded to the uncertain economic situation that was exaggerated by the threatening government and administration. Faculty associations expanded into provincial organizations, unionized and bargained collectively for protection; so too did librarians and staff. By 1980 fifty percent of faculty and professional librarians were part of "business" unionism. The so-called university collegiality, if it ever existed, was seriously undermined. Tied to the faculty issue was the economic and cultural struggle

to decrease the large number of foreign academics teaching in Canada. The question had been seriously raised in the late 1960s. Jobs for Canadian graduates were obviously circumscribed and Canadian content in courses was jeopardized. This was not resolved satisfactorily.

For Axelrod the institutions remained in a state of limbo. They were unable to fulfil the erratic demands of free enterprise. Nonetheless, they remained bastions of capitalist ideology and carriers of its mythology.

Overall, this is a useful work outlining the university's weak position in society. Yet there are some differences between the stated objectives of the book and the results. The author aspires to examine "the internal dynamics of university life", but that is not done. Similarly he purports to consider how the public perceives universities. The public discussed, however, is not the general public; working-class Ontarians — the majority of whom, by the author's own admission, do not attend university. Nor is it the collegial academic community. It might have been interesting, for example, to look at the reaction of university Senates to course proposals or programmes that question the prevailing capitalist propaganda.

The other works in the series keep much more closely to the general editorial focus in that they concentrate on the activities of the federal state's apparatus. Thus, Traves considers the interplay of selected manufacturers and the federal government as they tried to respond to economic changes and uncertainty confronting industrial capitalism from near the end of World War I to the early years of the Great Depression. Business followed a number of approaches to deal with economic conditions. The moves, however, were conditioned by the profit motive and were reflective of the state of the economy. When the economy was buoyant controls were unwanted; as the situation worsened business appealed for state aid. Businessmen established pressure group organizations and the state responded by creating regulatory agencies and other social and economic institutional controls which benefited the manufacturers and maintained their dominance in capitalistic Canadian society.

A number of economic changes occurred in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Business keyed on efficiency, rationalization, scientific research and management, security and controls. Competition and individualism were downplayed, Traves tells us, as mergers and control of the labour market became prime methods for used to maximize profits. Price fixing, tariffs, company unions and factory welfare schemes were utilized, and anti-combines legislation was ignored.

Among other virtues, this work provides useful information on the Canadian Reconstruction Association, a lobbyist organization that has long needed investigation. It represented small business but existed only briefly due to the division it created in the business community. The CRA became a competitor for funds with the CMA, the voice of big business, and the two had different aims and objectives. This weakened the potential for a united business front. Nonetheless the CRA was a significant propaganda force countering the mounting criticism of business between the end of the war and election of 1921, after which the organization died.

As Traves demonstrates, Government agencies were formed at the urging of manufacturers. The Board of Commerce appears to have been the most noteworthy but it too died quickly as did others such as the Canadian Trade Mission. The only lasting body was the research component of the Board, out of which grew the NRC. There was a major

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division in business ranks over the merits of regulation and the state's *ad hoc* approach. The newsprint, steel and automobile, and sugar-manufacturing industries all differed concerning this issue. Some industries simply ignored the regulatory agencies, and, until the time of the Great Depression, businesses grew more reluctant to seek state aid, only to seek it again as the economic situation worsened. In addition to requesting the assistance of government agencies, businesses worked with the government to control the work force in order to increase productivity.

This is a solid study, but it is not entirely satisfactory in its handling of certain important questions. Did Canadian firms avoid investing in research because of inadequate funds or did they do so to preserve high profits? Is it important that George Mead was an American whose primary interests were his American plants? To what extent can he be considered as a valid representative of Canadian pulp and paper manufacturers? In the United States in the 1920s there was a blatant open shop drive and it would be useful to discuss the importance of the similar movement that took place in Canada at the same time.

While business and the state were trying to work out their relationship of mutual aid, they had to deal with a period of intense labour-management confrontation from 1900 to 1911. As Craven's title indicates, he considers the state's role as an umpire, a neutral judge in a pluralist society. However, neither the federal government, nor Mackenzie King as federal employee or Minister of Labour, demonstrated any real capacity for remaining neutral in the role of arbitrator between management and labour. Even so, King was the central character, indeed, perhaps the hero, in the drama of conflict resolution during this period.

Craven clears up some of the mysteries surrounding King's career and his character; many of his warts remain untouched. A knowledge of his behaviour and his ideology are essential to understanding the methods of interference he employed within the institutional structure, methods that became a sporadic "system" based on the inconsistency of the government's response. This was characterized in King and his legacy, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1907 which formed the basis of legalized state intervention in labour disputes.

Craven believes that it is essential to understand King to understand the evolution of the government's system of labour management, and so considers him carefully. He thoroughly reviews the formation of King's ideology. It was rooted in liberal capitalist society and devoted to sustaining that society at all costs. He rejected the idea that classes must necessarily be antagonistic to each other; he wished to preserve social harmony even if this required the rule of a capitalist élite. A modified laissez faire system, or the liberal state, would maintain such a society. State mechanisms would balance confrontation between labour and management and neutralize the areas where class conflict might occur. Legislation and force were to be the tools used to maintain this system. Nor was King above intervening personally in particular disagreements when it suited his purpose, always on the side of capital, as he did in the disputes in the coal fields of British Columbia and Alberta, and in the Grand Trunk railway strike. King was unsympathetic to strikes, socialists, radicals and to certain unions. He wished to eliminate or minimize their development and influence. This was evident in the IDIA with its special tripartite boards that mediated rather than conciliated, imposed compulsory investigation, mediation, and a "cooling-off" period, and unenforceable awards. It was used particularly in disputes involving public utilities employing "essential" workers. Whatever King may have intended, the workers' freedom was effectively circumscribed by this legislation.

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Craven ably outlines the unequal position of management and organized labour. The two major organizations, the CMA and the TLC, accused each other of favouritism and of seeking class legislation. Business spread a good deal of propaganda about the workeremployer community of interests to counter the increasing radicalism of the workers. They paid lip-service to non-intervention by the state but used state mechanisms to control labour. They feared "trade unionism and socialism" (p. 101) and did everything possible to combat these forces. Structural changes in industrial organization, such as company mergers, branch plantism, bureaucratization, scientific management, and the immigration of large numbers of workers were protested by labour, but to little effect. Legislative recognition did little to improve their situation, which deteriorated during this period, as Craven shows. Injunctions and unfavourable judicial decisions underscored the alignment of courts and government with employers against workers.

The attitudes of business and labour fluctuated. The feelings of both towards King and the IDIA changed. Initially management was suspicious of King and the Act but then accepted both when they posed no threat. On the other hand, by 1911 King lost the support of organized labour due to his mishandling of the 1910 Grand Trunk strike; this was followed by his electoral defeat in 1911.

Craven suggests that the legislation was effective since there were requests from labour to establish boards. Thus, he argues, the act must have been satisfactory. Perhaps another possibility is that labour had no other legal recourse and used the only legal means at their disposal. In fact, unionists were divided over the best means of working with the Act and were therefore unable to lobby successfully to amend it.

The least satisfactory aspect of Craven's work is his portrayal of his chief protagonist. While events are considered even-handedly, the same cannot be said of King. Rarely is he taken to task for his actions and too frequently is he defended. Craven wants to accept King at his word. Yet he was a leading practitioner of deceit. The distortions and falsehoods are difficult to defend or excuse. If he was deceitful to others, did he deceive himself, despite all his moral platitudes? If so should a historian not recognize such a situation. In any event, to break personal promises to further one's ends, as was done with John Mitchell or Augustus Nanton, should be noted loudly and clearly.

There are other problems as well. King, Craven contends, made sense of society and society accepted the sense he made of it. Unfortunately, this is not proven. It is claimed that King was sympathetic to organized labour; if so, why were his actions constantly destructive of it? The historical record suggests that King was biased against the working class, no matter what he said. Was he moved by a sense of moral guilt over the Grand Trunk strike and his disastrous interference? In 1910 he sold out the workers, including Jimmy Murdock who later became King's Minister of Labour. Such an appointment, one presumes would have salved his conscience for the injustice done earlier. Craven justly condemns *Industry and Humanity* for its confused definition of community; conversely no mention is made of King's magnificent charts. What do they tell about King?

Lastly a disturbing quasi-providential element is included in this otherwise careful piece of investigation. Craven lends significance to "a host of other historical accidents" (p. 363) that contributed to the development of Canadian industrial relations. Are court decisions "accidents"? Is the choice of a location for a labour convention an "accidents" or a weighed decision? Is the governing party's desire to retain power distributing patronage accidental or part of their purposeful objectives? Was it an "accidents" that King entered

the more lucrative civil service rather than going to Harvard? These are scarcely credible as "historical accidents".

Craven, and other defenders of King, might contend that King established a system that improved conditions for workers; that there was progress. Yet to gloss over how this occurred ignores the reality of Canadian labour history and the relations between workers, unions, management and governments. This was shown starkly in B.C. from 1912-14, in 1919, in Cape Breton in the 1920s, in Quebec during the Great Depression, and during World War II — particularly in 1943 and afterwards. Some may feel the need to contribute to the apologia for King's and the government's treatment of the working class, but such a position does a disservice to the evolution of Canadian labour history.

King's influence is also noted in MacDowell's lengthy monograph on the bitter three month long strike at Kirkland Lake during World War II, when labour unrest repeatedly exploded and workers increasingly unionized. The author contends that the conflict warrants the intensive study because of the issues, the participants, and their impact on subsequent labour-management relations. At issue were basic labour complaints. These included no union recognition, no right of collective bargaining, long hours of work, poor working conditions, and inadequate wages. Management complained vigorously that labour's viewpoint was invalid. They opposed unionization and all it implied and were primarily concerned with maximizing profits. All levels of government were involved. The federal and provincial governments sided with management; the former through the selective enforcement of certain aspects of its laws; the latter by sending in the provincial police. Significantly, the two levels of local government divided on this contentious provincial gesture. The strike, of course, was lost but from its ashes, phoenix-like, came order-incouncil PC 1003 in 1944 and an amended Industrial Disputes Investigation Act four years later, which granted union recognition and the right to collective bargaining albeit with some restrictions.

This work has much to recommend it. Gold mining's rise and decline in importance to the wartime economy, the attempt to unionize, the blanket opposition from management, the active support that the latter received from the federal and provincial governments and the dilemma of local authorities and the inhabitants are well documented. The industry's change in status in 1942 from an essential to a non-essential war industry affected the outcome of the strike and those touched by it. Successful organizing by Mine, Mill, an affiliate of the Canadian Congress of Labour appeared to strengthen the miner's case, yet they remained vulnerable to the vagaries of government and management policies. Workers sought a master contract for workforce cohesiveness and to ensure financial security. The CCL assisted with funds and even their rivals, the TLC, provided money; the United Church was openly sympathetic, while other religious bodies were divided, as was the community.

With the war, King's administration introduced numerous regulatory orders to ensure a high level of productivity and to give qualified recognition to unions. Yet, the government equivocated. Neither King nor his Ministers of Labour were sympathetic to the miners' union and refused to enforce the collective bargaining principles contained in their Orders. Union recognition was refused, even though the miners twice endorsed the union by a democratic vote. The provincial government and the media, for their part, openly sided with management. Traditional epithets and accusations of communist domination, foreign leadership, and socialization of the mines were trotted out to undermine the union. No attempt, except by the unions, were made to correct these falsehoods. Power, paranoia and ideology combined to defeat the strike. Unionization, however, did not die. Many of the scabs later joined the reborn union and workers rightly became more skeptical and critical of politicians.

On balance, MacDowell demonstrates that the strike was devastating for the workers, the union and the community. It took years for them to recover, and all this suffering was due to a strike that need not have happened had the federal government honestly implemented its own laws. This is a well researched, pro-labour study which contains a wealth of information. The author, however, does not do justice to communist or pro-communist labour leaders. They are dismissed in a few lines. Undoubtedly they had flaws, but was their domination by others so evident as to make them superfluous? Or was their role important? The author could have used more insight and understanding of the role of procommunist organizers. Equally important is the government's shift in attitude towards collective bargaining. MacDowell suggests this happened with PC 1003 and legislation of 1948, yet in the first chapter she notes that it was only in the 1970s that the Ontario and federal governments made positive moves in support of collective bargaining. Did it take 30 years for the Kirkland Lake imbroglio to have a positive impact on the government's will to act? It needs to be made clear that organized labour was concerned over the eventual fate of PC 1003 in 1944-45, as there was no guarantee that it would continue in force at the end of the war. The battle for collective bargaining was far from over with this Order in Council.

The final book, *No Fault of Their Own* ... deals with the real underside of capitalist industrialism — unemployment. It is a compelling, revisionist interpretation of how unemployment insurance was reluctantly implemented in 1940. Struthers solidly explores the federal government's dismal record in dealing with the unemployed during the depressions of 1913-15, 1920-25 and 1929-40. He places emphasis on the latter period, when unemployment was chronically severe and public policy-making was plagued by fruitless intergovernmental disputes over responsibility for the jobless. The ultimate result was that although unemployment legislation was adopted, it did not reflect any philosophic change towards the jobless or responsibility for them. Thus, Canada backed into the twentieth century, into the welfare state.

Despite having experienced serious unemployment problems prior to 1929, the federal government remained ill-equipped to cope with it. The Great Depression did not produce a significant change in attitudes. Liberal and Conservative administrations clung tenaciously to concepts derived from the British Poor Law of an earlier century and obdurately refused to accept responsibility for the unemployed as was demanded by provincial and municipal governments. The resultant squabbles between these bodies neither helped the jobless nor speeded up the introduction of unemployment insurance. Indeed, Struthers shows that the motivation, intent and position of the federal government was obstructive rather than constructive.

Refusal to act was based on three main tenets that became their stock refrain for two decades. Responsibility for the jobless rested with the individual or municipal authorities or provincial governments; it was too costly to assist these individuals, and constitutionally the federal government did not have the power to help them. Federal Conservatives and Liberals, businessmen and agrarian interests, Struthers contends, preferred the cheap labour pool of the unemployed. In the 1920s they favoured immigration to augment the pool's size. A decade later unemployment increase inexorably aggravating the economic malaise and worsening relations between various levels of government. Relations were bad between Bennett and the provinces and worse in the era of "King or chaos" as intergovernmental disputes became a depression tradition.

Bennett and King refused to recognize the extent and depth of the unemployment situation. Neither did they believe in unemployment insurance to combat it, nor did they accept the Keynesian belief in pump-priming to correct it. Some steps were taken, as indicated by Bennett's allocation of monies, the creation of the quasi-military work relief camps, or placing the unemployed on farms or in lumber camps; the steps to deal with unemployment were almost invariably a result of a paranoic fear of the unemployed. When they responded to a worsening situation by holding demonstrations and marches the police or the military were called out. Nonetheless, the move towards the semi-nationalization or nationalization of some Canadian institutions demonstrated that federal politicians were prepared to consider reform as an avenue to change.

Struthers graphically shows the politicians' predictable indecisiveness. As such are wont to do, Bennett and King sought to direct attention away from their actions or inaction, and sought support from a variety of sources. This bought time and gave the appearance of concern. They consulted civil servants, academics, social workers, or military leaders, and established commissions. They rejected incisive, critical works such as those by Harry Cassidy or Arthur Purvis and accepted Charlotte Whitton's endorsement of a tougher policy of efficiency and financial restraints since that was what they wanted to hear. The reports, however, created friction and divided the government.

In response the politicians changed stance several times. Bennett went from implementing relief work to direct relief (and the degradation built into that system), then put on the reformist cap by advocating unemployment insurance in the 1935 election. King continued direct relief, reduced Ottawa's involvement in grants-in-aid, then increased spending, and finally enacted unemployment insurance at a time when it was no longer critically needed.

The new legislation, as Struthers demonstrates, was a landmark regarding Canadian social welfare, centralization and restrictiveness. The "less eligibility" concept was not included; only seventy-five percent of the work-force was covered; those who were most insecure in their jobs were specifically excluded; the work ethic was reinforced. In addition, payments were kept lower than the lowest paid workers' wages, and the catalyst for action was the war rather than a belief in insuring against being out of work. Thus, modifications to the federal system eventually occurred but not without a struggle that reflected the governments' attitude towards unemployment.

Some weaknesses are apparent in this otherwise-first rate study. Struthers purports to deal with the reaction of organized labour to the unemployment issue, but he does not. Similarly, short shrift is given to Quebec and the Maritimes. The Quebec gap might have been partially filled by consulting Claude Larivière's "Crise économique et contrôle social, le cas de Montréal, 1929-1937."

Three other points merit comment. Selected jobless unrest is rightly given attention since it contributed to the federal government's psychosis; yet no mention is made of the notable unemployed march on Edmonton in 1932. Struthers states that agrarians supported immigration (p. 32); but they were in fact divided and most opposed it because of the threat it posed to their weakened position in the 1920s. Lastly, care must be taken with figures and geography. The village of Swansea may have been one of the wealthy suburbs of Toronto with only five to eight per cent on relief (p. 83) but the village divided naturally north and south. It is probable that 100 per cent of the jobless (of recent European origin) were in the south between the Canada Sewer Company, the sewer pipe pond, Stelco, and the Toronto city dump and probably constituted a fairly dense pocket of misery.

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Traves and Struthers, for whatever reasons, are ambivalent about the nature of a depression. The former refers to the depression of the 1920s as a "sharp recession" (p. 11) and this is neatly corrected by Struthers. He, however, later falls into the same trap when mentioning the depression's lessening in 1937 and then citing a regression which moved the situation to the status of "recession" (pp. 187-88) rather than back to a depression. Those that experience these conditions are not likely to consider this a matter of mere semantics and it is doubtful that historians should do so.

Collectively, these studies contribute to our appreciation of the dynamics of Canadian state intervention in society. Struthers' work is particularly valuable in this regard, and the others, by exploring variations on this theme, enrich our knowledge further. Craven, for instance thoroughly outlines how ambitious souls like King manipulated the state apparatus. The dishonesty of governments, politicians and businessmen who seem more concerned with power and profits than people, and whose fundamental objective is to maintain capitalism, is well enunciated by MacDowell and Craven. These two authors in particular illustrate how the restrictive and retrogressive industrial relations system that evolved was due to the state's unwillingness to enforce its own laws. Indeed, King, and the state, as "impartial umpires", did no more than sustain illusions which worked to the detriment of the Canadian working class and Canadian society. Craven and Traves, for their part, establish that while there was interest in scientific management, few Canadian industries implemented these principles totally. Other means were applied to control workers and increase productivity. Overall, these works demonstrate the federal and Ontario governments' inability to institute long-term planning, a phenomenon which Traves and Axelrod demonstrate most clearly through their studies of domains where ad hoc solutions parade as planning. Throughout all of these works the difficulty in bringing about changes in government attitudes is well documented. No Fault of Their Own ... in particular, notes how state and business views have changed little in the past thirty-five years.

If there ever was any doubt about the close relationship between business and the state, these studies now effectively document it. The cozy relationship between the two reinforced industrial capitalism. From works such as these it seems evident that Canada is not a pluralist society since government works in collusion with business to ensure their primacy within capitalism. Politicians and businessmen will likely ignore these works; the academic community, however, will find them extremely useful. They also deserve to gain a wider readership in the Canadian public at large; whether they will receive it is another question.