

c'est à ses relations avec diverses maisons de commerce qu'il a recours pour les localiser. Par ce double réseau de surveillance, le créancier espère éviter tout mécompte. Hélas pour lui, ceux-ci sont nombreux et Laurence Fontaine montre qu'il est parfois obligé d'engager des poursuites pour récupérer son dû.

Le mode de financement des campagnes de colportage permet aussi à l'auteure d'établir une typologie des marchands ambulants très similaire à celle que nous avons proposée dans nos propres travaux. Tout au bas de l'échelle, elle situe les « colporteurs faméliques », petits porte-balles sans tournées fixes qui combinent la vente d'objets sans valeur avec la mendicité. Viennent ensuite les « colporteurs familiers » proches du boutiquier, qui écoulent des produits plus spécifiques à l'aide d'un mulet ou d'une voiture et visitent régulièrement une ou deux régions. Enfin, les « colporteurs à la grosse aventure », souvent des fleuristes, parcourent le monde n'hésitant pas à traverser océans et continents pour se rendre au Mexique, au Chili voire en Thaïlande ou à Madagascar. Dans leur cas, les investissements sont bien sûr beaucoup plus importants et les obligent à former des associations de trois ou quatre personnes. L'auteure montre bien les conséquences sociales de ces longs périple qui, au retour, situent les marchands hors de leur condition. Revenus au village, ils y occupent en effet une position particulière et font miroiter aux jeunes les possibilités d'ascension sociale qu'offrent les migrations temporaires.

Il est certain que le commerce ambulants joua un rôle capital dans les déplacements des populations montagnardes. « L'émigration temporaire fait le lit de l'émigration définitive qui, à son tour, crée des pôles d'attraction pour ceux de la famille restés au pays » écrit à juste titre Laurence Fontaine (p.215). De fait, le colportage « apprivoise » le départ et il permet en outre de repérer le lieu d'un futur établissement dans une région plus prometteuse. D'anciens marchands ambulants chercheront ainsi à s'engager dans l'administration, la police ou les chemins de fer, dédaignant par contre l'industrie naissante.

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William C. Fuller, Jr. — *Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia. 1881-1914*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. xxvi, 295.

This monograph is important because it addresses a major subject; but there are frustrations, most of which were avoidable. In an introduction, nine chapters, plus illustrations, tables, and various notes Professor Fuller argues that in the last decades of the old regime attempts by the Russian army to modernize weaponry and recruit and train men to carry out its primary mission of preparing for the next war often were undermined by domestic foes, particularly the ministries of finance, interior, and justice. The war ministry was not guiltless in these defeats, he admits, for their leaders often saw their own role rather narrowly in terms of preparation for external challenges, while the civilians were (at times desperately) grasping for assistance in times of real and perceived domestic unrest. And the army paid dearly when it was used to restore domestic peace: funds needed for new weapons were siphoned off; maneuvers the army saw as critical for combat readiness were interrupted, delayed or simply cancelled; and the use of military formations against unarmed civilians cost the military domestic prestige and self-respect.

The author writes almost exclusively from a military perspective, so that the civilian side, though not unappreciated, is generally underrepresented. Civilian agencies often seem anti-army rather than offering Imperial solutions. In his concentration on the army, the author in part employs the term "negative corporatism" and argues that much of the conflict can be explained by rising military professionalism, but the case may be overstated: there doesn't seem to be much difference, for ex-

ample, between the struggles of Razvedchik to upgrade the officer corps and those experienced thirty years earlier in the initial years of *voennyi sbornik*. For that matter, when the author admits at one point that the Russian officer corps in late 19th century was “not very” professional, and that “it might even be plausibly argued that a military profession as profession in late Imperial Russia simply did not exist” (p. 32), one wonders if *voennyi sbornik*’s 5,000 subscriptions in 1858 (versus Razvedchik’s 4,004 in 1894) are an indication that professionalization had stagnated. A higher sales figure (over 8,000) in 1896 comes closer to the author’s intended point, but the argument probably would have been made much more effectively if subscription figures for other new military journals also were shown (along with an update about the role of *voennyi sbornik*). The conflict between civilians and the military, however, was a natural dilemma, the result of different visions of state security and sound fiscal policies, and certainly was not a new one — even D. A. Miliutin, whose successes in modernizing the Russian army in the pre-1881 period are cited in admiration, regularly struggled against a Minister of Finances beset by threatening state bankruptcy, and occasionally had to accept budget cuts.

Several individuals emerge as unsung heroes, particularly Ministers of War A. F. Rediger and V. A. Sukhomlinov (who comes off surprisingly well after other scholars’ revisionism is critiqued). V. D. Kuz’min-Karavaev (whose cited publication is not in the bibliography, though an uncited one is erroneously listed under Karavaev, V. Kuz’min) in his two cameo appearances seemed potentially more important than the author allowed. But the greatest surprise is the relative absence of N. N. Obruchev: since the pre-1881 period of the Miliutin ministry is recognized as having laid the groundwork for much of what followed, it is disappointing that there is no explanation as to how or why the quality of the War Ministry, characterized as having made up lost ground to match “the most sophisticated of the Empire’s governmental agencies” (p. 8), declined so disastrously, particularly since Obruchev, Miliutin’s closest aide, continued as Chief of the Main Staff until 1897. Although Obruchev is mentioned four times, one wonders why he was not a central figure in the early chapters.

More generally, although strictly speaking the army was separated from the Naval Ministry, a study of civil-military relations probably ought to have included the navy, particularly because they were potential competitors for funding to modernize their equipment from the same civilian ministries and because they both provided military force as instruments of domestic repression.

Other frustrations generally are related more to the production of the work: the author’s style grates (e.g., “to evince enthusiasm” [p. 207], “to eschew contact” [p. 236], “to burke” [p. 226], and “inhered” [5 times]); and there are typographical errors and other gaffes one is pressed to explain — gender of Russian authors misrepresented (p. 269) where the two volume set *Russkaia periodicheskaia pechat’* is listed as separate entries (and one author, Fingerit, misspelled); Rediger is shown as War Minister to 1911 (p. xxiv) and the date of the introduction of universal military service as 4 January 1874 (p. 11). If it is the intention to list in the bibliography only those works cited in the text (though the work is not consistent in this style), Kuprin’s *The Duel* should have been included. It is not (though it is indexed) leaving the reader in doubt as to which edition was used. Since much useful information is relegated to footnotes, it would have been desirable to include authors of cited works in the index, and all titles in the bibliography (for that matter, one such title, the Emets work cited on p. 243, note 108, has both a typographical error and lists the title on the book cover rather than the more traditional recording of the full title from the title page). On occasion the author’s use of sources confuses the reader, and raises questions and doubts without resolving either. For example, the relationship between the army and the Imperial family is examined by using A. A. Mossolov’s *The Court of the Last Tsar*, which is then labelled (p. 231) as “subjective and untruthful.” In the next paragraph, however, the evaluation of the Imperial family continues, with a citation (note 57) to Mossolov again and to an archival reference. But the Mossolov reference says nothing related to the foregoing sentence, and the archival reference is obscure, though presumably Rediger’s memoirs (apparent from other references). The result is that the Imperial family is critiqued by a non-reference that would have been “subjective and untruthful” and an unpublished memoir that may suffer from similar strained loyalties. What is the reader to conclude in such a situation? One obvious conclusion is the difficulty of research in the field of Russian history, given available/accessible sources.

In short, in both its strengths and its weaknesses the work seems to reflect many of the problems currently affecting the Slavic field (and, perhaps, academia generally). The pressures to publish are so great that breadth of scope and usefulness to the profession seem to have become secondary considerations. But have these pressures become so great that one dares not acknowledge that this work was a 1980 doctoral dissertation of the same title? Is such an admission an embarrassment, or simply bad for sales? And even if the answer is yes on both counts, why omit note of other relevant publications by the author, including an interesting piece on Rediger in *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*? Secondly, broadening the scope of the work since dissertation stage, especially to balance the civilian side of the equation and to include the parallel naval struggle with civilian agencies, would have made the arguments more effective and insights more useful. Finally, the author's limited access, and limited time of access, to Soviet archives must be cited as negatively affecting all works researched in the USSR. For example, on page 170 the author cites one situation where "volume of data" (read: lack of time) prevented systematic study; and while no archive rat admits to being satiated, in Soviet archives one is rarely sure how restricted one is, never mind the reasons for it. The author seems to have had better luck than many others in gaining archival access, but it is wildly unrealistic in our field to write footnotes inviting readers to "see" such and such an archival item. If succeeding scholars wish to seek access to reexamine certain archival materials, they will be better served by monographs that include brief descriptions of the more important materials used. For example, the Rediger memoirs might be a rich lode, but on what subjects?

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Patrick J. Geary, *Aristocracy in Provence, The Rhône Basin at the Dawn of the Carolingian Age*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985, X-176 p. (Coll. "The Middle Ages").

La partie centrale de cet ouvrage est constituée de l'édition (avec une traduction anglaise) du testament d'un aristocrate provençal nommé Abbon, rédigé en 739. Mais la présentation du document (chap. I) puis sa remise en contexte (chap. III, IV et V) cherchent à dépasser la formule du commentaire de texte pour proposer un essai sur l'histoire de la Provence au moment de la main-mise des Pippinides sur la région. En effet, l'acte mis en oeuvre fournit bien plus qu'une simple énumération de biens fonciers légués par le testateur à son légataire universel, le monastère de Novalèse : il indique de plus régulièrement l'origine des biens (héritage, achat, échange, jugement de cour, faveur royale...) et laisse entrevoir leur mode d'occupation.

Bien que le testament d'Abbon soit édité ici pour la septième fois, il n'avait jamais reçu un traitement aussi poussé, car des doutes ont longtemps plané sur son authenticité. L'auteur fait le point sur les motifs que nous avons aujourd'hui de croire à la validité du texte; il conclut par un jugement favorable, tout en acceptant que des interpolations mineures aient pu se glisser. Cette position paraît bien établie, même si la critique du document pourra être poussée plus loin. Comment expliquer, par exemple, le changement de ton à hauteur de l'alinéa 45 du testament? Le respect des formes juridiques romaines prouve-t-il l'authenticité de l'acte aussi fortement que le croit l'auteur (p. 27)? Nous savons en effet qu'encore au IX^e siècle, un grand laïc comme le père d'Odon de Cluny connaissait par cœur les nouvelles de Justinien (*Justiniani novellam memoriter retinebat*; BHL 6292).

L'argumentation de l'auteur se déploie concurremment sur les terrains de l'histoire sociale et économique; il s'agit de montrer que les années 30 du VIII^e siècle constituent une période de transition dans les relations entre les aristocraties gallo-romaine et germanique d'une part, dans les modes d'exploitation du sol antiques et médiévaux d'autre part. Le volet social de la démonstration est le plus convaincant, malgré une place importante et inévitable faite aux hypothèses; il montre