The Parisian Order of the Barristers and the French Revolution is an informative history of the barristers and their struggle against the new ideal of the nation which surfaced in the National Assembly. It clearly demonstrates the incompatibility of corporate professional associations and the revolutionary ideals of liberty and equality. Fitzsimmons’ decision to include in his study only those barristers who continued to practice law during the Revolution distorts his findings towards a conclusion that barristers generally opposed the Revolution. A disproportionately high number of previous members of the Order chose not only to participate in the recreation of the judicial system, but also to serve as justices and administrators to this system. Their activity seems to indicate tacit approval.

Fitzsimmons’ conclusion that the legal profession was generally less enthusiastic towards the French Revolution is based upon data drawn from his investigation of a small and elite minority. The profession of barrister was atop the legal pyramid; it was a mark of status to belong to their Order and many joined just for this reason, without then continuing to practice law. Because of their honored position and their professional attachment to such Old Regime institutions as the Parliament of Paris, the barristers were precisely the group of lawyers who would most likely oppose the Revolution. Other members of the legal profession might have welcomed decorporatization which opened the courthouses to these less elite jurists.

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At the outset of this ambitious study, Jan Goldstein observes that work on the emergence of psychiatry in nineteenth-century France has tended to be “insufficiently historical” (4). The present work, the first book-length publication by a non-French scholar, aims to remedy this perceived deficiency by placing psychiatric thought in the broad contexts of professionalization, bureaucratization and secularization. To say that Goldstein succeeds without neglecting the major conceptual themes within psychiatry nor the human actors who shaped the profession’s development is to recognize that Console and Classify is an historiographical tour de force, quite simply the most insightful work on the subject in English or any other language (at least from the perspective of this reviewer who considers himself reasonably sympathetic to Foucault and the Gallic approach).

The author’s skill in marshalling the results of scrupulous research in archives and a wide variety of texts at various levels of analysis — social, political, linguistic, epistemological — makes this a difficult book to unpack for review. Goldstein uses models provided by historian-philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn and sociologist Terry Clark to look at psychiatry in terms of paradigms and academic “circles” of patronage respectively.

After sketching how a loosely structured framework for a professional subdiscipline dealing with mental diseases emerged in revolutionary France from a convergence of bureaucratic state concerns, anthropological ideas on the reciprocal
interactions of mind and body via the “passions” or emotions, and medical professional specialization, she identifies Philippe Pinel’s “moral therapy” as the founding paradigm for the new discipline. Goldstein vividly reconstructs the elements of moral therapy by describing and analysing a series of Pinel’s own case histories from Bicêtre hospital, in the 1790s. The result is a more balanced and nuanced account than Foucault’s well-known revision of Pinel, which cast moral therapy in essentially repressive terms.

The centerpiece of this study comes with the account of Pinel’s successor, J.-D. Esquirol (1772-1840), and his own circle of some nineteen students. The second and third generations furthered the conceptual and institutional maturation of psychiatry, even if they fell short of the lofty aspirations they had for their profession. From the early 1820s, Esquirol, who had working relationships with several ministerial regimes, envisaged a national network of medical “moral statisticians” in purpose-built lunatic asylums under centralized government and scientific control. Monomania, Esquirol’s novel diagnostic category, which flourished during the second quarter of the century and enjoyed wide cultural currency, functioned as a *machine de guerre* for the psychiatrists. Goldstein demonstrates how Esquirol and his students applied the concept of monomania in the realm of jurisprudence in an effort to broaden the insanity defense against criminal responsibility and enhance psychiatry’s authority at the expense of traditional prerogatives of the legal profession. Similar boundary disputes with religious healers and nurses, and philosophers informed psychiatric theory and the profession’s limited institutional triumph represented by the passage of the law of 1838. This piece of legislation, which is still in force today, mandated medical authority over a national system of lunatic asylums and established the physician’s right to commit the mentally ill without prior legal disposition.

Goldstein’s most significant achievement is to show convincingly and consistently that intellectual and politico-cultural imperatives must be taken together in order to understand professional development. Both determinants constituted moral therapy, monomania, psychiatric materialism, the hysteria diagnosis. Not only does Goldstein bring off the integration of what used to be called internal and external history of science, but unlike Foucault and other epistemologists, she tolerates conceptual plurality and seeks to explain dissonance within the profession and society.

*Console and Classify* is not without certain flaws. The opening chapter on the French revolutionary context of the medical profession is diffuse and somewhat peripheral. More seriously, the final chapter, which seeks to add a third central personage, “circle”, and conceptual paradigm to those of Pinel and Esquirol, and to bring the story down to the end of the century misconstrues, at least in part, the career of Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) and his school at the Salpêtrière hospital. Unlike his alienist predecessors, Charcot was not a mad-doctor, but rather the champion of a new rival medical speciality, that of neurology or neuropathology. Neither his hospital service nor his new professorial chair dealt primarily with the kinds of pathological problems discussed earlier. Charcot and his school were concerned with diseases of the nervous system, which included problems such as hysteria and other neuroses, but much else of a non-psychiatric nature as well. Moreover, the Salpêtrière assimilated hysteria to the neurological frame of reference, not simply to the level of a less serious psychiatric problem of “demi-fous”, as Goldstein claims. Although this final chapter
elaborates Goldstein’s brilliant earlier publication on the anticlerical ends to which the Charcot school adapted (perhaps invented) the hysteria diagnosis (see Journal of Modern History, 1982), the relevance of Charcot’s démarche for the psychiatric profession remains problematic. This leaves similarly fragile some of the implications drawn in the conclusion about how and why French psychiatry changed during the Third Republic. It seems likely that both the psychiatrists and the neuropathologists abandoned the moral therapy paradigm (to which the latter group had never been committed) for reasons about which Goldstein is curiously silent, namely the rise of an alternative conception, that of hereditarianism or degeneration theory.

Console and Classify is not a synthesis in the conventional sense of bringing together or reconciling all that has been written on a subject, by now a considerable corpus in this instance. Selective yet opportunistic and wide-ranging in sources and methodology, this is a work of distinctive originality and penetrating insight. It is written with lucidity and elegance, even a certain confident scholarly panache, that make it a pleasure to read.

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Voici une étude très détaillée et très dense de l’esclavage « kholopstvo » en Russie moscovite. Se basant sur une documentation variée (contrats de mariage et d’achat, testaments, codes de lois, documents d’enregistrement et de manumission, sources généalogiques, attestations de cadeaux et de dots, décisions de cours de justice et règlements hors cours), quoique limitée à la fois dans le temps et dans l’espace (80 p. 100 des documents datent des années 1581 à 1603 et 92 p. 100 d’entre eux, touchant 2 499 propriétaires d’esclaves et 5 575 esclaves, proviennent de la région du nord-ouest, autour de Novgorod), Richard Hellie présente une image extrêmement saisissante de cette strate de la société moscovite (environ 10 p. 100 de la population (689)). L’intérêt de ce livre tient à l’originalité de la recherche et de la présentation (l’analyse a été menée à l’aide d’un ordinateur et l’ouvrage abonde en cartes—d’une lecture pas toujours facile, cependant—, en graphiques et en tableaux de toutes sortes) et, davantage, à son amplitude : l’approche est multidisciplinaire — l’auteur faisant appel à des notions de droit, de psychologie, d’anthropologie et de sociologie — et comparative — l’auteur soulignant les similitudes et les différences, plus significatives encore, avec d’autres sociétés ayant également connu l’esclavage, aussi éloignées dans le temps et l’espace que, par exemple, celles de la Mésopotamie, des États-Unis, de la Chine, des îles Vierge, de la Grèce et de la Rome antiques. À l’aide de telles comparaisons, Hellie attribue au système moscovite une certaine humanité, une certaine « douceur », dûes à l’influence du droit lituanien et, davantage, au fait que la plupart des esclaves étaient, comme leurs maîtres, des Russes de religion orthodoxe.