

God's appointed queen. Essex's resistance to such a monarch was by definition the irreligious act of a Catilan possessed with a high-insatiable thirst for power. The queen was the icon and substance of religion and order; Essex epitomized irreligion and subversion. And the failure of his values was not to be found in his failed conspiracy but in his own eleventh-hour acceptance of the providentialist ideology.

Essex and his circle were self-conscious anachronisms for whom fifteenth-century architecture (434) and antique patterns of behavior served as models, and who found in the military culture (429) a style of living and an ethical construct that resonated with their sense of personal honor. Lineage was a paramount issue with them as it was thought to be aristocratic blood that carried the "innate qualities ... of rule and dominance" (432). They distrusted the urban and the urbane and their opposition to the rôle of lawyers suggests an antipathy similar to that in France between the "robe" and the "sword." (429-30)

Regardless of his personal charisma and the strong bonds of his patronal following, Essex was dependent upon the queen for the resources of his patronage and he was inextricably a part of the state system that he despised. In short, on the eve of the revolt that would bear his name, Essex was of the same "divided mind and uncertain purpose" that characterized many of his associates and allies (442). It was the persistence of this tension that led, first, to the abject confessions of his co-conspirators and, by the end of his trial, to Essex's spectacular reversal. "Essex's bold stance in terms of honour had already acquired an aura of brazen falsehood and absurdity. His own disillusionment followed" (457).

By the 1620s, the Essexian faction had been reconstituted under the leadership of Southampton and then of the restored third earl. Much of their behavior was consonant with that of the original Essexians but the vehicle through which it was expressed was no longer a personal clientele but, instead, the peerage as a political entity: the House of Lords. From the platform that Parliament provided them and within the playing rules of the political establishment they pursued the honor of their class; it was, indeed, their political agenda. In concluding this essay, James brings his analysis to a conclusion with a telling observation.

On 12 July 1642 it was not any community of honour but the members of the two houses of Parliament who were called on 'to live and die with the Earl of Essex'. The politics of honour had been overshadowed by the politics of principle and ideological commitment. (465)

This is an interesting idea that must be considered in conjunction with Professor Russell's recent works in which the absence (or presence) of ideology on the eve of Civil War plays so important a part.

With this collection of essays M.E. James has enriched the literature of the period generally coterminous with Tawney's *Century. Society, Politics and Culture* provides a welcome opportunity to examine the methodological and historiographical development of a distinguished historian through nearly twenty-five years of his productive career.

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Hartmut Kaelble — *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft: Eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas 1880-1980*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1987. Pp. 194.

The cosmopolitan traveller feels pity (often mixed with disdain) for the North American who returns with stories of his or her "European" vacation. Fourteen days, as many countries, it's all a blur. The one clear impression is that things were very, very different from things back home. Now Hartmut Kaelble tells us that this homogenized Europe exists not only in the minds of befuddled North Americans, but also for the "average European" (*Durchschnittseuropaer*), at least in the western

European nations at the center of Kaelble's investigation. To be sure, what unifies Kaelble's Europe is not a succession of cathedrals and art museums; he measures the diminishing divergence among European nations with other scales. The argument for European unity rests heavily on what differentiates all Europeans from Japanese, Soviets, and particularly North Americans.

What makes for European exceptionalism? Kaelble offers many answers. Europeans moved more decisively than Soviets or Japanese toward a small nuclear family. More Europeans continue to find employment as industrial workers; the service sector has never been as important as in the United States. Labor force participation rates among women are also high, at least relative to North America. Industries have often continued to be controlled not by corporate managers but by entrepreneurial families. Compared to the United States, Europeans have enjoyed fewer chances for upward social mobility; the system of higher education has remained more restricted, and has been particularly dilatory in extending equal opportunities to women. At the same time, social inequality has remained far less marked than in the United States, possibly, Kaelble speculates, because race plays a much less significant role in the European context. European cities never grew as rapidly or uncontrollably as their American counterparts, and thus have not experienced the same crises. Europeans enjoy a far more developed state-regulated social insurance system than do non-Europeans. And finally, although in the area of labor organization and labor conflict there remain important differences among European nations, here too, European countries have more in common with one another than with the United States. Workers have typically joined trade union organizations in greater numbers than their North American counterparts, and the labor movement has had much closer ties to the political party system.

While not denying that measured on any of these axes there remain differences among European nations, Kaelble maintains that the twentieth century has been characterized by steady convergence; on balance, European societies have become more and more like one another. Although he admits that it is far easier to describe this process than to analyze its sources, he does venture some hypotheses. Industrialization bears a major explanatory weight. As industrial development extended within Europe from center to periphery, it ironed out important pre-industrial differences among nations and regions. The post-1945 economic boom only accelerated these tendencies. In addition, the end of the Second World War brought with it the end of an old-style nationalism. Added together, these developments have left Europeans far more open to one another and far less constrained by the definitions imposed by national boundaries and traditions.

There exists, Kaelble argues, a distinct "European path of societal development." This conclusion is particularly significant for a German historian like Kaelble. As he emphasizes, the discovery of European social integration, particularly since 1945, suggests that a peculiar German historical path, the *Sonderweg*, has ended with the founding of a democratic Federal Republic. Kaelble concedes that national differences may again begin to emerge as European countries pursue alternative strategies toward confronting the economic crises of the last decade, but he argues that what unifies Western Europeans remains more significant than what divides them.

The central and most intriguing argument of Kaelble's book is that European integration has come not just at the level of political or economic cooperation in the European Parliament or the Common Market. Average Europeans have come closer together and have moved away from national identities not simply because of external forces; rather, Kaelble seems to imply, they have been more inclined to accept political and economic integration because they have recognized their similarities with one another and their differences from Soviets, Japanese and North Americans. It is this *social* integration, which most interests him.

Kaelble's separation of "society" from "politics" and "economy" doubtless serves him methodologically. However, in the lives of "average Europeans," it may sometimes be more difficult to appreciate where one sphere ends and another begins. Kaelble seems to concede this, and he is forced back onto political factors to explain in particular the articulation of European welfare systems and differences in the history of labor organization and labor conflict. If politics is allowed to enter here, readers are left wondering why they are excluded elsewhere. The Cold War and the western

integration strategy of the United States — the essential background to the post-1945 economic boom — receive virtually no attention. Nor is the eclipsing of nationalism ever set in the long-term decline of European ethnocentrism and imperialism. Other silences are equally difficult to explain. It seems surprising that a book so explicitly focused on *social* developments completely neglects any discussion of the expansion of popular culture through radio, television, and movies, or of the influence of American cultural exports in shaping a common consciousness among some classes of Europeans. Is “culture,” like “politics” and “economy” to be distinguished so neatly from “society”? I am also puzzled by Kaelble’s failure to consider the increasing significance of racial tensions and racial conflict *within* at least some European countries since 1945. The significance of racial and ethnic differences, particularly in France and England, would seem to counter the thesis of growing integration both within and among the nations of Europe.

Such reactions can only begin to suggest the highly provocative and stimulating quality of Kaelble’s analysis, and he offers his book as the beginning of a discussion, not its conclusion. His boldly stated theses are intended to invite debate and to stimulate further research, and on both scores, this book should be successful.

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Arcadius Kahan — *The Plow, the Hammer and the Knout. An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. 399.

Although he published relatively little in his lifetime, I count Arcadius Kahan among the great economic historians of his generation. Because the ascendancy of cliometrics within the discipline pushed him out of the mainstream he was less esteemed by economists than by historians. Yet, as fate would have it, his primary appointment was in an economics department in the forefront of the paradigm change. Here was the quintessential marginal man from Vilna, on the periphery of his discipline, working practically day and night in Regenstein Library, with dogged attention to detail that few scholars could match, a man who could conceptualize market processes better than many of the Nobel-prize winning colleagues in his department.

I feel compelled to describe, however briefly, the man who wrote this book because he was not able to publish it. The work of at least fifteen years was interrupted by sudden death, and the manuscript was brought to press by two of his colleagues. Hence it must be read for what it is: a wonderful contribution that will be the standard in the field for many decades to come, one destined to become a masterpiece yet was not quite completed at the time its writing ended.

In contrast to those historians who tend to emphasize the enormous power of the Tsarist governments in influencing Russia’s socio-economic development, Kahan prefers to stress the expansion of the market as an autonomous force. While hardly ignoring the impact of both Peter and Catherine the Great’s policies, Kahan is much more comfortable with outlining the outcome of the decisions made by millions of anonymous individuals seeking to further their own economic interests. While some have tended to emphasize Russia’s backwardness, it is clear from Kahan’s rendering of its economic development that by the 1750s Russia had become integrated into the broader European economic framework. Because markets in the West, particularly in Great Britain, were within reach, the growth impulses generated in Northwestern Europe were propagated to Russia by way of foreign trade. With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, demand for a large variety of Russian agricultural products, industrial raw materials, as well as even some finished goods, expanded enormously, stimulating the economy correspondingly. The value of exports, consisting of such items as hemp, tallow, grain, flax, linseed, pig iron, and linen textiles,