sense, as the middle portion of the book implies, but does not state forthrightly, the opponents of modernization were all historical. This was certainly true, as Sieferle proves, of the biting criticism of conservatives like Robert Mohl and Wilhelm Riehl and the socialist spokesmen Max Nordau. Passionate and vitriolic, these writers were never interested in the history of poverty. Rather, they used Europe’s growing social consciousness and feelings of guilt regarding the poverty that was left over from previous generations to launch their initial critiques of this new industrial age.

From the start of their movement, and this is one part of this book that is well documented, opponents of the unrelenting growth of industrialization went on to indict the society of the time in the other ways. In the last half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conservative essayists Ernst Rudorff and Paul Schultze-Naumburg seriously began to raise the environmental issue. In their estimation, industrial capitalism was threatening the destruction of nature. They called for the protection of agriculture and the rural landscape, plus all remaining animals and endangered plants. This particular movement, originally an issue called forth by the right would, after World War I, become an increasing monopoly of the left. In time, it would wind up as the current Green Movement of West Germany. Although there is declining literary evidence in this book about this development, Sieferle does, nonetheless, prove its importance.

Affixed to this movement was the vision of the eternal peasant kept alive by men like Justus Moser and Peter Rosegger. Sieferle explains that this was a vital myth perpetuated by conservatives to again indict capitalist society, but once more he does not muster overpowering evidence to prove his point. In any event, peasants in the past were depicted as resolute and productive and always in harmony with their environment and community. The truth may have been radically different, but this myth was a convenient one for those who felt perpetually unsettled by and antagonistic to industrial change.

No one would argue that Prof. Sieferle has not told an important story here, for he has. His book is cerebral, well-organized and clearly written. He has taken on a daunting task and deserves credit for a major philosophical effort. While no book is definitive, this volume would at least have come closer to being truly profound if the author had used literary evidence in greater abundance and more evenly from chapter to chapter to underpin his overall contentions. As it is, while this volume is unquestionably thoughtful, not all of its themes are actually proven.

Vincent J. Knapp
State University of New York, Potsdam

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Recent historians have not been terribly kind to France’s pre-1914 advocates of social reform, those middle-class politicians and academics who hoped to soothe labour strife by legislating a measure of solidarité. Scholars, especially those on the left, have tended to dismiss them as closet conservatives more interested in shoring up capitalism than in helping the working class. But with the welfare state increasingly under attack, historians have begun to view the early proponents of social amelioration with more sympathy. Judith Stone’s refreshing new book examines the achievements as well as the limitations of the Belle Époque’s champions of “bourgeois reform.” And in the process she suggests some of the reasons why it has been so difficult to make capitalist societies more equitable.

Stone identifies two main groups of reformers during the years from 1890 to 1914: leaders of the Radical Party and academicians, principally in the fields of law and political economy. A sprinkling of independent socialists rounded out this intellectually impressive coalition. Stone argues
that these progressive elements of the bourgeoisie were united by a common desire to assure "social peace," which to them meant a society unscarred by class conflict. Like Frenchmen of the right and centre, Stone's reformers sought an orderly society grounded in private property. But unlike them, reformers wanted to achieve such order by using the carrot and not the stick. The antidote to labour unrest was to be found not in repression but in positive legislation: old age pensions, a reduced work day, factory safety, and collective bargaining. Stone's greatest contribution is to chronicle the reformers' persistent attempts to enact this legislation and to show why they found it so hard to succeed.

The reform movement began, Stone contends, in the early 1890s when a group of Radicals led by Léon Bourgeois distanced themselves from the Republic's reigning ideology of laissez-faire individualism. Advanced societies, Bourgeois argued, were composed not of isolated individuals, but rather of interdependent members each of whom existed only because of others' contributions. A nation like France, therefore, was a complex organism that rested on the solidarity of its human elements. Bourgeois and his colleagues drew heavily on the ideas of Émile Durkheim, and they labelled their new doctrine Solidarism. It was a position that aimed for the middle ground between classical liberalism and collectivist socialism. The plight of workers would be improved not by challenging private property but by recognizing the "social debt" owed them. In exchange for the labour society depended on, workers were entitled, the solidarists maintained, to a measure of security financed by entrepreneurs and the state.

Stone improves on earlier historians of solidarism by detailing not just the doctrine but the valiant efforts to translate it into public policy. Solidarists made an initial attempt to do so in 1895 when Léon Bourgeois formed the Third Republic's first all-Radical ministry. His premier legislative act was a proposal to acquire the social debt owed the nation's workers through a progressive tax on income. The funds raised would finance a variety of measures designed to ease the life of labour. Though Bourgeois' project enjoyed considerable support in the popularly-elected Chamber of Deputies, the more elitist Senate remained adamantly opposed. And the upper house wasted no time in moving a vote of no confidence against the Radical government. Senators possessed no clear right to overturn a ministry, but to avoid the risk of constitutional crisis Bourgeois quickly stepped down, unwilling as he was to appeal to the streets. This would not be the last time a reform-minded leader of the Third Republic would resign when faced with the choice of mobilizing the left or submitting to the right.

This early incident revealed the structural problems that would confront France's reformers for the next two decades. Not only would the Senate consistently obstruct or dilute reform legislation, but ideological and strategic conflicts within the progressive coalition itself would stymie bills in the lower house as well. In the Chamber reformers had always to contend with the troubled relations between Radicals and Socialists. Although the Radicals dominated government between 1899 and 1909, they could not achieve a parliamentary majority for reform without the Socialists' support. But precisely that support threatened the Radicals' sizable lower-middle-class constituency whose members feared their party would become, as the right put it, "the Trojan horse of collectivism." The Socialists, in turn, could not escape misgivings about their association with bourgeois politics and the compromises it entailed.

The right and centre derived only minor relief from such conflicts because for them the danger lay in the impulse to reform itself, not simply in the Socialists' more extreme intentions. To conservatives the differences between Radicals and Socialists receded in importance, for as Stone puts it, all "programmatic reform requiring state financing and the political allegiance of socialists was as threatening...as revolution" (p. 68).

The author's point here is enormously important, for it reveals the powerful obstacles to reform even when its architects remain utterly committed to capitalism and private property. What is more, she suggests that historians who dismiss reform as another way to maintain the status quo miss the point. The question for pre-1914 France was not whether or not capitalism would be maintained, but what kind of capitalism it would be. For laissez-faire liberals, the capitalism of progressives — with its government intervention, redistribution of income, bargaining and organizing rights for workers, regulation of the factory — was revolutionary. It was revolutionary not simply because it
proposed to transfer some private resources to the state and to workers, but because it sought limits on the economic power of entrepreneurs and businessmen.

Beyond these political and ideological conflicts, the reform coalition was stymied by the uneven development of France’s economy. By 1907 a powerful factory sector employing some 42 percent of the industrial/manufacturing labour force had grown up in the Paris Basin, the North, and the Rhone-Saône Valley. But these large-scale firms constituted only 1.3 percent of the nation’s manufacturing and industrial establishments. Ateliers staffed by fewer than five workers still accounted for 85 percent of all manufacturing enterprises. The political consequences of this economic situation were devastating to reformers. On the one hand, proposals that some large-scale factory owners could accept — namely old-age pensions and the six-day week — encountered violent opposition from small manufacturers and commerçants concerned about their fragile profits. But on the other, attempts to regulate conditions in the factory encountered resistance from industrialists while finding ready acceptance from small businessmen hostile themselves to large enterprise.

In this context, virtually every project for change offended someone, and capitalists large and small possessed the means to have their way. The former relied on their wealth and their strength in the Senate, the latter on their heavy influence within the Radical Party. Moreover, when labour conflict intensified between 1906 and 1909 the chances for reform became weaker still. Confronted with mounting labour militancy, property owners united around the sole means of insuring social peace on which they could all agree: repression. In the absence of a consensus for reform, the hopes of Bourgeois gave way to the muscle of Clemenceau.

Still, as Stone makes clear in her admirable conclusion, the reformers had not failed completely by 1914. Some welfare legislation managed to see the light of day, and simply by virtue of existing these new laws, however enfeebled, opened the way for the more significant changes to come.

Edward Berenson

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**Citations**


Comme le titre l’indique, l’ouvrage de Rex A. Wade, de l’université d’Hawaii, porte sur l’histoire des milices ouvrieres et des Gardes rouges dans la Révolution russe de 1917. L’auteur démontre l’importance stratégique de ces groupes de travailleurs armés dans un contexte où la société russe se désintègre, où le pouvoir devient chaque jour plus faible et où le gouvernement ne peut compter sur l’armée ou la police pour se maintenir.

Beaucoup plus qu’une description des bandes armées et de leur rôle, le volume de Wade vient alimenter la question si largement débattue par les historiens du rôle de la spontanéité et du leadership dans la révolution russe. Tout en défendant sans équivoque la thèse de la spontanéité, l’étude n’en souligne pas moins la grande complexité des relations entre les aspirations et les initiatives populaires, le poids des idéologies politiques, les tentatives de contrôle ou d’influence des partis et la volonté des travailleurs d’obtenir des leaders un support politique et la défense de leurs intérêts. L’étude fournit également un éclairage important sur le mouvement de radicalisation des masses de février à octobre 1917 et sur l’analyse des niveaux intermédiaires du leadership politique.

L’ouvrage se divise en deux parties. La plus importante qui comprend neuf chapitres se concentre sur Péterrograd. Nous y suivons, de février à octobre, la formation des milices ouvrières, l’émergence des Gardes rouges, les périphéries et les modalités de leur organisation, leurs caractéristiques sociales et politiques, de même que leur rôle dans les journées d’Octobre. La seconde partie élargit l’analyse à Saratov et Kharkov, deux villes choisies à la fois pour des motifs géographiques,