the dispute was possible by taking the Lord’s Supper when a civil settlement was still pending. Those in authority tended to view the sacrament as one of personal, individual salvation while those who refused to celebrate communion viewed it as a clear attempt at social control. Sabean has demonstrated effectively that this complex series of interrelationships made resistance to authority difficult to accomplish.

Sabean’s creative and imaginative use of archival sources adds significantly to the quality of the book. Utilizing the church visitation records from the Duchy of Württemberg from the 1580s, the author gleaned information about village discourse through disputes between pastor and parishioners. In a series of simple accounts, often in the works of the individual, the author presented stories of those who refused to take communion or to recite the Lord’s Prayer on the grounds of being unable to do so for reasons of enmity, that is, of being unable to forgive one’s enemies or forgive those who had wronged the villagers. Clearly, these were not matters of private devotion or inner spirituality, for many of them lived otherwise exemplary lives. Public worship in front of the local dignitaries created the difficulties. Time after time the villagers refused to forgive the authorities, the village leaders, or the local agents of the duchy who had wronged them or who continued to wrong them.

From the criminal files Sabean has presented the reader with a complex analysis into the ways in which popular attitudes and values influences how villagers dealt with authority. One incident elaborated upon involved a vintner who saw a vision on a hillside while tending his grapes. According to this prophet the angel has instructed him to take his demands right away to the duke. Eight general areas had to be improved upon, ranging from cursing and adultery to vanity, usury, the clergy, and hunting on the Sabbath. The prophet called for immediate change in behavior and threatened swift punishment in the secular world if change did not occur. Several of the sins outlined by the vintner applied to all classes, but most were restricted to the aristocracy or at least to the well-to-do. Normal avenues for protest against the existing order had not brought results. Only the spectacular sight of blood flowing from grape vines might attract attention to his demands.

The final incident in this study took place in 1796. Referring again and again to the more than two hundred pages of testimony taken by officials of the duchy, the author told an incredible tale of massive superstition engaged in by hundreds of members of the community. In trying to deal with the effects of a deadly epidemic of hoof and mouth disease the villagers turned away from rational knowledge and enlightened thought and deliberately chose instead superstition and ignorance. Most of the local officials had known something of the decision to bury a communal bull alive as a sacrifice to the disease, but no one took responsibility for it. After discussion the villagers had acted in their own way.

By no means does this book represent the final word on the subject. Much more remains to be done. Through a detailed examination of a delightful collection of incidents, David Sabean has introduced a myriad of possibilities for further research. Skillfully he has brought alive villagers from earlier centuries and has given them a dignity not usually accorded to them. We await further studies.

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Howard P. Segal’s Technological Utopianism in American Culture is the published version of a Ph.D. thesis in history which he completed a decade earlier. The topic, according to the author himself, “plugs few scholarly holes, complements no earlier case studies and suggests few future
ones, and offers only modest methodological innovation” (vii). Yet, as his intriguing title suggests, Segal’s study takes up a considerable challenge by setting out to illuminate the cultural connection between American utopianism and technological advance in the period of modernization from the 1880s to the 1930s. Segal focuses on the writings of 25 individuals who, he says, espoused “more clearly, more systematically, and more intensely” than their fellow citizens an increasingly popular belief in the inevitability of technological progress as a means toward a more perfect society.

The collection, which Segal assures us is comprehensive, ranges from John Macnies’s The Dithos (1883); Edward Bellamy’s influential Looking Backward (1888); Chauncey Thomas’s The Crystal Button (1891); the inventor of the safety razor King Camp Gillette’s The Human Drift (1894); and Harold Loeb’s Life in a Technocracy (1933), to a host of far more obscure works. Moreover, it is weighted heavily in favour of the 2 decades after 1890: 13 out of the 25 works appeared during the 1890s, and 5 between 1900 and 1910. The author sets out by asking “Why these works appeared when they did, why no more such works seem to have appeared, what these works tell us about their authors and the real and ideal worlds in which their authors lived, and what they tell us about our own real and ideal realms” (1). He notes a common tendency among them to identify advancing technology with utopia itself, and he argues finally that utopian thought in general serves a legitimate dual social function which is at once both creative and critical. “Even as conservative a variety as technological utopianism,” he writes, “simultaneously reflects and criticizes the society that produces it” (9).

The society that produced Segal’s technological utopians certainly manifested both the promise and the problems that focused their hopes on the future, and Segal makes a praiseworthy attempt to view their utopianism in terms of its historical roots, as both “a particular response to pervasive problems in late nineteenth — and twentieth-century America,” and “a phenomenon with a vocabulary and a set of ideas reflecting a specific time and place in American culture” (10). Indeed, the first five chapters of his study are devoted to outlining the utopian visions with special attention to their vocabulary as well as their American and European origins.

Yet the difficulty with this historical study lies not so much in its roots as in its organization and context, on several different levels. First, while the treatment of the 25 utopian writers is integral to the work as a whole, the relevant particulars of their backgrounds are nevertheless relegated to a separate appendix instead of being subsumed in the main body of the argument. This technique may lend a quasi-statistical or social science dimension to the work, but it disturbs the flow of the discussion and forces the conscientious reader to flip back and forth in order to keep some of the more obscure utopian writers straight in his mind. Second, while Chapters 4 and 5 centre on the European and American origins of technological utopianism, this discussion is not carried forward to include the wider historical contexts of utopian thought and its various transmutations. It is, for example, not enough to claim that technological advance and utopianism coalesced first in the United States (56) or, still further, that technological utopianism is a “peculiarly American phenomenon” (back cover), without offering some framework within which to comprehend such statements. One wonders, for example, to what extent American technological utopianism in the late 19th century represented part of a broader social response to the rapid industrialization and urbanization common to most British and Western European cultures. If popular attitudes to technology changed with the devastation of World War I, then utopian writings might logically have been superseded by the more popular (and more secular) genre of science fiction; one is reminded by Segal’s technological utopians not only of Jules Verne in France but also on Hans Dominick in Weimar and Nazi Germany, and of George Orwell later in England.

The core group of Segal’s technological utopians really belonged to the generation preceding the First World War, a “Victorian” generation which believed it had utopia in sight and which strove unwearied toward that goal, optimistic in the belief that the improvement of the physical conditions of life improved as well the moral quality of society. Their connection to the social gospel and other social and urban reform movements is well known, but Segal’s emphasis on technology begins to illuminate some of the deeper intellectual links between spatial and mechanical thinking and the particular paths of action chosen by these reformers. The hints are certainly there, but nowhere does
Segal draw out these important threads and tie them together. The reader is left wondering not only how technological utopianism fits into Western culture in general, but exactly what place it occupies even in American culture.

Segal’s last 3 chapters give the study an unusual final twist by defining the diagnostic and prescriptive cultural roles played by technological utopians in society. They help to identify “technological plateaus,” points where societies might wisely decide to arrest the process of technological advance until social and moral values catch up, thus permitting real “progress” to take place. This section seems to wander beyond the realm of strictly historical analysis, and remains an interesting tangent to an interesting historical study. Segal’s technological utopians in principle bear great relevance to the social and intellectual background of late 19th-century Canadian social reform movements as well, and it would be fascinating to know just how technology and technological thinking shaped the social gospel in particular. But we have to read between the lines, and study the enormous set of notes which attempt to update not only the evidence but also the basic thinking in the original dissertation, in order to receive the deeper message of this book; further revision is all it would have taken to resolve most of these problems.

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Twenty years ago, in September 1968, an experimental college opened its doors on Bloor Street in Toronto. It was unfinished, the consequence of a cement-haulers’ strike the previous year: residents moved in as floors became available, often before the workmen had finished and moved on. The beginning was inauspicious.

Rochdale College seemed to epitomize the later 1960s, that era of long-haired hippies, anti-Vietnam protesters and rebellious students. From the outset the college defied convention; soon it defied the police as well. The eighteen-storey building between St. George and Huron Streets, on the edge of the University of Toronto campus, became a symbol of freedom to some, of license to others. Lurid stories soon did the rounds about drugs and nudity, suicides and wicked sex. Led by Toronto alderman Tony O’Donohue, who called the college “an 18 storey flop house” (209), right-minded Hogtowners denounced Rochdale as a den of drug-dealing depravity. In 1975 they finally got their wish: the last of its residents moved out.

After a costly renovation Rochdale re-opened late in 1979 as the Senator David E. Croll Apartments for seniors. Its notoriety quickly faded. Canada since 1945, written by Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English within five years of the college’s closing, makes no mention of it. While preparing this review I asked a random dozen students as they passed my door whether the phrase or concept Rochdale College meant anything to them. I drew a complete blank, though one young woman thought she had heard of a documentary by that name. Sic transit gloria mundi?

The author of this book, a Toronto writer and teacher, does not think that Rochdale was one of the glories of the world. But neither, in his view, was it a horror. “Despite all the full-scale pain and confusion we are about to see,” David Sharpe introduces his book, “Rochdale was one of the brightest mindgames in a decade of mindgames, and none of it makes sense without a sense of fun.” (14)

Sharpe’s generally balanced account captures both the weird creativity of Rochdale as well as its ambivalence, confusion and sometimes near-chaos. About 5,000 young people lived there during its seven years, he writes: lots of them were more or less straight. In a city chronically short of affordable housing the rent was reasonable, and if you were short of cash the management was