masculinity concerns the superordination of men over women, they are critical of the men's movement and feminist perspectives which admit of little else. Their volume moves us closer to a legitimate position for men's history and it takes several steps in the direction of the historiographic revolution which Roper and Tosh envisage in their introduction.

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As Timothy Scully points out, Chilean centre parties have not received much academic attention despite the crucial role they have played in the development of Chile's political system over the last 140 years. He seeks to remedy this neglect and to shed light on the way the party political system has developed by taking a close look at three "critical junctures" periods during which party politics underwent significant alteration. The three junctures which Scully identifies are 1855-1861, 1920-1932 and 1952-1958. (He also examines the question of whether the Pinochet era should be considered as a critical juncture and rightly concludes that it probably should not be.) The first saw the issue of Church State relations generate a tripartite division of politics into left, centre and right — a division which, for rather different reasons, characterises Chilean politics to this day. The second saw the political incorporation of the urban and mining working-class movements which had emerged as a consequence of economic and social change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finally, the third juncture saw the political incorporation of rural workers and the emergence of the Christian Democrats as a new type of centre party. It is Scully's contention that each of these critical junctures had a profound impact on the way the political system functioned in subsequent decades. Further, he also explores the nature of centre parties, distinguishing between two types, the positional and the programmatic. According to author, positional parties are flexible and opportunistic and more interested in acting as brokers between opposing extremes than in imposing their own programmatic demands. He places the Liberals and the Radical Party in this category whereas the Christian Democrats, who have their own agenda and hegemonic ambitions, clearly belong in the programmatic category.

Although a political scientist, Scully has kept the methodological and terminological trappings of his discipline well under control and he has produced a clear and elegantly written book. His treatment of each critical juncture shows a sure grasp of the historical literature and he provides a convincing analysis of how party politics has evolved since the 1850s. His identification of key political cleavages along ideological and class lines and his demonstration of how even new cleavages related to the old are particularly interesting and this reviewer, for one, is grateful to be reminded of the continuing impact and resonances of the anti-clerical divide. Indeed, while not all of Scully's insights and analysis are necessarily novel, this is a well organised and tightly argued study which will stimulate debate where it does not illuminate.
Given the many merits of this work, it seems somewhat churlish to enter any cavils at all. However, while most of his history is accurate, some of it is open to challenge. While he deals adequately enough (given his pre-eminently political focus and concerns) with major economic developments like the impacts of the integration of Nitrates into the economy and the Great Depression, he is less sensitive to the less dramatic but continuing pressures which economic difficulty, and most particularly inflation, placed on political actors. Thus, for example, he describes the origins and early years of the working-class movement without directly mentioning what most historians would consider one of its key motor forces, namely, the persistent inflation which Chile experienced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And it was surely economics as much as politics that underpinned the generalised political crisis which Chile experienced in the later 1940s. One of the key reasons why González Videla was unable to resist national and international pressures to dispense with the Communists in 1947 was because the country was almost bankrupt. Certainly, the persistent failure of the economy to generate sufficient rewards deserves greater emphasis in the explanation of the retreat from coalition and party politics during those years.

Ranging as widely as he does, it is not surprising that he has left other hostages to fortune. In his discussion of the emergence of the working class movement, for example, he seems to imply that the organisation of the mutualist movement was entirely politically inspired and controlled. This was by no means the case while the contention, not infrequently made, that the Democratic Party's links with the working class “atrophied” after the 1907 Iquique strike and massacre is somewhat overstated. While the PD lost out in the struggle to control the FOCh, obrerista Democrats continued to be a significant force in the union movement and the PD was not really overtaken by the Marxist parties in the competition for working-class electoral support until the 1930s.

Less importantly, it should be pointed out that the foundation of GFOCh was not connected to a court case about a strike action, that POS militants had designed the strategy and begun to work to win control of the FOCh before Recabarren's return from Argentina in 1918 and that the more pressing motivations behind Recabarren's presidential candidacy in 1920 were to protest against his imprisonment and to put down markers for the forthcoming congressional elections. Finally, since it is such a commonly held belief, perhaps it should be noted here that Recabarren was not excluded from Congress in 1906 for refusing to invoke the Deity in the oath of office. He and his Democrat colleague Bonifacio Veas (who was not later prevented from taking up his seat) both took the oath, but then tried to protest against the religious language in which it was couched. That protest was disallowed and the Deputies voted to return to the order of the day, formally closing the incident. But Recabarren's Radical opponents alleged irregularities in his election and he lost a subsequent motion that he should be recognised as Deputy-elect while this matter was being sorted out. In that vote, more nominally anti-clerical Radicals and Liberal Democrats voted against Recabarren than did Catholic Conservatives, and four Conservatives, who were presumably no less Catholic than their fellow party members, actually voted for him. It was not so much the anti-clerical issue which led to Recabarren's exclusion as the politics of that year's presidential election, internecine strife inside the Democratic Party and Recabarren's own reputation as a rabble rouser, recently implicated in a bloody strike in Antofagasta.
None of this seriously undermines the main arguments and propositions presented by Scully who, with this work, seems well set to join that select band of US political scientists who have made such valuable contributions to the study of Chilean history over the last twenty years or so.

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Historians have not elaborated on E.P. Thompson's twenty-year-old classic article on workers' resistance to labor, "Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism" (*Past and Present*, 1967, No. 38, pp. 56-97). That is why Michael Seidman's new book is so welcome. Moving beyond the essay format and the local history approach that so many students of indiscipline have taken, this comparative history offers us a broad-based study of two major cities at a crucial moment in twentieth-century European labor relations: the Popular Front era of 1936-1938. Although both Paris and Barcelona were industrial cities, Seidman shows that they were at stages of markedly different development. Paris had a much more "modern" political, economic, and social infrastructure than did Barcelona. This disparity between the two cities provides him with one of his most important points, and one of the most persuasive reasons to do comparative labor history: that workers in both "developing" and "advanced" industrial societies reject the work ethic.

Unlike many social historians, Seidman never loses sight of the larger political and economic picture in either urban venue. His argument that differences in the level of capitalist development decisively shaped each city's working class is compelling. First, he shows that the Barcelonian bourgeoisie, like the Spanish one in general, had never experienced the Reformation or the ideological and economic revolutions of the eighteenth century and had failed also to modernize the state and the economy after 1870. The Barcelonian bourgeoisie used the state more for repressing the working class than expanding the economy. When the civil war broke out in the 1930s, Barcelonian capitalists essentially deserted the city and left the factories to the proletariat. In the face of such long-standing bourgeois impotence, Barcelonian workers were revolutionary and attracted either to anarcho-syndicalism, with its call for workers' control of the means of production, or to Marxism-Leninism, with its call for nationalization. Once the anarchist CNT (*Confederación nacional de trabajo*) and the Marxist UGT (*Unión general de trabajadores*) took over, Seidman persuasively argues, they attempted to build a modern industrial plant, something the bourgeoisie had failed to do. They also used the same methods of labor discipline as advanced capitalist classes — i.e., reestablishing piece work, the use of strict regulation of the shop floor, pushing of the Soviet doctrine of overwork (Stakhanovism) and the use of socialist realist art as propaganda to promote greater worker production in newly collectivized factories.