

integration strategy of the United States — the essential background to the post-1945 economic boom — receive virtually no attention. Nor is the eclipsing of nationalism ever set in the long-term decline of European ethnocentrism and imperialism. Other silences are equally difficult to explain. It seems surprising that a book so explicitly focused on *social* developments completely neglects any discussion of the expansion of popular culture through radio, television, and movies, or of the influence of American cultural exports in shaping a common consciousness among some classes of Europeans. Is “culture,” like “politics” and “economy” to be distinguished so neatly from “society”? I am also puzzled by Kaelble’s failure to consider the increasing significance of racial tensions and racial conflict *within* at least some European countries since 1945. The significance of racial and ethnic differences, particularly in France and England, would seem to counter the thesis of growing integration both within and among the nations of Europe.

Such reactions can only begin to suggest the highly provocative and stimulating quality of Kaelble’s analysis, and he offers his book as the beginning of a discussion, not its conclusion. His boldly stated theses are intended to invite debate and to stimulate further research, and on both scores, this book should be successful.

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Arcadius Kahan — *The Plow, the Hammer and the Knout. An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. 399.

Although he published relatively little in his lifetime, I count Arcadius Kahan among the great economic historians of his generation. Because the ascendancy of cliometrics within the discipline pushed him out of the mainstream he was less esteemed by economists than by historians. Yet, as fate would have it, his primary appointment was in an economics department in the forefront of the paradigm change. Here was the quintessential marginal man from Vilna, on the periphery of his discipline, working practically day and night in Regenstein Library, with dogged attention to detail that few scholars could match, a man who could conceptualize market processes better than many of the Nobel-prize winning colleagues in his department.

I feel compelled to describe, however briefly, the man who wrote this book because he was not able to publish it. The work of at least fifteen years was interrupted by sudden death, and the manuscript was brought to press by two of his colleagues. Hence it must be read for what it is: a wonderful contribution that will be the standard in the field for many decades to come, one destined to become a masterpiece yet was not quite completed at the time its writing ended.

In contrast to those historians who tend to emphasize the enormous power of the Tsarist governments in influencing Russia’s socio-economic development, Kahan prefers to stress the expansion of the market as an autonomous force. While hardly ignoring the impact of both Peter and Catherine the Great’s policies, Kahan is much more comfortable with outlining the outcome of the decisions made by millions of anonymous individuals seeking to further their own economic interests. While some have tended to emphasize Russia’s backwardness, it is clear from Kahan’s rendering of its economic development that by the 1750s Russia had become integrated into the broader European economic framework. Because markets in the West, particularly in Great Britain, were within reach, the growth impulses generated in Northwestern Europe were propagated to Russia by way of foreign trade. With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, demand for a large variety of Russian agricultural products, industrial raw materials, as well as even some finished goods, expanded enormously, stimulating the economy correspondingly. The value of exports, consisting of such items as hemp, tallow, grain, flax, linseed, pig iron, and linen textiles,

increased by tenfold during the second half of the century. Such a rise in demand was bound to have an impact on the domestic economy.

As in the West, the population, too, was growing rapidly. The urban population increased from 1.2 to 3.0 million during the course of the century and accounted for eight percent of the total by 1800. (In contrast, Britain had reached that level of urbanization almost two centuries earlier.) This, too, had market-expanding effects. The rise in demand for agricultural products brought about price increases, which in turn stimulated an intensification in production. Plowland under cultivation doubled, and the landlords converted their leases from money into labor obligations, hoping to profit thereby. The land cultivated by the landlords on their own account, the demesne, was expanded, as were also the holdings of the serfs. Historians have viewed the restructuring of the estates "...not as a means by which Russian agriculture could reach higher levels of output, but primarily as a redistribution of a fixed total income from the serfs to their masters"(78). Kahan disagrees: "I have failed to find the consequences of a 'declining curve of feudalism' or signs of economic deterioration in Russian agriculture during the second half of the eighteenth century." The serf-landlord relationship, too is interpreted by Kahan differently than it is by most historians. The latter

"... have stressed the oppressive nature of the labor services under the assumption that free decision-making by the serf household would have created a more optimal relation between land and labor and would have resulted in a higher overall output. They have overlooked, however, the fact that the estate owners were more responsive to changes in the market demand and they had both economic as well as non-economic means to evoke a higher labor input by the serfs."
(78)

In other words, there was a response to market opportunities which called forth processes of expansion and rationalization. Not only the serf-owners, but also the serf themselves increased market activity, from which both groups benefited. Social differentiation accelerated as a consequence, even within the serf community itself.

Kahan explores practically all facets of the Russian economy, from the growth of the industrial sector to the formation of the labor force, from entrepreneurship to domestic trade and transportation. Financial institutions, government finance, population growth and urbanization are all discussed. While some have preferred to stress Russia's backwardness, Kahan prefers to emphasize the advances. Instead of relying on the conventional wisdom, Kahan investigates the logic of economic outcomes patiently and with a sophisticated conceptual apparatus. One might lament the absence of archival sources, but not if one knows that the author was barred from entering the Soviet Union for political reasons about which he was reluctant to talk. Such limitations notwithstanding, this work is a major contribution, from which much can be learned by those who prefer an iconoclastic, but careful approach to the past. No student with even peripheral interest in either Russian history or the history of the European economy can afford to neglect this book.

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Nancy Shields Kollmann — *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987. Pp. xi, 324.

For some time now, the "new" social history and related approaches developed in the study of western Europe have influenced historians of Russia. Understandably, much of the initial impact came in the more modern periods where primary sources are far more numerous and varied. Recently, however, some historians have started to apply these new approaches to earlier periods. Thus, Nancy Kollmann's reevaluation of the Muscovite political system prior to Ivan the Terrible complements Brenda Meehan-Waters' 1982 work on *Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Service Elite of 1730*