Acheson's eschewing any sustained analysis based on class conflict. The core of the contested terrain of city management, though, certainly reflected class interests, albeit those of the middle and upper classes primarily. Within his frame of reference poorer workers were sometimes to be dealt with by the establishment, never quite an entity to be analysed in any detail.

The thesis that traditional commercial elites lost their position of dominance in local affairs to alternative elites who successfully challenged their control over the instruments of community identity is clearly and convincingly put. These new men-of-industry adapted traditional instruments to changing circumstances. What Acheson discovers in their quest for order are the roots of community consciousness. His identification of it with an emerging middle class of indigenous professionals and artisans is powerful and convincing.

This is the most significant monograph to be published in Maritime history since Ernie Forbes' ground-breaking *Maritime Rights Movement*, almost a decade ago. More than that though, anyone interested in exploring urban communities in transition during the 19th century should make this volume a new reference point. It advances our understanding far beyond the sterile approach of the pure quantifiers and leaps far beyond the triviality of the more traditional city biographers of an earlier era.

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FRED ANDERSON — A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War. Published for The Institute of Early American History and Culture. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Pp. 274.

Military history has been changing of late; it is no longer a matter of battles, strategy and logistics. Much greater attention is being paid to the social composition of the armies, their relationship to society in general and the experience of the ordinary soldier in the field. Anderson's work is a fine example of this "new military" history; indeed it is as much social history and, at times intellectual history, as anything. The army closely reflected colonial society and its attitudes and beliefs.

It is Anderson's thesis that the Seven Years War had a wide-spread, and even profound, impact on the lives of Massachusetts' inhabitants; almost every family had someone serving with the army. The shared wartime experience created a "generation", analogous to that which Robert Wohl postulated for 1914, and shaped the colonists' common reaction toward the mother country's actions during the 1760s and 1770s, which, it is maintained, should be seen as a postwar rather than as a pre-revolutionary period.

There is a fine description of the make-up of the army: its social composition, the age and geographical distribution of the men, the periods of service. What quickly becomes clear is that the Massachusetts militia was indeed a people's army with men from all areas and every class in society. Young men especially found in army service a chance to amass the capital to buy a farm, to marry or get a start in life. Such an army was essentially a collection of war bands held together by bonds of friendship, kinship and personal loyalty. It was a far cry from the British army composed of an aristocratic officer class and a soldiery recruited from the dregs of society, held together by a brutal code of discipline.

Such social differences helped shape a colonial outlook quite at variance from that of the British on the nature and conduct of military service and of war itself. Provincial leadership depended on negotiation, explanation, the creation of trust between leaders and men, not the unquestioned acceptance of blind orders under fear of flogging or death. Such a structure could easily disintegrate under stress. In Massachusetts military service itself was seen in contractual terms (a natural reflection

of the puritan Covenant). Service was for fixed terms under clearly stated conditions. These could not be altered and conferred rights and obligations on both parties. Soldiers were essentially contracted workers paid to bear arms against the French and Indians. They expected the authorities to deliver on their promises of food, shelter and the like and saw no reason to honour their commitments if the government defaulted on its. Mutiny and desertion were thus merely means of exacting rights or expressing grievances. Such attitudes were utterly foreign to the British (both officers and other ranks), who consequently saw the provincials as an undisciplined, overpaid, querulous rabble. Thus the scene was set for later misjudgments.

For most provincials, contact with the regular army often provided their first close dealings with the British. They found the officers merciless and haughty; the soldiers profane, crude, lewd and uncouth. The system of military justice appalled them; but left a clear image of the substance of tyranny that was to haunt them throughout the next decade.

The colonials unlike the British, saw the war itself in terms of the covenant; this was no great war for earthly empire, merely part of the providential plan. Massachusetts was a highly literate society and the Jeremiad was a constant theme not only of sermons but the musings of private journals and letters. Victory was the reward of virtue, defeat of moral offense; indeed the profanity of the red coats could imperil victory by inviting divine reproof. Men as well as officers kept diaries, wrote letters, and these are skillfully used to portray not only their state of mind but also their reaction to the physical conditions of military service. Here was an almost total gulf between the British and the colonials. Anderson goes well beyond military, or even social history here. What we get is a very rare portrait of the popular mind. We can see just how deeply ingrained into Massachusetts thinking traditional puritan notions were; the providential model was the only intellectual framework available to account for human experience.

This is an excellent book. It is clear the militia played a significant role in mid-eighteenth century Massachusetts and this study gives a vivid picture of many facets of provincial life: the working of an almost cashless society, the nexus of credit and debt relationships, the popular mind. The Keeganesque approach with its concern for ordinary men is particularly instructive. The more general thesis of a generation of shared experience that shaped future actions is more problematical. Certainly the divergent perceptions of the colonials and British are brilliantly accounted for, the fear of tyranny and the spectre of a standing army take on new meaning. No evidence is presented that this "generation" existed in 1773. It is made very clear that for *homo massachusettensis* the bible via Calvin and Ames meant far more than the Roman Republic via Machiavelli and Harrington. Yet the overall ideological framework, the more general fear of tyranny has to be accounted for. Even if it were, it would not be a purely Massachusetts phenomenon; the fear of tyranny and the army extended far beyond. Similar militia experiences would have to be established for Pennsylvania and Virginia or else other factors have to be taken into account. The shared experiences of the Seven Years War may explain why some citizens of the Bay Colony thought and acted as they did; but it is hardly a *deus ex machina* for the American Revolution.

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J.M. BEATTIE — Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pp. xxiv, 663.

The history of crime and punishment in eighteenth century England has a long-standing fascination, from the days of literary hero-worship of Henry Fielding, to the early scientific research of the Webbs, on to the most recent school of social analysis of crime and criminals. In this work, J.M. Beattie has given us a thoroughly-documented study which revisits many of the old questions,