

increased by tenfold during the second half of the century. Such a rise in demand was bound to have an impact on the domestic economy.

As in the West, the population, too, was growing rapidly. The urban population increased from 1.2 to 3.0 million during the course of the century and accounted for eight percent of the total by 1800. (In contrast, Britain had reached that level of urbanization almost two centuries earlier.) This, too, had market-expanding effects. The rise in demand for agricultural products brought about price increases, which in turn stimulated an intensification in production. Plowland under cultivation doubled, and the landlords converted their leases from money into labor obligations, hoping to profit thereby. The land cultivated by the landlords on their own account, the demesne, was expanded, as were also the holdings of the serfs. Historians have viewed the restructuring of the estates "...not as a means by which Russian agriculture could reach higher levels of output, but primarily as a redistribution of a fixed total income from the serfs to their masters"(78). Kahan disagrees: "I have failed to find the consequences of a 'declining curve of feudalism' or signs of economic deterioration in Russian agriculture during the second half of the eighteenth century." The serf-landlord relationship, too is interpreted by Kahan differently than it is by most historians. The latter

"... have stressed the oppressive nature of the labor services under the assumption that free decision-making by the serf household would have created a more optimal relation between land and labor and would have resulted in a higher overall output. They have overlooked, however, the fact that the estate owners were more responsive to changes in the market demand and they had both economic as well as non-economic means to evoke a higher labor input by the serfs."
(78)

In other words, there was a response to market opportunities which called forth processes of expansion and rationalization. Not only the serf-owners, but also the serf themselves increased market activity, from which both groups benefited. Social differentiation accelerated as a consequence, even within the serf community itself.

Kahan explores practically all facets of the Russian economy, from the growth of the industrial sector to the formation of the labor force, from entrepreneurship to domestic trade and transportation. Financial institutions, government finance, population growth and urbanization are all discussed. While some have preferred to stress Russia's backwardness, Kahan prefers to emphasize the advances. Instead of relying on the conventional wisdom, Kahan investigates the logic of economic outcomes patiently and with a sophisticated conceptual apparatus. One might lament the absence of archival sources, but not if one knows that the author was barred from entering the Soviet Union for political reasons about which he was reluctant to talk. Such limitations notwithstanding, this work is a major contribution, from which much can be learned by those who prefer an iconoclastic, but careful approach to the past. No student with even peripheral interest in either Russian history or the history of the European economy can afford to neglect this book.

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Nancy Shields Kollmann — *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987. Pp. xi, 324.

For some time now, the "new" social history and related approaches developed in the study of western Europe have influenced historians of Russia. Understandably, much of the initial impact came in the more modern periods where primary sources are far more numerous and varied. Recently, however, some historians have started to apply these new approaches to earlier periods. Thus, Nancy Kollmann's reevaluation of the Muscovite political system prior to Ivan the Terrible complements Brenda Meehan-Waters' 1982 work on *Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Service Elite of 1730*

and Robert Crummeys's 1983 study on *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite of Russia, 1613-1689*, both of which are frequently cited by the author. Now, all we need are comparable studies for the period 1547-1613 as well as for the pre-Mongol era in order to complete this series on the role of the aristocratic/boyar elites in pre-modern Russia.

Studies of the Muscovite political system have traditionally focused on two basic questions: 1) how do we explain the territorial expansion of Moscow, and 2) how do we explain the growth of autocracy within Moscow. Kollmann essentially ignores the first question and dramatically revises the second. She argues quite vigorously and usually persuasively that Muscovite politics during the period under study revolved around a struggle for power among boyar clans that manifested itself in kinship and personal alliances which were cemented by marriages. Contrary to the approach of most prior works, Kollmann claims that court struggles (which she equates with Muscovite politics) were not over policies, corporate rights, ideologies, or class interests. In fact, Kollmann contends that Muscovite politics eschewed internal conflict and instead sought cooperation both among the boyars and between the boyars and the Grand Prince. Kollmann thus maintains that the alleged autocratic powers of the Grand Prince were an ideological facade erected to create an outward show of unity. In reality, the Grand Prince ruled with his boyars and both sides assiduously sought consensus and avoided confrontation. In sum, Muscovite politics, in Kollmann's view, consisted primarily of power struggles amongst boyar groups seeking their own self-interest and the key to success in this system normally lay in the forging of kinship ties among families in the elite or with the Grand Princely family. In this system, consensus was crucial to maintain stability and to prevent power struggles from threatening Muscovy's survival.

Kollmann's thesis rests upon a solid evidential base. A lengthy appendix (199-241) provides a condensed biography of the sixty boyar clans while twenty figures and tables show the composition of key boyar clans, the evolution of the boyar elite over two hundred years, and basic career data on important boyars. This distillation is the product of years of painstaking work which probably produced the most comprehensive data base yet assembled on the Muscovite ruling elite. Based on this extensive research, the five chapters in the book review the historiography on the Muscovite political system, outline the author's methodology, examine the formation of the boyar elite in the fourteenth century, analyze the process by which boyars were selected, explore the changes that took place in the boyar elite, review how the system operated in practice as different clans dominated the boyar inner circle, and discuss how consensus was sought and conflict minimized in order to maintain stability. The author also writes very well, presents complexity without resorting to jargon, and has a real talent for getting to the point. It is a pleasure to read such a well-crafted study.

Kollmann's new and exciting perspective on the Muscovite political system constitutes a major scholarly contribution. While the systematic study of the boyar elite owes much to Soviet scholars such as the late S.B. Veselovskii, the author has developed a provocative theory which helps make sense out of the massive data. Furthermore, as Kollmann states, this interpretation deliberately avoids modern and/or western concepts of class, ideology, and corporate rights which had no place in late medieval Russia. Instead, she focuses upon "pragmatic self-interest" which she correctly sees as the real motive force in Muscovite court politics. Subsequent scholarship on the formation of Muscovy will have to consider Kollmann's arguments seriously and reconsider, if not revise, many long-held views.

Any revisionist work deeply committed to the advocacy of a particular interpretation inevitably presents certain problems. Without denying the significance of self-interest, I simply cannot accept the author's contention that conflicts over ideology and policy had no place in the Muscovite political system. The mysterious murder of the great boyar A.P. Khvost in 1356, for instance, has been linked to a major split amongst the boyars over foreign policy toward the Golden Horde and Lithuania. Kollmann too easily dismisses real conflicts within the political system over foreign policy and internal problems. Although Kollmann describes Muscovite politics as an endless struggle for power among the boyar clans, she never examines what the dominant boyar clans did with their power. To be fully convincing, the author needs to explain why the boyars fought so long and so hard to obtain and keep power. In an effort to focus our attention on the very real power of the boyar elite, Kollmann has

left little latitude for the Grand Prince. His main role in the system described by Kollmann appears to be the mediation of conflicts amongst the boyars who seem to be the real powers behind the throne.

In her attempt to show continuity through the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the author greatly downplays the very significant changes which took place in the reign of Ivan III (1462-1505). The compilation of a new law code, the reforms of local administration, the growth of a new gentry class, the restructuring and expansion of the army, the initial stage of peasant enserfment, and sharp conflicts involving the church are only some of the developments pointing to Ivan's reign as a real watershed. Chapter Four, which is designed to demonstrate how the system actually functioned, becomes overly mechanistic. By reducing all politics to boyar struggles and by judging the relative power of boyars by such signs as where their signatures appear in wedding lists, Kollmann has created a medieval version of Kremlinology. The author's contention that political power was confined to the boyar elite and the Grand Prince also seems extreme especially when we consider the church. As A.E. Presniakov long ago suggested, one of the major reasons why Muscovite Grand Princes encountered problems during the second half of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries is that they lost the full support of the Metropolitan. Finally, Kollmann states (181) that the goal of the Muscovite political system was territorial expansion and defense against external threats. Unfortunately, the prior 180 pages give no indication of how the political system worked to accomplish these goals. In sum, then, the Muscovite political system was much more than the kinship relations of the boyar elite. We must not equate one important part of this system with the entire system.

In conclusion, *Kinship and Politics* is highly recommended for its erudite and penetrating reexamination of the Muscovite political system. The traditional approaches to this system must now be reviewed and even discarded in the light of Kollmann's study. At the same time, Kollmann may well wish to expand the scope of her analysis in future studies and even reconsider or moderate some of the views presented here.

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A.B. McKillop — *Contours of Canadian Thought*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Pp. xii, 163.

Students of Canadian history will welcome Brian McKillop's "collection of explorations" (xi), which supplements and expands his important *A Disciplined Intelligence: Critical Inquiry and Canadian Thought in the Victorian Era* (Montreal, 1979). *Contours* in part continues the earlier work's examination of Canadian intellectuals' response to scientific doubt in the later nineteenth century, but it probes other avenues as well. McKillop advocates drawing the links between the individuals he studies and the socio-economic context in which they pondered, just as he argues for looking for the ties between the interior life of the mind and the external evolution of society. This broadening out seems appropriate at this stage of the development of intellectual history in English Canada.

McKillop's eight essays fall readily into three categories. Two chapters are concerned with the subdiscipline of intellectual history and what it has to offer to Canadian history at large. Two others are focused on the locus of most intellectuals' work, the university. The second half of the collection zeroes in on individuals and small groups of intellectuals. Chapters on Daniel Wilson, on W.D. LeSueur and on John Watson and "The Idealist Legacy" amplify themes that were introduced in *A Disciplined Intelligence*. The fourth of the specific studies, an examination of a group of English-Canadian intellectuals (especially ones who wrote for *The Canadian Forum*) in the 1920s rounds out the volume. Throughout McKillop demonstrates his accustomed careful analysis, deep reading and thoughtful conclusions.