

by non-communists and follows certain formal rules. The “democratic” solution to the problem of the CSU that he argues would have avoided all the trouble was that the TLC should, in 1948, have “placed the CSU under trusteeship and, through supervised rank-and-file elections, turned it over to the control of its members”, even though it had been “a strong militant trade union organization protecting and enhancing the rights of its members” (53), and though he can present absolutely no evidence that there had been anything undemocratic about the election of CSU officers.

The core of Kaplan’s hostile account of the CSU is not the question of democracy but his unsubstantiated claim that CSU policies were politically motivated and inimical to the true interests of the membership. “Canadian seamen were being used in the interests of the Soviet Union” (65). This is asserted, not proven or even coherently argued. As Kaplan himself shows, the steamship companies frequently broke agreements with the union and established labour laws and, in 1949, did so with the active collaboration of the government in signing with the SIU. Yet, this weighs little with Kaplan in comparison with the iniquity of the CSU in attempting to deny a union crew to a ship carrying arms to Chaing Kai Shek, in 1948, the one overtly political CSU action he can establish. The evidence clearly seems to be that the CSU deep-sea strike of 1949, in which the union was destroyed, was forced upon the union leadership by the attacks of the companies and the government and by the spontaneous militancy of the CSU membership. There is no reason to suppose that a strike was imposed on the membership by the CP in the interests of the Soviet Union. Yet, Kaplan asserts it was, without any credible explanation. The TLC abandonment of the seamen’s union was only wrong in coming so late, but the strike “was an enormous act of betrayal” (64).

The question of whether the government’s assistance in the destruction of the CSU was motivated by a desire to facilitate the dismantling of the Canadian deep-sea merchant fleet with little outcry is dismissed by Kaplan with no discussion. Also not discussed is the relationship of the overthrow of communist influence in seamen’s unions to the equally undemocratic, if less violent, process by which this occurred in other unions. Such issues are crucial to an understanding of the transformation of the Canadian union movement in this period. No light is cast on them by Kaplan, however, whose biased views seem to preclude elementary respect for the historical evidence, and whose opinion that only the narrowest form of business unionism has validity is in itself profoundly historical.

Michael Earle
Dalhousie University

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Georges-Émile Lapalme — *Pour une politique. Le programme de la Révolution tranquille*. Montréal: VLB Éditeur, 1988. Pp. 353.

In many ways, *How a Liberal Became a Quebec Neo-nationalist* would be a far more revealing title to this collection of policies written by Georges-Émile Lapalme during the summer of 1959 as his party prepared impatiently for the next provincial election. This set of policies, which formed the basis of the Fédération libérale du Québec’s platform in the June 1960 election, reflected accurately the trials and tribulations of Lapalme during his time as leader of the Liberal Party, 1950-1958. The reader is provided an insider’s view of what it was like to grapple with the growing ideological ferment taking root in Quebec society.

Pour une politique encapsulates the eclectic and tension-ridden juxtaposition of old and new liberal ideas with the growing preoccupation of the emerging new middle class with the survival and development of the francophone majority of Quebec. In a very real sense, then, this document constitutes a blue print of the Quiet Revolution that would preoccupy and alter in irrevocable ways Quebec and Canada over the next three decades. Claude Corbo maintains in his preface that publishing *Pour une politique* redresses an injustice to the author. While partially revealing, this explanation certainly does not constitute the primary reason for making this work accessible to a larger

readership. This document will stand on its own because it reflects so accurately the ideological turmoil of the 1950s. More importantly, *Pour une politique* demonstrates vividly the evolution of Lapalme from Liberal to Neo-nationalist.

Georges-Émile Lapalme was a typical product of French Canada's petite bourgeoisie. His family read *Le Devoir* and supported Henri Bourassa's mixture of French-Canadian and Pan-Canadian nationalisms. Following a classical education and then law school in Montreal, he returned to practice in Joliette. He was eventually drawn through his partner and federal member, Charles-Édouard Ferland, into the federal Liberal Party during the Second World War. He won election to the House of Commons in 1945 and 1949 in two hard-fought victories against the Union nationale electoral machine. Consequently, Lapalme attracted considerable attention on the provincial scene and was easily elected as leader of the Quebec Liberal Party in May 1950.

Two defeats at the hands of Maurice Duplessis and the Union nationale in 1952 and 1953, combined with his willingness to look outside the Party and Legislature at the ideological and social debates taking place in certain sectors of the francophone society, convinced Lapalme that if the Liberal Party preached exclusively a variant of the welfare-state liberalism, it could not defeat the Union nationale. For the Liberal Party to win, it had to attract the 15 to 20 percent of the francophone electorate that was considered nationalist in its concerns and aspirations. Lapalme's relatively smooth conversion to neo-nationalism was not purely machiavelian. He was a man for whom the francophone culture, in the broadest sense of the term, was deeply cherished. He was a man who was intuitively and, then, rationally committed to the survival and modernization of the French-Canadian nationality through the Quebec state, the only political jurisdiction over which Francophones held majority control.

Lapalme was one of the few, apart from the neo-nationalists at *Le Devoir*, who understood by the mid 1950s that, henceforth, it was going to be the French language and not the Catholic Church that was going to be the bulwark of the francophone society in North America. Consequently, the quality of the French language and the ability of Francophones to use it effectively in all walks of life, literary, scientific and commercial, became a life-long concern of Lapalme. The Quebec state, via a Ministry of Cultural Affairs and an *Office de la linguistique*, was perceived by Lapalme to be the central instrument in the promotion of the francophone language and culture in all dimensions of Quebec society. Through a Department of Immigration, Lapalme envisaged how Quebec could reassert its control over the selection, reception and adaptation of all immigrants to the province to ensure their eventual integration into the francophone society. Similarly, the goal of Lapalme's proposals for educational reform was to enable Francophones to gain control, with the appropriate policies of the state, over all the social and economic fields that affected that growth and survival of their society.

All of this presumed, of course, that the state apparatus itself and the political parties and political culture that enfolded that state would be fully modernized. Lapalme perceived immediately that the emergence of a new middle class in charge of a modernized Quebec state was going to have significant repercussions on the federal system. He quickly became a proponent of the provincial and cultural compact theories of confederation with all the attendant institutional changes that these theories entailed. For him, the provinces required exclusive control over all social and linguistic policies and the taxing powers to sustain these enhanced responsibilities. His reading of the history of federal-provincial relations brought him to believe that these two theories had to be entrenched in a revised Constitution if the country hoped to avoid political and constitutional turmoil. Lapalme drew many of these proposals from the neo-nationalists at *Le Devoir* and the traditional nationalists who wrote the Tremblay Commission Report, in 1956. What was significant was that these ideas had, by the late 1950s, made their way to the heart of the Quebec Liberal Party. Now that both theories have been entrenched in the Constitution via the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord, Lapalme's contention will be put to the only real test.

Pour une politique deserves a wide readership because it is a superb primary source that enlightens readers as to the intellectual development of its author and the resulting transformation of the Liberal Party that adopted most of his reformist ideas. Those responsible for organizing the Georges-

Émile-Lapalme symposium, in May 1987, are to be commended for their efforts and diligence in getting this historic document into print.

Michael D. Behiels
University of Ottawa

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Brian C. Mitchell — *The Paddy Camps: The Irish of Lowell, 1821-1861*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988. Pp. xiii, 247.

This is a local case study at its most sensitive, using a full range of local sources to analyse a particular question, in this instance, the transformation of the Irish in a New England mill town from "a transient collection of unskilled workers" into "a permanent Irish working class" (3). The book is readable and the depth of research, a pleasant change from so many works which attempt to portray a community solely through the impersonality of census statistics. Lowell, as a leading Massachusetts textile town, has previously been used as a laboratory by historians, most notably by Thomas Dublin, who explored the lives of the New England farm-women who moved into mill-work there, in *Women at Work*. Mitchell focusses on the evolving relationship between the Irish and the masters of Lowell.

At first, no one intended the Irish to have a permanent place in the industrial utopia the Boston Associates created on the banks of the Merrimack River, in 1821. Itinerant labourers who had resided some years in America, some coming via Canada, the Irish came to Lowell at its foundation to construct its buildings and canals. They grouped in gangs, sought work at first through their foremen, and lived in shantytowns or "paddy camps" on unused corporation land near the works. Though their jobs were seasonal, their numbers grew and many brought their families in. When a Catholic church was built in 1831 with the encouragement of the company which hoped it would bring a measure of social order to the camps, competing Yankee labourers rioted, viewing the new structure as an unwelcome sign that these interlopers were there to stay.

A new "middle class" of Irish shopkeepers and craftsmen, only moderately better off than the labourers but less transient and, therefore, with a greater stake in the community, took root about 1830 and soon became intermediaries between their fellow countrymen and the town authorities. Largely non-citizens and split between two wards at opposite ends of town, the Irish were not active politically and depended on this "middle class" to articulate their interests. The shopkeepers were not able to prevent the company from selling off much of the squatter lands to speculators, but as supporters of the Catholic parish, they worked out a remarkable educational compromise in 1835 by which a public school was opened in the Irish district staffed by Catholic teachers approved by the priests.

However, the tenacious appeal of the old factions intruded upon the parish and divided even the middle class. Mitchell is at times ambiguous in dealing with this period. He admits a lack of detailed information on the schism in the church under Fr. McDermott, but seems unsure whether the end result was positive or negative. McDermott alienated parishioners by railing against the character of the Catholic teachers with such vehemence that he endangered the educational compromise and left the Yankees feeling less accommodating. On the plus side, his temperance society, and later the Irish Repeal movement, overcame some of the regional differences dividing his congregation. These Irish national movements were also viewed approvingly by the Americans, who saw in them echoes of their own republican ideals and concern for respectability. Nonetheless, Mitchell concludes that the Irish middle class was in disarray as economic conditions in Lowell declined.

By the 1840s, the town was falling behind newer textile centres and the Boston Associates attempted to maximize profits by abandoning the ideals with which they had founded the town. The Yankee farm-women living in the boarding houses were replaced in the mills by women and children