Plus d’un(e) professeur(e) d’histoire de l’Union soviétique, j’en suis sûr, trouvera l’approche historiographique de la sixième et dernière partie de ce livre, « The Legacy of the Civil War », tout à fait pertinente, remarquable même, et combien utile pour ses étudiants! Dans le premier des deux articles, Sheila Fitzpatrick évalue le résultat de la guerre civile (désolation matérielle, militarisation du Parti et de la société, légitimité du pouvoir bolchévique fondée sur l’héroïme presque mythique des soldats de l’Armée rouge) sur le phénomène du stalinisme (particulièrement ses origines) et conclut, avec beaucoup de nuances, à une « complex but basically non causal relationship » (397), préférant (sans toutefois souscrire pleinement à l’interprétation traditionnelle du modèle totalitaire) établir des liens idéologiques étroits entre léninisme et stalinisme. Dans le second article, Moshe Lewin résume d’abord les raisons de la victoire de l’Armée rouge sur les armées blanches, puis montre comment, d’une part, la « statization » (417) et l’autoritarisme centralisateur du régime bolchévique et, d’autre part, l’« archaization » (416) du monde rural laissaient entrevoir d’inévitables conflits entre le Parti et la paysannerie.

Étant donné le sous-titre de ce gros volume, il est certainement déplorable qu’aucun chapitre ne soit consacré principalement à la paysannerie (dont le rôle a été crucial durant la guerre civile), au communisme de guerre et à l’Armée rouge. Finalement, l’approche révisionniste de plus d’un collaborateur à ce livre, tout « exploratoire » qu’elle soit, prête flanc à la critique : si leur rejet — parce que trop simpliste à leurs yeux — du modèle totalitaire (centré sur l’idéologie et la volonté politique d’individus bien précis) et, en contrepartie, leur valorisation des circonstances économiques et sociales en tant qu’éléments explicatifs du développement de l’autoritarisme bolchévique soulignent la richesse et la complexité de l’histoire de ces années de guerre civile, une telle dépréciation de l’approche traditionnelle (telle qu’exposée dans les ouvrages de Shapiro, Daniels et Keep) ne risque-t-elle pas de créer un autre déséquilibre ? Sans renier les mérites de l’approche qui consiste à voir l’histoire « par en bas », ne serait-il pas plus sage (comme le suggère Sheila Fitzpatrick, d’ailleurs) de reconnaître qu’il existe entre le social et l’idéologique davantage d’interactions que de contrastes ? L’échec de l’expérience démocratique de l’année 1917 n’est pas attribuable uniquement aux circonstances nées de la guerre civile — comme en fait foi, du reste, l’article de Suny !

Jean-Guy Lalande
St. Francis Xavier University

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The publication of Rudy Koshar’s study of Marburg from 1880 to 1935 contributes significantly to our knowledge of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century local German political and social life. Through focusing on voluntary organizations in Marburg during an era when German mass political parties increasingly dominated national politics, Koshar develops important insights into the impact of national political developments on the interplay of social life and local politics. The author’s primary concern is with the rise of nazism in Marburg. He is more successful, however, with his exploration of the role of voluntary organizations in the social and
political life of the urban bourgeoisie during the Second Reich and the Weimar Republic than he is with tracing and connecting the rise of nazism within the context of organizational life in Marburg.

Marburg was selected as the focus of this study because of its optimal size, large enough to reflect the complexity of an urban center, yet small enough to reconstruct its organizational life, and because of the information already compiled about the city in more than a dozen other secondary works on the rise of nazism and its impact on Marburg society (19). In the time period under consideration, this university town had an unusually high percentage of people employed in service and administrative-oriented occupations or not employed at all (students, pensioners, retirees and non-employed spouses) and an exceptionally low percentage of people employed in industry-related occupations. In this sense, Koshar provides a useful counterpoint to David Crew's *Town in the Ruhr: A Social History of Bochum, 1860-1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), which zeroes in on "one of the fastest growing, industrial towns in Germany's most dynamic industrial region during the critical period of that country's transformation into an industrial society" (Crew, 7). Although Marburg's class and occupational structure was quite non-industrial as compared to other German cities at the time, Koshar does not regard Marburg as especially atypical. Yet in choosing Marburg, he has found a city that was in many ways the polar opposite of Bochum, at least in terms of the role and the size of the population involved directly in industry.

These two books thus complement each other as case studies, especially in terms of the recent historiographical concern with the issues of continuity and change in the Second and Third Reichs. Both Crew and Koshar see their studies as correctives to the Sonderweg argument, an argument that compares Germany's political development during its industrialization period with that of liberal parliamentary states, in particular England, and concludes that Germany took a "special path" or Sonderweg. Accordingly, Germany's road to nazism was paved by the lack of liberalism and the supposed political immaturity of the German bourgeoisie and the stubborn continuation of pre-industrial values and norms in state institutions like the military, the diplomatic corps and the civil service. Thus, pre-industrial elites retained political hegemony and, in league with the pre-industrial Mittelstand and via the so-called negative integration of the working classes, resisted political changes which would have corresponded to "normal" modern industrial development, at least according to the British model. Siding against the so-called orthodoxy of this Sonderweg argument, both Crew and Koshar are much more persuaded by the more recent school of thought associated most strongly with Geoff Eley. This school stresses looking beyond (even beneath) the national level of traditional politics to explore the political behavior of the German bourgeoisie in order to see what actually did happen to German liberalism rather than to just use England as the basis of comparison for political development in modern industrial societies.

Koshar stresses the connection between Marburg's local bourgeoisie's resistance to mass politics and thus mass political parties, which accompanied the rise of industrialization, and the growth of voluntary associations, a category in which he includes social and athletic clubs, special interest political parties and student fraternities. Koshar finds that the urban bourgeoisie, which was strongly suspicious of national politics, attempted "to channel and deflate national conflict in local arenas" (53). Responding to Max Weber's critique of the supposed political philistinism of the German bourgeoisie, a view that reinforces the Sonderweg argument, Koshar claims
that the bourgeoisie's "attachment to local power bases was not a sign of political philistinism but a practical response to power relationships in the late Second Empire," in fact "a functional response to mass politics" (53).

A major problem with Koshar's argument is the vague and inconsistent way in which he uses the term "apoliticism" to both describe the behavior and explain the motives of the various members of the local bourgeoisie in forming or joining voluntary associations and ultimately in supporting the NSDAP in disproportionately high numbers. Koshar refers to this term as "a much discussed though insufficiently analyzed aversion to mass parties and the political marketplace that produced them," which "was not based on a misunderstanding of power relations but rather contained the raw materials of an ideology, of a particular mode of political practice, and of a common sense with diverse origins and textures" (xiv). This description, which does not suffice as a definition, and the author's repeated use of the term result in catch-all explanations which obscure rather than clarify its meaning. In his attributions of apolitical behavior to various voluntary association members and groups, he often provides no clue as to whether this is his own interpretation of their behavior or whether they perceived of themselves as apolitical. The author's acceptance of a claim made by a former veteran association member that "politics played no role" in his club (158) as proof of clubs "apoliticism" raises questions about the perception as well as the meaning of the terms, political, apolitical and even unpolitical.

Koshar places his approach within a fairly sophisticated theoretical framework. He explains his use of a combination of "resource management" and Gramscian categories that seek to explain the process of group mobilization. This theoretical amalgam sees power relationships as the result of competition for resources either through the use of material force or moral authority or through a combination of both (16-17). Unfortunately, the application of this theoretical framework to the detailed empirical data he presents remains, at best, vague and opaque. The theory appears in the introduction and conclusion, but it does nothing to pull together the two parts of the book. Whereas Part I explores the relationship between economic structure, party politics and social organizations, Part II examines the Nazis' attempt to mobilize support by recasting the relationship between social and political life, the realms, which as Koshar convincingly asserts, the Marburg bourgeoisie tried so hard to keep separate. Part II looks back to Part I intermittently, but there is insufficient foreshadowing in Part I to pull the argument together.

What another reviewer of this book criticizes as the use of social science jargon (Johnpeter H. Grill, American Historical Review, June 1988, 725-726), this reviewer would not regard as the use of jargon per se but rather the lack of sufficient clarification of certain conceptual terms, such as apoliticism, and the tendency to pepper the text with complex terms that apparently refer back to the theoretical underpinnings of his framework. Koshar fails to integrate such terms into the empirical analysis. Thus, rather than using such concepts in ways that strengthen his argument, Koshar's insufficient clarifications leave the reader confused, and worse yet, unconvinced.

Rudy Koshar has written a very ambitious book, perhaps too ambitious. In trying to cover and connect so many complex themes over such a broad and diverse period of time, he has not been able to tie together the theme of the rise of nazism and bourgeois "apoliticism" with the pattern of cross-affiliation of membership in voluntary associations and in the NSDAP. But he has given us a new and important look at
German voluntary organizations and the interplay of social and political life on the local level in the Second Empire and the Weimar Republic. His socio-political approach challenges historians to re-examine the connections between social and political life and the motivations behind class behavior. This is a real service to the profession.

Rebecca Boehling
University of Maryland-Baltimore County

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This work will undoubtedly cement the author’s reputation as one of the leading historians of modern Quebec. Already the co-author of a two-volume overview of the history of Quebec since Confederation that has been widely hailed as the definitive work of its kind, Linteau has now established himself as the author of the first serious synthesis of the history of Montreal. Other works have been produced which provide no more than a superficial narrative, but this work brings together the considerable academic research that has been produced over the past two decades touching upon the history of Montreal. While Linteau’s text leans heavily upon specialized studies, it should prove attractive to both an academic as well as a more general readership. The author writes with considerable grace, and the text includes excellent illustrations on nearly every page.

In his introduction, Linteau quite appropriately notes that “une synthèse porte nécessairement la marque de celui qui l’écrit” (8), and it is precisely in terms of the shape that he gives to the history of Montreal that some questions can be raised. To begin with, there is the obvious question as to why a history of Montreal should begin with Confederation. After all, a city is not a political territory, and in terms of the history of Montreal, the argument can well be made that the turning point came in the early nineteenth century when it began to develop links to the Upper Canadian hinterland that led to the growth of Montreal as a centre of commerce, finance and, eventually, industry. In a sense, the developments that Linteau sees as somehow “new” in the immediate aftermath of Confederation entailed no more than the extension of Montreal’s influence to the Canadian west. He does explain in the introduction that the post-Confederation focus was dictated by the interests of publishers, but he might have made it clearer that 1867 provided no new beginning for the city.

Within the confines of the first 125 years of Confederation, he then focuses upon four distinct periods. The first, from 1867 to 1896, saw Montreal emerge as the undisputed master of the Canadian hinterland, a process that was only reinforced by developments during the second era which stretched from 1896 to the start of World War I. In fact, the story of continued strength so dominates the first two sections that they might well have been combined into one, cutting back on the length of the volume in the process. The final two sections then turn to the decline of Montreal as Canada’s most important city. The third part, covering the years from 1914 to 1945,