In the final chapter, a review broadens into a wide ranging interpretation of class structure and ethnic accommodation in American society. Most interestingly, it places the remarkable decline of fertility in the U.S. and its class differentials at the centre of the changes that deeply incorporated the American working class into the cultural forms and family commitments of American capitalism. Stern suggests, in effect, the decline of fertility among white-collar workers and among the skilled aristocraty of American labour reflected the emergence of a version of Stedman-Jones "culture of consolation" in England (75), presumably replacing the community and potential for conflict of the earlier working class with the more individualist accommodations of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This is an interesting, readable and tightly-written book that contributes significant empirical evidence and theoretical argument to the study of the decline in fertility; it offers, moreover, interpretations that are intended to and should draw demographic history into wider debates about class formation and forms of class action in the making of modern American capitalism.

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Frank B. Tipton and Robert Aldrich — *An Economic and Social History of Europe, 1890-1939*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. Pp. vii, 323.

Frank B. Tipton and Robert Aldrich — *An Economic and Social History of Europe, from 1939 to the Present*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. Pp. viii, 297.

To write an economic and social history of Europe for the last century is an ambitious undertaking. Yet Tipton and Aldrich attempt more: they cover the political and military history of Europe as well, and they seek to deal with all the European countries, except the dwarf states like Liechtenstein and Malta. Moreover, as the bookjacket puts it, they "further examine Europe's impact on Africa, Asia and America, particularly through trade and decolonization." This task is addressed in volumes which together contain a quarter of a million words of text, four maps, about 159 references and an index.

Volume I has a symmetric structure. The first four chapters deal with European economic development, Europe and the international economy, European society, and European politics and ideology, all prior to 1914. Then, after a chapter on World War I, the next four chapters repeat the themes of the first chapters, but for the inter-war period. The volume ends with a brief epilogue on the Spanish Civil War and World War II. Volume II starts with a chapter on World War II, and two chapters on post-war reconstruction, the first focussing on Europe, the second on the international economy. The four following chapters cover the period 1950-70 and repeat the themes of the first four chapters in volume I. Chapter 8 deals with the so-called continuing crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and the volume ends with an epilogue on World War III.

The overall organization is thus thematic rather than national, somewhat along the lines of volume V of Carlo Cipolla's *Economic History of Europe*. However, within this overall approach, nearly half the chapters have a micro-level structure which successively deals with individual countries or groups of countries, such as Scandinavia, Eastern or Southern Europe. This framework has the advantage of permitting a self-contained discussion on a given theme over a given period. A topic well suited to such treatment is decolonization after World War II. But the framework has attendant disadvantages: where themes overlap, there will be repetition; the chronology of events and policies will be difficult to follow; and a coherent presentation of the formulation and execution of government policies at the national or sub-national level is likely to be impossible. Clio is not likely to flourish under these disabilities; and indeed, Tipton and Aldrich celebrate their approach as a succession of epochs, rather than a dynamic flow of change.

Inevitably, the excessive ambition of these books forces the authors into superficiality. *Inter alia*, this makes it impossible to illustrate social or economic theory with historical examples. Moreover, with minor exceptions, the presentation is *ex cathedra*. There is little hint of controversy regarding facts, their selection or their interpretation. The perspective is closed rather than open to inquiry. Not only is there no documentation — not a single note or reference interrupts the flow of the text — but there are no tables, graphs, or other organized methods of presenting statistical information comprehensively yet compactly. A major weakness is the maps, which are insufficiently detailed. Worse, one is drawn inaccurately: the Rhine starts at Basle and flows into the North Sea at Emden, the Elbe flows into the Baltic, Transylvania is located east of the Carpathians in Moldavia and so on. These books are doubtless intended as texts and not addressed to historians or economists, but what is the student audience? Perhaps they are aimed at high school or junior college students, enrolled in a course like "modern world problems."

Nevertheless, even if the audience for these texts is unclear, individual chapters might be useful as supplementary reading. The best chapters are those dealing with the first World War, with economic development before World War I, with the economic boom after World War II, and with European society between 1950 and 1970. The common characteristics of these sections are logical organization, sound generalization, focus on major issues, and absence of bias. Consider first the treatment of World War I. It deals with the economic dimensions of the war and provides only sufficient military history to enable the reader to understand why Russia, Austria, Germany and other countries suffered an economic and military collapse in the short run, and how the exhaustion of the combatants led to longer-run economic consequences. By covering Europe as a whole, the treatment is more balanced than the often encountered emphasis on the nations contending along the Western front.

The weakest chapters, on the other hand, are those on economic development in the 1920s and 1930s in volume I and the final chapter in Volume II on the "continuing crisis" of the 1970s and 1980s. Consider the former. It presents a number of well-conceived generalizations, but contains far too many factual errors. For example, did prices in Europe generally show "a persistent tendency to decline following the currency stabilizations of the early 1920's" (165)? According to B.R. Mitchell's data, this certainly was not true in most countries prior to the depression. Did the amount of money in circulation decline late in 1923 in Germany (176)? Not according to Constantino Bresciani-Turroni, Hjalmar Schacht or Owen D. Young. Did the Nazi government in March 1933 announce "a massive construction program as the centerpiece of a four-year plan" and did "the greatest positive factor in economic life continue to be the highway construction program", even after 1936 (179 and 180)? The Nazi "work creation" program announced in May and legislated in June 1933, somewhat expanded initiatives undertaken in 1932 under von Papen. But Wolfram Fischer shows that rearmament expenditures in the five years after *die Machtergreifung* were ten times those on construction. Did Italy make no economic progress in the late 1920s, did its GNP per capita "probably ... not increase at all between 1929 and 1939" (188)? B.R. Mitchell's data show an 11% rise in GNP between 1925 and 1929 and an increase of approximately 10% in GNP per capita over the following decade. Is it true that "no one [in the Soviet Union] had seen the NEP as anything more than a temporary expedient" (195)? Try telling that to descendants of liquidated "kulaks"!

Turn next to the "crisis" chapter in volume II and its apocalyptic epilogue. A positive feature is a succinct discussion of political democratization in Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. But consider some negative aspects: Was "the OPEC cartel ... only effective because widespread development had proceeded to the point where oil was no longer plentiful" (326)? Did "the depression of the late 1970s and early 1980s reduce the price of petroleum" (237)? One would have thought that both OPEC price shocks raised petroleum prices and depended for their success on restriction of supply. In the EEC are the heaviest "subsidy payments to farmers [targeted to] particularly the least efficient ones working the worst land" (254)? Elementary economic analysis of price support programs suggests the opposite. For the late 1970s and 1980s, is it "clear that inflationary pressures in the east resemble those in the west [of Europe], both in their origins and in their severity" (266)? This *obiter dictum* does not persuade the reviewer! More fundamentally, can one write of a continuing crisis and depression in Europe when, with exception of Eire, every western European country (and in eastern

Europe, Hungary and Yugoslavia as well) enjoyed an increase in per capita real consumption over the period 1973 through 1983 (*World Development Report 1986*)? And lest one object that GNP per capita only measures material welfare, infant mortality fell and life expectancy at birth increased in every European country over the six years from 1978 through 1984. Doubtless rates of economic progress are lower and levels of unemployment higher in the 1980s in Europe than was the case two decades earlier, but does this constitute a "continuing crisis"?

The authors and their research assistants have laboured mightily and ranged widely to produce these volumes, which contain many positive features. But in the reviewer's opinion, they have failed overall to inform sufficiently and challenge adequately the potential university-level student of history or economics. It is regrettable that these volumes were not limited to a shorter period, fewer countries and a smaller range of materials. This tighter focus would have permitted increased accuracy and relevance, as well as more detail to buttress often insightful generalizations.

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Bernard Waites — *A Class Society at War: England 1914-18*. Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1987. Pp. 303.

Bernard Waites argues that in the decade from 1914 a conjunction of societal changes altered the form of the class structure but maintained the processes of social differentiation. The changes were the elimination of much primary poverty and the concomitant decline in the living standards of the skilled artisans, a redistribution of the national income in favour of the salariat and workers, a narrowing of wage differentials between and within the working class and middle class, a reduction of the large incomes derived from wealth and some redistribution of that wealth, an expansion of educational opportunities, and a strengthening of civic integration. Waites does not fall into the trap of assuming that the war caused these changes — the war, he says, concentrated them in a brief span of time and gave a demonstrable impetus to long-term cultural and demographic trends.

Using a culture-based model of class, Waites suggests that economically and culturally the working class in 1924 was more homogenous and more nationalistic than it had been in 1914. The pressures of economic mobilisation accentuated class divisions. Inflation, unequal income distribution and official restraints on labour created, we are told, a pent-up discontent which erupted in widespread industrial conflict in the aftermath of the war. Waites does not ignore but does pass over rather casually the fact that industrial conflict had been rife before 1914 and was scarcely muted during the war. It is a pity that he adheres so strictly to his self-imposed geographical limitations that he does not mention Clydeside. Where wartime distributions were notable and received much contemporary and, recently, some scholarly attention. Paradoxically, despite the political domination of the nationalist right, conscription and the direction of labour made for a more inclusive sense of national identity. A popular (he calls it demotic) nationalism was one legacy of the war. Although the war sensitised workers to class inequality (were they not already well sensitised?), Waites argues, nationalist sentiments in popular culture set limits on the political consequences of class feeling.

The war was "a great divide in the history of everyday working-class life" (122) which separated the poverty of Charles Booth's London from the relative well-being of the 1920s. And, Waites tells us, there was another divide apparent by 1923. London was in the favoured south. An imaginary line crossed England from the south of the Severn to Scarborough, dividing the economic stagnation of the north from the south's war-stimulated manufacturing centres. It is depressingly familiar today but, surely, was current long before the twentieth century. Despite the increased geographical mobility afforded by the railways, a north-south polarisation was as recognizable to nineteenth century politicians and writers as was Disraeli's two nations of the rich and the poor.