over the period covered in this book, the East India Company made cash payments in Britain of £667 million, a figure equivalent to more than 20 per cent of the entire expenditure of the British government over this period. Thus, the East India Company did exert considerable effect on Britain. However, Bowen rightly dismisses the simplistic and out-dated argument that specie and other capital drained from India by the British funded England’s own industrial revolution.

Overall, Bowen’s thorough research in the East India Company’s massive archive has enabled him to make definitive arguments about aspects of its functions, structure, composition, and effects that have been long inconclusively debated. Combining social and economic history, he provides a highly accessible and yet rigorously scholarly study of this crucial period in the history of the East India Company and of British colonialism as well. Deliberately limited to the “domestic history” of the East India Company in Britain, this book achieves its goals.

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This very good book should be read by those interested in Canadian military history. Cook’s stated purpose is to provide a military intellectual history, to study the history of ideas, events, individuals, and actions that underpin the Canadian documentation and writing of the world wars. The men tasked with writing Canadian official military history confronted budgetary shortcomings, a lack of historically skilled personnel, military indifference (especially in an anti-intellectual navy and an operationally obsessed air force), overt military and political interference, and sometimes near complete governmental indifference. It is a wonder that anything was written at all. Cook, however, is a good writer — his exceptional first book explored the impact of gas warfare upon the Canadian Corps in the Great War. He presents material clearly, the narrative flows easily, the analysis is sound. Cook does not bore.

The production of the official history of the Canadian effort in the First World War was particularly cursed. There were multiple efforts to document the Canadian role, led by the mercurial and hyperactive Max Aitken and Arthur Doughty, the more staid head of the Public Archives of Canada. At war’s end, the job of putting pen to official paper was handed to Arthur Duguid. It proved a poor choice. A man unable to see the forest for the trees, Duguid did good research but had failed to produce even one book of a projected multi-volume series when the Second World War had begun. That task fell to G. W. L. Nicholson, whose fine history emerged finally in 1964! Cook rightly damns Duguid’s proprietary behaviour for injuring subsequent attempts to explain the Great War to Canadians.
Things went better for the army’s official Second World War history, thanks in very large part to the efforts of C. P. Stacey, a trained and extremely able historian (unlike Duguid). Stacey placed some very competent historical officers into the field, collecting records and interviewing participants. The real problems began when the war ended. First, British authorities frequently denied Stacey access to the essential documents that put Canadian tactical operations into their proper strategic context. Secondly, Brooke Claxton, the postwar Minister of National Defence, convinced that no one in the future would be interested in the war, tried to kill the official histories. With the help of senior Canadian officers, Stacey convinced Claxton to reverse his inexplicable initial decision. Finally, the navy and the air force showed rather little interest in their histories. The air force’s very good official histories were completed only in the 1990s, while only one of the navy’s volumes has recently emerged.

Cook does a very good job of explaining the various political and intellectual intrigues that bedevilled the official histories, but the title of this book is a misnomer. It should read “Canadian Official Historians”, for this volume’s focus is the travails of the official historians. The last chapter, the forging of the canon from 1960 to 2000 as other historians entered the fray, is this good book’s weakest chapter. Indeed, as someone who, like Cook, also trained in the history of Canadian military history in the War Studies programme at the Royal Military College of Canada, I am tempted to say the book worships too much at the altar of the great Stacey. I do not mean to denigrate either Cook or Stacey; I should be so fortunate as to receive even a fraction of the acclaim so rightly accorded to Stacey. Still, sometimes Stacey looms too large. Some years ago one of my articles was rejected by a reader for a Canadian journal because, the reader stated, when it came to the Second World War, Stacey had said it all before. That article, subsequently published by a more impressive American journal, had shown that, on one particular issue, Stacey had gotten things wrong. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, Stacey’s famous assertion that W. L. M. King knew nothing about and cared even less for military matters in fact did not pertain when it came to security relations with the United States prior to 1940.

I find it odd that Brian Villa’s award-winning and controversial Dieppe study, which lays the blame for the fiasco directly on Lord Mountbatten, is not mentioned by Cook. Furthermore, while Cook correctly lambastes the awful three-part Valour and the Horror television documentary produced by the McKenna brothers in the early 1990s, his account focuses exclusively on the Bomber Command controversy, leaving the equally bad Hong Kong programme unexplained. Cook does not discuss the growing Hong Kong historiography, most notably the flawed anti-British monographs produced by Carl Vincent and Brereton Greenhous, or the more reasoned shorter accounts from John Ferris, Paul Dickson, Christopher Bell, and myself. Moreover, the account in Chapter 5 of Stacey’s attempts to moderate the initially harsh and anti-Canadian account of what had happened at Hong Kong in 1941 by the former British commander of that doomed garrison, General Maltby, is underdeveloped. We get a
very short version of the Canadian side of that contretemps, but no description of what transpired in the British camp. I was present in London in early 1993 when a special British Cabinet order, prompted by much resented recent criticism from the Australian Prime Minister about what had happened at Singapore in 1942, released sensitive documents about Singapore and Hong Kong. This action caused a furor, especially in Australia, as the British documents, including the Maltby report, painted a very unflattering portrait of Australian and Canadian troops, blaming them by implication for the loss of those two imperial outposts. (Maltby’s original account had been available for years before 1993 at the Library and Archives of Canada.) Lastly, Cook’s statement that the history of Canada’s home front remains poorly explored is no longer true, thanks to Jeff Keshen’s wonderful account of the home front in the Second World War. Still, I heartily recommend Cook’s satisfying book.

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The American publication of the ninth book of Gerard DeGroot, of St. Andrews University in Glasgow, coincided with the sixtieth birthday, in August 2005, of the atomic bomb, but the subject has lost none of its urgency, as witnessed in the crises over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and North Korea’s testing of its own nuclear bomb.

DeGroot’s aim is to provide a definitive biography of “the entire life of the Bomb” by fusing the long view with a broad approach that combines cultural and social history with the political and diplomatic. The well-spun narrative constantly negotiates among the perspectives and respective roles of political and military leaders, government and military doctrine and policy, international relations, intelligence, the scientific community, and, mostly as comic relief, anti-nuclear activists.

This balancing act pays dividends in the book’s last chapters, “Testing Times”, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”, and “Fallout”, where the author provides an entertaining social and cultural history of the bomb. He depicts the utter disregard of governments for the damage to people, animals, or the environment caused by radiation. While in earlier instances of testing the long-term effects of radiation were not yet fully understood, by the 1950s the pattern of deception, lies, and denial had become common to all Western governments in possession of nuclear weapons. They were only slightly surpassed, mostly in the scale of devastation, by the Soviet Union. DeGroot is having obvious fun with the American obsession with the atom and the many ways in which the bomb had become the iconic cultural influence of the Cold War era. Hollywood films and American civil defence manuals are just some of