

War. My only reservations here are essentially wishes for more: more on the development of the Canadian story; more space devoted to the activities and outlooks of that mass of Indian immigrants who were neither leaders nor elite.

There is much here for the specialist, too, for whom this must become a central reference work. For the United States, this is the only detailed, contemporary historical monograph on the general situation of the early Indian migrants available. But this is faint praise, for it is more than this. *Passage from India* has digested a massive amount of data derived from what has evidently been at least a fifteen-year quest: government records, at least fifty American court cases, the historical media, academic commentary and even a bit of oral history. It, thus, provides a host of new factual insights to anyone working in the field of Asian North American history or early twentieth-century race relations. Although American-centered, there is even a fair amount of new material on Canada. Indeed, though someone who perhaps knows the Canadian scene as well as anyone, I was often surprised at how much new there was for me in this book, especially on U.S.-Canadian government relations.

*Passage from India* is of course neither perfect nor all-encompassing. After 1914, it is essentially an American history with few references to the Canadian situation. As such, while it presents a number of powerful parallels in Canadian and American reactions to Indian migrants before the World War, it does not show the many differences in these responses which arose thereafter. Indeed, its coverage of Canada (save for inter-governmental relations) is somewhat weak throughout, and it does not specifically reference much of the academic literature which has arisen in Canada over the past decade (e.g. Doreen Indra's and my *Continuous Journey: A Social History of South Asians in Canada*, McClelland & Stewart, 1985). Moreover, this is not an especially theoretical book. Theory occasionally comes in, as in the discussion of why it was primarily Sikhs who came rather than other Indians (25-27), or in accounting for their subsequent geographical distribution in California (36). Jensen also adequately describes but does not fully explain the wide range of discriminatory practices faced by Indian migrants in California, save in reference to now-traditional arguments of the "Asian menace"; the whole book might have benefitted from more comparative race relation theory and from more comparative material on the South Asian diaspora elsewhere in the world. It also becomes somewhat theoretical in its effective presentation of the wider implications of Indian naturalization struggles in America (ch. 12). This book is stuffed full of facts and a few, inevitably, are wrong. As Canadian examples, there were not 2,500 Indians in British Columbia in 1903 (60) but rather only a handful; it is very unlikely that 80 percent of early immigrants mortgaged land in order to pay for passage (26); Indian immigration continued to be a very contentious issue in Canada after the 1908 ban, despite Jensen's conclusion otherwise (82); Indians got the vote in British Columbia in 1947, not in 1938 (276).

Stylistically, this book is quite well-written and very readable with only a few troublesome disconnected historical threads, and virtually no typos. The text is well referenced and is augmented with a reasonably comprehensive index and a bibliography which rates "good" for America, "basic" for Canada. I have no hesitancy in recommending it to a wide audience.

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William Kaplan — *Everything That Floats — Pat Sullivan, Hal Banks, and the Seamen's Unions of Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Pp. 241.

The cover of this book proclaims that it recounts "one of the most infamous chapters in the history of the Canadian labour movement." The infamy of Hal Banks and his Seafarers' International Union (SIU) is indisputable. Brought in from the United States by shipping companies, with the

collaboration of the Canadian government, to supplant the militant, communist-led Canadian Seamen's Union (CSU) during its 1949 strike, the SIU used violence and brutality to smash the CSU pickets. Through "sweetheart" deals with the companies, and with the acquiescence and even assistance of the government in illegal actions, the SIU was able to destroy the CSU. The Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), despite American Federation of Labor (AFL) pressure, had earlier supported its affiliate, the CSU, against the SIU raid. In 1949, the TLC reversed its position and expelled the CSU and, in 1951, permitted the affiliation of the SIU.

Banks and the SIU thus appeared to have become fully accepted within the Canadian labour movement. However, his corrupt practices, the use of the notorious "do not ship" list to blacklist thousands of sailors who might oppose his control of the union, and the vicious beatings suffered by some of his adversaries soon caused Hal Banks to become an embarrassment to the government, and an even greater embarrassment to a labour movement seeking public support. SIU efforts to expand its power also resulted in jurisdictional quarrels with other unions. This led, in 1962, to the Norris Commission, to the placing of the SIU and other maritime unions under trusteeship and, eventually, to the conviction of Banks for conspiracy to assault. The release of Banks on bail, his escape to the United States, and the fruitless efforts of Canadian authorities to obtain his extradition added farce and the suggestion of political scandal to the story.

William Kaplan's telling of the story of Hal Banks in the latter half of his book covers most of the well known events. However, Kaplan's explanation of the roots of SIU corruption and violence is weak and unconvincing. The reason for this is that, in his biased treatment of the CSU in the first part of the book, he fully accepts the Cold War line that a communist-led union should have no right to exist. Destroying the CSU, he believes, was justified; it was only the illegality of the methods and the nature of the instrument used that were wrong; and even the initial behaviour of the SIU thugs could have been forgiven and forgotten if Banks had been satisfied to settle into quiet trade unionism. What Kaplan does not seem to understand is that the SIU, established by violence and illegality, could not subsequently operate without such tactics. Kaplan holds that communists had no valid place in union leadership, but cannot refute clear evidence that the CSU leaders had strong support from the union's membership, so that the destruction of the CSU in such a manner precluded any possibility of its destroyer operating democratically.

Historical analysis of communist-led unions in Canada and of the process by which the communist influence was destroyed is in an early stage of development. Nevertheless, it is extraordinary to read today such a simplistic and red-baiting account of the CSU. Kaplan's attacks of the union come straight from Cold War rhetoric: the communists were bad union leaders because they were undemocratic, and inadmissible because they had a political agenda imposed by the Soviet Union and were not primarily concerned with "bread and butter" unionism.

The evidence Kaplan presents to establish the undemocratic nature of the CSU leadership is quite insignificant, drawn mainly from the testimony of Pat Sullivan, the CSU leader who defected from the CP and the CSU. It primarily consists of the revelation that Communist Party members planned the tactics they would follow at union conventions "secretly in advance at a party 'fraction' meeting" (18). Factional groups of all types meet separately in many organizations without this being regarded as inimical to democracy. In the parliamentary system of government, it is even regarded as a strong bulwark of democracy. Yet, simply because the communists planned and co-ordinated their activities in the union, Kaplan regards this as evidence that there was no democracy in the CSU. But it is not really evidence on which Kaplan relies for his claim that the communists acted undemocratically, it is an implicit argument: the Soviet Union was undemocratic; the Canadian CP supported the Soviet Union; hence, the communist leaders of the CSU must have been undemocratic.

With this preformed conviction, Kaplan ignores the testimony of most former members of the CSU that it was a very democratic and decentralized union. Communist leadership in unions was usually won through militant tactics and great emphasis on rank-and-file control, hence, they were almost invariably much less dependent on bureaucratic control over union memberships than were other union leaders. Kaplan appears to believe that bureaucratic control is democracy, so long as it is wielded

by non-communists and follows certain formal rules. The “democratic” solution to the problem of the CSU that he argues would have avoided all the trouble was that the TLC should, in 1948, have “placed the CSU under trusteeship and, through supervised rank-and-file elections, turned it over to the control of its members”, even though it had been “a strong militant trade union organization protecting and enhancing the rights of its members” (53), and though he can present absolutely no evidence that there had been anything undemocratic about the election of CSU officers.

The core of Kaplan’s hostile account of the CSU is not the question of democracy but his unsubstantiated claim that CSU policies were politically motivated and inimical to the true interests of the membership. “Canadian seamen were being used in the interests of the Soviet Union” (65). This is asserted, not proven or even coherently argued. As Kaplan himself shows, the steamship companies frequently broke agreements with the union and established labour laws and, in 1949, did so with the active collaboration of the government in signing with the SIU. Yet, this weighs little with Kaplan in comparison with the iniquity of the CSU in attempting to deny a union crew to a ship carrying arms to Chaing Kai Shek, in 1948, the one overtly political CSU action he can establish. The evidence clearly seems to be that the CSU deep-sea strike of 1949, in which the union was destroyed, was forced upon the union leadership by the attacks of the companies and the government and by the spontaneous militancy of the CSU membership. There is no reason to suppose that a strike was imposed on the membership by the CP in the interests of the Soviet Union. Yet, Kaplan asserts it was, without any credible explanation. The TLC abandonment of the seamen’s union was only wrong in coming so late, but the strike “was an enormous act of betrayal” (64).

The question of whether the government’s assistance in the destruction of the CSU was motivated by a desire to facilitate the dismantling of the Canadian deep-sea merchant fleet with little outcry is dismissed by Kaplan with no discussion. Also not discussed is the relationship of the overthrow of communist influence in seamen’s unions to the equally undemocratic, if less violent, process by which this occurred in other unions. Such issues are crucial to an understanding of the transformation of the Canadian union movement in this period. No light is cast on them by Kaplan, however, whose biased views seem to preclude elementary respect for the historical evidence, and whose opinion that only the narrowest form of business unionism has validity is in itself profoundly historical.

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Georges-Émile Lapalme — *Pour une politique. Le programme de la Révolution tranquille*. Montréal: VLB Éditeur, 1988. Pp. 353.

In many ways, *How a Liberal Became a Quebec Neo-nationalist* would be a far more revealing title to this collection of policies written by Georges-Émile Lapalme during the summer of 1959 as his party prepared impatiently for the next provincial election. This set of policies, which formed the basis of the Fédération libérale du Québec’s platform in the June 1960 election, reflected accurately the trials and tribulations of Lapalme during his time as leader of the Liberal Party, 1950-1958. The reader is provided an insider’s view of what it was like to grapple with the growing ideological ferment taking root in Quebec society.

*Pour une politique* encapsulates the eclectic and tension-ridden juxtaposition of old and new liberal ideas with the growing preoccupation of the emerging new middle class with the survival and development of the francophone majority of Quebec. In a very real sense, then, this document constitutes a blue print of the Quiet Revolution that would preoccupy and alter in irrevocable ways Quebec and Canada over the next three decades. Claude Corbo maintains in his preface that publishing *Pour une politique* redresses an injustice to the author. While partially revealing, this explanation certainly does not constitute the primary reason for making this work accessible to a larger